



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>




03/
-75ra

2








NOTICE TO PURCHASERS.

The number of this copy is left blank, so that owners of the histories previously issued, "The Conquest of Mexico," and "Ferdinand and Isabella," may correspondingly number the present work.

Two Hundred and Fifty Copies printed.

No.



HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
CHARLES THE FIFTH.

Two Hundred and Fifty Copies printed.

No.



CHARLES THE FIFTH.

An engraved painting by Titian
Engraved by J. M. Barry

HISTORICAL WORKS
BY
CHARLES THEODORE

WILLIAM ROBERTSON,
WITH
An Account of the Emperor's Life, &c.
his Abdication

BY CHARLES THEODORE

THE LONDON AND EDINBURGH
PUBLISHING COMPANY



John C. H. Stennis

THE
HISTORY OF THE REIGN
OF THE
EMPEROR
CHARLES THE FIFTH

BY
WILLIAM ROBERTSON, D.D.
//
WITH

An Account of the Emperor's Life after
his Abdication

BY
WILLIAM H. PREScott

ILLUSTRATED LIBRARY EDITION.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY.

1893.

467180

Copyright, 1836,
By WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT.

Copyright, 1874,
By J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.

Copyright, 1884,
By WILLIAM G. PRESCOTT

Charles the Fifth—Vol. I



ADVERTISEMENT.

THE life of Charles the Fifth subsequently to his abdication is disposed of by Dr. Robertson in some six or seven pages. It did not, in truth, come strictly within the author's plan, which proposed only a history of the reign of the emperor. But, unfortunately, these few pages contain many inaccuracies, and, among others, a very erroneous view of the interest which Charles, in his retirement, took in the concerns of the government. Yet it would be unjust to impute these inaccuracies to want of care in the historian, since he had no access to such authentic sources of information as would have enabled him to correct them. Such information was to be derived from documents in the archives of Simancas, consisting, among other things, of the original correspondence of the emperor and his household, and showing conclusively that the monarch, instead of remaining dead to the world in his retreat, took not merely an interest, but a decided

part, in the management of affairs. But in Robertson's day Simancas was closed against the native as well as the foreigner ; and it is not until within a few years that the scholar has been permitted to enter its dusty recesses and draw thence materials to illustrate the national history. It is particularly rich in materials for the illustration of Charles the Fifth's life after his abdication. Availing themselves of the opportunities thus afforded, several eminent writers, both in England and on the Continent, have bestowed much pains in investigating a passage of history hitherto so little understood. The results of their labours they have given to the world in a series of elaborate works, which, however varying in details, all exhibit Charles's character and conduct in his retirement in a very different point of view from that in which it has been usual to regard them. It was the knowledge of this fact which led the publishers of the present edition of Robertson's "Charles the Fifth," to request me to prepare such an account of his monastic life as might place before the reader the results of the recent researches in Simancas, and that in a more concise form—as better suited to the purpose for which it was designed—than had been adopted by preceding writers. I was the more willing to undertake the task, that my previous studies had made

ADVERTISEMENT.

v

me familiar with the subject, and that I was possessed of a large body of authentic documents relating to it, copied from the originals in Simancas. These documents, indeed, form the basis of a chapter on the monastic life of Charles at the close of the first Book of the History of Philip the Second,—written, I may add, in the summer of 1851, more than a year previous to the publication of Mr. Stirling's admirable work, which led the way in the series of brilliant productions relating to the cloister life of Charles.

In complying with the request of the publishers, I have made the authentic records which I have received from Simancas the foundation of my narrative,—freely availing myself, at the same time, of the labours of my predecessors, especially those of Mr. Stirling and M. Mignet, wherever they have thrown light on the path from sources not within my reach.

In the performance of the task I have been insensibly led into a much greater length than I had originally intended, or than, I fear, will be altogether palatable to those who have become already familiar with the narrative in the writings of those who have preceded me. To such readers I cannot, indeed, flatter myself that I have given

any information of importance beyond what they may have acquired from these more extended and elaborate works. But by far the larger part of readers in our community have probably had no access to these works ; and I may express the hope that I have executed the task in such a manner as to satisfy any curiosity which, after perusing the narrative of the illustrious Scottish historian, they may naturally feel respecting the closing scenes in the life of the great emperor.

WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT.

BOSTON, November 10, 1856

TO

THE KING.

SIR,—

I PRESUME to lay before your Majesty the history of a period which, if the abilities of the writer were equal to the dignity of the subject, would not be unworthy the attention of a monarch who is no less a judge than a patron of literary merit.

History claims it as her prerogative to offer instruction to kings, as well as to their people. What reflections the reign of the Emperor Charles the Fifth may suggest to your Majesty, it becomes not me to conjecture. But your subjects cannot observe the various calamities which that monarch's ambition to be distinguished as a conqueror brought upon his dominions, without recollecting the felicity of their own times, and looking up with gratitude to their sovereign, who, during the fervour of youth, and amidst the career of victory, possessed such self-command, and maturity of judgment, as to set bounds to his own triumphs, and prefer the blessings of peace to the splendour of military glory.

Posterity will not only celebrate the wisdom of your Majesty's choice, but will enumerate the many virtues which

render your reign conspicuous for a sacred regard to all the duties incumbent on the sovereign of a free people.

It is our happiness to feel the influence of these virtues, and to live under the dominion of a prince who delights more in promoting the public welfare than in receiving the just praise of his royal beneficence.

I am, Sir,

Your Majesty's most faithful subject,

And dutiful servant,

WILLIAM ROBERTSON.

PREFACE.

No period in the history of one's own country can be considered as altogether uninteresting. Such transactions as tend to illustrate the progress of its constitution, laws, or manners, merit the utmost attention. Even remote and minute events are objects of a curiosity, which being natural to the human mind, the gratification of it is attended with pleasure.

But with respect to the history of foreign states, we must set other bounds to our desire of information. The universal progress of science during the last two centuries, the art of printing, and other obvious causes, have filled Europe with such a multiplicity of histories, and with such vast collections of historical materials, that the term of human life is too short for the study or even the perusal of them. It is necessary, then, not only for those who are called to conduct the affairs of nations, but for such as inquire and reason concerning them, to remain satisfied with a general knowledge of distant events, and to confine their study of history in detail chiefly to that period in which, the several states of Europe having become intimately connected, the operations of one power are so felt by all as to influence their councils and to regulate their measures.

Some boundary, then, ought to be fixed, in order to separate these periods. An era should be pointed out, prior to which each country, little connected with those around it, may trace its own history apart; after which,

the transactions of every considerable nation in Europe become interesting and instructive to all. With this intention I undertook to write the History of the Emperor Charles the Fifth. It was during his administration that the powers of Europe were formed into one great political system, in which each took a station, wherein it has since remained with less variation than could have been expected after the shocks occasioned by so many internal revolutions and so many foreign wars. The great events which happened then have not hitherto spent their force. The political principles and maxims then established still continue to operate. The ideas concerning the balance of power then introduced, or rendered general, still influence the councils of nations.

The age of Charles the Fifth may therefore be considered as the period at which the political state of Europe began to assume a new form. I have endeavoured to render my account of it an introduction to the history of Europe subsequent to his reign. While his numerous biographers describe his personal qualities and actions, while the historians of different countries relate occurrences the consequences of which were local or transient, it hath been my purpose to record only those great transactions in his reign, the effects of which were universal or continue to be permanent.

As my readers could derive little instruction from such a history of the reign of Charles the Fifth without some information concerning the state of Europe previous to the sixteenth century, my desire of supplying this has produced a preliminary volume,* in which I have attempted to point out and to explain the great causes

* These passages in the text refer to the original edition : the additional matter incorporated in the present edition has required a somewhat different arrangement in respect to the division of the volumes.

and events to whose operation all the improvements in the political state of Europe, from the subversion of the Roman empire to the beginning of the sixteenth century, must be ascribed. I have exhibited a view of the progress of society in Europe, not only with respect to interior government, laws, and manners, but with respect to the command of the national force requisite in foreign operations; and I have described the political constitution of the principal states in Europe at the time when Charles the Fifth began his reign.

In this part of my work I have been led into several critical disquisitions, which belong more properly to the province of the lawyer or antiquary than to that of the historian. These I have placed at the end of the first volume, under the title of Proofs and Illustrations.* Many of my readers will, probably, give little attention to such researches. To some, they may perhaps appear the most curious and interesting part of the work. I have carefully pointed out the sources from which I have derived information, and have cited the writers on whose authority I rely with a minute exactness, which might appear to border upon ostentation, if it were possible to be vain of having read books, many of which nothing but the duty of examining with accuracy whatever I laid before the public could have induced me to open. As my inquiries conducted me often into paths which were obscure or little frequented, such constant references to the authors who have been my guides were not only necessary for authenticating the facts which are the foundations of my reasonings, but may be useful in pointing out the way to such as shall hereafter hold the same course, and in enabling them to carry on their researches with greater facility and success.

* See note on p. x.

Every intelligent reader will observe one omission in my work, the reason of which it is necessary to explain. I have given no account of the conquests of Mexico and Peru, or of the establishment of the Spanish colonies in the continent and islands of America. The history of these events I originally intended to have related at considerable length. But upon a nearer and more attentive consideration of this part of my plan, I found that the discovery of the New World, the state of society among its ancient inhabitants, their character, manners, and arts, the genius of the European settlements in its various provinces, together with the influence of these upon the systems of policy or commerce in Europe, were subjects so splendid and important that a superficial view of them could afford little satisfaction ; and, on the other hand, to treat of them as extensively as they merited must produce an episode disproportionate to the principal work. I have therefore reserved these for a separate history ; which, if the performance now offered to the public shall receive its approbation, I purpose to undertake.

Though, by omitting such considerable but detached articles in the reign of Charles the Fifth, I have circumscribed my narration within more narrow limits, I am yet persuaded, from this view of the intention and nature of the work which I thought it necessary to lay before my readers, that the plan must still appear to them too extensive, and the undertaking too arduous. I have often felt them to be so. But my conviction of the utility of such a history prompted me to persevere. With what success I have executed it, the public must now judge. I wait, not without solicitude, for its decision, to which I shall submit with a respectful silence.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

A VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE.

SECTION I.

VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE WITH RESPECT TO INTERIOR GOVERNMENT, LAWS, AND MANNERS.

The Effects of the Roman Power on the State of Europe.—The Irruption of the Barbarous Nations.—Their Settlements in the Countries they had conquered.—Decay of the Roman Empire.—Desolation occasioned by the Barbarians.—Origin of the present Political System of Europe.—The Feudal System.—Its Effects upon the Arts, Literature, and Religion.—The Crusades, and their Effects upon Society.—Growth of Municipal Institutions.—Emancipation of the Peasantry.—Beginning of a regular Administration of Justice.—Trial by Combat.—Appeals.—Ecclesiastical Courts.—Discovery of the Code of Justinian.—Chivalry.—Revival of Learning.—Influence of Commerce.—Italians the First Merchants and Bankers.—Rise of Trade and Manufactures among the Cities of the Hanseatic League.—In the Netherlands.—In England . 1—79

PAGE

SECTION II.

VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE WITH RESPECT TO THE COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL FORCES REQUISITE IN FOREIGN OPERATIONS.

Improved State of Society at the Beginning of the Fifteenth Century.—The Concentration of Resources in European States.—The Power of Monarchs; their Revenues and Armies.—Affairs of Different States at first entirely Distinct.—Progress of Combination.—Loss of Continental Territory by the English.—Effects upon the French Monarchy.—Growth of Standing Armies, and of the Royal Prerogative under Louis XI.—His Example imitated in England and in Spain.—The heiress of Burgundy.—Perfidious Conduct of Louis XI. towards her.—Her Marriage with Maximilian, Archduke of Austria.—Invasion of Italy by Charles VIII.—The Balance of Power.—Use of Infantry in Armies.—League of Cambray against Venice 80—118

SECTION III.

VIEW OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL STATES IN EUROPE, AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

Italy at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century.—The Papal Power.—Alexander VI. and Julius II.—Defects in Ecclesiastical Governments,

—Venice ; its Rise and Progress ; its Naval Power and its Commerce ; Florence.—Naples and Sicily.—Contest for its Crown.—Duchy of Milan.—Ludovico Sforza.—Spain ; conquered by the Vandals and by the Moors ; gradually re-conquered by the Christians.—Marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella.—The Royal Prerogative.—Constitution of Aragon and of Castile.—Internal Disorders.—“ The Holy Brother- hood.”—France ; its Constitution and Government.—The Power of its Early Kings.—Government becomes purely Monarchical, though restrained by the Nobles and the Parliaments.—The German Empire. —Power of the Nobles and of the Clergy.—Contests between the Popes and the Emperors.—Decline of Imperial Authority.—Total Change of Government.—Maximilian.—The Real Power and Revenues of the Emperors, contrasted with their Pretensions.—Complication of Diffi- culties.—Origin of the Turkish Empire ; its Character.—The Janizaries. Solyman	PAGE 116—181
---	-------------------------------

PROOFS AND ILLUSTRATIONS	183—290
------------------------------------	----------------

HISTORY OF CHARLES V.

BOOK I.

Birth of Charles V.—His Hereditary Dominions.—Philip and Joanna, his Parents.—Birth of Ferdinand, his Brother.—Death of Isabella.— Philip's Attempts to obtain the Government of Castile.—The Regent Ferdinand marries a Niece of the French King to exclude Philip and his Daughter.—The Castilian Nobility declare for Philip.—Philip and Joanna proclaimed.—Death of Philip.—Incapacity of Joanna.—Ferdi- nand made Regent.—His Acquisition of Territory.—His Death.— Education of Charles V.—Cardinals Ximenes and Adrian.—Charles acknowledged King.—Ximenes strengthens the Royal Power ; is opposed by the Nobles.—War in Navarre and in Africa.—Peace with France.—Charles visits Spain.—His Ingratitude towards Ximenes.— Death of the Latter.—Discontent of the Castilians.—Corruption of the King's Flemish Favourites.—Reception of Charles in Aragon.—Death of the Emperor Maximilian.—Charles and Francis I. Competitors for the Empire.—Views of the other Reigning Potentates.—Assembly of the Electors.—The Crown offered to Frederic of Saxony.—He declines in Favour of Charles, who is chosen.—Discontent of the Spaniards.— Insurrection in Valencia.—The Cortes of Castile summoned to meet in Galicia.—Charles appoints Regents, and embarks for the Low Coun- tries	293—358
--	----------------

BOOK II.

Rivalry between Charles and Francis I. for the Empire.—They negotiate with the Pope, the Venetians, and Henry VIII. of England.—Character of the latter.—Cardinal Wolsey.—Charles visits England.—Meeting between Henry VIII. and Francis I.—Coronation of Charles.—Soly- man the Magnificent.—The Diet convoked at Worms.—The Reforma- tion.—Sale of Indulgences by Leo X.—Tetzel.—Luther.—Progress of his Opinions.—Is summoned to Rome.—His Appearance before the Legate.—His Appeals to a General Council.—Luther questions the	
--	--

CONTENTS.

xv

PAGE
Papal Authority.—Reformation in Switzerland.—Excommunication of Luther.—Reformation in Germany.—Causes of the Progress of the Reformation.—The Corruption in the Roman Church.—Power and Ill Conduct of the Clergy.—Venality of the Roman Court.—Effects of the Invention of Printing.—Erasmus.—The Diet at Worms.—Edict against Luther.—He is seized and confined at Wartburg.—His Doctrines condemned by the University of Paris, and controverted by Henry VIII. of England.—Henry VIII. favours the Emperor Charles against Francis I.—Leo X. makes a Treaty with Charles.—Death of Chièvres.—Hostilities in Navarre and in the Low Countries.—Siege of Mézières.—Congress at Culais.—League against France.—Hostilities in Italy.—Death of Leo X.—Defeat of the French.—Henry VIII. declares War against France.—Charles visits England.—Conquest of Rhodes by Solyman 369—445

BOOK III.

Insurrections.—Attempts of the Regent, Adrian, to suppress them.—Confederacy in Castile against him.—Measures taken by the Emperor.—Remonstrance of the Junta.—They take up Arms.—Their Negotiations with the Nobles.—The Junta under Padilla defeated in Battle.—Defence of Toledo by his Widow.—The War in Valencia and in Majorca.—Generosity of the Emperor.—Reception of Adrian at Rome.—His Pacific Policy.—A New League against France.—Treachery of the Duke of Bourbon.—Francis attacks Milan.—Death of Adrian, and Election of Clement VII.—Disappointment of Wolsey.—Progress of the War with France.—Pope Clement unable to bring about Peace.—The French abandon the Milanese.—Death of Bayard.—The Reformation in Germany.—Luther translates the Bible.—The Diet at Nuremberg proposes a General Council.—The Diet presents a List of Grievances to the Pope.—Opinion at Rome concerning the Policy of Adrian.—Clement's Measures against Luther 446—502
--

BOOK IV.

Views of the Italian States respecting Charles and Francis.—Charles invades France without Success.—Francis invades the Milanese.—He besieges Pavia.—Neutrality of the Pope.—Francis attacks Naples.—Movements of the Imperial Generals.—Battle of Pavia.—Francis taken Prisoner.—Schemes of the Emperor.—Prudence of Louise the Regent.—Conduct of Henry VIII. and of the Italian Powers.—The Emperor's rigorous Terms to Francis.—Francis carried to Spain.—Henry makes a Treaty with the Regent Louise.—Intrigues of Morone in Milan.—He is betrayed by Pescara.—Treatment of Francis.—Bourbon made General and Duke of Milan.—Treaty of Madrid.—Liberation of Francis.—Charles marries Isabella of Portugal.—Affairs in Germany.—Insurrections.—Conduct of Luther.—Prussia wrested from the Teutonic Knights.—Measures of Francis upon reaching his Kingdom.—A League against the Emperor.—Preparations for War.—The Colonnas Masters of Rome.—The Pope detached from the Holy League.—Position of the Emperor.—Bourbon marches towards the Pope's Territories.—Negotiations.—Assault of Rome.—Bourbon slain.—The City taken and plundered.—The Pope a Prisoner.—Hypocrisy of the Emperor.—Solyman invades Hungary.—Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, becomes King of Hungary.—Progress of the Reformation 503—576
--

BOOK V.

General Indignation and Confederacy against the Emperor.—The Florentines.—The French Army in Italy.—The Emperor sets the Pope at
--

	PAGE
Liberty, and makes Pacific Overtures.—A Royal Challenge.—Retreat of the Imperial Army from Rome.—The French besiege Naples.—Revolt of Andrew Doria.—Freedom of Genoa.—Operations in the Milanese.—Treaty between the Pope and the Emperor, and between Charles and Francis.—Henry VIII. seeks a Divorce from his Queen, Catharine of Aragon.—Charles visits Italy and re-establishes the Power of the Medici.—Returns to Germany.—The Diet of Spirea.—The Protest.—The Diet of Augsburg.—Decree against the Protestants.—Charles makes his Brother Ferdinand King of the Romans.—Negotiations of the Protestants.—The Campaign in Hungary.—Conference between the Emperor and the Pope.—Movements of the French King.—Henry divorced from Queen Catharine by the Archbishop, and excommunicated by the Pope.—Papal Authority abolished in England.—Death of Clement VII.—Pope Paul III.—Insurrection of the Anabaptists in Germany.—They become Masters of Munster.—John of Leyden crowned King.—Confederacy against him.—Munster besieged and taken.—The League of Smalkalde.—Expedition of the Emperor to Africa.—The Barbary States.—The Barbarossa.—Conquest of Tunis.—The Emperor besieges Goletta, defeats Barbarossa, and restores the King of Tunis.	577—653

LIST OF PHOTOTYPES.

VOLUME I.

	PAGE
LOUIS XI. AND HIS MINISTER, OLIVIER LE DAIN	93
MAXIMILIAN RECEIVING A DELEGATION FROM VENICE	128
AVILA	141
CHARLES V. IN HIS YOUTH	315
ENTRY OF CHARLES V. INTO ANTWERP	381
SARAGOSSA	387
LEO X. AT THE BIER OF RAPHAEL	346
LUTHER BURNING THE POPE'S BULL	389
LUTHER BEFORE THE DIET OF WORMS	418
WARTBURG CASTLE	420
DON JUAN PADILLA ON THE SCAFFOLD	468
LUTHER PREACHING IN THE CHAPEL OF WARTBURG CASTLE . .	494
SWORD AND BUCKLER OF FRANCIS I., TAKEN AT PAVIA	516
FRANCIS I. REFUSING THE DEMANDS OF THE EMPEROR	535
HENRY VIII. AND ANNE BOLEYN	602

VOLUME II.

FLORENTINE LIFE UNDER THE MEDICI	88
A SCENE OF MONASTIC LIFE	65
VALENCIA	104
THE FAMILY OF LUTHER	158
FRANKFORT-ON-THE-MAIN	195
PALACE OF THE DORIAS	205
EHRENBURG CASTLE	322
MASSACRE OF MONKS BY THE TROOPS OF ALBERT OF BRANDEN- BURG	330
CAMPAIGN LITTER OF CHARLES V.	349
FLORENCE	384
THE DOGE DESCENDING THE MAIN STAIRCASE OF HIS PALACE, VENICE	517
BURGOS	541
CHARLES V. APPROACHING YUSTE	548
ARRIVAL OF CHARLES V. AT YUSTE	566
IRON CHEST OF DRAWERS USED BY CHARLES V.	571

THE PHOTOTYPE ILLUSTRATIONS.

THE pictorial representation of the events which occurred during the reign of Charles V., is virtually the illustration of one of the most eventful epochs in the annals of mankind. The empire of that ruler extended far beyond the limits hitherto assigned by geographers to the domain of any European power. His rivals and his allies were the most renowned sovereigns of the age. In France, the greatest prince of the house of Valois, supported by the wealth of an industrious nation and the pride of a gallant nobility, endeavored, with disastrous results, to challenge his self-assumed title of political dictator of Europe. England, rising into prominence under the sceptre of the Tudors, was anxious to court the favor of a monarch whose pretensions, however arrogant, even the security of her isolated position and the devotion of her people did not permit her to dispute with impunity. Brilliant conquests, whose results changed the destiny of mighty empires, were achieved by Spanish generals, under the nominal guidance of the grandson of Ferdinand and Isabella. The great provincial towns of the Spanish monarchy—Avila and Burgos, with their massive fortifications and wonderful cathedrals; Valencia, with its souvenirs of Moorish thrift and luxury; Saragossa, with its curious bridges, and its picturesque environs; the magnificent cities of Andalusia—all were illustrated by the deeds of their heroic sons in the battle-fields of France and Italy, as well as in the remote and unknown wilderness of America.

The age of Charles V. was an era of extraordinary intellectual activity, whose prevailing sentiment, while apparently religious, yet countenanced indulgence in every form of vice. The public austerity of conventional manners, the meagre fare of the refectory, the coarse monastic habit, the unfailing attendance at mass, the solemn demeanor, the lengthy prayer, the ceremonious penance, not infrequently served to conceal the most reprehensible practices. In the Peninsula the beneficial effects of the Moorish occupation had not entirely disappeared. Outside of Italy the revival of letters had scarcely begun. At Rome, under the patronage of Leo, who before the bier of Raphael could forget the dignity of the pontiff in the sorrow of the friend, learning and the arts had been cultivated with remarkable success. At Florence, embellished by the wealth and genius of the Medici, the civilization of the sixteenth century had attained its highest development. The republic of Venice, whose influence

had been acquired by the energy and diligence of commercial enterprise, was rapidly approaching that degree of importance which enabled it to treat on an equality with the most powerful of kingdoms. In Germany, amidst the turmoil of religious revolution, arose the sturdy and menacing figure of Luther. His bold attitude before the Diet, his defiance of the Pope, his public destruction of edicts emanating from the sacred precincts of the Vatican, his voluntary imprisonment in the Castle of Wartburg, his homely discourses delivered in the presence of his companions and his guards, his visions of the infernal world, his recreations in the retirement of his home, awakened far more interest among the masses in Europe than the discoveries, the battles, the diplomatic triumphs of the illustrious occupant of the imperial throne. The ominous example of insubordination was imitated in England, and discontent with the arrogant mandates of papal despotism, aided by the coarse and sanguinary passions of Henry VIII., led to the spiritual freedom of a majority of the subjects of that monarch and the independence of the Anglican Church.

Under deceptive appearances of power and grandeur, the overwhelming influence of the papacy had impaired the vitality of the empire. The crimes perpetrated in the New World had destroyed the civilization of the Aztecs and the Incas. In Europe the abuses of the Holy See, sanctioned by the descendant of the Catholic king, had seriously affected the loyalty of such countries as Germany and Holland. The vices of a constitution where ecclesiastical interests controlled by the arbitrary will of a foreign and irresponsible potentate were paramount, had already begun to paralyze every movement conducive to material prosperity and intellectual progress, and to foreshadow the national calamities and humiliations subsequently endured under the tyrannical rule of the degenerate princes of the house of Austria.

S. P. SCOTT.

PHILADELPHIA, 1893.

A VIEW
OF THE
PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE,
FROM THE
SUBVERSION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
TO THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.



A VIEW
OF THE
PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE,
FROM THE SUBVERSION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE TO
THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

SECTION I.

**VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE WITH
RESPECT TO INTERIOR GOVERNMENT, LAWS, AND
MANNERS.**

The Effects of the Roman Power on the State of Europe.—The Irruption of the Barbarous Nations.—Their Settlements in the Countries they had conquered.—Decay of the Roman Empire.—Desolation occasioned by the Barbarians.—Origin of the present Political System of Europe.—The Feudal System.—Its Effects upon the Arts, Literature, and Religion.—The Crusades, and their Effects upon Society.—Growth of Municipal Institutions.—Emancipation of the Peasantry.—Beginning of a regular Administration of Justice.—Trial by Combat.—Appeals.—Ecclesiastical Courts.—Discovery of the Code of Justinian.—Chivalry.—Revival of Learning.—Influence of Commerce.—Italians the first Merchants and Bankers.—Rise of Trade and Manufactures among the Cities of the Hanseatic League,—in the Netherlands,—in England.

Two great revolutions have happened in the political state and in the manners of the European nations. The first was occasioned by the progress of the Roman power; the second by the subversion of it. When the spirit of conquest led the armies of Rome beyond the Alps, they found all the countries which they invaded inhabited by people whom they denominated

barbarians, but who were nevertheless brave and independent. These defended their ancient possessions with obstinate valour. It was by the superiority of their discipline, rather than that of their courage, that the Romans gained any advantage over them. A single battle did not, as among the effeminate inhabitants of Asia, decide the fate of a state. The vanquished people resumed their arms with fresh spirit, and their undisciplined valour, animated by the love of liberty, supplied the want of conduct as well as of union. During those long and fierce struggles for dominion or independence, the countries of Europe were successively laid waste, a great part of their inhabitants perished in the field, many were carried into slavery, and a feeble remnant, incapable of farther resistance, submitted to the Roman power.

The Romans, having thus desolated Europe, set themselves to civilize it. The form of government which they established in the conquered provinces, though severe, was regular, and preserved public tranquillity. As a consolation for the loss of liberty, they communicated their arts, sciences, language, and manners to their new subjects. Europe began to breathe, and to recover strength after the calamities which it had undergone; agriculture was encouraged; population increased; the ruined cities were rebuilt; new towns were founded; an appearance of prosperity succeeded, and repaired in some degree, the havoc of war.

This state, however, was far from being happy or favourable to the improvement of the human mind. The vanquished nations were disarmed by their conquerors and overawed by soldiers kept in pay to restrain them. They were given up as a prey to rapacious governors, who plundered them with impunity, and were drained of their wealth by exorbitant taxes, levied with so little attention to the situation of the provinces that

the impositions were often increased in proportion to their inability to support them. They were deprived of their most enterprising citizens, who resorted to a distant capital in quest of preferment or of riches; and were accustomed in all their actions to look up to a superior and tamely to receive his commands. Under so many depressing circumstances, it was hardly possible that they could retain vigour or generosity of mind. The martial and independent spirit which had distinguished their ancestors became in a great measure extinct among all the people subjected to the Roman yoke; they lost not only the habit but even the capacity of deciding for themselves or of acting from the impulse of their own minds; and the dominion of the Romans, like that of all great empires, degraded and debased the human species.¹

A society in such a state could not subsist long. There were defects in the Roman government, even in its most perfect form, which threatened its dissolution. Time ripened these original seeds of corruption, and gave birth to many new disorders. A constitution unsound and worn out must have fallen into pieces of itself, without any external shock. The violent irruption of the Goths, Vandals, Huns, and other barbarians hastened this event, and precipitated the downfall of the empire. New nations seemed to arise, and to rush from unknown regions, in order to take vengeance on the Romans for the calamities which they had inflicted on mankind. These fierce tribes either inhabited the various provinces in Germany which had never been subdued by the Romans, or were scattered over those vast countries in the north of Europe and northwest of Asia which are now occupied by the Danes, the Swedes, the Poles, the subjects of the Russian empire, and the Tartars. Their condition and transactions previous to

¹ Note I.

their invasion of the empire are but little known. Almost all our information with respect to these is derived from the Romans; and, as they did not penetrate far into countries which were at that time uncultivated and uninviting, the accounts of their original state given by the Roman historians are extremely imperfect. The rude inhabitants themselves, destitute of science as well as of records, and without leisure or curiosity to inquire into remote events, retained, perhaps, some indistinct memory of recent occurrences, but beyond these all was buried in oblivion or involved in darkness and in fable.²

The prodigious swarms which poured in upon the empire from the beginning of the fourth century to the final extinction of the Roman power have given rise to an opinion that the countries whence they issued were crowded with inhabitants; and various theories have been formed to account for such an extraordinary degree of population as hath procured these countries the appellation of "the storehouse of nations." But if we consider that the countries possessed by the people who invaded the empire were of vast extent, that a great part of these was covered with woods and marshes, that some of the most considerable of the barbarous nations subsisted entirely by hunting or pasturage, in both which states of society large tracts of land are required for maintaining a few inhabitants, and that all of them were strangers to the arts and industry, without which population cannot increase to any great degree, we must conclude that these countries could not be so populous in ancient times as they are in the present, when they still continue to be less peopled than any other part of Europe or of Asia.

But the same circumstances that prevented the barbarous nations from becoming populous contributed to

* Note IL

inspire, or to strengthen, the martial spirit by which they were distinguished. Inured by the rigour of their climate, or the poverty of their soil, to hardships which rendered their bodies firm and their minds vigorous, accustomed to a course of life which was a continual preparation for action, and disdaining every occupation but that of war or of hunting, they undertook and prosecuted their military enterprises with an ardour and impetuosity of which men softened by the refinements of more polished times can scarcely form any idea.³

Their first inroads into the empire proceeded rather from the love of plunder than from the desire of new settlements. Roused to arms by some enterprising or popular leader, they sallied out of their forests, broke in upon the frontier provinces with irresistible violence, put all who opposed them to the sword, carried off the most valuable effects of the inhabitants, dragged along multitudes of captives in chains, wasted all before them with fire or sword, and returned in triumph to their wilds and fastnesses. Their success, together with the accounts which they gave of the unknown conveniences and luxuries that abounded in countries better cultivated or blessed with a milder climate than their own, excited new adventurers and exposed the frontier to new devastations.

When nothing was left to plunder in the adjacent provinces, ravaged by frequent excursions, they marched farther from home, and, finding it difficult or dangerous to return, they began to settle in the countries which they had subdued. The sudden and short excursions in quest of booty, which had alarmed and disquieted the empire, ceased; a more dreadful calamity impended. Great bodies of armed men, with their wives and children and slaves and flocks, issued forth, like regular colonies, in quest of new settlements. People

* Note III.

who had no cities, and seldom any fixed habitation, were so little attached to their native soil that they migrated without reluctance from one place to another. New adventurers followed them. The lands which they deserted were occupied by more remote tribes of barbarians. These, in their turn, pushed forward into more fertile countries, and, like a torrent continually increasing, rolled on, and swept every thing before them. In less than two centuries from their first irruption, barbarians of various names and lineage plundered and took possession of Thrace, Pannonia, Gaul, Spain, Africa, and at last of Italy, and Rome itself. The vast fabric of the Roman power, which it had been the work of ages to perfect, was in that short period overturned from the foundation.

Many concurring causes prepared the way for this great revolution, and insured success to the nations which invaded the empire. The Roman commonwealth had conquered the world by the wisdom of its civil maxims and the rigour of its military discipline. But under the emperors the former were forgotten or despised, and the latter was gradually relaxed. The armies of the empire in the fourth and fifth centuries bore scarcely any resemblance to those invincible legions which had been victorious wherever they marched. Instead of freemen who voluntarily took arms from the love of glory or of their country, provincials and barbarians were bribed or forced into service. These were too feeble, or too proud, to submit to the fatigue of military duty. They even complained of the weight of their defensive armour as intolerable, and laid it aside. Infantry, from which the armies of ancient Rome derived their vigour and stability, fell into contempt; the effeminate and undisciplined soldiers of later times could hardly be brought to venture into the field but on horseback. These wretched troops, however, were the only

guardians of the empire. The jealousy of despotism had deprived the people of the use of arms; and subjects oppressed and rendered incapable of defending themselves had neither spirit nor inclination to resist their invaders, from whom they had little to fear, because their condition could hardly be rendered more unhappy. At the same time that the martial spirit became extinct, the revenues of the empire gradually diminished. The taste for the luxuries of the East increased to such a pitch in the imperial court that great sums were carried into India, from which, in the channel of commerce, money never returns. By the large subsidies paid to the barbarous nations, a still greater quantity of specie was withdrawn from circulation. The frontier provinces, wasted by frequent incursions, became unable to pay the customary tribute; and the wealth of the world, which had long centred in the capital of the empire, ceased to flow thither in the same abundance, or was diverted into other channels. The limits of the empire continued to be as extensive as ever, while the spirit requisite for its defence declined, and its resources were exhausted. A vast body, languid and almost unanimated, became incapable of any effort to save itself, and was easily overpowered. The emperors, who had the absolute direction of this disordered system, sunk in the softness of Eastern luxury, shut up within the walls of a palace, ignorant of war, unacquainted with affairs, and governed entirely by women and eunuchs, or by ministers equally effeminate, trembled at the approach of danger, and, under circumstances which called for the utmost vigour in council as well as in action, discovered all the impotent irresolution of fear and of folly.

In every respect the condition of the barbarous nations was the reverse of that of the Romans. Among the former the martial spirit was in full vigour; their leaders were hardy and enterprising; the arts which

had enervated the Romans were unknown; and such was the nature of their military institutions that they brought forces into the field without any trouble, and supported them at little expense. The mercenary and effeminate troops stationed on the frontier, astonished at their fierceness, either fled at their approach or were routed on the first onset. The feeble expedient to which the emperors had recourse, of taking large bodies of the barbarians into pay and of employing them to repel new invaders, instead of retarding, hastened the destruction of the empire. These mercenaries soon turned their arms against their masters, and with greater advantage than ever; for by serving in the Roman armies they had acquired all the discipline, or skill in war, which the Romans still retained; and upon adding these to their native ferocity they became altogether irresistible.

But though, from these and many other causes, the progress and conquests of the nations which overran the empire became so extremely rapid, they were accompanied with horrible devastations and an incredible destruction of the human species. Civilized nations, which take arms upon cool reflection, from motives of policy or prudence, with a view to guard against some distant danger or to prevent some remote contingency, carry on their hostilities with so little rancour or animosity that war among them is disarmed of half its terrors. Barbarians are strangers to such refinements. They rush into war with impetuosity and prosecute it with violence. Their sole object is to make their enemies feel the weight of their vengeance; nor does their rage subside until it be satiated with inflicting on them every possible calamity. It is with such a spirit that the savage tribes in America carry on their petty wars. It was with the same spirit that the more powerful and no less fierce barbarians in the north of Europe and of Asia fell upon the Roman empire.

Wherever they marched, their route was marked with blood. They ravaged or destroyed all around them. They made no distinction between what was sacred and what was profane. They respected no age, or sex, or rank. What escaped the fury of the first inundation perished in those which followed it. The most fertile and populous provinces were converted into deserts, in which were scattered the ruins of villages and cities that afforded shelter to a few miserable inhabitants whom chance had preserved, or the sword of the enemy, wearied with destroying, had spared. The conquerors who first settled in the countries which they had wasted were expelled or exterminated by new invaders, who, coming from regions farther removed from the civilized parts of the world, were still more fierce and rapacious. This brought fresh calamities upon mankind, which did not cease until the North, by pouring forth successive swarms, was drained of people and could no longer furnish instruments of destruction. Famine and pestilence, which always march in the train of war when it ravages with such inconsiderate cruelty, raged in every part of Europe and completed its sufferings. If a man were called to fix upon the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most calamitous and afflicted, he would without hesitation name that which elapsed from the death of Theodosius the Great to the establishment of the Lombards in Italy.⁴ The contemporary authors who beheld that scene of desolation labour and are at a loss for expressions to describe the horror of it. *The scourge of God, The destroyer of nations,* are the dreadful epithets by which they distinguish the most noted of the barbarous leaders; and they compare the ruin which they

* Theodosius died A.D. 395; the reign of Alboinus in Lombardy began A.D. 571: so that this period was one hundred and seventy-six years.

had brought on the world to the havoc occasioned by earthquakes, conflagrations, or deluges, the most formidable and fatal calamities which the imagination of man can conceive.

But no expressions can convey so perfect an idea of the destructive progress of the barbarians as that which must strike an attentive observer when he contemplates the total change which he will discover in the state of Europe after it began to recover some degree of tranquillity, towards the close of the sixth century. The Saxons were by that time masters of the southern and more fertile provinces of Britain; the Franks, of Gaul; the Huns, of Pannonia; the Goths, of Spain; the Goths and Lombards, of Italy and the adjacent provinces. Very faint vestiges of the Roman policy, jurisprudence, arts, or literature remained. New forms of government, new laws, new manners, new dresses, new languages, and new names of men and countries were everywhere introduced. To make a great or sudden alteration with respect to any of these, unless where the ancient inhabitants of a country have been almost totally exterminated, has proved an undertaking beyond the power of the greatest conquerors.⁵ The great change which the settlement of the barbarous nations occasioned in the state of Europe may, therefore, be considered as a more decisive proof, than even the testimony of contemporary historians, of the destructive violence with which these invaders carried on their conquests, and of the havoc which they had made from one extremity of this quarter of the globe to the other.⁶

In the obscurity of the chaos occasioned by this general wreck of nations, we must search for the seeds of order, and endeavour to discover the first rudiments of the policy and laws now established in Europe. To

* Note IV.

* Note V.

this source the historians of its different kingdoms have attempted, though with less attention and industry than the importance of the inquiry merits, to trace back the institutions and customs peculiar to their countrymen. It is not my province to give a minute detail of the progress of government and manners in each particular nation whose transactions are the object of the following history. But in order to exhibit a just view of the state of Europe at the opening of the sixteenth century it is necessary to look back, and to contemplate the condition of the Northern nations upon their first settlement in those countries which they occupied. It is necessary to mark the great steps by which they advanced from barbarism to refinement, and to point out those general principles and events which, by their uniform as well as extensive operation, conducted all of them to that degree of improvement in policy and in manners which they had attained at the period when Charles V. began his reign.

When nations subject to despotic government make conquests, these serve only to extend the dominion and the power of their master. But armies composed of freemen conquer for themselves, not for their leaders. The people who overturned the Roman empire and settled in its various provinces were of the latter class. Not only the different nations that issued from the north of Europe, which has always been considered as the seat of liberty, but the Huns and Alans, who inhabited part of those countries which have been marked out as the peculiar region of servitude,⁷ enjoyed freedom and independence in such a high degree as seems to be scarcely compatible with a state of social union or with the subordination necessary to maintain it. They followed the chieftain who led them forth in quest of new settlements, not by constraint, but from choice;

⁷ De l'Esprit des Loix, liv. xvii. ch. 3.

not as soldiers whom he could order to march, but as volunteers who offered to accompany him.⁸ They considered their conquests as a common property, in which all had a title to share, as all had contributed to acquire them.⁹ In what manner or by what principles they divided among them the lands which they seized, we cannot now determine with any certainty. There is no nation in Europe whose records reach back to this remote period; and there is little information to be got from uninstructive and meagre chronicles, compiled by writers ignorant of the true end and unacquainted with the proper objects of history.

This new division of property, however, together with the maxims and manners to which it gave rise, gradually introduced a species of government formerly unknown. This singular institution is now distinguished by the name of the *feudal system*; and though the barbarous nations which framed it settled in their new territories at different times, came from different countries, spoke various languages, and were under the command of separate leaders, the feudal policy and laws were established, with little variation, in every kingdom of Europe. This amazing uniformity hath induced some authors¹⁰ to believe that all these nations, notwithstanding so many apparent circumstances of distinction, were originally the same people. But it may be ascribed with greater probability to the similar state of society and of manners to which they were accustomed in their native countries, and to the similar situation in which they found themselves on taking possession of their new domains.

As the conquerors of Europe had their acquisitions to maintain, not only against such of the ancient inhabit-

⁸ Note VI.

Script. Byz., edit. Ven., vol. i.

⁹ Note VII.

p. 345.

¹⁰ Procop. de Bello Vandal., ap.

ants as they had spared, but against the more formidable inroads of new invaders, self-defence was their chief care, and seems to have been the chief object of their first institutions and policy. Instead of those loose associations which, though they scarcely diminished their personal independence, had been sufficient for their security while they remained in their original countries, they saw the necessity of uniting in more close confederacy, and of relinquishing some of their private rights in order to attain public safety. Every freeman, upon receiving a portion of the lands which were divided, bound himself to appear in arms against the enemies of the community. This military service was the condition upon which he received and held his lands; and, as they were exempted from every other burden, that tenure, among a warlike people, was deemed both easy and honourable. The king or general who led them to conquest, continuing still to be the head of the colony, had, of course, the largest portion allotted to him. Having thus acquired the means of rewarding past services, as well as of gaining new adherents, he parcelled out his lands with this view, binding those on whom they were bestowed to resort to his standard with a number of men in proportion to the extent of the territory which they received, and to bear arms in his defence. His chief officers imitated the example of the sovereign, and, in distributing portions of their lands among their dependants, annexed the same condition to the grant. Thus a feudal kingdom resembled a military establishment rather than a civil institution. The victorious army, cantoned out in the country which it had seized, continued ranged under its proper officers and subordinate to military command. The names of a soldier and of a freeman were synonymous.¹¹ Every proprietor of land, girt with a sword, was ready to march at the summons

¹¹ Du Cange, Glossar., voc. Miles.

of his superior and to take the field against the common enemy.

But though the feudal policy seems to be so admirably calculated for defence against the assaults of any foreign power, its provisions for the interior order and tranquillity of society were extremely defective. The principles of disorder and corruption are discernible in that constitution under its best and most perfect form. They soon unfolded themselves, and, spreading with rapidity through every part of the system, produced the most fatal effects. The bond of political union was extremely feeble ; the sources of anarchy were innumerable. The monarchical and aristocratical parts of the constitution, having no intermediate power to balance them, were perpetually at variance and justling with each other. The powerful vassals of the crown soon extorted a confirmation for life of those grants of land which, being at first purely gratuitous, had been bestowed only during pleasure. Not satisfied with this, they prevailed to have them converted into hereditary possessions. One step more completed their usurpations, and rendered them unalienable.¹² With an ambition no less enterprising, and more preposterous, they appropriated to themselves titles of honour, as well as offices of power or trust. These personal marks of distinction, which the public admiration bestows on illustrious merit, or which the public confidence confers on extraordinary abilities, were annexed to certain families, and transmitted like fiefs, from father to son, by hereditary right. The crown vassals having thus secured the possession of their lands and dignities, the nature of the feudal institutions, which, though founded on subordination, verged to independence, led them to new and still more dangerous encroachments on the prerogatives of the sovereign. They obtained the power of supreme jurisdiction, both civil

¹² Note VIII.

and criminal, within their own territories ; the right of coining money ; together with the privilege of carrying on war against their private enemies in their own name and by their own authority. The ideas of political subjection were almost entirely lost, and frequently scarce any appearance of feudal subordination remained. Nobles who had acquired such enormous power scorned to consider themselves as subjects. They aspired openly at being independent ; the bonds which connected the principal members of the constitution with the crown were dissolved. A kingdom considerable in name and in extent was broken into as many separate principalities as it contained powerful barons. A thousand causes of jealousy and discord subsisted among them, and gave rise to as many wars. Every country in Europe, wasted or kept in continual alarm during these endless contests, was filled with castles and places of strength erected for the security of the inhabitants, not against foreign force, but against internal hostilities. A universal anarchy, destructive in a great measure of all the advantages which men expect to derive from society, prevailed. The people, the most numerous as well as the most useful part of the community, were either reduced to a state of actual servitude, or treated with the same insolence and rigour as if they had been degraded into that wretched condition.¹³ The king, stripped of almost every prerogative, and without authority to enact or to execute salutary laws, could neither protect the innocent nor punish the guilty. The nobles, superior to all restraint, harassed each other with perpetual wars, oppressed their fellow-subjects, and humbled or insulted their sovereign. To crown all, time gradually fixed and rendered venerable this pernicious system, which violence had established.

Such was the state of Europe with respect to the

¹³ Note IX.

interior administration of government from the seventh to the eleventh century. All the external operations of its various states during this period were, of course, extremely feeble. A kingdom dismembered, and torn with dissension, without any common interest to rouse or any common head to conduct its force, was incapable of acting with vigour. Almost all the wars in Europe during the ages which I have mentioned were trifling, indecisive, and productive of no considerable event. They resembled the short incursions of pirates or banditti, rather than the steady operations of a regular army. Every baron, at the head of his vassals, carried on some petty enterprise to which he was prompted by his own ambition or revenge. The state itself, destitute of union, either remained altogether inactive, or, if it attempted to make any effort, that served only to discover its impotence. The superior genius of Charlemagne, it is true, united all these disjointed and discordant members, and formed them again into one body, restored to government that degree of activity which distinguishes his reign and renders the transactions of it objects not only of attention, but of admiration, to more enlightened times. But this state of union and vigour, not being natural to the feudal government, was of short duration. Immediately upon his death, the spirit which animated and sustained the vast system which he had established being withdrawn, it broke into pieces. All the calamities which flow from anarchy and discord, returning with additional force, afflicted the different kingdoms into which his empire was split. From that time to the eleventh century, a succession of uninteresting events, a series of wars the motives as well as the consequences of which were unimportant, fill and deform the annals of all the nations in Europe.

To these pernicious effects of the feudal anarchy may be added its fatal influence on the character and im-

provement of the human mind. If men do not enjoy the protection of regular government, together with the expectation of personal security, which naturally flows from it, they never attempt to make progress in science, nor aim at attaining refinement in taste or in manners. That period of turbulence, oppression, and rapine which I have described was ill suited to favour improvement in any of these. In less than a century after the barbarous nations settled in their new conquests, almost all the effects of the knowledge and civility which the Romans had spread through Europe disappeared. Not only the arts of elegance, which minister to luxury and are supported by it, but many of the useful arts, without which life can scarcely be considered as comfortable, were neglected or lost. Literature, science, taste, were words little in use during the ages which we are contemplating ; or, if they occur at any time, eminence in them is ascribed to persons and productions so contemptible that it appears their true import was little understood. Persons of the highest rank and in the most eminent stations could not read or write. Many of the clergy did not understand the breviary which they were obliged daily to recite ; some of them could scarcely read it.¹⁴ The memory of past transactions was in a great degree lost, or preserved in annals filled with trifling events or legendary tales. Even the codes of laws published by the several nations which established themselves in the different countries of Europe fell into disuse, while in their place customs vague and capricious were substituted. The human mind, neglected, uncultivated, and depressed, continued in the most profound ignorance. Europe, during four centuries, produced few authors who merit to be read, either on account of the elegance of their composition or the justness and novelty of their sentiments. There

* Note X.

are few inventions useful or ornamental to society of which that long period can boast.

Even the Christian religion, though its precepts are delivered, and its institutions are fixed in Scripture, with a precision which should have exempted them from being misinterpreted or corrupted, degenerated, during those ages of darkness, into an illiberal superstition. The barbarous nations, when converted to Christianity, changed the object, not the spirit, of their religious worship. They endeavoured to conciliate the favour of the true God by means not unlike to those which they had employed in order to appease their false deities. Instead of aspiring to sanctity and virtue, which alone can render men acceptable to the great Author of order and of excellence, they imagined that they satisfied every obligation of duty by a scrupulous observance of external ceremonies.¹⁵ Religion, according to their conceptions of it, comprehended nothing else; and the rites by which they persuaded themselves that they could gain the favour of Heaven were of such a nature as might have been expected from the rude ideas of the ages which devised and introduced them. They were either so unmeaning as to be altogether unworthy of the Being to whose honour they were consecrated, or so absurd as to be a disgrace to reason and humanity.¹⁶ Charlemagne in France, and Alfred the Great in England, endeavoured to dispel this darkness, and gave their subjects a short glimpse of light and knowledge. But the ignorance of the age was too powerful for their efforts and institutions. The darkness returned, and settled over Europe more thick and heavy than before.

As the inhabitants of Europe during these centuries were strangers to the arts which embellish a polished age, they were destitute of the virtues which abound

¹⁵ Note XI.

¹⁶ Note XII.

among people who continue in a simple state. Force of mind, a sense of personal dignity, gallantry in enterprise, invincible perseverance in execution, contempt of danger and of death, are the characteristic virtues of uncivilized nations. But these are all the offspring of equality and independence, both which the feudal institutions had destroyed. The spirit of domination corrupted the nobles, the yoke of servitude depressed the people, the generous sentiments inspired by a sense of equality were extinguished, and hardly any thing remained to be a check on ferocity and violence. Human society is in its most corrupted state at that period when men have lost their original independence and simplicity of manners, but have not attained that degree of refinement which introduces a sense of decorum and of propriety in conduct, as a restraint on those passions which lead to heinous crimes. Accordingly, a greater number of those atrocious actions which fill the mind of man with astonishment and horror occur in the history of the centuries under review than in that of any period of the same extent in the annals of Europe. If we open the history of Gregory of Tours, or of any contemporary author, we meet with a series of deeds of cruelty, perfidy, and revenge so wild and enormous as almost to exceed belief.

But, according to the observation of an elegant and profound historian,¹⁷ there is an ultimate point of depression, as well as of exaltation, from which human affairs naturally return in a contrary progress, and beyond which they never pass either in their advancement or decline. When defects either in the form or in the administration of government occasion such disorders in society as are excessive and intolerable, it becomes the common interest to discover and to apply

¹⁷ Hume's History of England, vol. ii. p. 441.

such remedies as will most effectually remove them. Slight inconveniences may be long overlooked or endured; but when abuses grow to a certain pitch the society must go to ruin or must attempt to reform them. The disorders in the feudal system, together with the corruption of taste and manners consequent upon these, which had gone on increasing during a long course of years, seemed to have attained their utmost point of excess towards the close of the eleventh century. From that era we may date the return of government and manners in a contrary direction, and can trace a succession of causes and events which contributed, some with a nearer and more conspicuous, others with a more remote and less perceptible influence, to abolish confusion and barbarism, and to introduce order, regularity, and refinement.

In pointing out and explaining these causes and events, it is not necessary to observe the order of time with a chronological accuracy: it is of more importance to keep in view their mutual connection and dependence, and to show how the operation of one event or one cause prepared the way for another and augmented its influence. We have hitherto been contemplating the progress of that darkness which spread over Europe, from its first approach, to the period of greatest obscuruation: a more pleasant exercise begins here; to observe the first dawnings of returning light, to mark the various accessions by which it gradually increased and advanced towards the full splendour of day.

I. The crusades, or expeditions in order to rescue the Holy Land out of the hands of infidels, seemed to be the first event that roused Europe from the lethargy in which it had been long sunk, and that tended to introduce any considerable change in government or in manners. It is natural to the human mind to view

those places which have been distinguished by being the residence of any illustrious personage, or the scene of any great transaction, with some degree of delight and veneration. To this principle must be ascribed the superstitious devotion with which Christians, from the earliest ages of the Church, were accustomed to visit that country which the Almighty had selected as the inheritance of his favourite people, and in which the Son of God had accomplished the redemption of mankind. As this distant pilgrimage could not be performed without considerable expense, fatigue, and danger, it appeared the more meritorious, and came to be considered as an expiation for almost every crime. An opinion which spread with rapidity over Europe about the close of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh century, and which gained universal credit, wonderfully augmented the number of credulous pilgrims, and increased the ardour with which they undertook this useless voyage. The thousand years mentioned by St. John¹⁸ were supposed to be accomplished, and the end of the world to be at hand. A general consternation seized mankind; many relinquished their possessions, and, abandoning their friends and families, hurried with precipitation to the Holy Land, where they imagined that Christ would quickly appear to judge the world.¹⁹ While Palestine continued subject to the Caliphs, they had encouraged the resort of pilgrims to Jerusalem, and considered this as a beneficial species of commerce, which brought into their dominions gold and silver and carried out of them but relics and consecrated trinkets. But the Turks having conquered Syria about the middle of the eleventh century,

¹⁸ Rev. xx. 2, 3, 4.

¹⁹ Chronic. Will. Godelli, ap. Bouquet, Recueil des Historiens de France, tom. x. p. 262.—Vita

Abonis, ibid., p. 332.—Chronic. S. Pantaleonis, ap. Eccard. Corp. Scrip. Medii Ævi, vol. i. p. 909.—Anna-lista Saxo, ibid., p. 576.

pilgrims were exposed to outrages of every kind from these fierce barbarians.²⁰ This change, happening precisely at the juncture when the panic terror which I have mentioned rendered pilgrimages most frequent, filled Europe with alarm and indignation. Every person who returned from Palestine related the dangers which he had encountered in visiting the holy city, and described with exaggeration the cruelty and vexations of the Turks.

When the minds of men were thus prepared, the zeal of a fanatical monk, who conceived the idea of leading all the forces of Christendom against the infidels, and of driving them out of the Holy Land by violence, was sufficient to give a beginning to that wild enterprise. Peter the Hermit, for that was the name of this martial apostle, ran from province to province with a crucifix in his hand, exciting princes and people to this holy war, and wherever he came kindled the same enthusiastic ardour for it with which he himself was animated. The Council of Placentia, where upwards of thirty thousand persons were assembled, pronounced the scheme to have been suggested by the immediate inspiration of Heaven. In the Council of Clermont, still more numerous, as soon as the measure was proposed, all cried out with one voice, "It is the will of God." Persons of all ranks caught the contagion; not only the gallant nobles of that age, with their martial followers, whom we may suppose apt to be allured by the boldness of a romantic enterprise, but men in the more humble and pacific stations of life, ecclesiastics of every order, and even women and children, engaged with emulation in an undertaking which was deemed sacred and meritorious. If we may believe the concurring testimony of contemporary

²⁰ Jo. Dan. Schoepflii de sacris tio[n]ibus, p. 4, Argent., 1726, 4to. Gallorum in Orientem Expedi-

authors, six millions of persons assumed the cross,²¹ which was the badge that distinguished such as devoted themselves to this holy warfare. All Europe, says the princess Anna Comnena, torn up from the foundation, seemed ready to precipitate itself in one united body upon Asia.²² Nor did the fumes of this enthusiastic zeal evaporate at once; the frenzy was as lasting as it was extravagant. During two centuries Europe seems to have had no object but to recover, or keep possession of, the Holy Land; and through that period vast armies continued to march thither.²³

The first efforts of valour, animated by enthusiasm, were irresistible: part of the lesser Asia, all Syria, and Palestine, were wrested from the infidels; the banner of the cross was displayed on Mount Sion; Constantinople, the capital of the Christian empire in the East, was afterwards seized by a body of those adventurers who had taken arms against the Mahometans; and an earl of Flanders and his descendants kept possession of the imperial throne during half a century. But though the first impression of the crusaders was so unexpected that they made their conquests with great ease, they found infinite difficulty in preserving them. Establishments so distant from Europe, surrounded by warlike nations animated with fanatical zeal scarcely inferior to that of the crusaders themselves, were perpetually in danger of being overturned. Before the expiration of the thirteenth century, the Christians were driven out of all their Asiatic possessions, in acquiring of which incredible numbers of men had perished and immense sums of money had been wasted. The only common enterprise in which the European nations ever engaged, and which they all undertook

²¹ Fulcherius Carnotensis, ap. Bongarsii *Gesta Dei per Francos*, vol. i. p. 387, edit. Han., 1611.

²² Alexias, lib. x., ap. *Byz. Script.*, vol. xi. p. 224.
²³ Note XIII.

with equal ardour, remains a singular monument of human folly.

But from these expeditions, extravagant as they were, beneficial consequences followed which had neither been foreseen nor expected. In their progress towards the Holy Land the followers of the cross marched through countries better cultivated and more civilized than their own. Their first rendezvous was commonly in Italy, in which Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and other cities had begun to apply themselves to commerce, and had made considerable advances towards wealth as well as refinement. They embarked there, and, landing in Dalmatia, pursued their route by land to Constantinople. Though the military spirit had been long extinct in the Eastern empire, and a despotism of the worst species had annihilated almost every public virtue, yet Constantinople, having never felt the destructive rage of the barbarous nations, was the greatest as well as the most beautiful city in Europe, and the only one in which there remained any image of the ancient elegance in manners and arts. The naval power of the Eastern empire was considerable. Manufactures of the most curious fabric were carried on in its dominions. Constantinople was the chief mart in Europe for the commodities of the East Indies. Although the Saracens and Turks had torn from the empire many of its richest provinces and had reduced it within very narrow bounds, yet great wealth flowed into the capital from these various sources, which not only cherished such a taste for magnificence, but kept alive such a relish for the sciences, as appears considerable when compared with what was known in other parts of Europe. Even in Asia, the Europeans who had assumed the cross found the remains of the knowledge and arts which the example and encouragement of the Caliphs had diffused through their empire. Although the attention of the historians of the crusades

was fixed on other objects than the state of society and manners among the nations which they invaded, although most of them had neither taste nor discernment enough to describe these, they relate, however, such signal acts of humanity and generosity in the conduct of Saladin, as well as some other leaders of the Mahometans, as give us a very high idea of their manners. It was not possible for the crusaders to travel through so many countries, and to behold their various customs and institutions, without acquiring information and improvement. Their views enlarged ; their prejudices wore off ; new ideas crowded into their minds ; and they must have been sensible, on many occasions, of the rusticity of their own manners when compared with those of a more polished people. These impressions were not so slight as to be effaced upon their return to their native countries. A close intercourse subsisted between the East and West during two centuries ; new armies were continually marching from Europe to Asia, while former adventurers returned home, and imported many of the customs to which they had been familiarized by a long residence abroad. Accordingly, we discover, soon after the commencement of the crusades, greater splendour in the courts of princes, greater pomp in public ceremonies, a more refined taste in pleasure and amusements, together with a more romantic spirit of enterprise, spreading gradually over Europe ; and to these wild expeditions, the effect of superstition or folly, we owe the first gleams of light which tended to dispel barbarism and ignorance.

But these beneficial consequences of the crusades took place slowly ; their influence upon the state of property, and consequently of power, in the different kingdoms of Europe, was more immediate, as well as discernible. The nobles who assumed the cross and bound themselves to march to the Holy Land soon

perceived that great sums were necessary towards defraying the expense of such a distant expedition and enabling them to appear with suitable dignity at the head of their vassals. But the genius of the feudal system was averse to the imposition of extraordinary taxes; and subjects in that age were unaccustomed to pay them. No expedient remained for levying the sums requisite, but the sale of their possessions. As men were inflamed with romantic expectations of the splendid conquests which they hoped to make in Asia, and possessed with such zeal for recovering the Holy Land as swallowed up every other passion, they relinquished their ancient inheritances without any reluctance, and for prices far below their value, that they might sally forth as adventurers in quest of new settlements in unknown countries. The monarchs of the great kingdoms in the West, none of whom had engaged in the first crusade, eagerly seized this opportunity of annexing considerable territories to their crowns at small expense.²⁴ Besides this, several great barons who perished in the holy war having left no heirs, their fiefs reverted of course to their respective sovereigns; and by these accessions of property, as well as power taken from the one scale and thrown into the other, the regal authority rose in proportion as that of the aristocracy declined. The absence, too, of many potent vassals, accustomed to control and give law to their sovereigns, afforded them an opportunity of extending their prerogative, and of acquiring a degree of weight in the constitution which they did not formerly possess. To these circumstances we may add that, as all who assumed the cross were taken under the immediate protection of the Church, and its heaviest anathemas were denounced against such as should disquiet or annoy those who had devoted themselves to

* Wilhelm. Malmsbur. Guibert. Abbas, ap. Bongars, vol. i. p. 481.

this service, the private quarrels and hostilities which banished tranquillity from a feudal kingdom were suspended or extinguished; a more general and steady administration of justice began to be introduced, and some advances were made towards the establishment of regular government in the several kingdoms of Europe.²⁵

The commercial effects of the crusades were not less considerable than those which I have already mentioned. The first armies under the standard of the cross, which Peter the Hermit and Godfrey of Bouillon led through Germany and Hungary to Constantinople, suffered so much by the length of the march, as well as by the fierceness of the barbarous people who inhabited those countries, that it deterred others from taking the same route; and, rather than encounter so many dangers, they chose to go by sea. Venice, Genoa, and Pisa furnished the transports on which they embarked. The sum which these cities received merely for freight from such numerous armies was immense.²⁶ This, however, was but a small part of what they gained by the expeditions to the Holy Land: the crusaders contracted with them for military stores and provisions; their fleets kept on the coast as the armies advanced by land, and, supplying them with whatever was wanting, engrossed all the profits of a branch of commerce which in every age has been extremely lucrative. The success which attended the arms of the crusaders was productive of advantages still more permanent. There are charters yet extant, containing grants to the Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese, of the most extensive immunities in the several settlements which the Christians made in Asia. All the commodities which they imported or exported are thereby exempted from every imposition;

²⁵ Du Cange, Glossar., voc. *Cruce signatus*.—Guib. Abbas, ap. Bon-gara, vol. i. pp. 480, 482.—See also Note XIV.
²⁶ Muratori, Antiquit. Italic. Medii Ævi, vol. ii. p. 905.

the property of entire suburbs in some of the maritime towns, and of large streets in others, is vested in them; and all questions arising among persons settled within their precincts or who traded under their protection are appointed to be tried by their own laws and by judges of their own appointment.²⁷ When the crusaders seized Constantinople and placed one of their own leaders on the imperial throne, the Italian states were likewise gainers by that event. The Venetians, who had planned the enterprise and took a considerable part in carrying it into execution, did not neglect to secure to themselves the chief advantages redounding from its success. They made themselves masters of part of the ancient Peloponnesus in Greece, together with some of the most fertile islands in the Archipelago. Many valuable branches of the commerce which formerly centred in Constantinople were transferred to Venice, Genoa, or Pisa. Thus a succession of events occasioned by the holy war opened various sources from which wealth flowed in such abundance into these cities²⁸ as enabled them, in concurrence with another institution, which shall be immediately mentioned, to secure their own liberty and independence.

II. The institution to which I alluded was the forming of cities into communities, corporations, or bodies politic, and granting them the privilege of municipal jurisdiction, which contributed more perhaps than any other cause to introduce regular government, police, and arts, and to diffuse them over Europe. The feudal government had degenerated into a system of oppression. The usurpations of the nobles were become unbounded and intolerable; they had reduced the great body of the people into a state of actual servitude: the

²⁷ Muratori, *Antiquit. Italic.* Constant. sous l'Empereurs François, p. 105, etc.
Medii Ævi, vol. ii. p. 906, etc.

²⁸ Villehardouin, *Histoire de*

condition of those dignified with the name of freemen was often little preferable to that of the other. Nor was such oppression the portion of those alone who dwelt in the country and were employed in cultivating the estate of their master. Cities and villages found it necessary to hold of some great lord, on whom they might depend for protection and become no less subject to his arbitrary jurisdiction. The inhabitants were deprived of those rights which, in social life, are deemed most natural and inalienable. They could not dispose of the effects which their own industry had acquired, either by a latter will, or by any deed executed during their life.²⁹ They had no right to appoint guardians for their children during their minority. They were not permitted to marry without purchasing the consent of the lord on whom they depended.³⁰ If once they had commenced a law-suit, they durst not terminate it by an accommodation, because that would have deprived the lord, in whose court they pleaded, of the perquisites due to him on passing sentence.³¹ Services of various kinds, no less disgraceful than oppressive, were exacted from them without mercy or moderation. The spirit of industry was checked in some cities by absurd regulations, and in others by unreasonable exactions; nor would the narrow and oppressive maxims of a military aristocracy have permitted it ever to rise to any degree of height or vigour.³²

But as soon as the cities of Italy began to turn their attention towards commerce, and to conceive some idea of the advantages which they might derive from it,

²⁹ Dacherii Spicileg., tom. xi. pp. 374, 375, edit. in 4to.—Ordonnances des Rois de France, tom. iii. p. 204, no. 2, 6.

³⁰ Ordonnances des Rois de France, tom. i. p. 22, tom. iii. p. 203, no. 1.—Murat., Antiq. Ital.,

vol. iv. p. 20.—Dacher., Spicil., vol. ix. pp. 325, 341.

³¹ Dacher., Spicil., vol. ix. p. 182.

³² M. l'Abbé Mably, Observations sur l'Histoire de France, tom. ii., pp. 2, 96.

they became impatient to shake off the yoke of their insolent lords, and to establish among themselves such a free and equal government as would render property secure and industry flourishing. The German emperors, especially those of the Franconian and Suabian lines, as the seat of their government was far distant from Italy, possessed a feeble and imperfect jurisdiction in that country. Their perpetual quarrels, either with the popes or with their own turbulent vassals, diverted their attention from the interior police of Italy and gave constant employment to their arms. These circumstances encouraged the inhabitants of some of the Italian cities, towards the beginning of the eleventh century, to assume new privileges, to unite together more closely, and to form themselves into bodies politic under the government of laws established by common consent.³³ The rights which many cities acquired by bold or fortunate usurpations, others purchased from the emperors, who deemed themselves gainers when they received large sums for immunities which they were no longer able to withhold; and some cities obtained them gratuitously, from the generosity or facility of the princes on whom they depended. The great increase of wealth which the crusades brought into Italy occasioned a new kind of fermentation and activity in the minds of the people, and excited such a general passion for liberty and independence that before the conclusion of the last crusade all the considerable cities in that country had either purchased or had extorted large immunities from the emperors.³⁴

This innovation was not long known in Italy before it made its way into France. Louis le Gros, in order to create some power that might counterbalance those potent vassals who controlled or gave law to the crown, first adopted the plan of conferring new privileges on

³³ Murat., Antiq. Ital., vol. iv. p. 5.

³⁴ Note XV.

the towns situated within its own domain. These privileges were called *charters of community*, by which he enfranchised the inhabitants, abolished all marks of servitude, and formed them into corporations or bodies politic, to be governed by a council and magistrates of their own nomination. These magistrates had the right of administering justice within their own precincts, of levying taxes, of embodying and training to arms the militia of the town, which took the field when required by the sovereign, under the command of officers appointed by the community. The great barons imitated the example of their monarch, and granted like immunities to the towns within their territories. They had wasted such great sums in their expeditions to the Holy Land that they were eager to lay hold on this new expedient for raising money, by the sale of those charters of liberty. Though the institution of communities was as repugnant to their maxims of policy as it was adverse to their power, they disregarded remote consequences in order to obtain present relief. In less than two centuries servitude was abolished in most of the towns in France, and they became free corporations, instead of dependent villages without jurisdiction or privileges.³⁵ Much about the same period the great cities in Germany began to acquire like immunities, and laid the foundation of their present liberty and independence.³⁶ The practice spread quickly over Europe, and was adopted in Spain, England, Scotland, and all the other feudal kingdoms.³⁷

The good effects of this new institution were immediately felt, and its influence on government as well as manners was no less extensive than salutary. A great body of the people was released from servitude, and from all the arbitrary and grievous impositions to which that wretched condition had subjected them. Towns, upon

* Note XVI.

* Note XVII.

* Note XVIII.

acquiring the right of community, became so many little republics, governed by known and equal laws. Liberty was deemed such an essential and characteristic part in their constitution that if any slave took refuge in one of them, and resided there during a year without being claimed, he was instantly declared a freeman and admitted as a member of the community.³⁸

As one part of the people owed their liberty to the erection of communities, another was indebted to them for their security. Such had been the state of Europe during several centuries that self-preservation obliged every man to court the patronage of some powerful baron, and in times of danger his castle was the place to which all resorted for safety. But towns surrounded with walls, whose inhabitants were regularly trained to arms, and bound by interest, as well as by the most solemn engagements, reciprocally to defend each other, afforded a more commodious and secure retreat. The nobles began to be considered as of less importance when they ceased to be the sole guardians to whom the people could look up for protection against violence.

If the nobility suffered some diminution of their credit and power by the privileges granted to the cities, the crown acquired an increase of both. As there were no regular troops kept on foot in any of the feudal kingdoms, the monarch could bring no army into the field but what was composed of soldiers furnished by the crown vassals, always jealous of the regal authority; nor had he any funds for carrying on the public service but such as they granted him with a very sparing hand. But when the members of communities were permitted to bear arms, and were trained to the use of them, this in some degree supplied the first defect, and gave the crown the command of a body of men independent of

³⁸ Statut. Humberti Bellojoci, 185.—*Charta Comit. Forens.*, *ibid.*, Dacher., Spicil., vol. ix. pp. 182, p. 193.

its great vassals. The attachment of the cities to their sovereigns, whom they respected as the first authors of their liberties, and whom they were obliged to court as the protectors of their immunities against the domineering spirit of the nobles, contributed somewhat towards removing the second evil, as, on many occasions, it procured the crown supplies of money, which added new force to government.³⁹

The acquisition of liberty made such a happy change in the condition of all the members of communities as roused them from that inaction into which they had been sunk by the wretchedness of their former state. The spirit of industry revived. Commerce became an object of attention, and began to flourish. Population increased. Independence was established; and wealth flowed into cities which had long been the seat of poverty and oppression. Wealth was accompanied by its usual attendants, ostentation and luxury; and though the former was formal and cumbersome, and the latter inelegant, they led gradually to greater refinement in manners and in the habits of life. Together with this improvement in manners, a more regular species of government and police was introduced. As cities grew to be more populous, and the occasions of intercourse among men increased, statutes and regulations multiplied of course, and all became sensible that their common safety depended on observing them with exactness and on punishing such as violated them with promptitude and rigour. Laws and subordination, as well as polished manners, taking their rise in cities, diffused themselves insensibly through the rest of the society.

III. The inhabitants of cities, having obtained personal freedom and municipal jurisdiction, soon acquired civil liberty and political power. It was a fundamental principle in the feudal system of policy that no free-

* Ordon. des Rois de France, tom. i. pp. 602, 785; tom. ii. pp. 318, 422.

man could be subjected to new laws or taxes unless by his own consent. In consequence of this, the vassals of every baron were called to his court, in which they established, by mutual consent, such regulations as they deemed most beneficial to their small society, and granted their superior such supplies of money as were proportioned to their abilities or to his wants. The barons themselves, conformably to the same maxim, were admitted into the supreme assembly of the nation, and concurred with the sovereign in enacting laws or in imposing taxes. As the superior lord, according to the original plan of feudal policy, retained the direct property of those lands which he granted in temporary possession to his vassals, the law, even after fiefs became hereditary, still supposed this original practice to subsist. The great council of each nation, whether distinguished by the name of a parliament, a diet, the cortes, or the states-general, was composed entirely of such barons and dignified ecclesiastics as held immediately of the crown. Towns, whether situated within the royal domain or on the lands of a subject, depended originally for protection on the lord of whom they held. They had no legal name, no political existence, which would entitle them to be admitted into the legislative assembly, or could give them any authority there. But as soon as they were enfranchised, and formed into bodies corporate, they became legal and independent members of the constitution, and acquired all the rights essential to freemen. Among these, the most valuable was the privilege of a decisive voice in enacting public laws and granting national subsidies. It was natural for cities, accustomed to a form of municipal government according to which no regulation could be established within the community, and no money could be raised, but by their own consent, to claim this privilege. The wealth, the power, and

consideration which they acquired on recovering their liberty added weight to their claim; and favourable events happened, or fortunate conjunctures occurred, in the different kingdoms of Europe, which facilitated their obtaining possession of this important right. In England, one of the first countries in which the representatives of boroughs were admitted into the great council of the nation, the barons who took arms against Henry III. summoned them to attend parliament, in order to add greater popularity to their party and to strengthen the barrier against the encroachment of regal power. In France, Philip the Fair, a monarch no less sagacious than enterprising, considered them as instruments which might be employed with equal advantage to extend the royal prerogative, to counterbalance the exorbitant power of the nobles, and to facilitate the imposition of new taxes. With these views, he introduced the deputies of such towns as were formed into communities into the states-general of the nation.⁴⁰ In the empire, the wealth and immunities of the imperial cities placed them on a level with the most considerable members of the Germanic body. Conscious of their own power and dignity, they pretended to the privilege of forming a separate bench in the diet, and made good their pretensions.⁴¹ [1293.]

But in what way soever the representatives of cities first gained a place in the legislature, that event had great influence on the form and genius of government. It tempered the rigour of aristocratical oppression with a proper mixture of popular liberty; it secured to the great body of the people, who had formerly no representatives, active and powerful guardians of their rights and privileges; it established an intermediate power

⁴⁰ Pasquier, *Recherches de la et Droit d'Allemagne*, pp. 408, France, ap. 81, edit. Par., 1633. 451.

⁴¹ Pfeffel, *Abrégué de l'Histoire*

between the king and the nobles, to which each had recourse alternately, and which at some times opposed the usurpations of the former, on other occasions checked the encroachments of the latter. As soon as the representatives of communities gained any degree of credit and influence in the legislature, the spirit of laws became different from what it had formerly been; it flowed from new principles; it was directed towards new objects; equality, order, the public good, and the redress of grievances, were phrases and ideas brought into use, and which grew to be familiar in the statutes and jurisprudence of the European nations. Almost all the efforts in favour of liberty in every country of Europe have been made by this new power in the legislature. In proportion as it rose to consideration and influence, the severity of the aristocratical spirit decreased; and the privileges of the people became gradually more extensive, as the ancient and exorbitant jurisdiction of the nobles was abridged.⁴²

IV. The inhabitants of towns having been declared free by the charters of communities, that part of the people which resided in the country and was employed in agriculture began to recover liberty by enfranchisement. During the rigour of feudal government, as hath been already observed, the great body of the lower people was reduced to servitude. They were slaves fixed to the soil which they cultivated, and together with it were transferred from one proprietor to another, by sale or by conveyance. The spirit of feudal policy did not favour the enfranchisement of that order of men. It was an established maxim that no vassal could legally diminish the value of a fief, to the detriment of the lord from whom he had received it. In consequence of this, manumission by the authority of the immediate master was not valid; and, unless it was confirmed by the

⁴² Note XIX.

superior lord of whom he held, slaves belonging to the fief did not acquire a complete right to their liberty. Thus it became necessary to ascend through all the gradations of feudal holding to the king, the lord paramount.⁴³ A form of procedure so tedious and troublesome discouraged the practice of manumission. Domestic or personal slaves often obtained liberty from the humanity or beneficence of their masters, to whom they belonged in absolute property. The condition of slaves fixed to the soil was much more unalterable.

But the freedom and independence which one part of the people had obtained by the institution of communities inspired the other with the most ardent desire of acquiring the same privileges; and their superiors, sensible of the various advantages which they had derived from their former concessions to their dependants, were less unwilling to gratify them by the grant of new immunities. The enfranchisement of slaves became more frequent; and the monarchs of France, prompted by necessity no less than by their inclination to reduce the power of the nobles, endeavoured to render it general. Louis X. and Philip the Long issued ordinances declaring "that as all men were by nature free born, and as their kingdom was called the kingdom of Franks, they determined that it should be so in reality as well as in name: therefore they appointed that enfranchisements should be granted throughout the whole kingdom, upon just and reasonable conditions."⁴⁴ These edicts were carried into immediate execution within the royal domain. The example of their sovereigns, together with the expectation of considerable sums which they might raise by this expedient, led many of the nobles to set their dependants at liberty; and servitude was gradually abolished in almost every province of the

⁴³ Establissements de St. Louis, p. 283, note (a).
liv. ii. ch. 34.—Ordon., tom. i. ⁴⁴ Ordon., tom. i. pp. 583, 653.

kingdom.⁴⁵ In Italy, the establishment of republican government in their great cities, the genius and maxims of which were extremely different from those of the feudal policy, together with the ideas of equality, which the progress of commerce had rendered familiar, gradually introduced the practice of enfranchising the ancient *predial* slaves. In some provinces of Germany, the persons who had been subject to this species of bondage were released; in others, the rigour of their state was mitigated. In England, as the spirit of liberty gained ground, the very name and idea of personal servitude, without any formal interposition of the legislature to prohibit it, was totally banished.

The effects of such a remarkable change in the condition of so great a part of the people could not fail of being considerable and extensive. The husbandman, master of his own industry, and secure of reaping for himself the fruits of his labour, became the farmer of the same fields where he had formerly been compelled to toil for the benefit of another. The odious names of master and of slave, the most mortifying and depressing of all distinctions to human nature, were abolished. New prospects opened, and new incitements to ingenuity and enterprise presented themselves, to those who were emancipated. The expectation of bettering their fortune, as well as that of raising themselves to a more honourable condition, concurred in calling forth their activity and genius; and a numerous class of men, who formerly had no political existence and were employed merely as instruments of labour, became useful citizens, and contributed towards augmenting the force or riches of the society which adopted them as members.

V. The various expedients which were employed in order to introduce a more regular, equal, and vigorous administration of justice contributed greatly towards

⁴⁵ Note XX.

the improvement of society. What were the particular modes of dispensing justice, in their several countries, among the various barbarous nations which overran the Roman empire and took possession of its different provinces, cannot now be determined with certainty. We may conclude, from the form of government established among them, as well as from their ideas concerning the nature of society, that the authority of the magistrate was extremely limited, and the independence of individuals proportionally great. History and records, as far as these reach back, justify this conclusion, and represent the ideas and exercise of justice in all the countries of Europe as little different from those which must take place in the most simple state of civil life. To maintain the order and tranquillity of society by the regular execution of known laws ; to inflict vengeance on crimes destructive of the peace and safety of individuals, by a prosecution carried on in the name and by the authority of the community ; to consider the punishment of criminals as a public example to deter others from violating the laws,—were objects of government little understood in theory, and less regarded in practice. The magistrate could hardly be said to hold the sword of justice ; it was left in the hands of private persons. Resentment was almost the sole motive for prosecuting crimes ; and to gratify that passion was considered as the chief end in punishing them. He who suffered the wrong was the only person who had a right to pursue the aggressor and to exact or to remit the punishment. From a system of judicial procedure so crude and defective that it seems to be scarcely compatible with the subsistence of civil society, disorder and anarchy flowed. Superstition concurred with this ignorance concerning the nature of government, in obstructing the administration of justice, or in rendering it capricious and unequal. To provide remedies for these evils, so as to give a more

regular course to justice, was, during several centuries, one great object of political wisdom. The regulations for this purpose may be reduced to three general heads: to explain these, and to point out the manner in which they operated, is an important article in the history of society among the nations of Europe.

1. The first considerable step towards establishing an equal administration of justice was the abolition of the right which individuals claimed of waging war with each other in their own name and by their own authority. To repel injuries, and to revenge wrongs, is no less natural to man than to cultivate friendship; and while society remains in its most simple state, the former is considered as a personal right, no less unalienable than the latter. Nor do men in this situation deem that they have a title to redress their own wrongs alone: they are touched with the injuries done to those with whom they are connected or in whose honour they are interested, and are no less prompt to avenge them. The savage, how imperfectly soever he may comprehend the principles of political union, feels warmly the sentiments of social affection and the obligations arising from the ties of blood. On the appearance of an injury or affront offered to his family or tribe, he kindles into rage, and pursues the authors of it with the keenest resentment. He considers it as cowardly to expect redress from any arm but his own, and as infamous to give up to another the right of determining what reparation he should accept, or with what vengeance he should rest satisfied.

The maxims and practice of all uncivilized nations with respect to the prosecution and punishment of offenders, particularly those of the ancient Germans, and other barbarians who invaded the Roman empire, are perfectly conformable to these ideas.⁴⁶ While they

⁴⁶ Tacit. de Mor. German., cap. 21.—Vell. Patrc., lib. ii. c. 118.

retained their native simplicity of manners, and continued to be divided into small tribes or societies, the defects in this imperfect system of criminal jurisprudence (if it merits that name) were less sensibly felt. When they came to settle in the extensive provinces which they had conquered, and to form themselves into great monarchies, when new objects of ambition presenting themselves increased both the number and the violence of their dissensions, they ought to have adopted new maxims concerning the redress of injuries, and to have regulated by general and equal laws that which they formerly left to be directed by the caprice of private passion. But fierce and haughty chieftains, accustomed to avenge themselves on such as had injured them, did not think of relinquishing a right which they considered as a privilege of their order and a mark of their independence. Laws enforced by the authority of princes and magistrates who possessed little power commanded no great degree of reverence. The administration of justice among rude, illiterate people was not so accurate, or decisive, or uniform, as to induce men to submit implicitly to its determinations. Every offended baron buckled on his armour and sought redress at the head of his vassals. His adversary met him in like hostile array. Neither of them appealed to impotent laws which could afford them no protection; neither of them would submit points, in which their honour and their passions were warmly interested, to the slow determination of a judicial inquiry. Both trusted to their swords for the decision of the contest. The kindred and dependants of the aggressor, as well as the defender, were involved in the quarrel. They had not even the liberty of remaining neutral. Such as refused to act in concert with the party to which they belonged were not only exposed to infamy, but subjected to legal penalties.

The different kingdoms of Europe were torn and afflicted, during several centuries, by intestine wars, excited by private animosities, and carried on with all the rage natural to men of fierce manners and of violent passions. The estate of every baron was a kind of independent territory, disjoined from those around it, and the hostilities between them seldom ceased. The evil became so inveterate and deep-rooted that the form and laws of private war were ascertained, and regulations concerning it made a part in the system of jurisprudence,⁴⁷ in the same manner as if this practice had been founded in some natural right of humanity, or in the original constitution of civil society.

So great was the disorder, and such the calamities, which these perpetual hostilities occasioned, that various efforts were made to wrest from the nobles this pernicious privilege. It was the interest of every sovereign to abolish a practice which almost annihilated his authority. Charlemagne prohibited it by an express law, as an invention of the Devil to destroy the order and happiness of society;⁴⁸ but the reign of one monarch, however vigorous and active, was too short to extirpate a custom so firmly established. Instead of enforcing this prohibition, his feeble successors durst venture on nothing more than to apply palliatives. They declared it unlawful for any person to commence war until he had sent a formal defiance to the kindred and dependants of his adversary; they ordained that, after the commission of the trespass or crime which gave rise to a private war, forty days must elapse before the person injured should attack the vassals of his adversary; they enjoined all persons to suspend their private animosities and to cease from hostilities when the king was

⁴⁷ Beaumanoir, *Coustumes de Beauvoisis*, ch. 59, et les notes de Thaumassière, p. 447.

⁴⁸ Capitul. A.D. 801, edit. Baluz, vol. i. p. 371.

engaged in any war against the enemies of the nation. The Church co-operated with the civil magistrate, and interposed its authority, in order to extirpate a practice so repugnant to the spirit of Christianity. Various councils issued decrees prohibiting all private wars, and denounced the heaviest anathemas against such as should disturb the tranquillity of society by claiming or exercising that barbarous right. The aid of religion was called in to combat and subdue the ferocity of the times. The Almighty was said to have manifested, by visions and revelations to different persons, his disapprobation of that spirit of revenge which armed one part of his creatures against the other. Men were required, in the name of God, to sheathe their swords, and to remember the sacred ties which united them as Christians and as members of the same society. But this junction of civil and ecclesiastical authority, though strengthened by everything most apt to alarm and to overawe the credulous spirit of those ages, produced no other effect than some temporary suspensions of hostilities, and a cessation from war on certain days and seasons consecrated to the more solemn acts of devotion. The nobles continued to assert this dangerous privilege; they refused to obey some of the laws calculated to annul or circumscribe it; they eluded others; they petitioned, they remonstrated, they struggled for the right of private war, as the highest and most honourable distinction of their order. Even so late as the fourteenth century we find the nobles in several provinces of France contending for their ancient method of terminating their differences by the sword, in preference to that of submitting them to the decision of any judge. The final abolition of this practice in that kingdom, and the other countries in which it prevailed, is not to be ascribed so much to the force of statutes and decrees, as to the gradual increase of the royal

authority, and to the imperceptible progress of juster sentiments concerning government, order, and public security.⁴⁹

2. The prohibition of the form of trial by judicial combat was another considerable step towards the introduction of such regular government as secured public order and private tranquillity. As the right of private war left many of the quarrels among individuals to be decided, like those between nations, by arms, the form of trial by judicial combat, which was established in every country of Europe, banished equity from courts of justice, and rendered chance or force the arbiter of their determinations. In civilized nations, all transactions of any importance are concluded in writing. The exhibition of the deed or instrument is full evidence of the fact, and ascertains with precision what each party has stipulated to perform. But among a rude people, when the arts of reading and writing were such uncommon attainments that to be master of either entitled a person to the appellation of a clerk or learned man, scarcely anything was committed to writing but treaties between princes, their grants and charters to their subjects, or such transactions between private parties as were of extraordinary consequence or had an extensive effect. The greater part of affairs in common life and business was carried on by verbal contracts or promises. This, in many civil questions, not only made it difficult to bring proof sufficient to establish any claim, but encouraged falsehood and fraud, by rendering them extremely easy. Even in criminal cases, where a particular fact must be ascertained or an accusation must be disproved, the nature and effect of legal evidence were little understood by barbarous nations. To define with accuracy that species of evidence which a court had reason to expect, to

⁴⁹ Note XXI.

determine when it ought to insist on positive proof and when it should be satisfied with a proof from circumstances, to compare the testimony of discordant witnesses, and to fix the degree of credit due to each, were discussions too intricate and subtile for the jurisprudence of ignorant ages. In order to avoid encumbering themselves with these, a more simple form of procedure was introduced into courts as well civil as criminal. In all cases where the notoriety of the fact did not furnish the clearest and most direct evidence, the person accused, or he against whom an action was brought, was called legally, or offered voluntarily, to purge himself by oath; and upon his declaring his innocence he was instantly acquitted.⁵⁰ This absurd practice effectually screened guilt and fraud from detection and punishment, by rendering the temptation to perjury so powerful that it was not easy to resist it. The pernicious effects of it were sensibly felt; and, in order to guard against them, the laws ordained that oaths should be administered with great solemnity, and accompanied with every circumstance which could inspire religious reverence or superstitious terror.⁵¹ This, however, proved a feeble remedy: these ceremonious rites became familiar, and their impression on the imagination gradually diminished; men who could venture to disregard truth were not apt to startle at the solemnities of an oath. Their observation of this put legislators upon devising a new expedient for rendering the purgation by oath more certain and satisfactory. They required the person accused to appear with a certain number of freemen, his neighbours or relations, who corroborated the oath which he took, by swearing that they believed all that he had uttered to be true. These

⁵⁰ Leg. Burgund., tit. 8 et 45.—
Leg. Aleman., tit. 89. — Leg. Baiwar., tit. 8, § 5, 2, etc.

⁵¹ Du Cange, Glossar., voc. *Juramentum*, vol. iii. p. 1607, edit. Benedict.

were called *compurgators*, and their number varied according to the importance of the subject in dispute, or the nature of the crime with which a person was charged.⁵² In some cases the concurrence of no less than three hundred of these auxiliary witnesses was requisite to acquit the person accused.⁵³ But even this device was found to be ineffectual. It was a point of honour with every man in Europe, during several ages, not to desert the chief on whom he depended, and to stand by those with whom the ties of blood connected him. Whoever then was bold enough to violate the laws was sure of devoted adherents, willing to abet and eager to serve him in whatever manner he required. The formality of calling compurgators proved an apparent, not a real, security against falsehood and perjury; and the sentences of courts, while they continued to refer every point in question to the oath of the defendant, became so flagrantly iniquitous as to excite universal indignation against this method of procedure.⁵⁴

Sensible of these defects, but strangers to the manner of correcting them or of introducing a more proper form, our ancestors, as an infallible method of discovering truth and of guarding against deception, appealed to Heaven, and referred every point in dispute to be determined, as they imagined, by the decisions of unerring wisdom and impartial justice. The person accused, in order to prove his innocence, submitted to trial, in certain cases, either by plunging his arm in boiling water, or by lifting a red-hot iron with his naked hand, or by walking barefoot over burning ploughshares, or by other experiments equally perilous

⁵² Du Cange, Glossar., voc. *Juramentum*, vol. iii. p. 1599.

⁵³ Spelman, Glossar., voc. *Assath*. —Gregor. Turon., Hist., lib. viii.

c. 9.

⁵⁴ Leg. Longobard., lib. ii. tit. 55, § 34.

and formidable. On other occasions he challenged his accuser to fight him in single combat. All these various forms of trial were conducted with many devout ceremonies; the ministers of religion were employed; the Almighty was called upon to interpose for the manifestation of guilt and for the protection of innocence; and whoever escaped unhurt or came off victorious was pronounced to be acquitted by the *judgment of God.*⁵⁵

Among all the whimsical and absurd institutions which owe their existence to the weakness of human reason, this, which submitted questions that affected the property, the reputation, and the lives of men to the determination of chance or of bodily strength and address, appears to be the most extravagant and preposterous. There were circumstances, however, which led the nations of Europe to consider this equivocal mode of deciding any point in contest as a direct appeal to Heaven and a certain method of discovering its will. As men are unable to comprehend the manner in which the Almighty carries on the government of the universe, by equal, fixed, and general laws, they are apt to imagine that in every case which their passions or interest render important in their own eyes the Supreme Ruler of all ought visibly to display his power in vindicating innocence and punishing guilt. It requires no inconsiderable degree of science and philosophy to correct this popular error. But the sentiments prevalent in Europe during the Dark Ages, instead of correcting, strengthened it. Religion, for several centuries, consisted chiefly in believing the legendary history of those saints whose names crowd and disgrace the Romish calendar. The fabulous tales concerning their miracles had been declared authentic by the bulls of popes and the decrees of councils; they

⁵⁵ Murat, *Dissertatio de Judiciis Dei, Antiquit. Ital.*, vol. iii. p. 612.
VOL. I.

made the great subjects of the instructions which the clergy offered to the people, and were received by them with implicit credulity and admiration. By attending to these, men were accustomed to believe that the established laws of nature might be violated on the most frivolous occasions, and were taught to look rather for particular and extraordinary acts of power under the divine administration than to contemplate the regular progress and execution of a general plan. One superstition prepared the way for another; and whoever believed that the Supreme Being had interposed miraculously on those trivial occasions mentioned in legends could not but expect his intervention in matters of greater importance, when solemnly referred to his decision.

With this superstitious opinion the martial spirit of Europe, during the Middle Ages, concurred in establishing the mode of trial by judicial combat. To be ready to maintain with his sword whatever his lips had uttered was the first maxim of honour with every gentleman. To assert their own rights by force of arms, to inflict vengeance on those who had injured or affronted them, were the distinction and pride of high-spirited nobles. The form of trial by combat, coinciding with this maxim, flattered and gratified these passions. Every man was the guardian of his own honour and of his own life; the justice of his cause, as well as his future reputation, depended on his own courage and prowess. This mode of decision was considered, accordingly, as one of the happiest efforts of wise policy; and as soon as it was introduced, all the forms of trial, by fire or water, and other superstitious experiments, fell into disuse, or were employed only in controversies between persons of inferior rank. As it was the privilege of a gentleman to claim the trial by combat, it was quickly authorized over all Europe, and received in every

country with equal satisfaction. Not only questions concerning uncertain or contested facts, but general and abstract points in law, were determined by the issue of a combat; and the latter was deemed a method of discovering truth more liberal, as well as more satisfactory, than that by investigation and argument. Not only might parties whose minds were exasperated by the eagerness and the hostility of opposition defy their antagonist and require him to make good his charge or to prove his innocence with his sword, but witnesses who had no interest in the issue of the question, though called to declare the truth by laws which ought to have afforded them protection, were equally exposed to the danger of a challenge, and equally bound to assert the veracity of their evidence by dint of arms. To complete the absurdities of this military jurisprudence, even the character of a judge was not sacred from its violence. Any one of the parties might interrupt a judge when about to deliver his opinion; might accuse him of iniquity and corruption in the most reproachful terms, and, throwing down his gauntlet, might challenge him to defend his integrity in the field; nor could he, without infamy, refuse to accept the defiance, or decline to enter the lists against such an adversary.

Thus the form of trial by combat, like other abuses, spread gradually, and extended to all persons, and almost to all cases. Ecclesiastics, women, minors, superannuated and infirm persons, who could not with decency or justice be compelled to take arms or to maintain their own cause, were obliged to produce champions, who offered from affection, or were engaged by rewards, to fight their battles. The solemnities of a judicial combat were such as were natural in an action which was considered both as a formal appeal to God and as the final decision of questions of the highest moment. Every circumstance relating to them was

regulated by the edicts of princes, and explained in the comments of lawyers, with a minute and even superstitious accuracy. Skill in these laws and rights was frequently the only science of which warlike nobles boasted, or which they were ambitious to attain.⁵⁶

By this barbarous custom, the natural course of proceeding, both in civil and criminal questions, was entirely perverted. Force usurped the place of equity in courts of judicature, and justice was banished from her proper mansion. Discernment, learning, integrity, were qualities less necessary to a judge than bodily strength and dexterity in the use of arms. Daring courage and superior vigour of address were of more moment towards securing the favourable issue of a suit than the equity of a cause or the clearness of the evidence. Men, of course, applied themselves to cultivate the talents which they found to be of greatest utility. As strength of body and address in arms were no less requisite in those lists which they were obliged to enter in defence of their private rights, than in the field of battle, where they met the enemies of their country, it became the great object of education, as well as the chief employment of life, to acquire these martial accomplishments. The administration of justice, instead of accustoming men to listen to the voice of equity or to reverence the decisions of law, added to the ferocity of their manners, and taught them to consider force as the great arbiter of right and wrong.

These pernicious effects of the trial by combat were so obvious that they did not altogether escape the view of the unobserving age in which it was introduced. The clergy, from the beginning, remonstrated against it, as repugnant to the spirit of Christianity and subversive

" See a curious discourse concerning the laws of judicial combat, by Thomas of Woodstock, duke of

Gloucester, uncle to Richard II., in Spelman's Glossar., voc. *Campus*.

of justice and order.⁵⁷ But the maxims and passions which favoured it had taken such hold of the minds of men that they disregarded admonitions and censures which on other occasions would have struck them with terror. The evil was too great and inveterate to yield to that remedy, and, continuing to increase, the civil power at length found it necessary to interpose. Conscious, however, of their own limited authority, monarchs proceeded with caution, and their first attempts to restrain or to set any bounds to this practice were extremely feeble. One of the earliest restrictions of this practice which occurs in the history of Europe is that of Henry I. of England. It extended no farther than to prohibit the trial by combat in questions concerning property of small value.⁵⁸ Louis VII. of France imitated his example, and issued an edict to the same effect.⁵⁹ St. Louis, whose ideas as a legislator were far superior to those of his age, endeavoured to introduce a more perfect jurisprudence, and to substitute the trial by evidence in place of that by combat; but his regulations with respect to this were confined to his own domains; for the great vassals of the crown possessed such independent authority, and were so fondly attached to the ancient practice, that he had not power to venture to extend it to the whole kingdom. Some barons voluntarily adopted his regulations. The spirit of courts of justice became averse to the mode of decision by combat, and discouraged it on every occasion. The nobles, nevertheless, thought it so honourable to depend for the security of their lives and fortunes on their own courage alone, and contended with so much vehemence for the preservation of this favourite privilege of their order, that the successors of St. Louis, unable to oppose

⁵⁷ Du Cange, Glossar., voc. *Duel-lum*, vol. ii. p. 1675. ⁵⁸ Ordon., tom. i. p. 16.
⁵⁹ Brussel, Usage des Fiefs, vol. ii.

and afraid of offending such powerful subjects, were obliged not only to tolerate but to authorize the practice which he had attempted to abolish.⁶⁰ In other countries of Europe, efforts equally zealous were employed to maintain the established custom, and similar concessions were extorted from their respective sovereigns. It continued, however, to be an object of policy with every monarch of abilities or vigour, to explode the trial by combat; and various edicts were issued for this purpose. But the observation which was made concerning the right of private war is equally applicable to the mode of trial under review. No custom, how absurd soever it may be, if it has subsisted long, or derived its source from the manners and prejudices of the age in which it prevails, was ever abolished by the bare promulgation of laws and statutes. The sentiments of the people must change, or some new power sufficient to counteract the prevalent custom must be introduced. Such a change accordingly took place in Europe, as science gradually increased and society advanced towards more perfect order. In proportion as the prerogative of princes extended and came to acquire new force, a power interested in suppressing every practice favourable to the independence of the nobles was introduced. The struggle, nevertheless, subsisted for several centuries: sometimes the new regulations and ideas seemed to gain ground; sometimes ancient habits recurred; and though, upon the whole, the trial by combat went more and more into disuse, yet instances of it occur as late as the sixteenth century, in the history both of France and of England. In proportion as it declined, the regular administration of justice was restored, the proceedings of courts were directed by known laws, the study of these became an object of attention to judges, and the people of Europe

⁶⁰ Ordon., tom. i. pp. 328, 390, 435.

advanced fast towards civility when this great cause of the ferocity of their manners was removed.⁶¹

3. By authorizing the right of appeal from the courts of the barons to those of the king, and subjecting the decisions of the former to the review of the latter, a new step, not less considerable than those which I have already mentioned, was taken towards establishing the regular, consistent, and vigorous administration of justice. Among all the encroachments of the feudal nobles on the prerogative of their monarchs, their usurping the administration of justice with supreme authority, both in civil and criminal causes, within the precincts of their own estates, was the most singular. In other nations, subjects have contended with their sovereigns, and have endeavoured to extend their own power and privileges; but in the history of their struggles and pretensions we discover nothing similar to this right which the feudal barons claimed and obtained. It must have been something peculiar in their genius and manners that suggested this idea and prompted them to insist on such a claim. Among the rude people who conquered the various provinces of the Roman empire and established new kingdoms there, the passion of resentment, too impetuous to bear control, was permitted to remain almost unrestrained by the authority of laws. The person offended, as has been observed, retained not only the right of prosecuting but of punishing his adversary. To him it belonged to inflict such vengeance as satiated his rage, or to accept of such satisfaction as appeased it. But while fierce barbarians continued to be the sole judges in their own cause, their enmities were implacable and immortal: they set no bounds either to the degree of their vengeance or to the duration of their resentment. The excesses which this occasioned proved so destructive of peace

* Note XXI.

and order in society as to render it necessary to devise some remedy. At first recourse was had to arbitrators, who by persuasion or entreaty prevailed on the party offended to accept of a fine or composition from the aggressor and to drop all farther prosecution. But, as submission to persons who had no legal or magisterial authority was altogether voluntary, it became necessary to establish judges, with power sufficient to enforce their own decisions. The leader whom they were accustomed to follow and to obey, whose courage they respected and in whose integrity they placed confidence, was the person to whom a martial people naturally committed this important prerogative. Every chieftain was the commander of his tribe in war, and their judge in peace. Every baron led his vassals to the field, and administered justice to them in his hall. The high-spirited dependants would not have recognized any other authority or have submitted to any other jurisdiction. But in times of turbulence and violence the exercise of this new function was attended not only with trouble, but with danger. No person could assume the character of a judge if he did not possess power sufficient to protect the one party from the violence of private revenge and to compel the other to accept of such reparation as he enjoined. In consideration of the extraordinary efforts which this office required, judges, besides the fine which they appointed to be paid as a compensation to the person or family who had been injured, levied an additional sum as a recompense for their own labour; and in all the feudal kingdoms the latter was not only as precisely ascertained, but as regularly exacted, as the former.

Thus, by the natural operation of circumstances peculiar to the manners or political state of the feudal nations, separate and territorial jurisdictions came not only to be established in every kingdom, but were established

in such a way that the interest of the barons concurred with their ambition in maintaining and extending them. It was not merely a point of honour with the feudal nobles to dispense justice to their vassals, but from the exercise of that power arose one capital branch of their revenue, and the emoluments of their courts were frequently the main support of their dignity. It was with infinite zeal that they asserted and defended this high privilege of their order. By this institution, however, every kingdom in Europe was split into as many separate principalities as it contained powerful barons. Their vassals, whether in peace or in war, were hardly sensible of an authority but that of their immediate superior lord. They felt themselves subject to no other command. They were amenable to no other jurisdiction. The ties which linked together these smaller confederacies became close and firm; the bonds of public union relaxed, or were dissolved. The nobles strained their invention in devising regulations which tended to ascertain and perpetuate this distinction. In order to guard against any appearance of subordination in their courts to those of the crown, they frequently constrained their monarchs to prohibit the royal judges from entering their territories or from claiming any jurisdiction there; and if, either through mistake or from the spirit of encroachment, any royal judge ventured to extend his authority to the vassals of a baron, they might plead their right of exemption and the lord of whom they held could not only rescue them out of his hands, but was entitled to legal reparation for the injury and affront offered to him. The jurisdiction of the royal judges scarcely reached beyond the narrow limits of the king's demesnes. Instead of a regular gradation of courts, all acknowledging the authority of the same general laws and looking up to these as the guides of their decisions, there were in every feudal kingdom a number of independent tribu-

nals, the proceedings of which were directed by local customs and contradictory forms. The collision of jurisdiction among these different courts often retarded the execution of justice; the variety and caprice of their modes of procedure must have forever kept the administration of it from attaining any degree of uniformity or perfection.

All the monarchs of Europe perceived these encroachments on their jurisdiction, and bore them with impatience. But the usurpations of the nobles were so firmly established, and the danger of endeavouring to overturn them by open force was so manifest, that kings were obliged to remain satisfied with attempts to undermine them. Various expedients were employed for this purpose, each of which merits attention, as they mark the progress of law and equity in the several kingdoms of Europe. At first, princes endeavoured to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the barons, by contending that they ought to take cognizance only of smaller offences, reserving those of greater moment, under the appellation of *pleas of the crown* and *royal causes*, to be tried in the king's courts. This, however, affected only the barons of inferior note; the more powerful nobles scorned such a distinction, and not only claimed unlimited jurisdiction, but obliged their sovereigns to grant them charters conveying or recognizing this privilege in the most ample form. The attempt, nevertheless, was productive of some good consequences, and paved the way for more. It turned the attention of men towards a jurisdiction distinct from that of the baron whose vassals they were; it accustomed them to the pretensions of superiority which the crown claimed over territorial judges, and taught them, when oppressed by their own superior lord, to look up to their sovereign as their protector. This facilitated the introduction of appeals, by which princes brought the decisions of the barons' courts under

the review of the royal judges. While trial by combat subsisted in full vigour, no point decided according to that mode could be brought under the review of another court. It had been referred to the judgment of God ; the issue of battle had declared his will ; and it would have been impious to have called in question the equity of the divine decision. But as soon as that barbarous custom began to fall into disuse, princes encouraged the vassals of the barons to sue for redress by appealing to the royal courts. The progress of this practice, however, was slow and gradual. The first instances of appeals were on account of *the delay or the refusal of justice* in the barons' court ; and, as these were countenanced by the ideas of subordination in the feudal constitution, the nobles allowed them to be introduced without much opposition. But when these were followed by appeals on account of *the injustice or iniquity of the sentence*, the nobles then began to be sensible that if this innovation became general the shadow of power alone would remain in their hands, and all real authority and jurisdiction would centre in those courts which possessed the right of review. They instantly took the alarm, remonstrated against the encroachment, and contended boldly for their ancient privileges. But the monarchs in the different kingdoms of Europe pursued their plan with steadiness and prudence. Though forced to suspend their operations on some occasions, and seemingly to yield when any formidable confederacy of their vassals united against them, they resumed their measures as soon as they observed the nobles to be remiss or feeble, and pushed them with vigour. They appointed the royal courts, which originally were ambulatory and irregular with respect to their times of meeting, to be held in a fixed place and at stated seasons. They were solicitous to name judges of more distinguished abilities than such as usually presided in the courts of barons.

They added dignity to their character and splendour to their assemblies. They laboured to render their forms regular and their decrees consistent. Such judicatories became, of course, the objects of public confidence as well as veneration. The people, relinquishing the tribunals of their lords, were eager to bring every subject of contest under the more equal and discerning eye of those whom their sovereign had chosen to give judgment in his name. Thus kings became once more the heads of the community, and the dispensers of justice to their subjects. The barons, in some kingdoms, ceased to exercise their right of jurisdiction, because it sunk into contempt; in others it was circumscribed by such regulations as rendered it innocent, or it was entirely abolished by express statutes. Thus the administration of justice, taking its rise from one source and following one direction, held its course in every state with more uniformity and with greater force.⁶²

VI. The forms and maxims of the canon law, which were become universally respectable, from their authority in the spiritual courts, contributed not a little towards those improvements in jurisprudence which I have enumerated. If we consider the canon law politically, and view it either as a system framed on purpose to assist the clergy in usurping powers and jurisdiction no less repugnant to the nature of their function than inconsistent with the order of government, or as the chief instrument in establishing the dominion of the popes, which shook the throne and endangered the liberties of every kingdom in Europe, we must pronounce it one of the most formidable engines ever formed against the happiness of civil society. But if we contemplate it merely as a code of laws respecting the rights and property of individuals, and attend only to the civil effects of its decisions concerning these, it will appear

* Note XXIII.

in a different and a much more favourable light. In ages of ignorance and credulity the ministers of religion are the objects of superstitious veneration. When the barbarians who overran the Roman empire first embraced the Christian faith, they found the clergy in possession of considerable power; and they naturally transferred to those new guides the profound submission and reverence which they were accustomed to yield to the priests of that religion which they had forsaken. They deemed their persons to be equally sacred with their function, and would have considered it as impious to subject them to the profane jurisdiction of the laity. The clergy were not blind to these advantages which the weakness of mankind afforded them. They established courts, in which every question relating to their own character, their function, or their property, was tried. They pleaded and obtained an almost total exemption from the authority of civil judges. Upon different pretexts, and by a multiplicity of artifices, they communicated this privilege to so many persons, and extended their jurisdiction to such a variety of cases, that the greater part of those affairs which give rise to contest and litigation was drawn under the cognizance of the spiritual courts.

But, in order to dispose the laity to suffer these usurpations without murmur or opposition, it was necessary to convince them that the administration of justice would be rendered more perfect by the establishment of this new jurisdiction. This was not a difficult undertaking at that period, when ecclesiastics carried on their encroachments with the greatest success. That scanty portion of science which served to guide men in the ages of darkness was almost entirely engrossed by the clergy. They alone were accustomed to read, to inquire, and to reason. Whatever knowledge of ancient jurisprudence had been preserved, either by tradition, or

in such books as had escaped the destructive rage of barbarians, was possessed by them. Upon the maxims of that excellent system they founded a code of laws consonant to the great principles of equity. Being directed by fixed and known rules, the forms of their courts were ascertained, and their decisions became uniform and consistent. Nor did they want authority sufficient to enforce their sentences. Excommunication and other ecclesiastical censures were punishments more formidable than any that civil judges could inflict in support of their decrees.

It is not surprising, then, that ecclesiastical jurisprudence should become such an object of admiration and respect that exemption from civil jurisdiction was courted as a privilege and conferred as a reward. It is not surprising that, even to a rude people, the maxims of the canon law should appear more equal and just than those of the ill-digested jurisprudence which directed all proceedings in civil courts. According to the latter, the differences between contending barons were terminated, as in a state of nature, by the sword; according to the former, every matter was subjected to the decision of laws. The one, by permitting judicial combats, left chance and force to be arbiters of right or wrong, of truth or falsehood; the other passed judgment with respect to these by the maxims of equity and the testimony of witnesses. Any error or iniquity in a sentence pronounced by a baron to whom feudal jurisdiction belonged was irremediable, because originally it was subject to the review of no superior tribunal; the ecclesiastical law established a regular gradation of courts, through all which a cause might be carried by appeal, until it was determined by that authority which was held to be supreme in the Church. Thus the genius and principles of the canon law prepared men for approving those three great alterations in the feudal jurisprudence

which I have mentioned. But it was not with respect to these points alone that the canon law suggested improvements beneficial to society. Many of the regulations now deemed the barriers of personal security or the safeguards of private property are contrary to the spirit and repugnant to the maxims of the civil jurisprudence known in Europe during several centuries, and were borrowed from the rules and practice of the ecclesiastical courts. By observing the wisdom and equity of the decisions in these courts, men began to perceive the necessity either of deserting the martial tribunals of the barons, or of attempting to reform them.⁶³

VII. The revival of the knowledge and study of the Roman law co-operated with the causes which I have mentioned in introducing more just and liberal ideas concerning the nature of government and the administration of justice. Among the calamities which the devastations of the barbarians who broke in upon the empire brought upon mankind, one of the greatest was their overturning the system of Roman jurisprudence, the noblest monument of the wisdom of that great people, formed to subdue and to govern the world. The laws and regulations of a civilized community were repugnant to the manners and ideas of these fierce invaders. They had respect to objects of which a rude people had no conception, and were adapted to a state of society with which they were entirely unacquainted. For this reason, wherever they settled, the Roman jurisprudence soon sunk into oblivion, and lay buried for some centuries under the load of those institutions which the inhabitants of Europe dignified with the name of laws. But towards the middle of the twelfth century a copy of Justinian's Pandects was accidentally discovered in Italy. By that time the state of society was so far advanced, and the ideas of men so much

* Note XXIV.

enlarged and improved by the occurrences of several centuries during which they had continued in political union, that they were struck with admiration of a system which their ancestors could not comprehend. Though they had not hitherto attained such a degree of refinement as to acquire from the ancients a relish for true philosophy or speculative science, though they were still insensible in a great degree to the beauty and elegance of classical composition, they were sufficiently qualified to judge with respect to the merit of their system of laws, in which all the points most interesting to mankind were settled with discernment, precision, and equity. All men of letters studied this new science with eagerness; and within a few years after the discovery of the Pandects, professors of civil law were appointed, who taught it publicly in most countries of Europe.

The effects of having such an excellent model to study and to imitate were immediately perceived. Men, as soon as they were acquainted with fixed and general laws, perceived the advantage of them, and became impatient to ascertain the principles and forms by which judges should regulate their decisions. Such was the ardour with which they carried on an undertaking of so great importance to society that before the close of the twelfth century the feudal law was reduced into a regular system; the code of canon law was enlarged and methodised; and the loose, uncertain customs of different provinces or kingdoms were collected and arranged with an order and accuracy acquired from the knowledge of Roman jurisprudence. In some countries of Europe the Roman law was adopted as subsidiary to their own municipal law, and all cases to which the latter did not extend were decided according to the principles of the former. In others the maxims as well as forms of Roman jurisprudence mingled

imperceptibly with the laws of the country, and had a powerful, though less sensible, influence in improving and perfecting them.⁶⁴

These various improvements in the system of jurisprudence and administration of justice occasioned a change in manners, of great importance and of extensive effect. They gave rise to a distinction of professions; they obliged men to cultivate different talents, and to aim at different accomplishments, in order to qualify themselves for the various departments and functions which became necessary in society.⁶⁵ Among uncivilised nations there is but one profession honourable, that of arms. All the ingenuity and vigour of the human mind are exerted in acquiring military skill or address. The functions of peace are few and simple, and require no particular course of education or of study as a preparation for discharging them. This was the state of Europe during several centuries. Every gentleman, born a soldier, scorned any other occupation; he was taught no science but that of war; even his exercises and pastimes were feats of martial prowess. Nor did the judicial character, which persons of noble birth were alone entitled to assume, demand any degree of knowledge beyond that which such untutored soldiers possessed. To recollect a few traditional customs which time had confirmed and rendered respectable, to mark out the lists of battle with due formality, to observe the issue of the combat, and to pronounce whether it had been conducted according to the laws of arms, included everything that a baron, who acted as a judge, found it necessary to understand.

But when the forms of legal proceedings were fixed,

Note XXV.

— Dr. Fergusson's Essay on the

VOL. I.

History of Civil Society, part iv.

sect. 1.

when the rules of decision were committed to writing and collected into a body, law became a science, the knowledge of which required a regular course of study, together with long attention to the practice of courts. Martial and illiterate nobles had neither leisure nor inclination to undertake a task so laborious, as well as so foreign from all the occupations which they deemed entertaining, or suitable to their rank. They gradually relinquished their places in courts of justice, where their ignorance exposed them to contempt. They became weary of attending to the discussion of cases which grew too intricate for them to comprehend. Not only the judicial determination of points which were the subject of controversy, but the conduct of all legal business and transactions, was committed to persons trained by previous study and application to the knowledge of law. An order of men to whom their fellow-citizens had daily recourse for advice, and to whom they looked up for decision in their most important concerns, naturally acquired consideration and influence in society. They were advanced to honours which had been considered hitherto as the peculiar rewards of military virtue. They were intrusted with offices of the highest dignity and most extensive power. Thus another profession than that of arms came to be introduced among the laity, and was reputed honourable. The functions of civil life were attended to. The talents requisite for discharging them were cultivated. A new road was opened to wealth and eminence. The arts and virtues of peace were placed in their proper rank and received their due recompense.⁶⁶

VIII. While improvements so important with respect to the state of society and the administration of justice gradually made progress in Europe, sentiments more

* Note XXVI.

liberal and generous had begun to animate the nobles. These were inspired by the spirit of chivalry, which, though considered, commonly, as a wild institution, the effect of caprice and the source of extravagance, arose naturally from the state of society at that period, and had a very serious influence in refining the manners of the European nations. The feudal state was a state of almost perpetual war, rapine, and anarchy, during which the weak and unarmed were exposed to insults or injuries. The power of the sovereign was too limited to prevent these wrongs, and the administration of justice too feeble to redress them. The most effectual protection against violence and oppression was often found to be that which the valour and generosity of private persons afforded. The same spirit of enterprise which had prompted so many gentlemen to take arms in defence of the oppressed pilgrims in Palestine incited others to declare themselves the patrons and avengers of injured innocence at home. When the final reduction of the Holy Land under the dominion of infidels put an end to these foreign expeditions, the latter was the only employment left for the activity and courage of adventurers. To check the insolence of overgrown oppressors, to rescue the helpless from captivity, to protect or to avenge women, orphans, and ecclesiastics, who could not bear arms in their own defence, to redress wrongs, and to remove grievances, were deemed acts of the highest prowess and merit. Valour, humanity, courtesy, justice, honour, were the characteristic qualities of chivalry. To these was added religion, which mingled itself with every passion and institution during the Middle Ages, and, by infusing a large proportion of enthusiastic zeal, gave them such force as carried them to romantic excess. Men were trained to knighthood by a long previous discipline; they were admitted into the order by solemnities no

less devout than pompous; every person of noble birth courted that honour; it was deemed a distinction superior to royalty; and monarchs were proud to receive it from the hands of private gentlemen.

This singular institution, in which valour, gallantry, and religion were so strangely blended, was wonderfully adapted to the taste and genius of martial nobles; and its effects were soon visible in their manners. War was carried on with less ferocity, when humanity came to be deemed the ornament of knighthood no less than courage. More gentle and polished manners were introduced, when courtesy was recommended as the most amiable of knightly virtues. Violence and oppression decreased, when it was reckoned meritorious to check and to punish them. A scrupulous adherence to truth, with the most religious attention to fulfil every engagement, became the distinguishing characteristic of a gentleman, because chivalry was regarded as the school of honour and inculcated the most delicate sensibility with respect to those points. The admiration of these qualities, together with the high distinctions and prerogatives conferred on knighthood in every part of Europe, inspired persons of noble birth on some occasions with a species of military fanaticism, and led them to extravagant enterprises. But they deeply imprinted on their minds the principles of generosity and honour. These were strengthened by everything that can affect the senses or touch the heart. The wild exploits of those romantic knights who sallied forth in quest of adventures are well known, and have been treated with proper ridicule. The political and permanent effects of the spirit of chivalry have been less observed. Perhaps the humanity which accompanies all the operations of war, the refinements of gallantry, and the point of honour, the three chief circumstances which distinguish modern from ancient manners, may

be ascribed in a great measure to this institution, which has appeared whimsical to superficial observers, but by its effects has proved of great benefit to mankind. The sentiments which chivalry inspired had a wonderful influence on manners and conduct during the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. They were so deeply rooted that they continued to operate after the vigour and reputation of the institution itself began to decline. Some considerable transactions recorded in the following history resemble the adventurous exploits of chivalry rather than the well-regulated operations of sound policy. Some of the most eminent personages whose characters will be delineated were strongly tinctured with this romantic spirit. Francis I. was ambitious to distinguish himself by all the qualities of an accomplished knight, and endeavoured to imitate the enterprising genius of chivalry in war, as well as its pomp and courtesy during peace. The fame which the French monarch acquired by these splendid actions so far dazzled his more temperate rival that he departed on some occasions from his usual prudence and moderation, and emulated Francis in deeds of prowess or of gallantry.⁶⁷

IX. The progress of science and the cultivation of literature had considerable effect in changing the manners of the European nations and introducing that civility and refinement by which they are now distinguished. At the time when their empire was overthrown, the Romans, though they had lost that correct taste which has rendered the productions of their ancestors standards of excellence and models of imitation for succeeding ages, still preserved their love of letters and cultivated the arts with great ardour. But rude barbarians were so far from being struck with any

* Note XXVII.

admiration of these unknown accomplishments that they despised them. They were not arrived at that state of society when those faculties of the human mind which have beauty and elegance for their objects begin to unfold themselves. They were strangers to most of those wants and desires which are the parents of ingenious invention; and, as they did not comprehend either the merit or utility of the Roman arts, they destroyed the monuments of them, with an industry not inferior to that which their posterity have since studied to preserve or to recover them. The convulsions occasioned by the settlement of so many unpolished tribes in the empire, the frequent as well as violent revolutions in every kingdom which they established, together with the interior defects in the form of government which they introduced, banished security and leisure, prevented the growth of taste or the culture of science, and kept Europe, during several centuries, in that state of ignorance which has been already described. Put the events and institutions which I have enumerated produced great alterations in society. As soon as their operation, in restoring liberty and independence to one part of the community, began to be felt, as soon as they began to communicate to all the members of society some taste of the advantages arising from commerce, from public order, and from personal security, the human mind became conscious of powers which it did not formerly perceive, and fond of occupations or pursuits of which it was formerly incapable. Towards the beginning of the twelfth century we discern the first symptoms of its awakening from that lethargy in which it had been long sunk, and observe it turning with curiosity and attention towards new objects.

The first literary efforts, however, of the European nations in the Middle Ages were extremely ill directed. Among nations, as well as individuals, the powers of

imagination attain some degree of vigour before the intellectual faculties are much exercised in speculative or abstract disquisition. Men are poets before they are philosophers; they feel with sensibility, and describe with force, when they have made but little progress in investigation or reasoning. The age of Homer and of Hesiod long preceded that of Thales or of Socrates. But, unhappily for literature, our ancestors, deviating from this course which nature points out, plunged at once into the depths of abstruse and metaphysical inquiry. They had been converted to the Christian faith soon after they settled in their new conquests. But they did not receive it pure; the presumption of men had added to the simple and instructive doctrines of Christianity the theories of a vain philosophy, that attempted to penetrate into mysteries and to decide questions which the limited faculties of the human mind are unable to comprehend or to resolve. These overcurious speculations were incorporated with the system of religion, and came to be considered as the most essential part of it. As soon, then, as curiosity prompted men to inquire and to reason, these were the subjects which first presented themselves and engaged their attention. The scholastic theology, with its infinite train of bold disquisitions, and subtle distinctions concerning points which are not the object of human reason, was the first production of the spirit of inquiry after it began to resume some degree of activity and vigour in Europe. It was not, however, this circumstance alone that gave such a strong turn to the minds of men, when they began again to exercise talents which they had so long neglected. Most of the persons who attempted to revive literature in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had received instruction or derived their principles of science from the Greeks in the Eastern empire, or from the Arabians in Spain and

Africa. Both these people, acute and inquisitive to excess, had corrupted those sciences which they cultivated. The former rendered theology a system of speculative refinement or of endless controversy; the latter communicated to philosophy a spirit of metaphysical and frivolous subtlety. Misled by these guides, the persons who first applied to science were involved in a maze of intricate inquiries. Instead of allowing their fancy to take its natural range, and to produce such works of invention as might have improved their taste and refined their sentiments,—instead of cultivating those arts which embellish human life and render it comfortable,—they were fettered by authority, they were led astray by example, and wasted the whole force of their genius in speculations as unavailing as they were difficult.

But, fruitless and ill directed as these speculations were, their novelty roused and their boldness interested the human mind. The ardour with which men pursued these uninviting studies was astonishing. Genuine philosophy was never cultivated, in any enlightened age, with more zeal. Schools, upon the model of those instituted by Charlemagne, were opened in every cathedral, and almost in every monastery of note. Colleges and universities were erected and formed into communities or corporations, governed by their own laws and invested with separate and extensive jurisdiction over their own members. A regular course of studies was planned; privileges of great value were conferred on masters and scholars; academical titles and honours of various kinds were invented as a recompense for both. Nor was it in the schools alone that superiority in science led to reputation and authority: it became an object of respect in life, and advanced such as acquired it to a rank of no inconsiderable eminence. Allured by all these advantages, an incredible number of students resorted to

those new seats of learning, and crowded with eagerness into that new path which was open to fame and distinction.

But, how considerable soever these first efforts may appear, there was one circumstance which prevented the effects of them from being as extensive as they naturally ought to have been. All the languages in Europe, during the period under review, were barbarous; they were destitute of elegance, of force, and even of perspicuity. No attempt had been hitherto made to improve or to polish them. The Latin tongue was consecrated by the Church to religion; custom, with authority scarcely less sacred, had appropriated it to literature. All the sciences cultivated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were taught in Latin; all books with respect to them were written in that language. It would have been deemed a degradation of any important subject to have treated of it in a modern language. This confined science within a very narrow circle; the learned alone were admitted into the temple of knowledge; the gate was shut against all others, who were suffered to remain involved in their former darkness and ignorance.

But though science was thus prevented, during several ages, from diffusing itself through society, and its influence was much circumscribed, the progress which it made may be mentioned, nevertheless, among the great causes which contributed to introduce a change of manners into Europe. The ardent though ill-judged spirit of inquiry which I have described occasioned a fermentation of mind that put ingenuity and invention in motion and gave them vigour. It led men to a new employment of their faculties, which they found to be agreeable as well as interesting. It accustomed them to exercises and occupations which tended to soften their manners, and to give them some relish for the gentle

virtues peculiar to people among whom science has been cultivated with success.⁶⁸

X. The progress of commerce had considerable influence in polishing the manners of the European nations, and in establishing among them order, equal laws, and humanity. The wants of men in the original and most simple state of society are so few, and their desires so limited, that they rest contented with the natural productions of their climate and soil, or with what they can add to these by their own rude industry. They have no superfluities to dispose of, and few necessities that demand a supply. Every little community, subsisting on its own domestic stock and satisfied with it, is either little acquainted with the states around it, or at variance with them. Society and manners must be considerably improved, and many provisions must be made for public order and personal security, before a liberal intercourse can take place between different nations. We find, accordingly, that the first effect of the settlement of the barbarians in the empire was to divide those nations which the Roman power had united. Europe was broken into many separate communities. The intercourse between these divided states ceased almost entirely during several centuries. Navigation was dangerous in seas infested by pirates; nor could strangers trust to a friendly reception in the ports of uncivilized nations. Even between distant parts of the same kingdom the communication was rare and difficult. The lawless rapine of banditti, together with the avowed exactions of the nobles, scarcely less formidable and oppressive, rendered a journey of any length a perilous enterprise. Fixed to the spot in which they resided, the greater part of the inhabitants of Europe lost, in a great measure, the knowledge of

⁶⁸ Note XXVIIIL

remote regions, and were unacquainted with their names, their situations, their climates, and their commodities.⁶⁹

Various causes, however, contributed to revive the spirit of commerce, and to renew, in some degree, the intercourse between different nations. The Italians, by their connection with Constantinople and other cities of the Greek empire, had preserved in their own country considerable relish for the precious commodities and curious manufactures of the East. They communicated some knowledge of these to the countries contiguous to Italy. But this commerce being extremely limited, the intercourse which it occasioned between different nations was not considerable. The crusades, by leading multitudes from every corner of Europe into Asia, opened a more extensive communication between the East and West, which subsisted for two centuries; and though the object of these expeditions was conquest, and not commerce, though the issue of them proved as unfortunate as the motives for undertaking them were wild and enthusiastic, their commercial effects, as hath been shown, were both beneficial and permanent. During the continuance of the crusades, the great cities in Italy, and in other countries of Europe, acquired liberty, and together with it such privileges as rendered them respectable and independent communities. Thus, in every state there was formed a new order of citizens, to whom commerce presented itself as their proper object and opened to them a certain path to wealth and consideration. Soon after the close of the holy war, the mariner's compass was invented, which, by rendering navigation more secure, encouraged it to become more adventurous, facilitated the communication between remote nations, and brought them nearer to each other.

* Note XXIX.

The Italian states, during the same period, established a regular commerce with the East in the ports of Egypt, and drew from thence all the rich products of the Indies. They introduced into their own territories manufactures of various kinds, and carried them on with great ingenuity and vigour. They attempted new arts, and transplanted from warmer climates, to which they had been hitherto deemed peculiar, several natural productions which now furnish the materials of a lucrative and extended commerce. All these commodities, whether imported from Asia or produced by their own skill, they disposed of to great advantage among the other people of Europe, who began to acquire some taste for an elegance in living unknown to their ancestors, or despised by them. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the commerce of Europe was almost entirely in the hands of the Italians, more commonly known in those ages by the name of Lombards. Companies or societies of Lombard merchants settled in every different kingdom. They were taken under the immediate protection of the several governments. They enjoyed extensive privileges and immunities. The operation of the ancient barbarous laws concerning strangers was suspended with respect to them. They became the carriers, the manufacturers, and the bankers of all Europe.

While the Italians, in the South of Europe, were cultivating trade with such industry and success, the commercial spirit awakened in the North towards the middle of the thirteenth century. As the nations around the Baltic were at that time extremely barbarous, and infested that sea with their piracies, the cities of Lubec and Hamburg, soon after they began to open some trade with these people, found it necessary to enter into a league of mutual defence. They derived such advantages from this union that other

towns acceded to their confederacy, and in a short time eighty of the most considerable cities scattered through those extensive countries which stretch from the bottom of the Baltic to Cologne on the Rhine joined in the famous Hanseatic league, which became so formidable that its alliance was courted and its enmity was dreaded by the greatest monarchs. The members of this powerful association formed the first systematic plan of commerce known in the Middle Ages, and conducted it by common laws enacted in their general assemblies. They supplied the rest of Europe with naval stores, and pitched on different towns, the most eminent of which was at Bruges in Flanders, where they established staples in which their commerce was regularly carried on. Thither the Lombards brought the productions of India, together with the manufactures of Italy, and exchanged them for the more bulky but not less useful commodities of the North. The Hanseatic merchants disposed of the cargoes which they received from the Lombards in the ports of the Baltic, or carried them up the great rivers into the interior parts of Germany.

This regular intercourse opened between the nations in the North and South of Europe made them sensible of their mutual wants, and created such new and increasing demands for commodities of every kind that it excited among the inhabitants of the Netherlands a more vigorous spirit in carrying on the two great manufactures of wool and flax, which seem to have been considerable in that country as early as the age of Charlemagne. As Bruges became the centre of communication between the Lombard and Hanseatic merchants, the Flemings traded with both in that city to such extent, as well as advantage, as spread among them a general habit of industry, which long rendered Flanders and the adjacent provinces the most opulent.

the most populous, and best cultivated countries in Europe.

Struck with the flourishing state of these provinces, of which he discerned the true cause, Edward III. of England endeavoured to excite a spirit of industry among his own subjects, who, blind to the advantages of their situation, and ignorant of the source from which opulence was destined to flow into their country, were so little attentive to their commercial interests as hardly to attempt those manufactures, the materials of which they furnished to foreigners. By alluring Flemish artizans to settle in his dominions, as well as by many wise laws for the encouragement and regulation of trade, Edward gave a beginning to the woollen manufactures of England, and first turned the active and enterprising genius of his people towards those arts which have raised the English to the highest rank among commercial nations.

This increase of commerce and of intercourse between nations, how inconsiderable soever it may appear in respect of their rapid and extensive progress during the last and present age, seems wonderfully great when we compare it with the state of both in Europe previous to the twelfth century. It did not fail of producing great effects. Commerce tends to wear off those prejudices which maintain distinction and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes the manners of men. It unites them by one of the strongest of all ties, the desire of supplying their mutual wants. It disposes them to peace, by establishing in every state an order of citizens bound by their interests to be the guardians of public tranquillity. As soon as the commercial spirit acquires vigour and begins to gain an ascendant in any society, we discover a new genius in its policy, its alliances, its wars, and its negotiations. Conspicuous proofs of this occur in the history of the Italian states,

of the Hanseatic league, and the cities of the Netherlands during the period under review. In proportion as commerce made its way into the different countries of Europe, they successively turned their attention to those objects and adopted those manners which occupy and distinguish polished nations.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Note XXX.

SECTION II.

VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE WITH RESPECT TO THE COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL FORCE REQUISITE IN FOREIGN OPERATIONS.

Improved State of Society at the Beginning of the Fifteenth Century.—

The Concentration of Resources in European States.—The Power of Monarchs: their Revenues and Armies.—Affairs of Different States at first entirely distinct.—Progress of Combination.—Loss of Continental Territory by the English.—Effects upon the French Monarchy.—Growth of Standing Armies, and of the Royal Prerogative under Louis XI.—His Example imitated in England and in Spain.—The Heiress of Burgundy.—Perfidious Conduct of Louis XI. towards her.—Her Marriage with Maximilian, Archduke of Austria.—Invasion of Italy by Charles VIII.—The Balance of Power.—Use of Infantry in Armies.—League of Cambray against Venice.

SUCH are the events and institutions which, by their powerful operation, contributed gradually to introduce regular government and polished manners in the various nations of Europe. When we survey the state of society, or the character of individuals, at the opening of the fifteenth century, and then turn back to view the condition of both at the time when the barbarous tribes which overturned the Roman power completed their settlement in their new conquests the progress which mankind had made towards order and refinement will appear immense.

Government, however, was still far from having attained that state in which extensive monarchies act with the united vigour of the whole community, or carry on great undertakings with perseverance and success. Small tribes or communities, even in their rudest state, may operate in concert and exert their utmost force. They are excited to act, not by the distant objects or the refined speculations which interest or affect men in

polished societies, but by their present feelings. The insults of an enemy kindle resentment; the success of a rival tribe awakens emulation: these passions communicate from breast to breast, and all the members of the community, with united ardour, rush into the field in order to gratify their revenge or to acquire distinction. But in widely-extended states, such as the great kingdoms of Europe at the beginning of the fifteenth century, where there is little intercourse between the distant members of the community, and where every great enterprise requires previous concert and long preparation, nothing can rouse and call forth their united strength but the absolute command of a despot or the powerful influence of regular policy. Of the former, the vast empires in the East are an example: the irresistible mandate of the sovereign reaches the most remote provinces of his dominions, and compels whatever number of his subjects he is pleased to summon to follow his standard. The kingdoms of Europe, in the present age, are an instance of the latter: the prince, by the less violent but no less effectual operation of laws and a well-regulated government, is enabled to avail himself of the whole force of his state, and to employ it in enterprises which require strenuous and persevering efforts.

But at the opening of the fifteenth century the political constitution in all the kingdoms of Europe was very different from either of these states of government. The several monarchs, though they had somewhat enlarged the boundaries of prerogative by successful encroachments on the immunities and privileges of the nobility, were possessed of an authority extremely limited. The laws and interior police of kingdoms, though much improved by the various events and regulations which I have enumerated, were still feeble and imperfect. In every country, a numerous body of nobles, who continued to be formidable notwithstanding

ing the various expedients employed to depress them, watched all the motions of their sovereign with a jealous attention which set bounds to his ambition, and either prevented his forming schemes of extensive enterprise, or obstructed the execution of them.

The ordinary revenues of every prince were so extremely small as to be inadequate to any great undertaking. He depended for extraordinary supplies on the good will of his subjects, who granted them often with a reluctant, and always with a sparing, hand.

As the revenues of princes were inconsiderable, the armies which they could bring into the field were unfit for long and effectual service. Instead of being able to employ troops trained to skill in arms, and to military subordination, by regular discipline, monarchs were obliged to depend on such forces as their vassals conducted to their standard in consequence of their military tenures. These, as they were bound to remain under arms only for a short time, could not march far from their usual place of residence, and, being more attached to the lord of whom they held than to the sovereign whom they served, were often as much disposed to counteract as to forward his schemes. Nor were they, even if they had been more subject to the command of the monarch, proper instruments to carry into execution any great and arduous enterprise. The strength of an army, formed either for conquest or defence, lies in infantry. To the stability and discipline of their legions, consisting chiefly of infantry, the Romans, during the times of the republic, were indebted for their victories; and when their descendants, forgetting the institutions which had led them to universal dominion, so far altered their military system as to place their principal confidence in a numerous cavalry, the undisciplined impetuosity of the barbarous nations, who fought mostly on foot, was sufficient, as I have already ob-

served, to overcome them. These nations, soon after they settled in their new conquests, uninstructed by the fatal error of the Romans, relinquished the customs of their ancestors, and converted the chief force of their armies into cavalry. Among the Romans this change was occasioned by the effeminacy of their troops, who could not endure the fatigues of service which their more virtuous and hardy ancestors had sustained with ease. Among the people who established the new monarchies into which Europe was divided, this innovation in military discipline seems to have flowed from the pride of the nobles, who, scorning to mingle with persons of inferior rank, aimed at being distinguished from them in the field as well as during peace. The institution of chivalry, and the frequency of tournaments, in which knights, in complete armour, entered the lists on horseback with extraordinary splendour, displaying amazing address, force, and valour, brought cavalry into still greater esteem. The fondness for that service increased to such a degree that during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the armies of Europe were composed almost entirely of cavalry. No gentleman would appear in the field but on horseback. To serve in any other manner he would have deemed derogatory to his rank. The cavalry, by way of distinction, was called *the battle*, and on it alone depended the fate of every action. The infantry, collected from the dregs and refuse of the people, ill armed and worse disciplined, was almost of no account.

As these circumstances rendered the operations of particular kingdoms less considerable and less vigorous, so they long kept the princes of Europe from giving such attention to the schemes and transactions of their neighbours as might lead them to form any regular system of public security. They were, of consequence, prevented from uniting in confederacy, or from acting

with concert, in order to establish such a distribution and balance of power as should hinder any state from rising to a superiority which might endanger the general liberty and independence. During several centuries, the nations of Europe appear to have considered themselves as separate societies, scarcely connected together by any common interest, and little concerned in each other's affairs or operations. An extensive commerce did not afford them an opportunity of observing and penetrating into the schemes of every different state. They had not ambassadors residing constantly in every court, to watch and give early intelligence of all its motions. The expectation of remote advantages, or the prospect of distant and contingent evils, was not sufficient to excite nations to take arms. Such only as were within the sphere of immediate danger, and unavoidably exposed to injury or insult, thought themselves interested in any contest or bound to take precautions for their own safety.

Whoever records the transactions of any of the more considerable European states during the two last centuries must write the history of Europe. Its various kingdoms, throughout that period, have been formed into one great system, so closely united that, each holding a determinate station, the operations of one are so felt by all as to influence their counsels and regulate their measures. But previous to the fifteenth century, unless when vicinity of territory rendered the occasions of discord frequent and unavoidable, or when national emulation fomented or embittered the spirit of hostility, the affairs of different countries are seldom interwoven with each other. In each kingdom of Europe great events and revolutions happened, which the other powers beheld with almost the same indifference as if they had been uninterested spectators, to whom the effect of these transactions could never extend.

During the violent struggles between France and England, and notwithstanding the alarming progress which was made towards rendering one prince the master of both these kingdoms, hardly one measure which can be considered as the result of a sagacious and prudent policy was formed in order to guard against an event so fatal to Europe. The Dukes of Burgundy and Bretagne, whom their situation would not permit to remain neutral, engaged, it is true, in the contest; but in taking their part they seem rather to have followed the impulse of their passions than to have been guided by any just discernment of the danger which threatened themselves and the tranquillity of Europe. The other princes, seemingly unaffected by the alternate successes of the contending parties, left them to decide the quarrel by themselves, or interposed only by feeble and ineffectual negotiations.

Notwithstanding the perpetual hostilities in which the various kingdoms of Spain were engaged during several centuries, and the successive occurrences which visibly tended to unite that part of the continent into one great monarchy, the princes of Europe hardly took any step from which we may conclude that they gave a proper attention to that important event. They permitted a power to arise imperceptibly, and to acquire strength there, which soon became formidable to all its neighbours.

Amidst the violent convulsions with which the spirit of domination in the see of Rome, and the turbulent ambition of the German nobles, agitated the empire, neither the authority of the popes, seconded by all their artifices and intrigues, nor the solicitations of the emperors, could induce any of the powerful monarchs in Europe to engage in their quarrel, or to avail themselves of many favourable opportunities of interposing with effect and advantage.

This amazing inactivity during transactions so interesting is not to be imputed to any incapacity of discerning their political consequences. The power of judging with sagacity, and of acting with vigour, is the portion of men of every age. The monarchs who reigned in the different kingdoms of Europe, during several centuries, were not blind to their particular interest, negligent of the public safety, or strangers to the method of securing both. If they did not adopt that salutary system which teaches modern politicians to take the alarm at the prospect of distant dangers, which prompts them to check the first encroachments of any formidable power, and which renders each state the guardian, in some degree, of the rights and independence of all its neighbours, this was owing entirely to such imperfections and disorders in the civil government of each country as made it impossible for sovereigns to act suitably to those ideas which the posture of affairs and their own observation must have suggested.

But during the course of the fifteenth century various events happened which, by giving princes more entire command of the force in their respective dominions, rendered their operations more vigorous and extensive. In consequence of this, the affairs of different kingdoms becoming more frequently as well as more intimately connected, they were gradually accustomed to act in concert and confederacy, and were insensibly prepared for forming a system of policy in order to establish or to preserve such a balance of power as was most consistent with the general security. It was during the reign of Charles V. that the ideas on which this system is founded first came to be fully understood. It was then that the maxims by which it has been uniformly maintained since that era were universally adopted. On this account, a view of the causes and events which contributed to establish a plan of policy

more salutary and extensive than any that has taken place in the conduct of human affairs is not only a necessary introduction to the following work, but is a capital object in the history of Europe.

The first event that occasioned any considerable alteration in the arrangement of affairs in Europe was the annexation of the extensive territories which England possessed on the continent to the crown of France. While the English were masters of several of the most fertile and opulent provinces in France, and a great part of its most martial inhabitants was bound to follow their standard, an English monarch considered himself rather as the rival than as the vassal of the sovereign of whom he held. The kings of France, circumscribed and thwarted in their schemes and operations by an adversary no less jealous than formidable, durst not enter upon any enterprise of importance or of difficulty. The English were always at hand, ready to oppose them. They disputed even their right to their crown, and, being able to penetrate with ease into the heart of the kingdom, could arm against them those very hands which ought to have been employed in their defence. Timid counsels and feeble efforts were natural to monarchs in such a situation. France, dismembered and overawed, could not attain its proper station in the system of Europe. But the death of Henry V. of England, happily for France, and not unfortunately for his own country, delivered the French from the calamity of having a foreign master seated on their throne. The weakness of a long minority, the dissensions in the English court, together with the unsteady and languid conduct which these occasioned, afforded the French a favourable opportunity of recovering the territories which they had lost. The native valour of the French nobility, heightened to an enthusiastic confidence by a supposed interposition of Heaven in their behalf,

conducted in the field by skilful leaders, and directed in the cabinet by a prudent monarch, was exerted with such vigour and success, during this favourable juncture, as not only wrested from the English their new conquests, but stripped them of their ancient possessions in France, and reduced them within the narrow precincts of Calais and its petty territory.

As soon as so many considerable provinces were re-united to their dominions, the kings of France, conscious of this acquisition of strength, began to form bolder schemes of interior policy as well as of foreign operations. They immediately became formidable to their neighbours, who began to fix their attention on their measures and motions, the importance of which they fully perceived. From this era, France, possessed of the advantages which it derives from the situation and contiguity of its territories, as well as from the number and valour of its people, rose to new influence in Europe, and was the first power in a condition to give alarm to the jealousy or fears of the states around it.

Nor was France indebted for this increase of importance merely to the reunion of the provinces which had been torn from it. A circumstance attended the recovery of these which, though less considerable and less observed, contributed not a little to give additional vigour and decision to all the efforts of that monarchy. During the obstinate struggles between France and England, all the defects of the military system under the feudal government were sensibly felt. A war of long continuance languished, when carried on by troops bound and accustomed to keep the field only for a short time. Armies composed chiefly of heavy-armed cavalry were unfit either for the defence or the attack of the many towns and castles which it became necessary to guard or to reduce. In order to obtain such permanent and effective force as became requisite

during these lengthened contests, the kings of France took into their pay considerable bands of mercenary soldiers, levied sometimes among their own subjects, and sometimes in foreign countries. But, as the feudal policy provided no sufficient fund for such extraordinary service, these adventurers were dismissed at the close of every campaign, or upon any prospect of accommodation ; and, having been little accustomed to the restraints of discipline, they frequently turned their arms against the country which they had been hired to defend, and desolated it with cruelty not inferior to that of its foreign enemies.

A body of troops kept constantly on foot, and regularly trained to military subordination, would have supplied what was wanting in the feudal constitution, and have furnished princes with the means of executing enterprises to which they were then unequal. Such an establishment, however, was so repugnant to the genius of feudal policy, and so incompatible with the privileges and pretensions of the nobility, that during several centuries no monarch was either so bold or so powerful as to venture on any step towards introducing it. At last, Charles VII., availing himself of the reputation which he had acquired by his successes against the English, and taking advantage of the impressions of terror which such a formidable enemy had left upon the minds of his subjects, executed that which his predecessors durst not attempt. Under pretence of having always ready a force sufficient to defend the kingdom against any sudden invasion of the English, he, at the time when he disbanded his other troops, retained under arms a body of nine thousand cavalry and of sixteen thousand infantry. He appropriated funds for the regular payment of these ; he stationed them in different places of the kingdom, according to his pleasure, and appointed the officers who commanded

and disciplined them. The prime nobility courted this service, in which they were taught to depend on their sovereign, to execute his orders, and to look up to him as the judge and rewarder of their merit. The feudal militia, composed of the vassals whom the nobles could call out to follow their standard, as it was in no degree comparable to a body of soldiers regularly trained to war, sunk gradually in reputation. The strength of an army was no longer estimated solely by the number of cavalry which served in it. From the time that gunpowder was invented, and the use of cannon in the field became general, horsemen cased in complete armour lost all the advantages which gave them the pre-eminence over other soldiers. The helmet, the shield, and the breastplate, which resisted the arrow or the spear, no longer afforded them security against these new instruments of destruction. The service of infantry rose again into esteem, and victories were gained, and conquests made, chiefly by their efforts. The nobles and their military tenants, though sometimes summoned to the field, according to ancient form, were considered as an incumbrance upon the troops with which they acted, and were viewed with contempt by soldiers accustomed to the vigorous and steady operations of regular service.

Thus the regulations of Charles VII., by establishing the first standing army known in Europe, occasioned an important revolution in its affairs and policy. By taking from the nobles the sole direction of the national military force, which had raised them to such high authority and importance, a deep wound was given to the feudal aristocracy, in that part where its power seemed to be most complete.

France, by forming this body of regular troops, at a time when there was hardly a squadron or company kept in constant pay in any other part of Europe,

acquired such advantages over its neighbours, either in attack or defence, that self-preservation made it necessary for them to imitate its example. Mercenary troops were introduced into all the considerable kingdoms on the continent. They gradually became the only military force that was employed or trusted. It has long been the chief object of policy to increase and to support them. It has long been the great aim of princes and ministers to discredit and to annihilate all other means of national activity or defence.

As the kings of France got the start of other powers in establishing a military force in their dominions, which enabled them to carry on foreign operations with more vigour and to greater extent, so they were the first who effectually broke the feudal aristocracy and humbled the great vassals of the crown, who by their exorbitant power had long circumscribed the royal prerogative within very narrow limits and had rendered all the efforts of the monarchs of Europe inconsiderable. Many things concurred to undermine, gradually, the power of the feudal aristocracy in France. The wealth and property of the nobility were greatly impaired during the long wars which the kingdom was obliged to maintain with the English. The extraordinary zeal with which they exerted themselves in defence of their country against its ancient enemies exhausted entirely the fortunes of some great families. As almost every province in the kingdom was in its turn the seat of war, the lands of others were exposed to the depredations of the enemy, were ravaged by the mercenary troops which their sovereigns hired occasionally but could not pay, or were desolated with rage still more destructive by the peasants, in different insurrections. At the same time, the necessities of government having forced their kings upon the desperate expedient of making great and sudden alterations in the current coin of the kingdom,

Louis XI. and his Minister, Olivier le Dain.



prerogative so far beyond its ancient limits, that, from being the most dependent prince who had ever sat upon the throne of France, he came to possess, during the latter years of his reign, a degree of authority which none of his predecessors had enjoyed for several ages.²

That plan of humbling the nobility which Charles began to execute, his son Louis XI. carried on with a bolder spirit and with greater success. Louis was formed by nature to be a tyrant; and at whatever period he had been called to ascend the throne, his reign must have abounded with schemes to oppress his people and to render his own power absolute. Subtle, unfeeling, cruel, a stranger to every principle of integrity, and regardless of decency, he scorned all the restraints which a sense of honour or the desire of fame imposes even upon ambitious men. Sagacious, at the same time, to discern what he deemed his true interest, and influenced by that alone, he was capable of pursuing it with a persevering industry, and of adhering to it with a systematic spirit, from which no object could divert and no danger could deter him.

The maxims of his administration were as profound as they were fatal to the privileges of the nobility. He filled all the departments of government with new men, and often with persons whom he called from the lowest as well as the most despised functions in life and raised at pleasure to stations of great power or trust. These were his only confidants, whom he consulted in forming his plans, and to whom he committed the execution of them; while the nobles, accustomed to be the companions, the favourites, and the ministers of their sovereigns, were treated with such studied and mortifying neglect that, if they would not submit to follow a court

² *Histoire de France par Velly et Villaret*, tom. xv. pp. 331, etc., 389; tom. xvi. p. 324.—*Variations de la Monarchie Françoise*, tom. iii. p. 162.

in which they appeared without any shadow of their ancient power, they were obliged to retire to their castles, where they remained unemployed and forgotten. Not satisfied with having rendered the nobles of less consideration by taking out of their hands the sole direction of affairs, Louis added insult to neglect, and, by violating their most valuable privileges, endeavoured to degrade the order and to reduce the members of it to the same level with other subjects. Persons of the highest rank among them, if so bold as to oppose his schemes or so unfortunate as to awaken the jealousy of his capricious temper, were persecuted with rigour from which all who belonged to the order of nobility had hitherto been exempt; they were tried by judges who had no right to take cognizance of their actions, and were subjected to torture, or condemned to an ignominious death, without regard to their birth or condition. The people, accustomed to see the blood of the most illustrious personages shed by the hands of the common executioner, to behold them shut up in dungeons and carried about in cages of iron, began to view the nobility with less reverence than formerly, and looked up with terror to the royal authority, which seemed to have humbled or annihilated every other power in the kingdom.

At the same time, Louis, being afraid that oppression might rouse the nobles, whom the rigour of his government had intimidated, or that self-preservation might at last teach them to unite, dexterously scattered among them the seeds of discord, and industriously fomented those ancient animosities between the great families, which the spirit of jealousy and emulation natural to the feudal government had originally kindled and still kept alive. To accomplish this, all the arts of intrigue, all the mysteries and refinements of his fraudulent policy, were employed, and with such success that,

at a juncture which required the most strenuous efforts as well as the most perfect union, the nobles never acted, except during one short sally of resentment at the beginning of his reign, either with vigour or in concert.

As he stripped the nobility of their privileges, he added to the power and prerogative of the crown. In order to have at command such a body of soldiers as might be sufficient to crush any force that his disaffected subjects could draw together, he not only kept on foot the regular troops which his father had raised, but, besides augmenting their number considerably, he took into his pay six thousand Swiss, at that time the best disciplined and most formidable infantry in Europe.³ From the jealousy natural to tyrants, he confided in these foreign mercenaries, as the most devoted instruments of oppression, and the most faithful guardians of the power which he had usurped. That they might be ready to act on the shortest warning, he, during the latter years of his reign, kept a considerable body of them encamped in one place.⁴

Great funds were requisite, not only to defray the expense of this additional establishment, but to supply the sums employed in the various enterprises which the restless activity of his genius prompted him to undertake. But the prerogative that his father had assumed of levying taxes without the concurrence of the states-general, which he was careful not only to retain, but to extend, enabled him to provide in some measure for the increasing charges of government.

What his prerogative, enlarged as it was, could not furnish, his address procured. He was the first monarch in Europe who discovered the method of managing those

³ Mém. de Comines, tom. i. p. 367.—Dan., Hist. de la Milice Françoise, tom. i. p. 182. ⁴ Mém. de Comines, tom. i. p. 381.

great assemblies in which the feudal policy had vested the power of granting subsidies and of imposing taxes. He first taught other princes the fatal art of beginning their attack on public liberty by corrupting the source from which it should flow. By exerting all his power and address in influencing the election of representatives, by bribing or overawing the members, and by various changes which he artfully made in the form of their deliberations, Louis acquired such entire direction of these assemblies that, from being the vigilant guardians of the privileges and property of the people, he rendered them tamely subservient towards promoting the most odious measures of his reign.⁵ As no power remained to set bounds to his exactions, he not only continued all the taxes imposed by his father, but he made great additions to them, which amounted to a sum that appeared astonishing to his contemporaries.⁶

Nor was it the power alone or wealth of the crown that Louis increased: he extended its territories by acquisitions of various kinds. He got possession of Roussillon by purchase; Provence was conveyed to him by the will of Charles de Anjou; and upon the death of Charles the Bold he seized with a strong hand Burgundy and Artois, which had belonged to that prince. Thus, during the course of a single reign France was formed into one compact kingdom, and the steady, unrelenting policy of Louis XI. not only subdued the haughty spirit of the feudal nobles, but established a species of government scarcely less absolute or less terrible than Eastern despotism.

But, fatal as his administration was to the liberties

⁵ Mém. de Comines, tom. i. p. 136.—Chronique Scandaleuse, ibid., tom. ii. p. 71.

⁶ Mém. de Comines, tom. i. p. 334.—Charles VII. levied taxes to the amount of 1,800,000 francs;

Louis XI. raised 4,700,000. The former had in pay 9000 cavalry and 16,000 infantry. The latter augmented the cavalry to 15,000, and the infantry to 25,000. Ibid., tom. i. p. 384.

of his subjects, the authority which he acquired, the resources of which he became master, and his freedom from restraint in concerting his plans as well as in executing them, rendered his reign active and enterprising. Louis negotiated in all the courts of Europe; he observed the motions of all his neighbours; he engaged, either as principal or as an auxiliary, in every great transaction; his resolutions were prompt, his operations vigorous; and upon every emergence he could call forth into action the whole force of his kingdom. From the era of his reign, the kings of France, no longer fettered and circumscribed at home by a jealous nobility, have exerted themselves more abroad, have formed more extensive schemes of foreign conquests, and have carried on war with a spirit and vigour long unknown in Europe.

The example which Louis set was too inviting not to be imitated by other princes. Henry VII., as soon as he was seated on the throne of England, formed the plan of enlarging his own prerogative by breaking the power of the nobility. The circumstances under which he undertook to execute it were less favourable than those which induced Charles VII. to make the same attempt; and the spirit with which he conducted it was very different from that of Louis XI. Charles, by the success of his arms against the English, by the merit of having expelled them out of so many provinces, had established himself so firmly in the confidence of his people as encouraged him to make bold encroachments on the ancient constitution. The daring genius of Louis broke through every barrier, and endeavoured to surmount or to remove every obstacle that stood in his way. But Henry held the sceptre by a disputed title; a popular faction was ready every moment to take arms against him; and after long civil wars, during which the nobility had often displayed

their power in creating and deposing kings, he felt that the regal authority had been so much relaxed, and that he had entered into possession of a prerogative so much abridged, as rendered it necessary to carry on his measures deliberately and without any violent exertion. He endeavoured to undermine that formidable structure which he durst not attack by open force. His schemes, though cautious and slow in their operation, were well concerted, and productive in the end of great effects. By his laws permitting the barons to break the entails of their estates and expose them to sale; by his regulations to prevent the nobility from keeping in their service those numerous bands of retainers, which rendered them formidable and turbulent; by favouring the rising power of the commons; by encouraging population, agriculture, and commerce; by securing to his subjects, during a long reign, the enjoyment of the blessings which flow from the arts of peace; by accustoming them to an administration of government under which the laws were executed with steadiness and vigour,—he made imperceptibly considerable alterations in the English constitution, and transmitted to his successor authority so extensive as rendered him one of the most absolute monarchs in Europe and capable of the greatest and most vigorous efforts.

In Spain, the union of all its crowns by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, the glory that they acquired by the conquest of Granada, which brought the odious dominion of the Moors to a period, the command of the great armies which it had been necessary to keep long on foot in order to accomplish this, the wisdom and steadiness of their administration, and the address with which they availed themselves of every incident that occurred to humble the nobility and to extend their own prerogative, conspired in raising these monarchs to

such eminence and authority as none of their predecessors had ever enjoyed. Though several causes, which shall be explained in another place, prevented their attaining the same powers with the kings of France and England, and preserved the feudal constitution longer entire in Spain, their great abilities supplied the defects of their prerogative, and improved with such dexterity all the advantages which they possessed that Ferdinand carried on his foreign operations, which were very extensive, with extraordinary vigour and effect.

While these princes were thus enlarging the boundaries of prerogative, and taking such steps towards rendering their kingdoms capable of acting with union and force, events occurred which called them forth to exert the new powers which they had acquired. These engaged them in such a series of enterprises and negotiations that the affairs of all the considerable nations in Europe came to be insensibly interwoven with each other, and a great political system was gradually formed, which grew to be an object of universal attention.

The first event which merits notice, on account of its influence in producing this change in the state of Europe, was the marriage of the daughter of Charles the Bold, the sole heiress of the house of Burgundy. For some years before her father's death she had been considered as the apparent successor to his territories, and Charles had made proposals of marrying her to several different princes, with a view of alluring them, by that offer, to favour the schemes which his restless ambition was continually forming.

This rendered the alliance with her an object of general attention; and all the advantages of acquiring possession of her territories, the most opulent at that time, and the best cultivated, of any on this side of the Alps, were perfectly understood. As soon, then, as

the untimely death of Charles opened the succession, the eyes of all the princes in Europe were turned towards Mary, and they felt themselves deeply interested in the choice which she was about to make of the person on whom she would bestow that rich inheritance.

Louis XI., from whose kingdom several of the provinces which she possessed had been dismembered, and whose dominions stretched along the frontier of her territories, had every inducement to court her alliance. He had, likewise, a good title to expect the favourable reception of any reasonable proposition he should make with respect to the disposal of a princess who was the vassal of his crown and descended from the royal blood of France. There were only two propositions, however, which he could make with propriety. The one was the marriage of the dauphin, the other that of the count of Angoulême, a prince of the blood, with the heiress of Burgundy. By the former, he would have annexed all her territories to his crown, and have rendered France at once the most respectable monarchy in Europe. But the great disparity of age between the two parties, Mary being twenty and the dauphin only eight years old, the avowed resolution of the Flemings not to choose a master possessed of such power as might enable him to form schemes dangerous to their liberties, together with their dread of falling under the odious and oppressive government of Louis, were obstacles in the way of executing this plan which it was vain to think of surmounting. By the latter, the accomplishment of which might have been attained with ease, Mary having discovered some inclination to a match with the count of Angoulême,⁷ Louis would have prevented the dominions of the house of Burgundy from being conveyed to a rival power, and in return for such a splendid establishment for the count of Angoulême he must have obtained,

⁷ Mém. de Comines, tom. i. p. 358.

or would have extorted from him, concessions highly beneficial to the crown of France. But Louis had been accustomed so long to the intricacies of a crooked and insidious policy that he could not be satisfied with what was obvious and simple, and was so fond of artifice and refinement that he came to consider these rather as an ultimate object than merely as the means of conducting affairs. From this principle, no less than from his unwillingness to aggrandize any of his own subjects, or from his desire of oppressing the house of Burgundy, which he hated, he neglected the course which a prince less able and artful would have taken, and followed one more suited to his own genius.

He proposed to render himself, by force of arms, master of those provinces which Mary held of the crown of France, and even to push his conquests into her other territories while he amused her with insisting continually on the impracticable match with the dauphin. In prosecuting this plan he displayed wonderful talents and industry, and exhibited such scenes of treachery, falsehood, and cruelty as are amazing even in the history of Louis XI. Immediately upon the death of Charles he put his troops in motion and advanced towards the Netherlands. He corrupted the leading men in the provinces of Burgundy and Artois, and seduced them to desert their sovereign. He got admission into some of the frontier towns by bribing the governors; the gates of others were opened to him in consequence of his intrigues with the inhabitants. He negotiated with Mary; and, in order to render her odious to her subjects, he betrayed to them her most important secrets. He carried on a private correspondence with the two ministers whom she chiefly trusted, and then communicated the letters which he had received from them to the states of Flanders, who, enraged at their perfidy, brought them immediately to trial, tor-

tured them with extreme cruelty, and, unmoved by the tears and entreaties of their sovereign, who knew and approved of all that the ministers had done, they beheaded them in her presence.⁸

While Louis, by his conduct, unworthy of a great monarch, was securing the possession of Burgundy, Artois, and the towns on the Somme, the states of Flanders carried on a negotiation with the emperor Frederic III., and concluded a treaty of marriage between their sovereign and his son Maximilian, archduke of Austria. The illustrious birth of that prince, as well as the high dignity of which he had the prospect, rendered the alliance honourable for Mary, while, from the distance of his hereditary territories and the scantiness of his revenues, his power was so inconsiderable as did not excite the jealousy or fear of the Flemings. [1477.]

Thus Louis, by the caprice of his temper and the excess of his refinements, put the house of Austria in possession of this noble inheritance. By this acquisition the foundation of the future grandeur of Charles V. was laid, and he became master of those territories which enabled him to carry on his most formidable and decisive operations against France. Thus, too, the same monarch who first united the interior force of France, and established it on such a footing as to render it formidable to the rest of Europe, contributed, far contrary to his intention, to raise up a rival power, which during two centuries has thwarted the measures, opposed the arms, and checked the progress of his successors.

The next event of consequence in the fifteenth century was the expedition of Charles VIII. into Italy. This occasioned revolutions no less memorable; produced alterations, both in the military and political

* Mém. de Comines, liv. v. chap. 15, p. 309, etc.

system, which were more immediately perceived; roused the states of Europe to bolder efforts, and blended their affairs and interests more closely together. The mild administration of Charles, a weak but generous prince, seems to have revived the spirit and genius of the French nation, which the rigid despotism of Louis XI., his father, had depressed and almost extinguished. The ardour for military service, natural to the French nobility, returned, and their young monarch was impatient to distinguish his reign by some splendid enterprise. While he was uncertain towards what quarter he should turn his arms, the solicitations and intrigues of an Italian politician, no less infamous on account of his crimes than eminent for his abilities, determined his choice. Ludovico Sforza, having formed the design of deposing his nephew, the duke of Milan, and of placing himself on the ducal throne, was so much afraid of a combination of the Italian powers to oppose this measure and to support the injured prince, with whom most of them were connected by blood or alliance, that he saw the necessity of securing the aid of some able protector. The king of France was the person to whom he applied; and, without disclosing his own intentions, he laboured to prevail with him to march into Italy at the head of a powerful army, in order to seize the crown of Naples, to which Charles had pretensions as heir of the house of Anjou. The right to that kingdom, claimed by the Angevin family, had been conveyed to Louis XI. by Charles of Anjou, count of Maine and Provence. But that sagacious monarch, though he took immediate possession of those territories of which Charles was really master, totally disregarded his ideal title to a kingdom over which another prince reigned in tranquillity, and uniformly declined involving himself in the labyrinth of Italian politics. His son, more adventurous, or more

inconsiderate, embarked eagerly in this enterprise, and, contemning all the remonstrances of his most experienced counsellors, prepared to carry it on with the utmost vigour. [1494.]

The power which Charles possessed was so great that he reckoned himself equal to this arduous undertaking. His father had transmitted to him such an ample prerogative as gave him the entire command of his kingdom. He himself had added considerably to the extent of his dominions by his prudent marriage with the heiress of Bretagne, which rendered him master of that province, the last of the great fiefs that remained to be annexed to the crown. He soon assembled forces which he thought sufficient; and so impatient was he to enter on his career as a conqueror that, sacrificing what was real for what was chimerical, he restored Roussillon to Ferdinand and gave up part of his father's acquisitions in Artois to Maximilian, with a view of inducing these princes not to molest France while he was carrying on his operations in Italy.

But so different were the efforts of the states of Europe in the fifteenth century from those which we shall behold in the course of this history, that the army with which Charles undertook this great enterprise did not exceed twenty thousand men. The train of artillery, however, the ammunition, and warlike stores of every kind provided for its use, were so considerable as to bear some resemblance to the immense apparatus of modern war.⁹

When the French entered Italy, they met with nothing able to resist them. The Italian powers, having remained during a long period undisturbed by the invasion of any foreign enemy, had formed a system with respect to their affairs, both in peace and war, peculiar to themselves. In order to adjust the interests and

* Mézéray, Hist., tom. ii. p. 777.

balance the power of the different states into which Italy was divided, they were engaged in perpetual and endless negotiations with each other, which they conducted with all the subtlety of a refining and deceitful policy. Their contests in the field, when they had recourse to arms, were decided in mock battles, by innocent and bloodless victories. Upon the first appearance of the danger which now impended they had recourse to the arts which they had studied, and employed their utmost skill in intrigue in order to avert it. But, this proving ineffectual, their bands of effeminate mercenaries, the only military force that remained in the country, being fit only for the parade of service, were terrified at the aspect of real war and shrunk at its approach. The impetuosity of the French valour appeared to them irresistible. Florence, Pisa, and Rome opened their gates as the French army advanced. The prospect of this dreadful invasion struck one king of Naples with such panic terror that he died (if we may believe historians) of the fright. Another abdicated his throne from the same pusillanimous spirit. A third fled out of his dominions as soon as the enemy appeared on the Neapolitan frontiers. Charles, after marching thither from the bottom of the Alps with as much rapidity and almost as little opposition as if he had been on a progress through his own dominions, took quiet possession of the throne of Naples, and intimidated or gave law to every power in Italy.

Such was the conclusion of an expedition that must be considered as the first great exertion of those new powers which the princes of Europe had acquired and now began to exercise. Its effects were no less considerable than its success had been astonishing. The Italians, unable to resist the impression of the enemy who broke in upon them, permitted him to hold on his course undisturbed. They quickly perceived that no

single power which they could rouse to action was an equal match for a monarch who ruled over such extensive territories and was at the head of such a martial people, but that a confederacy might accomplish what the separate members of it durst not attempt. To this expedient, the only one that remained to deliver or to preserve them from the yoke, they had recourse. While Charles inconsiderately wasted his time at Naples in festivals and triumphs on account of his past successes, or was fondly dreaming of future conquests in the East, to the empire of which he now aspired, they formed against him a powerful combination of almost all the Italian states, supported by the emperor Maximilian, and Ferdinand, King of Aragon. The union of so many powers, who suspended or forgot all their particular animosities that they might act in concert against an enemy who had become formidable to them all, awakened Charles from his thoughtless security. He saw now no prospect of safety but in returning to France. An army of thirty thousand men, assembled by the allies, was ready to obstruct his march; and though the French, with a daring courage which more than countervailed their inferiority in number, broke through that great body and gained a victory which opened to their monarch a safe passage into his own territories, he was stripped of all his conquests in Italy in as short a time as it had taken to acquire them; and the political system in that country resumed the same appearance as before his invasion.

The sudden and decisive effect of this confederacy seems to have instructed the princes and statesmen of Italy as much as the irruption of the French had disconcerted and alarmed them. They had extended, on this occasion, to the affairs of Europe, the maxims of that political science which had hitherto been applied only to regulate the operations of the petty states in

their own country. They had discovered the method of preventing any monarch from rising to such a degree of power as was inconsistent with the general liberty, and had manifested the importance of attending to that great secret in modern policy, the preservation of a proper distribution of power among all the members of the system into which the states of Europe are formed. During all the wars of which Italy from that time was the theatre, and amidst the hostile operations which the imprudence of Louis XIII. and the ambition of Ferdinand of Aragon carried on in that country, with little interruption, from the close of the fifteenth century to that period at which the subsequent history commences, the maintaining a proper balance of power between the contending parties became the great object of attention to the statesmen of Italy. Nor was the idea confined to them. Self-preservation taught other powers to adopt it. It grew to be fashionable and universal. From this era we can trace the progress of that intercourse between nations which has linked the powers of Europe so closely together, and can discern the operations of that provident policy which during peace guards against remote and contingent dangers, and in war has prevented rapid and destructive conquests.

This was not the only effect of the operations which the great powers of Europe carried on in Italy. They contributed to render general such a change as the French had begun to make in the state of their troops, and obliged all the princes who appeared on this new theatre of action to put the military force of their kingdoms on an establishment similar to that of France. When the seat of war came to be remote from the countries which maintained the contest, the service of the feudal vassals ceased to be of any use, and the necessity of employing soldiers regularly trained to

arms and kept in constant pay came at once to be evident. When Charles VIII. marched into Italy, his cavalry was entirely composed of those companies of gendarmes embodied by Charles VII. and continued by Louis XI.; his infantry consisted partly of Swiss, hired of the Cantons, and partly of Gascons, armed and disciplined after the Swiss model. To these Louis XII. added a body of Germans, well known in the wars of Italy by the name of the black bands. But neither of these monarchs made any account of the feudal militia, or ever had recourse to that military force which they might have commanded in virtue of the ancient institutions in their kingdom. Maximilian and Ferdinand, as soon as they began to act in Italy, employed similar instruments, and trusted the execution of their plans entirely to mercenary troops.

This innovation in the military system was quickly followed by another, which the custom of employing Swiss in the Italian wars was the occasion of introducing. The arms and discipline of the Swiss were different from those of other European nations. During their long and violent struggles in defence of their liberties against the house of Austria, whose armies, like those of other considerable princes, consisted chiefly of heavy-armed cavalry, the Swiss found that their poverty, and the small number of gentlemen residing in their country, at that time barren and ill cultivated, put it out of their power to bring into the field any body of horse capable of facing the enemy. Necessity compelled them to place all their confidence in infantry; and, in order to render it capable of withstanding the shock of cavalry, they gave the soldiers brcastplates and helmcts as defensive armour, together with long spears, halberds, and heavy swords as weapons of defence. They formed them into large battalions, ranged in deep and close array, so that they could

present on every side a formidable front to the enemy.¹⁰ The men-at-arms could make no impression on the solid strength of such a body. It repulsed the Austrians in all their attempts to conquer Switzerland. It broke the Burgundian gendarmerie, which was scarcely inferior to that of France, either in number or reputation; and when first called to act in Italy, it bore down, by its irresistible force, every enemy that attempted to oppose it. These repeated proofs of the decisive effect of infantry, exhibited on such conspicuous occasions, restored that service to reputation, and gradually re-established the opinion, which had been long exploded, of its superior importance in the operations of war. But, the glory which the Swiss had acquired having inspired them with such high ideas of their own prowess and consequence as frequently rendered them mutinous and insolent, the princes who employed them became weary of depending on the caprice of foreign mercenaries, and began to turn their attention towards the improvement of their national infantry.

The German powers, having the command of men whom nature has endowed with that steady courage and persevering strength which form them to be soldiers, soon modelled their troops in such a manner that they vied with the Swiss both in discipline and valour.

The French monarchs, though more slowly and with greater difficulty, accustomed the impetuous spirit of their people to subordination and discipline, and were at such pains to render their national infantry respectable that as early as the reign of Louis XII. several gentlemen of high rank had so far abandoned their ancient ideas as to condescend to enter into that service.¹¹

The Spaniards, whose situation made it difficult to

¹⁰ Machiavel's Art of War, b. ii. chap. ii. p. 451. ¹¹ Brantôme, tom. x. p. 18.—Mém. de Fleuranges, p. 143.

employ any other than their national troops in the southern parts of Italy, which was the chief scene of their operations in that country, not only adopted the Swiss discipline, but improved upon it, by mingling a proper number of soldiers, armed with heavy muskets, in their battalions, and thus formed that famous body of infantry which during a century and a half was the admiration and terror of all Europe. The Italian states gradually diminished the number of their cavalry, and, in imitation of their more powerful neighbours, brought the strength of their armies to consist in foot-soldiers. From this period the nations of Europe have carried on war with forces more adapted to every species of service, more capable of acting in every country, and better fitted both for making conquests and for preserving them.

As their efforts in Italy led the people of Europe to these improvements in the art of war, they gave them likewise the first idea of the expense with which it is accompanied when extensive or of long continuance, and accustomed every nation to the burden of such impositions as are necessary for supporting it. While the feudal policy subsisted in full vigour, while armies were composed of military vassals called forth to attack some neighbouring power and to perform in a short campaign the services which they owed to their sovereign, the expense of war was extremely moderate. A small subsidy enabled a prince to begin and to finish his greatest military operations. But when Italy became the theatre on which the powers of Europe contended for superiority, the preparations requisite for such a distant expedition, the pay of armies kept constantly on foot, their subsistence in a foreign country, the sieges to be undertaken, and the towns to be defended, swelled the charges of war immensely, and, by creating demands unknown in less active times, mul-

tiplied taxes in every kingdom. The progress of ambition, however, was so rapid, and princes extended their operations so fast, that it was impossible at first to establish funds proportional to the increase of expense which these occasioned. When Charles VIII. invaded Naples, the sums requisite for carrying on that enterprise so far exceeded those which France had been accustomed to contribute for the support of government that before he reached the frontiers of Italy his treasury was exhausted, and the domestic resources of which his extensive prerogative gave him the command were at an end. As he durst not venture to lay any imposition on his people, oppressed already with the weight of unusual burdens, the only expedient that remained was to borrow of the Genoese as much money as might enable him to continue his march. But he could not obtain a sufficient sum without consenting to pay annually the exorbitant interest of forty-two livres for every hundred that he received.¹² We may observe the same disproportion between the efforts and revenues of other princes, his contemporaries. From this period taxes went on increasing; and during the reign of Charles V. such sums were levied in every state as would have appeared enormous at the close of the fifteenth century, and gradually prepared the way for the still more exorbitant exactions of modern times.

The last transaction, previous to the reign of Charles V., that merits attention on account of its influence upon the state of Europe, is the league of Cambray. To humble the republic of Venice and to divide its territories was the object of all the powers who united in this confederacy. The civil constitution of Venice, established on a firm basis, had suffered no considerable alteration for several centuries; during which the senate conducted its affairs by maxims of policy no less prudent

¹² Mémoires de Comines, lib. vii. c. 5, p. 440.

than vigorous, and adhered to these with a uniform, consistent spirit which gave that commonwealth great advantage over other states, whose views and measures changed as often as the form of their government, or the persons who administered it. By these uninterrupted exertions of wisdom and valour the Venetians enlarged the dominions of their commonwealth until it became the most considerable power in Italy; while their extensive commerce, the useful and curious manufactures which they carried on, together with the large share which they had acquired of the lucrative commerce with the East, rendered Venice the most opulent state in Europe.

The power of the Venetians was the object of terror to their Italian neighbours. Their wealth was viewed with envy by the greatest monarchs, who could not vie with many of their private citizens in the magnificence of their buildings, in the richness of their dress and furniture, or in splendour and elegance of living.¹³ Julius II., whose ambition was superior, and his abilities equal, to those of any pontiff who ever sat on the papal throne, conceived the idea of this league against the Venetians, and endeavoured, by applying to those passions which I have mentioned, to persuade other princes to join it. By working upon the fears of the Italian powers, and upon the avarice of several monarchs beyond the Alps, he induced them, in concurrence with other causes, which it is not my province to explain, to form one of the most powerful confederacies that Europe had ever beheld, against those haughty republicans.

The emperor, the king of France, the king of Aragon, and the pope, were principals in the league of Cambray, to which almost all the princes of Italy acceded, the least considerable of them hoping for some share in the

¹³ Heliani Oratio, apud Goldastum, in Polit. Imperial., p. 980.

spoils of a state which they deemed to be now devoted to destruction. The Venetians might have diverted this storm, or have broken its force ; but, with a presumptuous rashness to which there is nothing similar in the course of their history, they waited its approach. The impetuous valour of the French rendered ineffectual all their precautions for the safety of the republic ; and the fatal battle of Ghiarraddada entirely ruined the army on which they relied for defence. Julius seized all the towns which they held in the ecclesiastical territories. Ferdinand re-annexed the towns of which they had got possession on the coast of Calabria to his Neapolitan dominions. Maximilian, at the head of a powerful army, advanced towards Venice on the one side. The French pushed their conquests on the other. The Venetians, surrounded by so many enemies, and left without one ally, sunk from the height of presumption to the depths of despair, abandoned all their territories on the continent, and shut themselves up in their capital, as their last refuge and the only place which they hoped to preserve.

This rapid success, however, proved fatal to the confederacy. The members of it, whose union continued while they were engaged in seizing their prey, began to feel their ancient jealousies and animosities revive as soon as they had a prospect of dividing it. When the Venetians observed these symptoms of distrust and alienation, a ray of hope broke in upon them : the spirit natural to their counsels returned ; they resumed such wisdom and firmness as made some atonement for their former imprudence and dejection ; they recovered part of the territory which they had lost ; they appeased the pope and Ferdinand by well-timed concessions in their favour ; and at length dissolved the confederacy which had brought their commonwealth to the brink of ruin.

Julius, elated with beholding the effects of a league

which he himself had planned, and imagining that nothing was too arduous for him to undertake, conceived the idea of expelling every foreign power out of Italy, and bent all the force of his mind towards executing a scheme so well suited to his enterprising genius. He directed his first attack against the French, who, on many accounts, were more odious to the Italians than any of the foreigners who had acquired dominion in their country. By his activity and address, he prevailed on most of the powers who had joined in the league of Cambray to turn their arms against the king of France, their former ally, and engaged Henry VIII., who had lately ascended the throne of England, to favour their operations by invading France. Louis XII. resisted all the efforts of this formidable and unexpected confederacy with undaunted fortitude. Hostilities were carried on, during several campaigns, in Italy, on the frontiers of Spain, and in Picardy, with alternate success. Exhausted, at length, by the variety as well as extent of his operations, unable to withstand a confederacy which brought against him superior force, conducted with wisdom and acting with perseverance, Louis found it necessary to conclude separate treaties of peace with his enemies; and the war terminated with the loss of everything which the French had acquired in Italy except the castle of Milan and a few inconsiderable towns in that duchy.

The various negotiations carried on during this busy period, and the different combinations formed among powers hitherto little connected with each other, greatly increased that intercourse among the nations of Europe which I have mentioned as one effect of the events in the fifteenth century; while the greatness of the objects at which different nations aimed, the distant expeditions which they undertook, as well as the length and obstinacy of the contest in which they engaged, obliged them to

exert themselves with a vigour and perseverance unknown in the preceding ages.

Those active scenes which the following history will exhibit, as well as the variety and importance of those transactions which distinguish the period to which it extends, are not to be ascribed solely to the ambition, to the abilities, or to the rivalship of Charles V. and of Francis I. The kingdoms of Europe had arrived at such a degree of improvement in the internal administration of government, and princes had acquired such command of the national force which was to be exerted in foreign wars, that they were in a condition to enlarge the sphere of their operations, to multiply their claims and pretensions, and to increase the vigour of their efforts. Accordingly, the sixteenth century opened with the certain prospect of its abounding in great and interesting events.

SECTION III.

VIEW OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL STATES IN EUROPE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

Italy at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century.—The Papal Power.—Alexander VI. and Julius II.—Defects in Ecclesiastical Governments.—Venice: its Rise and Progress; its Naval Power and its Commerce.—Florence.—Naples and Sicily.—Contest for its Crown.—Duchy of Milan.—Ludovico Sforza.—Spain; conquered by the Vandals and by the Moors; gradually reconquered by the Christians.—Marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella.—The Royal Prerogative.—Constitution of Aragon and of Castile.—Internal Disorders.—“The Holy Brotherhood.”—France; its Constitution and Government.—The Power of its Early Kings.—Government becomes purely Monarchical, though restrained by the Nobles and the Parliaments.—The German Empire.—Power of the Nobles and of the Clergy.—Contests between the Popes and the Emperors.—Decline of Imperial Authority.—Total Change of Government.—Maximilian.—The real Power and Revenues of the Emperors, contrasted with their Pretensions.—Complication of Difficulties.—Origin of the Turkish Empire; its Character.—The Janizaries.—Solyman.

HAVING thus enumerated the principal causes and events the influence of which was felt in every part of Europe, and contributed either to improve internal order and police in its various states, or to enlarge the sphere of their activity, by giving them more entire command of the force with which foreign operations are carried on, nothing farther seems requisite for preparing my readers to enter, with full information, upon perusing the history of Charles V., but to give a view of the political constitution and form of civil government in each of the nations which acted any considerable part during that period. For as the institutions and events which I have endeavoured to illustrate formed the people of Europe to resemble each other, and conducted them

from barbarism to refinement in the same path and by nearly equal steps, there were other circumstances which occasioned a difference in their political establishments, and gave rise to those peculiar modes of government which have produced such variety in the character and genius of nations.

It is no less necessary to become acquainted with the latter than to have contemplated the former. Without a distinct knowledge of the peculiar form and genius of civil government in each state, a great part of its transactions must appear altogether mysterious and inexplicable. The historians of particular countries, as they seldom extended their views farther than to the amusement or instruction of their fellow-citizens, by whom they might presume that all their domestic customs and institutions were perfectly understood, have often neglected to descend into such details with respect to these as are sufficient to convey to foreigners full light and information concerning the occurrences which they relate. But a history which comprehends the transactions of so many different countries would be extremely imperfect without a previous survey of the constitution and political state of each. It is from his knowledge of these that the reader must draw those principles which will enable him to judge with discernment and to decide with certainty concerning the conduct of nations.

A minute detail, however, of the peculiar forms and regulations in every country would lead to deductions of immeasurable length. To sketch out the great lines which distinguish and characterise each government is all that the nature of my present work will admit of, and all that is necessary to illustrate the events which it records.

At the opening of the sixteenth century the political aspect of Italy was extremely different from that of any other part of Europe. Instead of those extensive

monarchies which occupied the rest of the continent, that delightful country was parcelled out among many small states, each of which possessed sovereign and independent jurisdiction. The only monarchy in Italy was that of Naples. The dominion of the popes was of a peculiar species, to which there is nothing similar either in ancient or modern times. In Venice, Florence, and Genoa, a republican form of government was established. Milan was subject to sovereigns, who had assumed no higher title than that of dukes.

The pope was the first of these powers in dignity, and not the least considerable by the extent of his territories. In the primitive church, the jurisdiction of bishops was equal and co-ordinate. They derived, perhaps, some degree of consideration from the dignity of the see in which they presided. They possessed, however, no real authority or pre-eminence but what they acquired by superior abilities or superior sanctity. As Rome had so long been the seat of empire and the capital of the world, its bishops were on that account entitled to respect; they received it; but during several ages they received, and even claimed, nothing more. From these humble beginnings they advanced with such adventurous and well-directed ambition that they established a spiritual dominion over the minds and sentiments of men, to which all Europe submitted with implicit obedience. Their claim of universal jurisdiction, as heads of the Church, and their pretensions to infallibility in their decisions, as successors of St. Peter, are as chimerical as they are repugnant to the genius of the Christian religion. But on these foundations the superstition and credulity of mankind enabled them to erect an amazing superstructure. In all ecclesiastical controversies their decisions were received as the infallible oracles of truth. Nor was the plenitude of their power confined solely to what was spiritual: they dethroned

monarchs, disposed of crowns, absolved subjects from the obedience due to their sovereigns, and laid kingdoms under interdicts. There was not a state in Europe which had not been disquieted by their ambition; there was not a throne which they had not shaken, nor a prince who did not tremble at their power.

Nothing was wanting to render this empire absolute, and to establish it on the ruins of all civil authority, but that the popes should have possessed such a degree of temporal power as was sufficient to second and enforce their spiritual decrees. Happily for mankind, at the time when their spiritual jurisdiction was most extensive and most revered, their secular dominion was extremely limited. They were powerful pontiffs, formidable at a distance; but they were petty princes, without any considerable domestic force. They had early endeavoured, indeed, to acquire territory by arts similar to those which they had employed in extending their spiritual jurisdiction. Under pretence of a donation from Constantine, and of another from Charlemagne or his father Pepin, they attempted to take possession of some towns adjacent to Rome. But these donations were fictitious and availed them little. The benefactions for which they were indebted to the credulity of the Norman adventurers who conquered Naples, and to the superstition of the Countess Matilda, were real, and added ample domains to the holy see.

But the power of the popes did not increase in proportion to the extent of territory which they had acquired. In the dominions annexed to the holy see, as well as in those subject to other princes in Italy, the sovereign of a state was far from having the command of a force which it contained. During the turbulence and confusion of the Middle Ages, the powerful nobility or leaders of popular factions in Italy had seized the government of different towns; and, after strengthening

their fortifications and taking a body of mercenaries into pay, they aspired at independence. The territory which the Church had gained was filled with petty lords of this kind, who left the pope hardly the shadow of dominion.

As these usurpations almost annihilated the papal power in the greater part of the towns subject to the Church, the Roman barons frequently disputed the authority of the popes, even in Rome itself. In the twelfth century an opinion began to be propagated, “That as the function of ecclesiastics was purely spiritual, they ought to possess no property, and to claim no temporal jurisdiction, but, according to the laudable example of their predecessors in the primitive church, should subsist wholly upon their tithes, or upon the voluntary oblations of the people.”¹ This doctrine being addressed to men who had beheld the scandalous manner in which the avarice and ambition of the clergy had prompted them to contend for wealth and to exercise power, they listened to it with fond attention. The Roman barons, who had felt most sensibly the rigour of ecclesiastical oppression, adopted these sentiments with such ardour that they set themselves instantly to shake off the yoke. They endeavoured to restore some image of their ancient liberty, by reviving the institution of the Roman senate, in which they vested supreme authority; committing the executive power sometimes to one chief senator, sometimes to two, and sometimes to a magistrate dignified with the name of *The Patrician*. The popes exerted them with vigour, in order to check this dangerous encroachment on their jurisdiction. One of them, finding all his endeavours ineffectual, was so much mortified that extreme grief cut short his days. Another, having ventured to attack the senators at the head of some armed men, was mortally wounded in the

¹ Otto Frisingensis de Gestis Frider. Imp., lib. ii. cap. 10.

fray.² During a considerable period, the power of the popes, before which the greatest monarchs in Europe trembled, was circumscribed within such narrow limits in their own capital, that they durst hardly exert any act of authority without the permission and concurrence of the senate.

Encroachments were made upon the papal sovereignty, not only by the usurpations of the Roman nobility, but by the mutinous spirit of the people. During seventy years of the fourteenth century the popes fixed their residence in Avignon. The inhabitants of Rome, accustomed to consider themselves as the descendants of the people who had conquered the world and had given laws to it, were too high-spirited to submit with patience to the delegated authority of those persons to whom the popes committed the government of the city. On many occasions they opposed the execution of the papal mandates, and on the slightest appearance of innovation or oppression they were ready to take arms in defence of their own immunities. Towards the middle of the fourteenth century, being instigated by Nicholas Rienzo, a man of low birth and a seditious spirit, but of popular eloquence and an enterprising ambition, they drove all the nobility out of the city, established a democratical form of government, elected Rienzo tribune of the people, and invested him with extensive authority. But though the frantic proceedings of the tribune soon overthrew this new system, though the government of Rome was reinstated in its ancient form, yet every fresh attack contributed to weaken the papal jurisdiction; and the turbulence of the people concurred with the spirit of independence among the nobility in circumscribing it more and more.³ Gregory VII. and other domineering

² Otto Frising., Chron., lib. vii. cap. 27, 31. — Id. de Gest. Frid., lib. i. c. 27.— Muratori, Annali

d'Italia, vol. ix. pp. 398—404.

³ Histoire Florentine de Giov. Villani, liv. xii. c. 89, 104, ap.

pontiffs accomplished those great things which rendered them so formidable to the emperors with whom they contended, not by the force of their arms or by the extent of their power, but by the dread of their spiritual censures and by the effect of their intrigues, which excited rivals and called forth enemies against every prince whom they wished to depress or to destroy.

Many attempts were made by the popes, not only to humble those usurpers who lorded it over the cities in the ecclesiastical state, but to break the turbulent spirit of the Roman people. These were long unsuccessful. But at last Alexander VI., with a policy no less artful than flagitious, subdued or extirpated most of the great Roman barons, and rendered the popes masters of their own dominions. The enterprising ambition of Julius II. added conquests of no inconsiderable value to the patrimony of St. Peter. Thus the popes, by degrees, became powerful temporal princes. Their territories, in the age of Charles V., were of greater extent than at present; their country seems to have been better cultivated, as well as more populous; and, as they drew large contributions from every part of Europe, their revenues far exceeded those of the neighbouring powers, and rendered them capable of more sudden and vigorous efforts.

The genius of the papal government, however, was better adapted to the exercise of spiritual dominion than of temporal power. With respect to the former, all its maxims were steady and invariable; every new pontiff adopted the plan of his predecessor. By education and habit, ecclesiastics were so formed that the character of the individual was sunk in that of the profession, and the passions of the man were sacrificed

Murat., *Script. Rerum Ital.*, vol. xiii.—*Vita di Cola di Rienzo*, ap. Murat., *Antiq. Ital.*, vol. iii. p. 399,

etc.—*Hist. de Nic. Rienzy*, par M. de Boispréaux, p. 91, etc.

to the interest and honour of the order. The hands which held the reins of administration might change, but the spirit which conducted them was always the same. While the measures of other governments fluctuated, and the objects at which they aimed varied, the Church kept one end in view ; and to this unrelaxing constancy of pursuit it was indebted for its success in the boldest attempts ever made by human ambition.

But in their civil administration the popes followed no such uniform or consistent plan. There, as in other governments, the character, the passions, and the interest of the person who had the supreme direction of affairs occasioned a variation both in objects and measures. As few prelates reached the summit of ecclesiastical dignity until they were far advanced in life, a change of masters was more frequent in the papal dominions than in other states, and the political system was, of course, less stable and permanent. Every pope was eager to make the most of the short period during which he had the prospect of enjoying power, in order to aggrandize his own family and to attain his private ends ; and it was often the first business of his successor to undo all that he had done, and to overturn what he had established.

As ecclesiastics were trained to pacific arts, and early initiated in the mysteries of that policy by which the court of Rome extended or supported its spiritual dominion, the popes, in the conduct of their temporal affairs, were apt to follow the same maxims, and in all their measures were more ready to employ the refinements of intrigue than the force of arms. It was in the papal court that address and subtlety in negotiation became a science ; and during the sixteenth century Rome was considered as the school in which it might be best acquired.

As the decorum of their ecclesiastical character pre-

vented the popes from placing themselves at the head of their armies or from taking the command in person of the military force in their dominions, they were afraid to arm their subjects; and in all their operations, whether offensive or defensive, they trusted entirely to mercenary troops.

As their power and dominions could not descend to their posterity, the popes were less solicitous than other princes to form or to encourage schemes of public utility and improvement. Their tenure was only for a short life; present advantage was what they chiefly studied; to squeeze and to amass, rather than to ameliorate, was their object. They erected, perhaps, some work of ostentation, to remain as a monument of their pontificate; they found it necessary, at some times, to establish useful institutions, in order to soothe and silence the turbulent populace of Rome; but plans of general benefit of their subjects, framed with a view to futurity, were rarely objects of attention in the papal policy. The patrimony of St. Peter was worse governed than any part of Europe; and though a generous pontiff might suspend for a little, or counteract, the effects of those vices which are peculiar to the administration of ecclesiastics, the disease not only remained without remedy, but has gone on increasing from age to age; and the decline of the state has kept pace with its progress.

One circumstance farther, concerning the papal government, is so singular as to merit attention. As the spiritual supremacy and temporal power were united in one person, and uniformly aided each other in their operations, they became so blended together that it was difficult to separate them, even in imagination. The potentates who found it necessary to oppose the measures which the popes pursued as temporal princes could not easily divest themselves of the reverence

which they imagined to be due to them as heads of the Church and vicars of Jesus Christ. It was with reluctance that they could be brought to a rupture with the head of the Church ; they were unwilling to push their operations against him to extremity ; they listened eagerly to the first overtures of accommodation, and were anxious to procure it almost upon any terms. Their consciousness of this encouraged the enterprising pontiffs who filled the papal throne about the beginning of the sixteenth century to engage in schemes seemingly the most extravagant. They trusted that, if their temporal power was not sufficient to carry them through with success, the respect paid to their spiritual dignity would enable them to extricate themselves with facility and with honour.* But when popes came to take part more frequently in the contests among princes, and to engage as principals or auxiliaries in every war kindled in Europe, this veneration for their sacred character began to abate ; and striking instances will occur in the following history of its being almost totally extinct.

* The manner in which Louis XII. of France undertook and carried on war against Julius II. remarkably illustrates this observation. Louis solemnly consulted the clergy of France whether it was lawful to take arms against a pope who had wantonly kindled war in Europe, and whom neither the faith of treaties, nor gratitude for favours received, nor the decorum of his character, could restrain from the most violent actions to which the lust of power prompts ambitious princes. Though his clergy authorised the war, yet Anne of Bretagne, his queen, entertained scruples with regard to the lawfulness of it. The king himself, from some superstition of the same kind, carried it on

faintly, and, upon every fresh advantage, renewed his propositions of peace. (Mézéray, Hist. de France, fol. edit., 1685, tom. i. p. 852.) I shall produce another proof of this reverence for the papal character, still more striking. Guicciardini, the most sagacious, perhaps, of all modern historians, and the boldest in painting the vices and ambition of the popes, represents the death of Migliau, a Spanish officer who was killed during the siege of Naples, as a punishment inflicted on him by Heaven on account of his having opposed the setting of Clement VII. at liberty. Guicciardini, Istoria d'Italia, Genev., 1645, vol. ii. lib. 18, p. 467.

Of all the Italian powers, the republic of Venice, next to the papal see, was most connected with the rest of Europe. The rise of that commonwealth during the inroads of the Huns in the fifth century, the singular situation of its capital in the small isles of the Adriatic gulf, and the more singular form of its civil constitution, are generally known. If we view the Venetian government as calculated for the order of nobles alone, its institutions may be pronounced excellent; the deliberative, legislative, and executive powers are so admirably distributed and adjusted that it must be regarded as a perfect model of political wisdom. But if we consider it as formed for a numerous body of people subject to its jurisdiction, it will appear a rigid and partial aristocracy, which lodges all power in the hands of a few members of the community, while it degrades and oppresses the rest.

The spirit of government in a commonwealth of this species was, of course, timid and jealous. The Venetian nobles distrusted their own subjects, and were afraid of allowing them the use of arms. They encouraged among them arts of industry and commerce, they employed them in manufactures and in navigation, but never admitted them into the troops which the state kept in its pay. The military force of the republic consisted entirely of foreign mercenaries. The command of these was never trusted to noble Venetians, lest they should acquire such influence over the army as might endanger the public liberty, or become accustomed to the exercise of such power as would make them unwilling to return to the condition of private citizens. A soldier of fortune was placed at the head of the armies of the commonwealth; and to obtain that honour was the great object of the Italian *condottieri*, or leaders of bands, who in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries made a trade of war and raised and hired out

soldiers to different states. But the same suspicious policy which induced the Venetians to employ these adventurers preventing their placing entire confidence in them. Two noblemen, appointed by the senate, accompanied their army when it took the field, with the appellation of *proveditori*, and, like the field deputies of the Dutch republic in latter times, observed all the motions of the general and checked and controlled him in all his operations.

A commonwealth with such civil and military institutions was not formed to make conquests. While its subjects were disarmed, and its nobles excluded from military command, it carried on its warlike enterprises with great disadvantage. This ought to have taught the Venetians to rest satisfied with making self-preservation, and the enjoyment of domestic security, the objects of their policy. But republics are apt to be seduced by the spirit of ambition, as well as kings. When the Venetians so far forgot the interior defects in their government as to aim at extensive conquests, the fatal blow which they received in the war excited by the league of Cambray convinced them of the imprudence and danger of making violent efforts in opposition to the genius and tendency of their constitution.

It is not, however, by its military, but by its naval and commercial power that the importance of the Venetian commonwealth must be estimated. The latter constituted the real force and nerves of the state. The jealousy of government did not extend to this department. Nothing was apprehended from this quarter that could prove formidable to liberty. The senate encouraged the nobles to trade, and to serve on board the fleet. They became merchants and admirals. They increased the wealth of their country by their industry. They added to its dominions by the valour with which they conducted its naval armaments.

Commerce was an inexhaustible source of opulence to the Venetians. All the nations in Europe depended upon them, not only for the commodities of the East, but for various manufactures fabricated by them alone, or finished with a dexterity and elegance unknown in other countries. From this extensive commerce the state derived such immense supplies as concealed those vices in its constitution which I have mentioned, and enabled it to keep on foot such armies as were not only an over-match for the force which any of its neighbours could bring into the field, but were sufficient to contend, for some time, with the powerful monarchs beyond the Alps. During its struggles with the princes united against it by the league at Cambray, the republic levied sums which even in the present age would be deemed considerable; and while the king of France paid the exorbitant interest which I have mentioned for the money advanced to him, and the emperor, eager to borrow, but destitute of credit, was known by the name of *Maximilian the Moneyless*, the Venetians raised whatever sums they pleased, at the moderate premium of five in the hundred.⁵

The constitution of Florence was perfectly the reverse of the Venetian. It partook as much of democratical turbulence and licentiousness, as the other of aristocratical rigour. Florence, however, was a commercial, not a military democracy. The nature of its institutions was favourable to commerce, and the genius of the people was turned towards it. The vast wealth which the family of Medici had acquired by trade, together with the magnificence, the generosity, and the virtue of the first Cosmo, gave him such an ascendant over the affections as well as the counsels of his countrymen that though the forms of popular

⁵ Hist. de la Ligue faite à Cambray, par M. l'Abbé du Bos, liv. v.— Sandi, Storia civile Veneziana, liv. viii. c. 16, p. 891, etc.

Maximilian receiving a Delegation from Venice.



government were preserved, though the various departments of administration were filled by magistrates distinguished by the ancient names and elected in the usual manner, he was in reality the head of the commonwealth, and in the station of a private citizen he possessed supreme authority. Cosmo transmitted a considerable degree of this power to his descendants; and during a greater part of the fifteenth century the political state of Florence was extremely singular. The appearance of republican government subsisted, the people were passionately attached to it, and on some occasions contended warmly for their privileges; and yet they permitted a single family to assume the direction of their affairs, almost as absolutely as if it had been formally invested with sovereign power. The jealousy of the Medici concurred with the commercial spirit of the Florentines in putting the military force of the republic upon the same footing with that of the other Italian states. The troops which the Florentines employed in their wars consisted almost entirely of mercenary soldiers, furnished by the *condottieri*, or leaders of bands, whom they took into their pay.

In the kingdom of Naples, to which the sovereignty of the island of Sicily was annexed, the feudal government was established in the same form and with the same defects as in the other nations of Europe. The frequent and violent revolutions which happened in that monarchy had considerably increased these defects, and rendered them more intolerable. The succession to the crown of Naples had been so often interrupted or altered, and so many princes of foreign blood had at different periods obtained possession of the throne, that the Neapolitan nobility had lost in a great measure that attachment to the family of their sovereigns, as well as that reverence for their persons, which in other feudal kingdoms contributed to set some bounds to the en-

croachments of the barons upon the royal prerogative and power. At the same time, the different pretenders to the crown being obliged to court the barons who adhered to them and on whose support they depended for the success of their claims, they augmented their privileges by liberal concessions and connived at their boldest usurpations. Even when seated on the throne, it was dangerous for a prince who held his sceptre by a disputed title to venture on any step towards extending his own power or circumscribing that of the nobles.

From all these causes, the kingdom of Naples was the most turbulent of any in Europe, and the authority of its monarchs the least extensive. Though Ferdinand I., who began his reign in the year 1468, attempted to break the power of the aristocracy, though his son Alphonso, that he might crush it at once by cutting off the leaders of greatest reputation and influence among the Neapolitan barons, ventured to commit one of the most perfidious and cruel actions recorded in history, the order of nobles was nevertheless more exasperated than humbled by their measures.⁶ The resentment which these outrages excited was so violent, and the power of the malcontent nobles was still so formidable, that to these may be ascribed, in a great degree, the ease and rapidity with which Charles VIII. conquered the kingdom of Naples.⁷

The event that gave rise to the violent contests concerning the succession to the crown of Naples and Sicily, which brought so many calamities upon these kingdoms, happened in the thirteenth century. Upon the death of the emperor Frederic II., Manfred, his natural son, aspiring to the Neapolitan throne, murdered his brother, the emperor Conrad (if we may believe contemporary historians), and by that crime obtained

⁶ Giannone, book xxviii. chap. 2, vol. ii. p. 410, etc. ⁷ Id. ibid. p. 414.

possession of it.⁸ The popes, from their implacable enmity to the house of Swabia, not only refused to recognise Manfred's title, but endeavoured to excite against him some rival capable of wresting the sceptre out of his hand. Charles, count of Anjou, the brother of St. Louis, king of France, undertook this; and he received from the popes the investiture of the kingdom of Naples and Sicily as a fief held of the holy see. The count of Anjou's efforts were crowned with success; Manfred fell in battle; and he took possession of the vacant throne. But soon after, Charles sullied the glory which he had acquired by the injustice and cruelty with which he put to death, by the hands of the executioner, Conradin, the last prince of the house of Swabia, and the rightful heir of the Neapolitan crown. That gallant young prince asserted his title, to the last, with a courage worthy of a better fate. On the scaffold, he declared Peter, at that time prince, and soon after king, of Aragon, who had married Manfred's only daughter, his heir; and, throwing his glove among the people, he entreated that it might be carried to Peter, as the symbol by which he conveyed all his rights to him.⁹ The desire of avenging the insult offered to royalty by the death of Conradin concurred with his own ambition in prompting Peter to take arms in support of the title which he had acquired. From that period during almost two centuries the houses of Aragon and Anjou contended for the crown of Naples. Amidst a succession of revolutions more rapid, as well as of crimes more atrocious, than what occur in the history of almost any other kingdom, monarchs sometimes of the Aragonese line and sometimes of the Angevin were seated on the throne. At length the princes of the house of Aragon obtained such firm possession of

⁸ Struv., Corp. Hist. Germ., i. 481.—Giannone, book xviii. ch. 5.

⁹ Giannone, book xix. ch. 4, § 2.

this long-disputed inheritance that they transmitted it quietly to a bastard branch of their family.¹⁰ [1434.]

The race of the Angevin kings, however, was not extinct, nor had they relinquished their title to the Neapolitan crown. The count of Maine and Provence, the heir of this family, conveyed all his rights and pretensions to Louis XI. and to his successors. Charles VIII., as I have already related, crossed the Alps at the head of a powerful army in order to prosecute his claim with a degree of vigour far superior to that which the princes from whom he derived it had been capable of exerting. The rapid progress of his arms in Italy, as well as the short time during which he enjoyed the fruits of his success, have already been mentioned, and are well known. Frederic, the heir of the illegitimate branch of the Aragonese family, soon recovered the throne of which Charles had dispossessed him. Louis XII. and Ferdinand of Aragon united against this prince, whom both, though for different reasons, considered as a usurper and agreed to divide his dominions between them. Frederic, unable to resist the combined monarchs, each of whom was far his superior in power, resigned his sceptre. Louis and Ferdinand, though they had concurred in making the conquest, differed about the division of it, and from allies became enemies. But Gonsalvo de Córdova, partly by the exertion of such military talents as gave him a just title to the appellation of the *great captain*, which the Spanish historians have bestowed upon him, and partly by such shameless and frequent violations of the most solemn engagements as leave an indelible stain on his memory, stripped the French of all that they possessed in the Neapolitan dominions, and secured the peaceable possession of them to his master. These, together with his other kingdoms, Ferdinand transmitted to his grandson,

¹⁰ Giannone, book xxvi. ch. 2.

Charles V., whose right to possess them, if not altogether uncontrovertible, seems at least to be as well founded as that which the kings of France set up in opposition to it.¹¹

There is nothing in the political constitution or interior government of the duchy of Milan so remarkable as to require a particular explanation. But as the right of succession to that fertile province was the cause or the pretext of almost all the wars carried on in Italy during the reign of Charles V., it is necessary to trace these disputes to their source, and to inquire into the pretensions of the various competitors.

During the long and fierce contests excited in Italy by the violence of the Guelf and Ghibelline factions, the family of Visconti rose to great eminence among their fellow-citizens of Milan. As the Visconti had adhered uniformly to the Ghibelline or imperial interest, they, by way of recompense, received from one emperor the dignity of perpetual vicars of the empire in Italy;¹² they were created, by another, dukes of Milan; and, together with that title, the possession of the city and its territories was bestowed upon them as an hereditary fief.¹³ John, king of France, among other expedients for raising money which the calamities of his reign obliged him to employ, condescended to give one of his daughters in marriage to John Galeazzo Visconti, the first duke of Milan, from whom he had received considerable sums. Valentine Visconti, one of the children of this marriage, married her cousin, Louis, duke of Orleans, the only brother of Charles VI. In their marriage-contract, which the

¹¹ *Droits des Rois de France au Royaume de Sicile.—Mémoires de Comines, édit de Fresnoy, tom. iv. part ii. p. 5.*

¹² Petrarch, Epist., ap. Strav., Corp., i. 625.

¹³ Leibnit., Cod. Jur. Gent. Diplom., vol. i. p. 257.

pope confirmed, it was stipulated that upon failure of heirs male in the family of Visconti the Duchy of Milan should descend to the posterity of Valentine and the duke of Orleans. That event took place. In the year 1447, Philip Maria, the last prince of the ducal family of Visconti, died. Various competitors claimed the succession. Charles, duke of Orleans, pleaded his right to it founded on the marriage-contract of his mother, Valentine Visconti. Alfonso, king of Naples, claimed it in consequence of a will made by Philip Maria in his favour. The emperor contended that upon the extinction of male issue in the family of Visconti the fief returned to the superior lord and ought to be re-annexed to the empire. The people of Milan, smitten with the love of liberty which in that age prevailed among the Italian states, declared against the dominion of any master, and established a republican form of government.

But during the struggle among so many competitors, the prize for which they contended was seized by one from whom none of them apprehended any danger. Francis Sforza, the natural son of Jacomuzzo Sforza, whom his courage and abilities had elevated from the rank of a peasant to be one of the most eminent and powerful of the Italian *condottieri*, having succeeded his father in the command of the adventurers who followed his standard, had married a natural daughter of the last duke of Milan. Upon this shadow of a title Francis founded his pretensions to the duchy, which he supported with such talents and valour as placed him at last on the ducal throne. The virtues, as well as abilities, with which he governed, inducing his subjects to forget the defects in his title, he transmitted his dominions quietly to his son; from whom they descended to his grandson. He was murdered by his grand-uncle Ludovico, surnamed the Moor, who took possession of

the duchy; and his right to it was confirmed by the investiture of the emperor Maximilian, in the year 1494.¹⁴

Louis XI., who took pleasure in depressing the princes of the blood, and who admired the political abilities of Francis Sforza, would not permit the duke of Orleans to take any step in prosecution of his right to the duchy of Milan. Ludovico the Moor kept up such a close connection with Charles VIII. that during the greater part of his reign the claim of the family of Orleans continued to lie dormant. But when the crown of France devolved on Louis XII., duke of Orleans, he instantly asserted the rights of his family with the ardour which it was natural to expect, and marched at the head of a powerful army to support them. Ludovico Sforza, incapable of contending with such a rival, was stripped of all his dominions in the space of a few days. The king, clad in the ducal robes, entered Milan in triumph; and soon after, Ludovico, having been betrayed by the Swiss in his pay, was sent a prisoner into France, and shut up in the castle of Loches, where he lay unpitied during the remainder of his days. In consequence of one of the singular revolutions which occur so frequently in the history of the Milanese, his son, Maximilian Sforza, was placed on the ducal throne, of which he kept possession during the reign of Louis XII. But his successor, Francis I., was too high-spirited and enterprising tamely to relinquish his title. As soon as he was seated upon the throne, he prepared to invade the Milanese; and his right of succession to it appears, from this detail, to have been more natural and more just than that of any other competitor. [1512.]

It is unnecessary to enter into any detail with re-

* Ripalm., Hist. Mediol., lib. vi. Du Mont, Corps. Diplom., tom. iii. p. 654, ap. Struv., Corp., i. 930.— p. ii. 333, ibid.

spect to the form of government in Genoa, Parma, Modena, and the other inferior states of Italy. Their names, indeed, will often occur in the following history. But the power of these states themselves was so inconsiderable that their fate depended little upon their own efforts; and the frequent revolutions which they underwent were brought about rather by the operations of the princes who attacked or defended them than by anything peculiar in their internal constitution.

Of the great kingdoms on this side of the Alps, Spain is one of the most considerable; and, as it was the hereditary domain of Charles V., as well as the chief source of his power and wealth, a distinct knowledge of its political constitution is of capital importance towards understanding the transactions of his reign.

The Vandals and Goths, who overthrew the Roman power in Spain, established a form of government in that country, and introduced customs and laws, perfectly similar to those which were established in the rest of Europe by the other victorious tribes which acquired settlements there. For some time, society advanced, among the new inhabitants of Spain, by the same steps, and seemed to hold the same course, as in other European nations. To this progress a sudden stop was put by the invasion of the Saracens or Moors from Africa. The Goths could not withstand the efforts of their enthusiastic valour, which subdued the greatest part of Spain with the same impetuous rapidity that distinguishes all the operations of their arms. The conquerors introduced into the country in which they settled the Mahometan religion, the Arabic language, the manners of the East, together with that taste for the arts and that love of elegance and splendour which the Caliphs had begun to cultivate among their subjects. [712.]

Such Gothic nobles as disdained to submit to the

Moorish yoke fled for refuge to the inaccessible mountains of Asturias. There they comforted themselves with enjoying the exercise of the Christian religion and with maintaining the authority of their ancient laws. Being joined by many of the boldest and most warlike among their countrymen, they sallied out upon the adjacent settlements of the Moors in small parties; but, venturing only upon short excursions at first, they were satisfied with plunder and revenge, without thinking of conquest. By degrees their strength increased, their views enlarged, a regular government was established among them, and they began to aim at extending their territories. While they pushed on their attacks with the unremitting ardour excited by zeal for religion, by the desire of vengeance, and by the hope of rescuing their country from oppression, while they conducted their operations with the courage natural to men who had no other occupation but war, and who were strangers to all the arts which corrupt or enfeeble the mind, the Moors gradually lost many of the advantages to which they had been indebted for their first success. They threw off all dependence on the Caliphs;¹⁵ they neglected to preserve a close connection with their countrymen in Africa; their empire in Spain was split into many small kingdoms; the arts which they cultivated, together with the luxury to which these gave rise, relaxed in some measure the force of their military institutions and abated the vigour of their war-like spirit. The Moors, however, continued still to be a gallant people, and possessed great resources. According to the magnificent style of the Spanish historians, eight centuries of almost uninterrupted war elapsed, and three thousand seven hundred battles were fought, before the last of the Moorish kingdoms in Spain submitted to the Christian arms. [1492.]

¹⁵ *See Sim. Assemanni, Histor. Ital. Scriptores, vol. iii. p. 135.*

As the Christians made their conquests upon the Mahometans at various periods and under different leaders, each formed the territory which he had wrested from the common enemy into an independent state. Spain was divided into almost as many separate kingdoms as it contained provinces; in each city of note a petty monarch established his throne and assumed all the ensigns of royalty. In a series of years, however, by the usual events of intermarriages, or succession, or conquest, all these inferior principalities were annexed to the more powerful kingdoms of Castile and of Aragon. At length, by the fortunate marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, the former the hereditary monarch of Aragon, and the latter raised to the throne of Castile by the affection of her subjects, all the Spanish crowns were united, and descended in the same line. [1481.]

From this period the political constitution of Spain began to assume a regular and uniform appearance; the genius of its government may be delineated, and the progress of its laws and manners may be traced, with certainty. Notwithstanding the singular revolution which the invasion of the Moors occasioned in Spain, and the peculiarity of its fate in being so long subject to the Mahometan yoke, the customs introduced by the Vandals and Goths had taken such deep root, and were so thoroughly incorporated with the frame of its government, that in every province which the Christians recovered from the Moors we find the condition of individuals, as well as the political constitution, nearly the same as in other nations of Europe. Lands were held by the same tenure; justice was dispensed in the same form; the same privileges were claimed by the nobility, and the same power exercised by the cortes, or general assembly of the kingdom. Several circumstances contributed to secure this per-

manence of the feudal institutions in Spain, notwithstanding the conquests of the Moors, which seemed to have overturned them. Such of the Spaniards as preserved their independence adhered to their ancient customs, not only from attachment to them, but out of antipathy to the Moors, to whose ideas concerning property and government these customs were totally repugnant. Even among the Christians who submitted to the Moorish conquerors and consented to become their subjects, ancient customs were not entirely abolished. They were permitted to retain their religion, their laws concerning private property, their forms of administering justice, and their mode of levying taxes. The followers of Mahomet are the only enthusiasts who have united the spirit of toleration with zeal for making proselytes, and who, at the same time that they took arms to propagate the doctrine of their prophet, permitted such as would not embrace it to adhere to their own tenets and to practise their own rites. To this peculiarity in the genius of the Mahometan religion, as well as to the desire which the Moors had of reconciling the Christians to their yoke, it was owing that the ancient manners and laws in Spain survived the violent shock of a conquest, and were permitted to subsist notwithstanding the introduction of a new religion and a new form of government into that country. It is obvious from all these particulars that the Christians must have found it extremely easy to re-establish manners and government on their ancient foundations in those provinces of Spain which they wrested successively from the Moors. A considerable part of the people retained such a fondness for the customs and such a reverence for the laws of their ancestors that, wishing to see them completely restored, they were not only willing but eager to resume the former and to recognise the authority of the latter.

But though the feudal form of government, with all the institutions which characterise it, was thus preserved in Castile and Aragon, as well as in all the kingdoms which depended on these crowns, there were certain peculiarities in their political constitutions which distinguish them from those of any other country in Europe. The royal prerogative, extremely limited in every feudal kingdom, was circumscribed in Spain within such narrow bounds as reduced the power of the sovereign almost to nothing. The privileges of the nobility were great in proportion, and extended so far as to border on absolute independence. The immunities of the cities were likewise greater than in other feudal kingdoms ; they possessed considerable influence in the cortes, and they aspired at obtaining more. Such a state of society, in which the political machine was so ill adjusted and the several members of the legislature so improperly balanced, produced internal disorders in the kingdoms of Spain, which rose beyond the pitch of turbulence and anarchy usual under the feudal government. The whole tenor of the Spanish history confirms the truth of this observation ; and when the mutinous spirit to which the genius of their policy gave birth and vigour was no longer restrained and overawed by the immediate dread of the Moorish arms, it broke out into more frequent insurrections against the government of their princes, as well as more outrageous insults on their dignity, than occur in the annals of any other country. These were accompanied at some times with more liberal sentiments concerning the rights of the people, at other times with more elevated notions concerning the privileges of the nobles, than were common in other nations.

In the principality of Catalonia, which was annexed to the kingdom of Aragon, the impatience of the people to obtain a redress of their grievances having prompted

Avila.





them to take arms against their sovereign, John II., they, by a solemn deed, recalled the oath of allegiance which they had sworn to him, declared him and his posterity to be unworthy of the throne,¹⁶ and endeavoured to establish a republican form of government, in order to secure the perpetual enjoyment of that liberty after which they aspired.¹⁷ Nearly about the same period, the indignation of the Castilian nobility against the weak and flagitious administration of Henry IV. having led them to combine against him, they arrogated, as one of the privileges belonging to their order, the right of trying and of passing sentence on their sovereign. That the exercise of this power might be as public and solemn as the pretension to it was bold, they summoned all the nobility of their party to meet at Avila; a spacious theatre was erected in a plain without the walls of the town; an image representing the king was seated on a throne, clad in royal robes, with a crown on its head, a sceptre in its hand, and the sword of justice by its side. The accusation against the king was read, and the sentence of deposition was pronounced, in presence of a numerous assembly. At the close of the first article of the charge, the archbishop of Toledo advanced and tore the crown from the head of the image; at the close of the second, the Conde de Placentia snatched the sword of justice from its side; at the close of the third, the Conde de Benevente wrested the sceptre from its hand; at the close of the last, Don Diego Lopes de Stuniga tumbled it headlong from the throne. At the same instant, Don Alfonzo, Henry's brother, was proclaimed king of Castile and Leon in his stead.¹⁸

¹⁶ Zurita, *Anales de Arag.*, tom. ~~v.~~ pp. 113, 115, etc.

¹⁷ Ferrera, *Hist. d'Espagne*, tom. vii p. 92.—P. Orléans, *Révol. d'Espagne*, tom. iii p. 155.—L.

Marinæus Siculus, *De Reb. Hispan.*, apud Schotti *Script. Hispan.*, fol. 429.

¹⁸ Marian., *Hist.*, lib. xxxiii. & 9. [1465.]

The most daring leaders of faction would not have ventured on these measures, nor have conducted them with such public ceremony, if the sentiments of the people concerning the royal dignity had not been so formed by the laws and policy to which they were accustomed, both in Castile and Catalonia, as prepared them to approve of such extraordinary proceedings, or to acquiesce in them.

In Aragon the form of government was monarchical, but the genius and maxims of it were purely republican. The kings, who were long elective, retained only the shadow of power; the real exercise of it was in the cortes, or parliament of the kingdom. This supreme assembly was composed of four different *arms* or members: the nobility of the first rank; the equestrian order, or nobility of the second class; the representatives of the cities and towns, whose right to a place in the cortes, if we may give credit to the historians of Aragon, was coeval with the constitution; the ecclesiastical order, composed of the dignitaries of the church, together with the representatives of the inferior clergy.¹⁹ No law could pass in this assembly without the assent of every single member who had a right to vote.²⁰ Without the permission of the cortes no tax could be imposed, no war could be declared, no peace could be concluded, no money could be coined, nor could any alteration be made in the current specie.²¹ The power of reviewing the proceedings of all inferior courts, the privilege of inspecting every department of administration, and the right of redressing all grievances, belonged to the cortes. Nor did those who conceived themselves to be aggrieved address the cortes in the humble tone of supplicants and petition for

¹⁹ Forma de celebrar Cortes en Aragon, por Geron. Martel.

²⁰ Martel, *ibid.*, p. 2.

²¹ Hier. Blanca, *Comment. Rer. Aragon.*, ap. Schot. Script. Hispan., vol. iii. p. 750.

redress : they demanded it as the birthright of freemen, and required the guardians of their liberty to decide with respect to the points which they laid before them.²² This sovereign court was held during several centuries every year ; but, in consequence of a regulation introduced about the beginning of the fourteenth century, it was convoked from that period only once in two years. After it was assembled, the king had no right to prorogue or dissolve it without its own consent ; and the session continued forty days.²³

Not satisfied with having erected such formidable barriers against the encroachments of the royal prerogative, nor willing to commit the sole guardianship of their liberties entirely to the vigilance and authority of an assembly similar to the diets, states-general, and parliaments in which the other feudal nations have placed so much confidence, the Aragonese had recourse to an institution peculiar to themselves, and elected a *justiza*, or supreme judge. This magistrate, whose office bore some resemblance to that of the ephori in ancient Sparta, acted as the protector of the people and the controller of the prince. The person of the *justiza* was sacred, his power and jurisdiction almost unbounded. He was the supreme interpreter of the laws. Not only inferior judges, but the kings themselves, were bound to consult him in every doubtful case and to receive his responses with implicit deference.²⁴ An appeal lay to him from the royal judges, as well as from those appointed by the barons within their respective territories. Even when no appeal was made to him, he could interpose by his own authority, prohibit the ordinary judge to proceed, take immediate

²² Martel, *Forma de celebrar*, p. 2.

²³ Hier. Blanca, *Comment.*, p.

763.

²⁴ Blanca has preserved two re-

sponses of the *justiza* to James II., who reigned towards the close of the thirteenth century. Blanca, p. 748.

cognizance of the cause himself, and remove the party accused to the *manifestation*, or prison of the state, to which no person had access but by his permission. His power was exerted with no less vigour and effect in superintending the administration of government than in regulating the course of justice. It was the prerogative of the justiza to inspect the conduct of the king. He had a title to review all the royal proclamations and patents, and to declare whether or not they were agreeable to law and ought to be carried into execution. He, by his sole authority, could exclude any of the king's ministers from the conduct of affairs and call them to answer for their maladministration. He himself was accountable to the cortes only for the manner in which he discharged the duties of this high office and performed functions of the greatest importance that could be committed to a subject.*

It is evident, from a bare enumeration of the privileges of the Aragonese cortes, as well as of the rights belonging to the justiza, that a very small portion of power remained in the hands of the king. The Aragonese seem to have been solicitous that their monarchs should know and feel this state of impotence to which they were reduced. Even in swearing allegiance to their sovereign, an act which ought naturally to be accompanied with professions of submission and respect, they devised an oath in such a form as to remind him of his dependence on his subjects. "We," said the justiza to the king in the name of his high-spirited barons, "who are each of us as good, and who are altogether more powerful than you, promise obedience to your government if you maintain our rights and liberties; but if not, not." Conformably to this oath they established it as a fundamental article in their constitution that if the king should violate their rights

* Note XXXI.—Hier. Blanca, Comment., pp. 747, 755.

and privileges it was lawful for the people to disclaim him as their sovereign, and to elect another, even though a heathen, in his place.²⁶ The attachment of the Aragonese to this singular constitution of government was extreme, and their respect for it approached to superstitious veneration.²⁷ In the preamble to one of their laws they declare that such was the barrenness of their country, and the poverty of the inhabitants, that, if it were not on account of the liberties by which they were distinguished from other nations, the people would abandon it and go in quest of a settlement to some more fruitful region.²⁸

In Castile there were not such peculiarities in the form of Government as to establish any remarkable distinction between it and that of the other European nations. The executive part of government was committed to the king, but with a prerogative extremely limited. The legislative authority resided in the cortes, which was composed of the nobility, the dignified ecclesiastics, and the representatives of the cities. The assembly of the cortes in Castile was very ancient, and seems to have been almost coeval with the constitution. The members of the three different orders, who had a right of suffrage, met in one place and deliberated as one collective body, the decisions of which were regulated by the sentiments of the majority. The right of imposing taxes, of enacting laws, and of redressing grievances belonged to this assembly; and, in order to secure the assent of the king to such statutes and regulations as were deemed salutary or beneficial to the kingdom, it was usual in the cortes to take no step towards granting money until all business relative to the public welfare was concluded. The representatives

²⁶ Hier. Blanca, Comment., p. 720.

²⁷ Note XXXII.

VOL. L

²⁸ Hier. Blanca, Comment., p. 751.

of cities seemed to have obtained a seat very early in the cortes of Castile, and soon acquired such influence and credit as were very uncommon at a period when the splendour and pre-eminence of the nobility had eclipsed or depressed all other orders of men. The number of members from cities bore such a proportion to that of the whole collective body as rendered them extremely respectable in the cortes.²⁹ The degree of consideration which they possessed in the state may be estimated by one event. Upon the death of John I. a council of regency was appointed to govern the kingdom during the minority of his son. It was composed of an equal number of noblemen and of deputies chosen by the cities; the latter were admitted to the same rank and invested with the same powers as prelates and grantees of the first order.³⁰ But though the members of communities in Castile were elevated above the condition wherein they were placed in other kingdoms of Europe, though they had attained to such political importance that even the proud and jealous spirit of the feudal aristocracy could not exclude them from a considerable share in government, yet the nobles, notwithstanding these acquisitions of the commons, continued to assert the privileges of their order, in opposition to the crown, in a tone extremely high. There was not any body of nobility in Europe more distinguished for independence of spirit, haughtiness of deportment, and bold pretensions than that of Castile. The history of that monarchy affords the most striking examples of the vigilance with which they observed, and of the vigour with which they opposed, every measure of their king's that tended to encroach on their jurisdiction, to diminish their dignity, or to abridge their power. Even in their ordinary intercourse with their monarchs they preserved such a consciousness of their rank that the nobles

²⁹ Note XXXIII.

³⁰ Marian., Hist., lib. xviii. c. 15.

of the first order claimed it as a privilege to be covered in the royal presence, and approached their sovereigns rather as equals than as subjects.

The constitutions of the subordinate monarchies which depended on the crowns of Castile and Aragon nearly resembled those of the kingdoms to which they were annexed. In all of them, the dignity and independence of the nobles were great, the immunities and power of the cities were considerable.

An attentive observation of the singular situation of Spain, as well as the various events which occurred there from the invasion of the Moors to the union of its kingdom under Ferdinand and Isabella, will discover the causes to which all the peculiarities in its political constitution I have pointed out ought to be ascribed.

As the provinces of Spain were wrested from the Mahometans gradually and with difficulty, the nobles who followed the standard of any eminent leader in these wars conquered not for him alone, but for themselves. They claimed a share in the lands which their valour had won from the enemy, and their prosperity and power increased in proportion as the territory of the prince extended.

During their perpetual wars with the Moors, the monarchs of the several kingdoms in Spain depended so much on their nobles that it became necessary to conciliate their good will by successive grants of new honours and privileges. By the time that any prince could establish his dominion in a conquered province, the greater part of the territory was parcelled out by him among his barons, with such jurisdiction and immunities as raised them almost to sovereign power.

At the same time, the kingdoms erected in so many different corners of Spain were of inconsiderable extent. The petty monarch was but little elevated above his

nobles. They, feeling themselves to be almost his equals, acted as such, and could not look up to the kings of such limited domains with the same reverence that the sovereigns of the great monarchies in Europe were viewed by their subjects.³¹

While these circumstances concurred in exalting the nobility and in depressing the royal authority, there were other causes which raised the cities in Spain to consideration and power.

As the open country, during the wars with the Moors, was perpetually exposed to the excursions of the enemy, with whom no peace or truce was so permanent as to prove any lasting security, self-preservation obliged persons of all ranks to fix their residence in places of strength. The castles of the barons, which in other countries afforded a commodious retreat from the depredations of banditti or from the transient violence of any interior commotion, were unable to resist an enemy whose operations were conducted with regular and persevering vigour. Cities, in which great numbers united for their mutual defence, were the only places in which people could reside with any prospect of safety. To this was owing the rapid growth of those cities in Spain of which the Christians recovered possession. All who fled from the Moorish yoke resorted to them, as to an asylum; and in them the greater part of those who took the field against the Mahometans established their families.

Several of these cities, during a longer or shorter course of years, were the capitals of little states, and enjoyed all the advantages which accelerate the increase of inhabitants in every place that is the seat of government.

From these concurring causes, the number of cities in Spain at the beginning of the fifteenth century had

³¹ Note XXXIV.

become considerable, and they were peopled far beyond the proportion which was common in other parts of Europe, except in Italy and the Low Countries. The Moors had introduced manufactures into those cities while under their dominion. The Christians, who, by intermixture with them, had learned their arts, continued to cultivate these. Trade, in several of the Spanish towns, appears to have been carried on with vigour; and the spirit of commerce continued to preserve the number of their inhabitants, as the sense of danger had first induced them to crowd together.

As the Spanish cities were populous, many of the inhabitants were of a rank superior to those who resided in towns in other countries of Europe. That cause which contributed chiefly to their population affected equally persons of every condition, who flocked thither promiscuously, in order to find shelter there, or in hopes of making a stand against the enemy with greater advantage than in any other station. The persons elected as their representatives in the cortes by the cities, or promoted to offices of trust and dignity in the government of the community, were often, as will appear from transactions which I shall hereafter relate, of such considerable rank in the kingdom as reflected lustre on their constituents and on the stations wherein they were placed.

As it was impossible to carry on a continual war against the Moors without some other military force than that which the barons were obliged to bring into the field in consequence of the feudal tenures, it became necessary to have some troops, particularly a body of light cavalry, in constant pay. It was one of the privileges of the nobles that their lands were exempt from the burden of taxes. The charge of supporting the troops requisite for the public safety fell wholly upon the cities; and their kings, being obliged

frequently to apply to them for aid, found it necessary to gain their favour by concessions, which not only extended their immunities, but added to their wealth and power.

When the influence of all these circumstances, peculiar to Spain, is added to the general and common causes which contributed to aggrandize cities in other countries of Europe, this will fully account for the extensive privileges which they acquired, as well as for the extraordinary consideration to which they attained, in all the Spanish kingdoms.³²

By these exorbitant privileges of the nobility, and this unusual power of the cities, in Spain, the royal prerogative was hemmed in on every side and reduced within very narrow bounds. Sensible of this, and impatient of such restraint, several monarchs endeavoured, at various junctures and by different means, to enlarge their own jurisdiction. Their power, however, or their abilities, were so unequal to the undertaking that their efforts were attended with little success. But when Ferdinand and Isabella found themselves at the head of the united kingdoms of Spain and delivered from the danger and interruption of domestic wars, they were not only in a condition to resume, but were able to prosecute with advantage, the schemes for extending the prerogative which their ancestors had attempted in vain. Ferdinand's profound sagacity in concerting his measures, his persevering industry in conducting them, and his uncommon address in carrying them into execution, fitted him admirably for an undertaking which required all these talents.

As the overgrown power and high pretensions of the nobility were what the monarchs of Spain felt most sensibly and bore with the greatest impatience, the great object of Ferdinand's policy was to reduce

³² Note XXXV.

these within more moderate bounds. Under various pretexts, sometimes by violence, more frequently in consequence of decrees obtained in the courts of law, he wrested from the barons a great part of the lands which had been granted to them by the inconsiderate bounty of former monarchs, particularly during the feeble and profuse reign of his predecessor, Henry IV. He did not give the entire conduct of affairs to persons of noble birth, who were accustomed to occupy every department of importance in peace or in war, as if it had been a privilege peculiar to their order to be employed as the sole counsellors and ministers of the crown. He often transacted business of great consequence without their intervention, and bestowed many offices of power and trust on new men, devoted to his interest.²² He introduced a degree of state and dignity into his court which, being little known in Spain while it remained split into many small kingdoms, taught the nobles to approach their sovereign with more ceremony, and gradually rendered him the object of greater deference and respect.

The annexing the masterships of the three military orders of St. Jago, Calatrava, and Alcantara to the crown was another expedient by which Ferdinand greatly augmented the revenue and power of the kings of Spain. These orders were instituted, in imitation of those of the Knights Templars and of St. John of Jerusalem, on purpose to wage perpetual war with the Mahometans, and to protect the pilgrims who visited Compostella, or other places of eminent sanctity in Spain. The zeal and superstition of the ages in which they were founded prompted persons of every rank to bestow such liberal donations on those holy warriors that in a short time they engrossed a considerable share in the property and wealth of the kingdom. The master-

²² Zurita, *Anales de Arag.*, tom. vi. p. 22.

ships of these orders came to be stations of the greatest power and opulence to which a Spanish nobleman could be advanced. These high dignities were in the disposal of the knights of the order, and placed the persons on whom they conferred them almost on a level with their sovereign.³⁴ Ferdinand, unwilling that the nobility, whom he considered as already too formidable, should derive such additional credit and influence from possessing the government of these wealthy fraternities, was solicitous to wrest it out of their hands and to vest it in the crown. His measures for accomplishing this were wisely planned and executed with vigour.³⁵ By address, by promises, and by threats, he prevailed on the knights of each order to place Isabella and him at the head of it. Innocent VIII. and Alexander VI. gave this election the sanction of papal authority;³⁶ and subsequent pontiffs rendered the annexation of these masterships to the crown perpetual.

While Ferdinand by this measure diminished the power and influence of the nobility and added new lustre or authority to the crown, he was taking other important steps with a view to the same object. The sovereign jurisdiction which the feudal barons exercised within their own territories was the pride and distinction of their order. To have invaded openly a privilege which they prized so highly, and in defence of which they would have run so eagerly to arms, was a measure too daring for a prince of Ferdinand's cautious temper. He took advantage, however, of an opportunity which the state of his kingdoms and the spirit of his people presented him, in order to undermine what he durst not assault. The incessant depre-

³⁴ Note XXXVI.

³⁵ Marian., Hist., lib. xxv. c. 5.

³⁶ Zurita, Anales, tom. v. p. 22.

—Ælii Anton. Nebrissensis Rerum

a Ferdinand. et Elizab. gestarum

decades ii., apud Schot. Script.

Hispan., i. 860.

dations of the Moors, the want of discipline among the troops which were employed to oppose them, the frequent civil wars between the crown and the nobility, as well as the undiscerning rage with which the barons carried on their private wars with each other, filled all the provinces of Spain with disorder. Rapine, outrage, and murder became so common as not only to interrupt commerce, but in a great measure to suspend all intercourse between one place and another. That security and protection which men expect from entering into civil society ceased in a great degree. Internal order and police, while the feudal institutions remained in vigour, were so little objects of attention, and the administration of justice was so extremely feeble, that it would have been vain to have expected relief from the established laws or the ordinary judges. But the evil became so intolerable, and the inhabitants of cities, who were the chief sufferers, grew so impatient of this anarchy, that self-preservation forced them to have recourse to an extraordinary remedy. About the middle of the thirteenth century, the cities in the kingdom of Aragon, and, after their example, those in Castile, formed themselves into an association distinguished by the name of the *holy brotherhood*. They exacted a certain contribution from each of the associated towns; they levied a considerable body of troops, in order to protect travellers, and to pursue criminals; they appointed judges, who opened their courts in various parts of the kingdom. Whoever was guilty of murder, robbery, or of any act that violated the public peace, and was seized by the troops of the *brotherhood*, was carried before judges of their nomination, who, without paying any regard to the exclusive and sovereign jurisdiction which the lord of the place might claim, tried and condemned the criminals. By the establishment of this fraternity the prompt and impartial adminis-

tration of justice was restored, and, together with it, internal tranquillity and order began to return. The nobles alone murmured at this salutary institution. They complained of it as an encroachment on one of their most valuable privileges. They remonstrated against it in a high tone, and, on some occasions, refused to grant any aid to the crown unless it were abolished. Ferdinand, however, was sensible not only of the good effects of the holy brotherhood with respect to the police of his kingdoms, but perceived its tendency to abridge, and at length to annihilate, the territorial jurisdiction of the nobility. He countenanced it on every occasion. He supported it with the whole force of royal authority ; and, besides the expedients employed by him in common with the other monarchs of Europe, he availed himself of this institution, which was peculiar to his kingdom, in order to limit and abolish that independent jurisdiction of the nobility, which was no less inconsistent with the authority of the prince than with the order of society.³⁷

But though Ferdinand by these measures considerably enlarged the boundaries of his prerogative, and acquired a degree of influence and power far beyond what any of his predecessors had enjoyed, yet the limitations of the royal authority, as well as the barriers against its encroachments, continued to be many and strong. The spirit of liberty was vigorous among the people of Spain ; the spirit of independence was high among the nobility ; and though the love of glory, peculiar to the Spaniards in every period of their history, prompted them to support Ferdinand with zeal in his foreign operations, and to afford him such aid as enabled him not only to undertake but to execute great enterprises, he reigned over his subjects with a jurisdiction less extensive than that of any of the great monarchs in

³⁷ Note XXXVIL

Europe. It will appear from many passages in the following history that during a considerable part of the reign of his successor Charles V. the prerogative of the Spanish crown was equally circumscribed.

The ancient government and laws in France so nearly resembled those of the other feudal kingdoms that such a detail with respect to them as was necessary, in order to convey some idea of the nature and effects of the peculiar institutions which took place in Spain, would be superfluous. In the view which I have exhibited of the means by which the French monarchs acquired such a full command of the national force of their kingdom as enabled them to engage in extensive schemes of foreign operation, I have already pointed out the great steps by which they advanced towards a more ample possession of political power and a more uncontrolled exercise of their royal prerogative. All that now remains is to take notice of such particulars in the constitution of France as serve either to distinguish it from that of other countries, or tend to throw any light on the transactions of that period to which the following History extends.

Under the French monarchs of the first race, the royal prerogative was very inconsiderable. The general assemblies of the nation, which met annually at stated seasons, extended their authority to every department of government. The power of electing kings, of enacting laws, of redressing grievances, of conferring donations on the prince, of passing judgment in the last resort, with respect to every person and to every cause, resided in this great convention of the nation. Under the second race of kings, notwithstanding the power and splendour which the conquests of Charlemagne added to the crown, the general assemblies of the nation continued to possess extensive authority. The right of determining which of the royal family should be placed

on the throne was vested in them. The princes, elevated to that dignity by their suffrage, were accustomed regularly to call and to consult them with respect to every affair of importance to the state, and without their consent no law was passed and no new tax was levied.

But by the time that Hugh Capet, the father of the third race of kings, took possession of the throne of France, such changes had happened in the political state of the kingdom as considerably affected the power and jurisdiction of the general assembly of the nation. The royal authority, in the hands of the degenerate posterity of Charlemagne, had dwindled into insignificance and contempt. Every considerable proprietor of land had formed his territory into a barony almost independent of the sovereign. The dukes or governors of provinces, the counts or governors of towns and small districts, and the great officers of the crown, had rendered these dignities, which originally were granted only during pleasure or for life, hereditary in their families. Each of these had usurped all the rights which hitherto had been deemed the distinctions of royalty, particularly the privileges of dispensing justice within their own domains, of coining money, and of waging war. Every district was governed by local customs, acknowledged a distinct lord, and pursued a separate interest. The formality of doing homage to their sovereign was almost the only act of subjection which those haughty barons would perform; and that bound them no farther than they were willing to acknowledge its obligation.^{ss}

In a kingdom broken into so many independent baronies, hardly any common principle of union remained; and the general assembly, in its deliberations, could scarcely consider the nation as forming one body, or establish common regulations to be of equal force in

^{ss} Note XXXVIII.

every part. Within the immediate domains of the crown the king might publish laws, and they were obeyed, because there he was acknowledged as the only lord. But if he had aimed at rendering these laws general, that would have alarmed the barons as an encroachment upon the independence of their jurisdiction. The barons, when met in the great national convention, avoided with no less care the enacting of general laws to be observed in every part of the kingdom, because the execution of them must have been vested in the king, and would have enlarged that paramount power which was the object of their jealousy. Thus, under the descendants of Hugh Capet the states-general (for that was the name by which the supreme assembly of the French nation came then to be distinguished) lost their legislative authority, or at least entirely relinquished the exercise of it. From that period the jurisdiction of the states-general extended no farther than to the imposition of new taxes, the determination of questions with respect to the right of succession to the crown, the settling of the regency when the preceding monarch had not fixed it by his will, and the presenting remonstrances enumerating the grievances of which the nation wished to obtain redress.

As during several centuries the monarchs of Europe seldom demanded extraordinary subsidies of their subjects, and the other events which required the interposition of the states rarely occurred, their meetings in France were not frequent. They were summoned occasionally by their kings, when compelled by their wants or by their fears to have recourse to the great convention of their people; but they did not, like the diet in Germany, the cortes in Spain, or the parliament in England, form an essential member of the constitution, the regular exertion of whose powers was requisite to give vigour and order to government.

When the states of France ceased to exercise legisla-

tive authority, the kings began to assume it. They ventured at first on acts of legislation with great reserve, and after taking every precaution that could prevent their subjects from being alarmed at the exercise of a new power. They did not at once issue their ordinances in a tone of authority and command. They treated with their subjects; they pointed out what was best, and allured them to comply with it. By degrees, however, as the prerogative of the crown extended, and as the supreme jurisdiction of the royal courts came to be established, the kings of France assumed more openly the style and authority of lawgivers; and before the beginning of the fifteenth century the complete legislative power was vested in the crown.³⁹

Having secured this important acquisition, the steps which led to the right of imposing taxes were rendered few and easy. The people, accustomed to see their sovereigns issue ordinances, by their sole authority, which regulated points of the greatest consequence with respect to the property of their subjects, were not alarmed when they were required by the royal edicts to contribute certain sums towards supplying the exigencies of government and carrying forward the measures of the nation. When Charles VII. and Louis XI. first ventured to exercise this new power, in the manner in which I have already described, the gradual increase of the royal authority had so imperceptibly prepared the minds of the people of France for this innovation that it excited no commotion in the kingdom, and seemed scarcely to have given rise to any murmur or complaint.

When the kings of France had thus engrossed every power which can be exerted in government,—when the right of making laws, of levying money, of keeping an army of mercenaries in constant pay, of declaring war, and of concluding peace, centred in the crown,—the

³⁹ Note XXXIX.

constitution of the kingdom, which under the first race of kings was nearly democratical, which under the second race became an aristocracy, terminated under the third race in a pure monarchy. Every thing that tended to preserve the appearance or revive the memory of the ancient mixed government seems from that period to have been industriously avoided. During the long and active reign of Francis I., the variety as well as extent of whose operations obliged him to lay many heavy impositions on his subjects, the states-general of France were not once assembled, nor were the people once allowed to exert the power of taxing themselves, which, according to the original ideas of feudal government, was a right essential to every freeman.

Two things, however, remained which moderated the exercise of the regal prerogative and restrained it within such bounds as preserved the constitution of France from degenerating into mere despotism. The rights and privileges claimed by the nobility must be considered as one barrier against the absolute dominion of the crown. Though the nobles of France had lost that political power which was vested in their order as a body, they still retained the personal rights and pre-eminence which they derived from their rank. They preserved a consciousness of elevation above other classes of citizens; an exemption from burdens to which persons of inferior condition were subject; a contempt of the occupations in which they were engaged; the privilege of assuming ensigns that indicated their own dignity; a right to be treated with a certain degree of deference during peace; and a claim to various distinctions when in the field. Many of these pretensions were not founded on the words of statutes, or derived from positive laws: they were defined and ascertained by the maxims of honour, a title more delicate, but no less sacred. These rights, established and protected by a principle equally vigilant

in guarding and intrepid in defending them, are to the sovereign himself objects of respect and veneration. Wherever they stand in its way, the royal prerogative is bounded. The violence of a despot may exterminate such an order of men; but as long as it subsists, and its ideas of personal distinction remain entire, the power of the prince has limits.⁴⁰

As in France the body of nobility was very numerous, and the individuals of which it was composed retained a high sense of their own pre-eminence, to this we may ascribe in a great measure the mode of exercising the royal prerogative which peculiarly distinguishes the government of that kingdom. An intermediate order was placed between the monarch and his other subjects, and in every act of authority it became necessary to attend to its privileges, and not only to guard against any real violation of them, but to avoid any suspicion of supposing it to be possible that they might be violated. Thus a species of government was established in France unknown in the ancient world, that of a monarchy in which the power of the sovereign, though unconfined by any legal or constitutional restraint, has certain bounds set to it by the ideas which one class of his subjects entertain concerning their own dignity.

The jurisdiction of the parliaments in France, particularly that of Paris, was the other barrier which served to confine the exercise of the royal prerogative within certain limits. The parliament of Paris was originally the court of the kings of France, to which they committed the supreme administration of justice within their own domains, as well as the power of deciding with respect to all cases brought before it by appeals from the courts of the barons. When, in consequence of events and regulations which have been mentioned formerly, the

⁴⁰ De l'Esprit des Loix, liv. ii. History of Civil Society, part i. c. 4.—Dr. Ferguson's Essay on the sect. 10.

time and place of its meeting were fixed,—when not only the form of its procedure, but the principles on which it decided, were rendered regular and consistent,—when every cause of importance was finally determined there, and when the people became accustomed to resort thither as to the supreme temple of justice,—the parliament of Paris rose to high estimation in the kingdom, its members acquired dignity, and its decrees were submitted to with deference. Nor was this the only source of the power and influence which the parliament obtained. The kings of France, when they first began to assume the legislative power, in order to reconcile the minds of their people to this new exertion of prerogative, produced their edicts and ordinances in the parliament of Paris, that they might be approved of and registered there before they were published and declared to be of authority in the kingdom. During the intervals between the meetings of the states-general of the kingdom, or during those reigns in which the states-general were not assembled, the monarchs of France were accustomed to consult the parliament of Paris with respect to the most arduous affairs of government, and frequently regulated their conduct by its advice, in declaring war, in concluding peace, and in other transactions of public concern. Thus there was erected in the kingdom a tribunal which became the great depository of the laws, and, by the uniform tenor of its decrees, established principles of justice and forms of proceeding which were considered as so sacred that even the sovereign power of the monarch durst not venture to disregard or to violate them. The members of this illustrious body, though they neither possess legislative authority nor can be considered as the representatives of the people, have availed themselves of the reputation and influence which they had acquired among their countrymen, in order to make a stand, to the utmost of their ability, against

every unprecedented and exorbitant exertion of the prerogative. In every period of the French history they have merited the praise of being the virtuous but feeble guardians of the rights and privileges of the nation.⁴¹

After taking this view of the political state of France, I proceed to consider that of the German empire, from which Charles V. derived his title of highest dignity. In explaining the constitution of this great and complex body at the beginning of the sixteenth century, I shall avoid entering into such a detail as would involve my readers in that inextricable labyrinth which is formed by the multiplicity of its tribunals, the number of its members, their interfering rights, and by the endless discussions or refinements of the public lawyers of Germany with respect to all these.

The empire of Charlemagne was a structure erected in so short a time that it could not be permanent. Under his immediate successor it began to totter, and soon after fell to pieces. The crown of Germany was separated from that of France, and the descendants of Charlemagne established two great monarchies so situated as to give rise to a perpetual rivalry and enmity between them. But the princes of the race of Charlemagne who were placed on the imperial throne were not altogether so degenerate as those of the same family who reigned in France. In the hands of the former the royal authority retained some vigour, and the nobles of Germany, though possessed of extensive privileges as well as ample territories, did not so early attain independence. The great offices of the crown continued to be at the disposal of the sovereign, and during a long period fiefs remained in their original state, without becoming hereditary and perpetual in the families of the persons to whom they had been granted.

⁴¹ Note XL.

At length the German branch of the family of Charlemagne became extinct, and his feeble descendants who reigned in France had sunk into such contempt that the Germans, without looking towards them, exercised the right inherent in a free people, and in the general assembly of the nation elected Conrad, count of Franconia, emperor. After him Henry of Saxony, and his descendants, the three Othos, were placed, in succession, on the imperial throne, by the suffrages of their countrymen. The extensive territories of the Saxon emperors, their eminent abilities and enterprising genius, not only added new vigour to the imperial dignity, but raised it to higher power and pre-eminence. Otho the Great marched at the head of a numerous army into Italy, and, after the example of Charlemagne, gave law to that country. Every power there recognised his authority. He created popes, and deposed them, by his sovereign mandate. He annexed the kingdom of Italy to the German empire. Elated with his success, he assumed the title of Cæsar Augustus.⁴² A prince born in the heart of Germany pretended to be the successor of the emperors of ancient Rome, and claimed a right to the same power and prerogative. [952.]

But while the emperors, by means of these new titles and new dominions, gradually acquired additional authority and splendour, the nobility of Germany had gone on at the same time extending their privileges and jurisdiction. The situation of affairs was favourable to their attempts. The vigour which Charlemagne had given to government quickly relaxed. The incapacity of some of his successors was such as would have encouraged vassals less enterprising than the nobles of that age to have claimed new rights and to have assumed new powers. The civil wars in which other emperors were engaged obliged them to pay perpetual court to

* Annalista Saxo, etc., ap. Struv., Corp., vol. i. p. 246.

their subjects, on whose support they depended, and not only to connive at their usurpations, but to permit and even to authorise them. Fiefs gradually became hereditary. They were transmitted not only in the direct but also in the collateral line. The investiture of them was demanded not only by male but by female heirs. Every baron began to exercise sovereign jurisdiction within his own domains; and the dukes and counts of Germany took wide steps towards rendering their territories distinct and independent states.⁴³ The Saxon emperors observed their progress and were aware of its tendency. But, as they could not hope to humble vassals already grown too potent, unless they had turned their whole force as well as attention to that enterprise, and as they were extremely intent on their expeditions into Italy, which they could not undertake without the concurrence of their nobles, they were solicitous not to alarm them by any direct attack on their privileges and jurisdictions. They aimed, however, at undermining their power. With this view, they inconsiderately bestowed additional territories and accumulated new honours on the clergy, in hopes that this order might serve as a counterpoise to that of the nobility in any future struggle.⁴⁴

The unhappy effects of this fatal error in policy were quickly felt. Under the emperors of the Franconian and Swabian lines, whom the Germans, by their voluntary election, placed on the imperial throne, a new face of things appeared, and a scene was exhibited in Germany which astonished all Christendom at that time, and in the present age appears almost incredible. The popes, hitherto dependent on the emperors and indebted for power as well as dignity to their beneficence and protection, began to claim a superior jurisdiction, and,

⁴³ Pfeffel, Abrégé, pp. 120, 152.
—Lib. Feudor., tit. i.

⁴⁴ Pfeffel, Abrégé, p. 154.

in virtue of authority which they pretended to derive from heaven, tried, condemned, excommunicated, and deposed their former masters. Nor is this to be considered merely as a frantic sally of passion in a pontiff intoxicated with high ideas concerning the extent of priestly domination and the plenitude of papal authority. Gregory VII. was able as well as daring. His presumption and violence were accompanied with political discernment and sagacity. He had observed that the princes and nobles of Germany had acquired such considerable territories and such extensive jurisdiction as rendered them not only formidable to the emperors, but disposed them to favour any attempt to circumscribe their power. He foresaw that the ecclesiastics of Germany, raised almost to a level with its princes, were ready to support any person who would stand forth as the protector of their privileges and independence. With both of these Gregory negotiated, and had secured many devoted adherents among them before he ventured to enter the lists against the head of the empire.

He began his rupture with Henry IV. upon a pretext that was popular and plausible. He complained of the venality and corruption with which the emperor had granted the investiture of benefices to ecclesiastics. He contended that this right belonged to him as the head of the Church; he required Henry to confine himself within the bounds of his civil jurisdiction, and to abstain for the future from such sacrilegious encroachments on the spiritual dominion. All the censures of the Church were denounced against Henry because he refused to relinquish those powers which his predecessors had uniformly exercised. The most considerable of the German princes and ecclesiastics were excited to take arms against him. His mother, his wife, his sons, were wrought upon to disregard all the ties of blood as well as of duty, and to join the party of his

enemies.⁴⁵ Such were the successful arts with which the court of Rome inflamed the superstitious zeal and conducted the factious spirit of the Germans and Italians, that an emperor distinguished not only for many virtues, but possessed of considerable talents, was at length obliged to appear as a suppliant at the gate of the castle in which the pope resided, and to stand there three days, barefooted, in the depth of winter, imploring a pardon, which at length he obtained with difficulty.⁴⁶ [1077.]

This act of humiliation degraded the imperial dignity. Nor was the depression momentary only. The contest between Gregory and Henry gave rise to the two great factions of the Guelfs and Ghibellines,—the former of which, supporting the pretensions of the popes, and the latter, defending the rights of the emperor, kept Germany and Italy in perpetual agitation during three centuries. A regular system for humbling the emperors and circumscribing their power was formed, and adhered to uniformly throughout that period. The popes, the free states in Italy, the nobility and ecclesiastics of Germany, were all interested in its success; and, notwithstanding the return of some short intervals of vigour under the administration of a few able emperors, the imperial authority continued to decline. During the anarchy of the long interregnum subsequent to the death of William of Holland, it dwindled down almost to nothing. Rodulph of Hapsburg, the founder of the house of Austria, and who first opened the way to its future grandeur, was at length elected emperor, not that he might re-establish and extend the imperial authority, but because his territories and influence were so inconsiderable as to excite no jealousy in the German princes, who were willing to preserve the forms of a constitution the power and vigour of which they had destroyed. Several of his

⁴⁵ Annal German., ap. Struv., vol. i. p. 325.

⁴⁶ Note XII.

successors were placed on the imperial throne from the same motive, and almost every remaining prerogative was wrested out of the hands of feeble princes unable to exercise or to defend them.

During this period of turbulence and confusion the constitution of the Germanic body underwent a total change. The ancient names of courts and magistrates, together with the original forms and appearance of policy, were preserved; but such new privileges and jurisdiction were assumed, and so many various rights established, that the same species of government no longer subsisted. The princes, the great nobility, the dignified ecclesiastics, the free cities, had taken advantage of the interregnum which I have mentioned to establish or to extend their usurpations. They claimed and exercised the right of governing their respective territories with full sovereignty. They acknowledged no superior with respect to any point relative to the interior administration and police of their domains. They enacted laws, imposed taxes, coined money, declared war, concluded peace, and exerted every prerogative peculiar to independent states. The ideas of order and political union which had originally formed the various provinces of Germany into one body were almost entirely lost; and the society must have dissolved, if the forms of feudal subordination had not preserved such an appearance of connection or dependence among the various members of the community as preserved it from falling to pieces.

This bond of union, however, was extremely feeble; and hardly any principle remained in the German constitution of sufficient force to maintain public order or even to ascertain personal security. From the accession of Rodulph of Hapsburg to the reign of Maximilian, the immediate predecessor of Charles V., the empire felt every calamity which a state must endure when the

authority of government is so much relaxed as to have lost its proper degree of vigour. The causes of dissension among that vast number of members which composed the Germanic body were infinite and unavoidable. These gave rise to perpetual private wars, which were carried on with all the violence that usually accompanies resentment when unrestrained by superior authority. Rapine, outrage, exactions, became universal. Commerce was interrupted, industry suspended, and every part of Germany resembled a country which an enemy had plundered and left desolate.⁴⁷ The variety of expedients employed with a view to restore order and tranquillity prove that the grievances occasioned by this state of anarchy had grown intolerable. Arbiters were appointed to terminate the differences among the several states. The cities united in a league the object of which was to check the rapine and extortions of the nobility. The nobility formed confederacies on purpose to maintain tranquillity among their own order. Germany was divided into several circles, in each of which a provincial and partial jurisdiction was established, to supply the place of a public and common tribunal.⁴⁸

But all these remedies were so ineffectual that they served only to demonstrate the violence of that anarchy which prevailed, and the insufficiency of the means employed to correct it. At length Maximilian re-established public order in the empire, by instituting the Imperial Chamber, a tribunal composed of judges named partly by the emperor, partly by the several states, and vested with authority to decide finally concerning all differences among the members of the Germanic body. A few years after, by giving a new form to the Aulic

⁴⁷ See above, pp. 42-44 and Note XXI.—Datt., *de Pace Publica Imper.*, p. 25, no. 53, p. 28, no.

26, p. 35, no. 11.

⁴⁸ Datt., *passim*.—Struv., *Corp. Hist.*, i 510, etc.

Council which takes cognizance of all feudal causes and such as belong to the emperor's immediate jurisdiction, he restored some degree of vigour to the imperial authority. [1512.]

But, notwithstanding the salutary effects of these regulations and improvements, the political constitution of the German empire, at the commencement of the period of which I propose to write the history, was of a species so peculiar as not to resemble perfectly any form of government known either in the ancient or modern world. It was a complex body, formed by the association of several states, each of which possessed sovereign and independent jurisdiction within its own territories. Of all the members which composed this united body the emperor was the head. In his name all decrees and regulations with respect to points of common concern were issued, and to him the power of carrying them into execution was committed. But this appearance of monarchical power in the emperor was more than counterbalanced by the influence of the princes and states of the empire in every act of administration. No law extending to the whole body could pass, no resolution that affected the general interest could be taken, without the approbation of the diet of the empire. In this assembly every sovereign prince and state of the Germanic body had a right to be present, to deliberate, and to vote. The decrees, or *recesses*, of the diet were the laws of the empire, which the emperor was bound to ratify and enforce.

Under this aspect, the constitution of the empire appears a regular confederacy, similar to the Achæan league in ancient Greece, or to that of the United Provinces, and of the Swiss Cantons, in modern times. But, if viewed in another light, striking peculiarities in its political state present themselves. The Germanic body was not formed by the union of members altogether

distinct and independent. All the princes and states joined in this association were originally subject to the emperors and acknowledged them as sovereigns. Besides this, they originally held their lands as imperial fiefs, and in consequence of this tenure owed the emperor all those services which feudal vassals are bound to perform to their liege lord. But though this political subjection was entirely at an end, and the influence of the feudal relation much diminished, the ancient forms and institutions, introduced while the emperors governed Germany with authority not inferior to that which the other monarchs of Europe possessed, still remained. Thus an opposition was established between the genius of the government and the forms of administration in the German empire. The former considered the emperor only as the head of a confederacy, the members of which, by their voluntary choice, have raised him to that dignity; the latter seemed to imply that he is really invested with sovereign power. By this circumstance such principles of hostility and discord were interwoven into the frame of the -Germanic body as affected each of its members, rendering their interior union incomplete and their external efforts feeble and irregular. The pernicious influence of this defect, inherent in the constitution of the empire, is so considerable that without attending to it we cannot fully comprehend many transactions in the reign of Charles V. or form just ideas concerning the genius of the German government.

The emperors of Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century were distinguished by the most pompous titles, and by such ensigns of dignity as intimated their authority to be superior to that of all other monarchs. The greatest princes of the empire attended and served them, on some occasions, as the officers of their household. They exercised prerogatives

which no other sovereign ever claimed. They retained pretensions to all the extensive powers which their predecessors had enjoyed in any former age. But, at the same time, instead of possessing that ample domain which had belonged to the ancient emperors of Germany and which stretched from Basil to Cologne, along both banks of the Rhine,⁴⁹ they were stripped of all territorial property, and had not a single city, a single castle, a single foot of land, that belonged to them as heads of the empire. As their domain was alienated, their stated revenues were reduced almost to nothing; and the extraordinary aids which on a few occasions they obtained were granted sparingly and paid with reluctance. The princes and states of the empire, though they seemed to recognise the imperial authority, were subjects only in name, each of them possessing a complete municipal jurisdiction within the precincts of his own territories.

From this ill-compacted frame of government effects that were unavoidable resulted. The emperors, dazzled with the splendour of their titles and the external signs of vast authority, were apt to imagine themselves to be the real sovereigns of Germany, and were led to aim continually at recovering the exercise of those powers which the forms of the constitution seemed to vest in them, and which their predecessors, Charlemagne and the Othos, had actually enjoyed. The princes and states, aware of the nature as well as the extent of these pretensions, were perpetually on their guard in order to watch all the motions of the imperial court and to circumscribe its power within limits still more narrow. The emperors, in support of their claims, appealed to ancient forms and institutions which the states held to be obsolete. The states founded their

⁴⁹ Pfeffel, Abrégé, etc., p. 241.

rights on recent practice and modern privileges, which the emperors considered as usurpations.

This jealousy of the imperial authority, together with the opposition between it and the rights of the states, increased considerably from the time that the emperors were elected, not by the collective body of German nobles, but by a few princes of chief dignity. During a long period all the members of the Germanic body had a right to assemble and to make choice of the person whom they appointed to be their head. But amidst the violence and anarchy which prevailed for several centuries in the empire, seven princes who possessed the most extensive territories, and who had obtained an hereditary title to the great offices of the state, acquired the exclusive privilege of nominating the emperor. This right was confirmed to them by the Golden Bull; the mode of exercising it was ascertained, and they were dignified with the appellation of *electors*. The nobility and free cities, being thus stripped of a privilege which they had once enjoyed, were less connected with a prince towards whose elevation they had not contributed by their suffrages, and came to be more apprehensive of his authority. The electors, by their extensive power and the distinguishing privileges which they possessed, became formidable to the emperors with whom they were placed almost on a level in several acts of jurisdiction. Thus the introduction of the electoral college into the empire, and the authority which it acquired, instead of diminishing, contributed to strengthen, the principles of hostility and discord in the Germanic constitution.

These were farther augmented by the various and repugnant forms of civil policy in the several states which composed the Germanic body. It is no easy matter to render^{*} the union of independent states perfect and entire, even when the genius and forms of

their respective governments happen to be altogether similar. But in the German empire, which was a confederacy of princes, of ecclesiastics, and of free cities, it was impossible that they could incorporate thoroughly. The free cities were small republics, in which the maxims and spirit peculiar to that species of government prevailed. The princes and nobles, to whom supreme jurisdiction belonged, possessed a sort of monarchical power within their own territories, and the forms of their interior administration nearly resembled those of the great feudal kingdoms. The interests, the ideas, the objects of states so differently constituted cannot be the same. Nor could their common deliberations be carried on with the same spirit, while the love of liberty and attention to commerce were the reigning principles in the cities, while the desire of power and ardour for military glory were the governing passions of the princes and nobility.

The secular and ecclesiastical members of the empire were as little fitted for union as the free cities and the nobility. Considerable territories had been granted to several of the German bishoprics and abbeys, and some of the highest offices in the empire, having been annexed to them inalienably, were held by the ecclesiastics raised to these dignities. The younger sons of noblemen of the second order, who had devoted themselves to the Church, were commonly promoted to these stations of eminence and power; and it was no small mortification to the princes and great nobility to see persons raised from an inferior rank to the same level with themselves, or even exalted to superior dignity. The education of these churchmen, the genius of their profession, and their connection with the court of Rome, rendered their character as well as their interest different from those of the other members of the Germanic body with whom they were called to act in concert.

Thus another source of jealousy and variance was opened which ought not to be overlooked when we are searching into the nature of the German constitution.

To all these causes of dissension may be added one more, arising from the unequal distribution of power and wealth among the states of the empire. The electors, and other nobles of the highest rank, not only possessed sovereign jurisdiction, but governed such extensive, populous, and rich countries as rendered them great princes. Many of the other members, though they enjoyed all the rights of sovereignty, ruled over such petty domains that their real power bore no proportion to this high prerogative. A well-compacted and vigorous confederacy could not be formed of such dissimilar states. The weaker were jealous, timid, and unable either to assert or to defend their just privileges. The more powerful were apt to assume and to become oppressive. The electors and emperors, by turns, endeavoured to extend their own authority by encroaching on those feeble members of the Germanic body, who sometimes defended their rights with much spirit, but more frequently, being overawed or corrupted, they tamely surrendered their privileges, or meanly favoured the designs formed against them.⁵⁰

After contemplating all these principles of disunion and opposition in the constitution of the German empire, it will be easy to account for the want of concord and uniformity conspicuous in its councils and proceedings. That slow, dilatory, distrustful, and irresolute spirit which characterises all its deliberations will appear natural in a body the junction of whose members was so incomplete, the different parts of which were held together by such feeble ties and set at variance by such powerful motives. But the empire of Germany,

⁵⁰ Note XLII.

nevertheless, comprehended countries of such great extent, and was inhabited by such a martial and hardy race of men, that when the abilities of an emperor, or zeal for any common cause, could rouse this unwieldy body to put forth its strength, it acted with almost irresistible force. In the following history we shall find that as the measures on which Charles V. was most intent were often thwarted or rendered abortive by the spirit of jealousy and division peculiar to the Germanic constitution, so it was by the influence which he acquired over the princes of the empire, and by engaging them to co-operate with him, that he was enabled to make some of the greatest efforts which distinguish his reign.

The Turkish history is so blended, during the reign of Charles V., with that of the great nations in Europe, and the Ottoman Porte interposed so often, and with such decisive influence, in the wars and negotiations of the Christian princes, that some previous account of the state of government in that great empire is no less necessary for the information of my readers than those views of the constitution of other kingdoms which I have already exhibited to them.

It has been the fate of the southern and more fertile parts of Asia, at different periods, to be conquered by that warlike and hardy race of men who inhabit the vast country known to the ancients by the name of Scythia and among the moderns by that of Tartary. One tribe of these people, called Turks or Turcomans, extended its conquests, under various leaders, and during several centuries, from the shore of the Caspian Sea to the Straits of the Dardanelles. Towards the middle of the fifteenth century these formidable conquerors took Constantinople by storm and established the seat of their government in that imperial city. Greece, Moldavia, Wallachia, and the other provinces

of the ancient kingdoms of Thrace and Macedonia, together with part of Hungary, were subjected to their power.

But though the seat of the Turkish government was fixed in Europe, and the sultans obtained possession of such extensive dominions in that quarter of the globe, the genius of their policy continued to be purely Asiatic, and may be properly termed a despotism, in contradistinction to those monarchical and republican forms of government which we have been hitherto contemplating. The supreme power was vested in sultans of the Ottoman race, that blood being deemed so sacred that no other was thought worthy of the throne. From this elevation these sovereigns could look down and behold all their subjects reduced to the same level before them. The maxims of Turkish policy do not authorise any of those institutions which in other countries limit the exercise or moderate the rigour of monarchical power: they admit neither of any great court with constitutional and permanent jurisdiction to interpose both in enacting laws and in superintending the execution of them, nor of a body of hereditary nobles whose sense of their own pre-eminence, whose consciousness of what is due to their rank and character, whose jealousy of their privileges, circumscribe the authority of the prince, and serve not only as a barrier against the excesses of his caprice, but stand as an intermediate order between him and the people. Under the Turkish government the political condition of every subject is equal. To be employed in the service of the sultan is the only circumstance that confers distinction. Even this distinction is rather official than personal, and so closely annexed to the station in which any individual serves that it is scarcely communicated to the persons of those who are placed in them. The highest dignity in the empire does not give any rank or pre-eminence

to the family of him who enjoys it. As every man before he is raised to any station of authority must go through the preparatory discipline of a long and servile obedience,⁵¹ the moment he is deprived of power he and his posterity return to the same condition with other subjects and sink back into obscurity. It is the distinguishing and odious characteristic of Eastern despotism that it annihilates all other ranks of men in order to exalt the monarch; that it leaves nothing to the former, while it gives everything to the latter; that it endeavours to fix in the minds of those who are subject to it the idea of no relation between men but that of a master and of a slave, the former destined to command and to punish, the latter formed to tremble and obey.⁵²

But, as there are circumstances which frequently obstruct or defeat the salutary effects of the best-regulated governments, there are others which contribute to mitigate the evils of the most defective forms of policy. There can, indeed, be no constitutional restraints upon the will of a prince in a despotic government; but there may be such as are accidental. Absolute as the Turkish sultans are, they feel themselves circumscribed both by religion, the principle on which their authority is founded,⁵³ and by the army, the instrument which they must employ in order to maintain it. Wherever religion interposes, the will of the sovereign must submit to its decrees. When the Koran hath prescribed any religious rite, hath enjoined any moral duty, or hath confirmed by its sanction any political maxim, the command of the sultan cannot overturn that which a higher authority hath established. The chief restriction, however, on the will of the sultans is imposed by the military power. An armed force must

⁵¹ State of the Turkish Empire,
by Rycaut, p. 25.

⁵² Note XLIII.
⁵³ Rycaut, p. 8.

surround the throne of every despot, to maintain his authority and to execute his commands. As the Turks extended their empire over nations which they did not exterminate, but reduced to subjection, they found it necessary to render their military establishment numerous and formidable. Amruth, their third sultan, in order to form a body of troops devoted to his will, that might serve as the immediate guards of his person and dignity, commanded his officers to seize annually, as the imperial property, the fifth part of the youth taken in war. These, after being instructed in the Mahometan religion, inured to obedience by severe discipline, and trained to warlike exercises, were formed into a body distinguished by the name of *janizaries*, or new soldiers. Every sentiment which enthusiasm can inspire, every mark of distinction that the favour of the prince could confer, were employed in order to animate this body with martial ardour and with a consciousness of its own pre-eminence.⁵⁴ The janizaries soon became the chief strength and pride of the Ottoman armies, and, by their number as well as reputation, were distinguished above all the troops whose duty it was to attend on the person of the sultan.⁵⁵ [1362.]

Thus, as the supreme power in every society is possessed by those who have arms in their hands, this formidable body of soldiers, destined to be the instruments of enlarging the sultan's authority, acquired at the same time the means of controlling it. The janizaries in Constantinople, like the prætorian bands in ancient Rome, quickly perceived all the advantages which they derived from being stationed in the capital, from their union under one standard, and from being masters of the person of the prince. The sultans became no less sensible of their influence and importance. The

⁵⁴ Prince Cantemir's History of the Othman Empire, p. 87.

⁵⁵ Note XLIV.

*capricul*y, or soldiery of the Porte, was the only power in the empire that a sultan or his vizier had reason to dread. To preserve the fidelity and attachment of the janizaries was the great art of government and the principal object of attention in the policy of the Ottoman court. Under a monarch whose abilities and vigour of mind fit him for command, they are obsequious instruments,—execute whatever he enjoins, and render his power irresistible. Under feeble princes, or such as are unfortunate, they become turbulent and mutinous,—assume the tone of masters, degrade and exalt sultans at pleasure, and teach those to tremble, on whose nod, at other times, life and death depend.

From Mahomet II., who took Constantinople, to Solyman the Magnificent, who began his reign a few months after Charles V. was placed on the imperial throne of Germany, a succession of illustrious princes ruled over the Turkish empire. By their great abilities they kept their subjects of every order, military as well as civil, submissive to government, and had the absolute command of whatever force their vast empire was able to exert. Solyman, in particular, who is known to the Christians chiefly as a conqueror, but is celebrated in the Turkish annals as the great lawgiver who established order and police in their empire, governed during his long reign with no less authority than wisdom. He divided his dominions into several districts; he appointed the number of soldiers which each should furnish; he appropriated a certain proportion of the land in every province for their maintenance; he regulated with a minute accuracy every thing relative to their discipline, their arms, and the nature of their service. He put the finances of the empire into an orderly train of administration; and, though the taxes in the Turkish dominions, as well as in the other despotic monarchies of the East, are far from

being considerable, he supplied that defect by an attentive and severe economy.

Nor was it only under such sultans as Solyman, whose talents were no less adapted to preserve internal order than to conduct the operations of war, that the Turkish empire engaged with advantage in its contests with the Christian states. The long succession of able princes which I have mentioned had given such vigour and firmness to the Ottoman government that it seems to have attained during the sixteenth century the highest degree of perfection of which its constitution was capable. Whereas the great monarchies in Christendom were still far from that state which could enable them to act with a full exertion of their force. Besides this, the Turkish troops in that age possessed every advantage which arises from superiority in military discipline. At the time when Solyman began his reign, the janizaries had been embodied near a century and a half, and during that long period the severity of their military discipline had in no degree relaxed. The other soldiers, drawn from the provinces of the empire, had been kept almost continually under arms, in the various wars which the sultans had carried on, with hardly an interval of peace. Against troops thus trained and accustomed to service the forces of the Christian powers took the field with great disadvantage. The most intelligent as well as impartial authors of the sixteenth century acknowledge and lament the superior attainments of the Turks in the military art.⁵⁶ The success which almost uniformly attended their arms, in all their wars, demonstrates the justness of this observation. The Christian armies did not acquire that superiority over the Turks which they now possess until the long establishment of stand-

* Note XLV.

ing forces had improved military discipline among the former, and until various causes and events, which it is not in my province to explain, had corrupted or abolished their ancient warlike institutions among the latter.

PROOFS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTE I.—Sect. I. p. 5.

THE consternation of the Britons, when invaded by the Picts and Caledonians, after the Roman legions were called out of the island, may give some idea of the degree of debasement to which the human mind was reduced by long servitude under the Romans. In their supplicatory letter to Aetius, which they call the *Groans of Britain*, “We know not (say they) which way to turn us. The barbarians drive us to the sea, and the sea forces us back on the barbarians; between which we have only the choice of two deaths, either to be swallowed up by the waves, or to be slain by the sword.” (Hist. Gildæ, ap. Gale, Hist. Britan. Script., p. 6.) One can hardly believe this dastardly race to be descendants of that gallant people who repulsed Cæsar and defended their liberty so long against the Roman arms.

NOTE II.—Sect. I. p. 6.

The barbarous nations were not only illiterate, but regarded literature with contempt. They found the inhabitants of all the provinces of the empire sunk in effeminacy and averse to war. Such a character was the object of scorn to a high-spirited and gallant race of men. “When we would brand an enemy,” says Luitprandus, “with the most disgraceful and contumelious appellation, we call him a Roman; hoc solo, id est *Romani* nomine, quicquid ignobilitatis, quicquid timiditatis, quicquid avaritiae, quicquid luxuriæ, quicquid mendacii, immo quicquid vitiorum est comprehendentes.” (Luitprandi Legatio, apud Murat., Scriptor. Italic., vol. ii. para. i. p. 481.) This degeneracy of manners, illiterate barbarians imputed to their love of learning. Even after they settled in the countries which they had conquered, they would not permit their children to be instructed in any science. “For (said they) instruction in the sciences tends to corrupt, enervate, and depress the mind; and he who has been accustomed to tremble under the rod of a pedagogue will never look on a sword or a spear with an undaunted eye.” (Procop., de Bello Gothor., lib. i. p. 4, ap. Script. Byz., edit. Venet., vol. i.) A considerable number of years elapsed before nations so rude and so unwilling to learn could produce historians capable of recording their transactions or of describing their manners and institutions. By that time the memory of their ancient condition was in a great measure lost, and few monuments remained to guide their first writers to any certain knowledge of it. If one expects to

receive any satisfactory account of the manners and laws of the Goths, Lombards, or Franks during their residence in those countries where they were originally seated, from Jornandes, Paulus Warnefridus, or Gregory of Tours, the earliest and most authentic historians of these people, he will be miserably disappointed. Whatever imperfect knowledge has been conveyed to us of their ancient state we owe not to their own writers, but to the Greek and Roman historians.

NOTE III.—Sect. I. p. 7.

A circumstance related by Priscus, in his history of the embassy to Attila, king of the Huns, gives a striking view of the enthusiastic passion for war which prevailed among the barbarous nations. When the entertainment to which that fierce conqueror admitted the Roman ambassadors was ended, two Scythians advanced towards Attila and recited a poem in which they celebrated his victories and military virtues. All the Huns fixed their eyes with attention on the bards. Some seemed to be delighted with the verses ; others, remembering their own battles and exploits, exulted with joy ; while such as were become feeble through age burst out into tears, bewailing the decay of their vigour, and the state of inactivity in which they were now obliged to remain. *Excerpta ex Historia Prisci Rhetoris*, ap. *Byz. Hist. Scrip.*, vol. i. p. 45.

NOTE IV.—Sect. I. p. 12.

A remarkable confirmation of both parts of this reasoning occurs in the history of England. The Saxons carried on the conquest of that country with the same destructive spirit which distinguished the other barbarous nations. The ancient inhabitants of Britain were either exterminated, or forced to take shelter among the mountains of Wales, or reduced to servitude. The Saxon government, laws, manners, and language were of consequence introduced into Britain, and were so perfectly established that all memory of the institutions previous to their conquest of the country was in a great measure lost. The very reverse of this happened in a subsequent revolution. A single victory placed William the Norman on the throne of England. The Saxon inhabitants, though oppressed, were not exterminated. William employed the utmost efforts of his power and policy to make his new subjects conform in every thing to the Norman standard, but without success. The Saxons, though vanquished, were far more numerous than their conquerors ; when the two races began to incorporate, the Saxon laws and manners gradually gained ground. The Norman institutions became unpopular and odious ; many of them fell into disuse ; and in the English constitution and language at this day many essential parts are manifestly of Saxon, not of Norman extraction.

NOTE V.—Sect. I. p. 12.

Procopius, the historian, declines, from a principle of benevolence, to give any particular detail of the cruelties of the Goths ; "lest," says he, "I should transmit a monument and example of inhumanity to succeeding

agea." (*Proc., de Bello Goth.*, lib. iii. cap. 10, ap. *Byz. Script.*, vol. i. p. 126.) But as the change which I have pointed out as a consequence of the settlement of the barbarous nations in the countries formerly subject to the Roman empire could not have taken place if the greater part of the ancient inhabitants had not been extirpated, an event of such importance and influence merits a more particular illustration. This will justify me for exhibiting some part of that melancholy spectacle over which humanity prompted Procopius to draw a veil. I shall not, however, disgust my readers by a minute narration, but rest satisfied with collecting some instances of the devastations made by two of the many nations which settled in the empire. The Vandals were the first of the barbarians who invaded Spain. It was one of the richest and most populous of the Roman provinces: the inhabitants had been distinguished for courage, and had defended their liberty against the arms of Rome with greater obstinacy and during a longer course of years than any nation in Europe. But so entirely were they enervated by their subjection to the Romans that the Vandals, who entered the kingdom A.D. 409, completed the conquest of it with such rapidity that in the year 411 these barbarians divided it among them by casting lots. The desolation occasioned by their invasion is thus described by Idatius, an eye-witness: "The barbarians wasted every thing with hostile cruelty. The pestilence was no less destructive. A dreadful famine raged to such a degree that the living were constrained to feed on the dead bodies of their fellow-citizens; and all these terrible plagues desolated at once the unhappy kingdoms." (*Idatii Chron.*, ap. *Biblioth. Patrum*, vol. vii. p. 1233, edit. *Lugd.*, 1677.) The Goths having attacked the Vandals in their new settlements, a fierce war ensued; the country was plundered by both parties; the cities which had escaped from destruction in the first invasion of the Vandals were now laid in ashes, and the inhabitants exposed to suffer every thing that the wanton cruelty of barbarians could inflict. Idatius describes these scenes of inhumanity, *ibid.*, p. 1235, b. 1236, c. f. A similar account of their devastations is given by Isidorus Hispalensis and other contemporary writers. (*Isid.*, *Chron.*, ap. *Grot.*, *Hist. Goth.*, 732.) From Spain the Vandals passed over into Africa, A.D. 428. Africa was, next to Egypt, the most fertile of the Roman provinces. It was one of the granaries of the empire, and is called by an ancient writer the soul of the commonwealth. Though the army with which the Vandals invaded it did not exceed thirty thousand fighting-men, they became absolute masters of the province in less than two years. A contemporary author gives a dreadful account of the havoc which they made: "They found a province well cultivated, and enjoying plenty, the beauty of the whole earth. They carried their destructive arms into every corner of it; they dispeopled it by their devastations, exterminating every thing with fire and sword. They did not even spare the vines and fruit-trees, that those to whom caves and inaccessible mountains had afforded a retreat might find no nourishment of any kind. Their hostile rage could not be satiated, and there was no place exempted from the effects of it. They tortured their prisoners with the most exquisite cruelty, that they might force from them a discovery of their hidden treasures. The more they discovered, the more they expected, and the more implacable they became. Neither the infirmities of age nor of sex, neither the

dignity of nobility nor the sanctity of the sacerdotal office, could mitigate their fury ; but the more illustrious their prisoners were, the more barbarously they insulted them. The public buildings which resisted the violence of the flames they levelled with the ground. They left many cities without an inhabitant. When they approached any fortified place which their undisciplined army could not reduce, they gathered together a multitude of prisoners, and, putting them to the sword, left their bodies unburied, that the stench of the carcasses might oblige the garrison to abandon it." (Victor Vitensis de Persecutione Africana, ap. Bibl. Patrum, vol. viii. p. 666.) St. Augustin, an African, who survived the conquest of his country by the Vandals some years, gives a similar description of their cruelties. (Opera, vol. x. p. 372, edit. 1616.) About a hundred years after the settlement of the Vandals in Africa, Belisarius attacked and dispossessed them. Procopius, a contemporary historian, describes the devastation which that war occasioned. "Africa," says he, "was so entirely dispeopled that one might travel several days in it without meeting one man ; and it is no exaggeration to say that in the course of the war five millions of persons perished." (Proc., Hist. Arcana, cap. 18, ap. Byz. Script., vol. i. p. 315.) I have dwelt longer upon the calamities of this province, because they are described not only by contemporary authors, but by eye-witnesses. The present state of Africa confirms their testimony. Many of the most flourishing and populous cities with which it was filled were so entirely ruined that no vestiges remain to point out where they were situated. That fertile territory, which sustained the Roman empire, still lies in a great measure uncultivated ; and that province, which Victor, in his barbarous Latin, called *speciositas totius terrae florentis*, is now the retreat of pirates and banditti.

While the Vandals laid waste a great part of the empire, the Huns desolated the remainder. Of all the barbarous tribes they were the fiercest and most formidable. Ammianus Marcellinus, a contemporary author, and one of the best of the later historians, gives an account of their policy and manners, which nearly resemble those of the Scythians described by the ancients, and of the Tartars known to the moderns. Some parts of their character, and several of their customs, are not unlike those of the savages in North America. Their passion for war was extreme. "As in polished societies (says Ammianus) ease and tranquillity are courted, they delight in war and dangers. He who falls in battle is reckoned happy. They who die of old age or of disease are deemed infamous. They boast with the utmost exultation of the number of enemies whom they have slain, and, as the most glorious of all ornaments, they fasten the scalps of those who have fallen by their hands to the trappings of their horses." (Ammian. Marc., lib. xxxi. p. 477, edit. Gronov., Lugd., 1693.) Their incursions into the empire began in the fourth century ; and the Romans, though no strangers, by that time, to the effects of barbarous rage, were astonished at the cruelty of their devastations. Thrace, Pannonia, and Illyricum were the countries which they first laid desolate. As they had at first no intention of settling in Europe, they made only inroads of short continuance into the empire ; but these were frequent ; and Procopius computes that in each of these, at a medium, two hundred thousand persons perished, or were carried off as slaves. (Procop., Hist. Arcan., ap. Byz. Script., vol. i.

p. 316.) Thrace, the best cultivated province in that quarter of the empire, was converted into a desert ; and when Priscus accompanied the ambassadors sent to Attila there were no inhabitants in some of the cities, but a few miserable people who had taken shelter among the ruins of the churches ; and the fields were covered with the bones of those who had fallen by the sword. (Priscus, ap. Byz. Script., vol. i. p. 34.) Attila became king of the Huns, A.D. 434. He is one of the greatest and most enterprising conquerors mentioned in history. He extended his empire over all the vast countries comprehended under the general names of Scythia and Germany in the ancient division of the world. While he was carrying on his wars against the barbarous nations, he kept the Roman empire under perpetual apprehensions, and extorted enormous subsidies from the timid and effeminate monarchs who governed it. In the year 451 he entered Gaul, at the head of an army composed of all the various nations which he had subdued. It was more numerous than any with which the barbarians had hitherto invaded the empire. The devastations which he committed were horrible. Not only the open country, but the most flourishing cities, were desolated. The extent and cruelty of his devastations are described by Salvianus de Gubernat. Dei, edit. Baluz., Par. 1669, p. 139, etc., and by Idatius, ubi supra, p. 1235. Aetius put a stop to his progress in that country by the famous battle of Châlons, in which (if we may believe the historians of that age) three hundred thousand persons perished. (Idat., ibid. ; Jornandes de Rebus Geticis, ap. Grot., Hist. Gothor., p. 671, Amst., 1665.) But the next year he resolved to attack the centre of the empire, and, marching into Italy, wasted it with rage inflamed by the sense of his late disgrace. What Italy suffered by the Huns exceeded all the calamities which the preceding incursions of the barbarians had brought upon it. Conringius has collected several passages from the ancient historians which prove that the devastations committed by the Vandals and Huns in the countries situated on the banks of the Rhine were no less cruel and fatal to the human race. (Exercitatio de Urbibus Germaniae, Opera, vol. i. p. 488.) It is endless, it is shocking, to follow these destroyers of mankind through so many scenes of horror, and to contemplate the havoc which they made of the human species.

But the state in which Italy appears to have been during several ages after the barbarous nations settled in it is the most decisive proof of the cruelty as well as extent of their devastations. Whenever any country is thinly inhabited, trees and shrubs spring up in the uncultivated fields, and, spreading by degrees, form large forests ; by the overflowing of rivers and the stagnating of waters, other parts of it are converted into lakes and marshes. Ancient Italy, which the Romans rendered the seat of elegance and luxury, was cultivated to the highest pitch. But so effectually did the devastations of the barbarians destroy all the effects of Roman industry and cultivation that in the eighth century a considerable part of Italy appears to have been covered with forests and marshes of great extent. Muratori enters into a minute detail concerning the situation and limits of several of these, and proves by the most authentic evidence that great tracts of territory in all the different provinces of Italy were either overrun with wood or laid under water. Nor did these occupy parts of the country naturally barren or of little value, but were spread over districts which

ancient writers represent as extremely fertile and which at present are highly cultivated. (Muratori, *Antiquitates Italicae Medii Aevi*, dissert. *xxi.*, vol. *ii.* pp. 149, 153, etc.) A strong proof of this occurs in a description of the city of Modena, by an author of the tenth century. (Murat., *Script. Rerum Italic.*, vol. *iii.* pars. *ii.* p. 691.) The state of desolation in other countries of Europe seems to have been the same. In many of the most early charters now extant, the lands granted to monasteries or to private persons are distinguished into such as are cultivated or inhabited, and such as were *cremi*, desolate. In many instances lands are granted to persons because they had taken them from the desert, *ab eremo*, and had cultivated and planted them with inhabitants. This appears from a charter of Charlemagne, published by Eckhart, *de Rebus Franciae Orientalis*, vol. *ii.* p. 864, and from many charters of his successors quoted by Du Cange, voc. *Eremus*. Wherever a right of property in land can be thus acquired, it is evident that the country must be extremely desolate and thinly peopled. The first settlers in America obtained possession of land by such a title. Whoever was able to clear and to cultivate a field was recognised as the proprietor. His industry merited such a recompense. The grants in the charters which I have mentioned flow from a similar principle, and there must have been some resemblance in the state of the countries.

Muratori adds that during the eighth and ninth centuries Italy was greatly infested by wolves and other wild beasts; another mark of its being destitute of inhabitants. (Murat., *Antiq.*, vol. *ii.* p. 163.) Thus Italy, the pride of the ancient world for its fertility and cultivation, was reduced to the state of a country newly peopled and lately rendered habitable.

I am sensible not only that some of these descriptions of the devastations, which I have quoted, may be exaggerated, but that the barbarous tribes, in making their settlements, did not proceed invariably in the same manner. Some of them seemed to be bent on exterminating the ancient inhabitants; others were more disposed to incorporate with them. It is not my province either to inquire into the causes which occasioned this variety in the conduct of the conquerors, or to describe the state of those countries where the ancient inhabitants were treated most mildly. The facts which I have produced are sufficient to justify the account which I have given in the text, and to prove that the destruction of the human species, occasioned by the hostile invasions of the Northern nations and their subsequent settlements, was much greater than many authors seem to imagine.

NOTE VI.—Sect. I. p. 14.

I have observed, Note II., that our only certain information concerning the ancient state of the barbarous nations must be derived from the Greek and Roman writers. Happily, an account of the institutions and customs of one people, to which those of all the rest seem to have been in a great measure similar, has been transmitted to us by two authors, the most capable, perhaps, that ever wrote, of observing them with profound discernment and of describing them with propriety and force. The reader

must perceive that Cæsar and Tacitus are the authors whom I have in view. The former gives a short account of the ancient Germans in a few chapters of the sixth book of his Commentaries ; the latter wrote a treatise expressly on that subject. These are the most precious and instructive monuments of antiquity to the present inhabitants of Europe. From them we learn,—

1. That the state of society among the ancient Germans was of the rudest and most simple form. They subsisted entirely by hunting or by pasture. (Cæs., lib. vi. c. 21.) They neglected agriculture, and lived chiefly on milk, cheese, and flesh. (Ibid., c. 22.) Tacitus agrees with him in most of these points. (De Morib. Germ., c. 14, 15, 23.) The Goths were equally negligent of agriculture. (Prisc. Rhet., ap. Byz. Script., v. i. p. 31, B.) Society was in the same state among the Huns, who disdained to cultivate the earth or to touch a plough. (Amm. Marcel., lib. xxxi. p. 475.) The same manners took place among the Alans. (Ibid., p. 477.) While society remains in this simple state, men by uniting together scarcely relinquish any portion of their natural independence. Accordingly, we are informed, 2. That the authority of civil government was extremely limited among the Germans. During times of peace they had no common or fixed magistrate, but the chief men of every district dispensed justice and accommodated differences. (Cæs. ibid., c. 23.) Their kings had not absolute or unbounded power ; their authority consisted rather in the privilege of advising than in the power of commanding. Matters of small consequence were determined by the chief men ; affairs of importance, by the whole community. (Tacit., c. 7, 11.) The Huns, in like manner, deliberated in common concerning every business of moment to the society, and were not subject to the rigour of regal authority. (Amm. Marcel., lib. xxxi. p. 474.) 3. Every individual among the ancient Germans was left at liberty to choose whether he would take part in any military enterprise which was proposed ; there seems to have been no obligation to engage in it imposed on him by public authority. “When any of the chief men proposes an expedition, such as approve of the cause and of the leader rise up and declare their intention of following him ; after coming under this engagement, those who do not fulfil it are considered as deserters and traitors, and are looked upon as infamous.” (Cæs., ibid., c. 23.) Tacitus plainly points at the same custom, though in terms more obscure. (Tacit., c. 11.) 4. As every individual was so independent, and master in so great a degree of his own actions, it became, of consequence, the great object of every person among the Germans, who aimed at being a leader, to gain adherents and attach them to his person and interest. These adherents Cæsar calls *ambacti* and *clientes*, i.e., retainers or clients ; Tacitus, *comites*, or companions. The chief distinction and power of the leaders consisted in being attended by a numerous band of chosen youth. This was their pride as well as ornament during peace, and their defence in war. The leaders gained or preserved the favour of these retainers by presents of armour and of horses, or by the profuse though inelegant hospitality with which they entertained them. (Tacit., c. 14, 15.) 5. Another consequence of the personal liberty and independence which the Germans retained, even after they united in society, was their circumscribing the criminal juris-

diction of the magistrate within very narrow limits, and their not only claiming, but exercising, almost all the rights of private resentment and revenge. Their magistrates had not the power either of imprisoning or of inflicting any corporal punishment on a free man. (*Tacit.*, c. 7.) Every person was obliged to avenge the wrongs which his parents or friends had sustained. Their enmities were hereditary, but not irreconcilable. Even murder was compensated by paying a certain number of cattle. (*Tacit.*, c. 21.) A part of the fine went to the king, or state, a part to the person who had been injured, or to his kindred. *Ibid.*, c. 12.

Those particulars concerning the institutions and manners of the Germans, though well known to every person conversant in ancient literature, I have thought proper to arrange in this order, and to lay before such of my readers as may be less acquainted with these facts, both because they confirm the account which I have given of the state of the barbarous nations, and because they tend to illustrate all the observations I shall have occasion to make concerning the various changes in their government and customs. The laws and customs introduced by the barbarous nations into their new settlements are the best commentary on the writings of Cæsar and Tacitus; and their observations are the best key to a perfect knowledge of these laws and customs.

One circumstance with respect to the testimonies of Cæsar and Tacitus concerning the Germans merits attention. Cæsar wrote his brief account of their manners more than a hundred years before Tacitus composed his *Treatise de Moribus Germanorum*. A hundred years make a considerable period in the progress of national manners, especially if during that time those people who are rude and unpolished have had much communication with more civilised states. This was the case with the Germans. Their intercourse with the Romans began when Cæsar crossed the Rhine, and increased greatly during the interval between that event and the time when Tacitus flourished. We may accordingly observe that the manners of the Germans in his time, which Cæsar describes, were less improved than those of the same people as delineated by Tacitus. Besides this, it is remarkable that there was a considerable difference in the state of society among the different tribes of Germans. The Suiones were so much improved that they began to be corrupted. (*Tacit.*, c. 44.) The Fenni were so barbarous that it is wonderful how they were able to subsist. (*Ibid.*, c. 46.) Whoever undertakes to describe the manners of the Germans, or to found any political theory upon the state of society among them, ought carefully to attend to both these circumstances.

Before I quit this subject, it may not be improper to observe that, though successive alterations in their institutions, together with the gradual progress of refinement, have made an entire change in the manners of the various people who conquered the Roman empire, there is still one race of men nearly in the same political situation with theirs when they first settled in their new conquests; I mean the various tribes and nations of savages in North America. It cannot, then, be considered either as a digression, or as an improper indulgence of curiosity, to inquire whether this similarity in their political state has occasioned any resemblance between their character and manners. If the likeness turns out to be

striking, it is a stronger proof that a just account has been given of the ancient inhabitants of Europe than the testimony even of Cæsar or of Tacitus.

1. The Americans subsist chiefly by hunting and fishing. Some tribes neglect agriculture entirely. Among those who cultivate some small spot near their huts, that, together with all works of labour, is performed by the women. (P. Charlevoix, *Journal historique d'un Voyage de l'Amérique*, 4to, Par. 1744, p. 334.) In such a state of society, the common wants of men being few and their mutual dependence upon each other small, their union is extremely imperfect and feeble, and they continue to enjoy their natural liberty almost unimpaired. It is the first idea of an American that every man is born free and independent, and that no power on earth hath any right to diminish or circumscribe his natural liberty. There is hardly any appearance of subordination, either in civil or domestic government. Every one does what he pleases. A father and mother live with their children like persons whom chance has brought together and whom no common bond unites. Their manner of educating their children is suitable to this principle. They never chastise or punish them, even during their infancy. As they advance in years, they continue to be entirely masters of their own actions, and seem not to be conscious of being responsible for any part of their conduct. (*Ibid.*, pp. 272, 273.) 2. The power of their civil magistrates is extremely limited. Among most of their tribes, the sachem, or chief, is elective. A council of old men is chosen to assist him, without whose advice he determines no affair of importance. The sachems neither possess nor claim any great degree of authority. They propose and entreat, rather than command. The obedience of their people is altogether voluntary. (*Ibid.*, pp. 266, 268.) 3. The savages of America engage in their military enterprises, not from constraint, but choice. When war is resolved, a chief arises and offers himself to be the leader. Such as are willing (for they compel no person) stand up one after another and sing their war-song. But if, after this, any of these should refuse to follow the leader to whom they have engaged, his life would be in danger, and he would be considered as the most infamous of men. (*Ibid.*, pp. 217, 218.) 4. Such as engage to follow any leader expect to be treated by him with great attention and respect; and he is obliged to make them presents of considerable value. (*Ibid.*, p. 218.) 5. Among the Americans, the magistrate has scarcely any criminal jurisdiction. (*Ibid.*, p. 272.) Upon receiving any injury, the person or family offended may inflict what punishment they please on the person who was the author of it. (*Ibid.*, p. 274.) Their resentment and desire of vengeance are excessive and implacable. Time can neither extinguish nor abate it. It is the chief inheritance parents leave to their children; it is transmitted from generation to generation, until an occasion be found of satisfying it. (*Ibid.*, p. 309.) Sometimes, however, the offended party is appeased. A compensation is paid for a murder that has been committed. The relations of the deceased receive it; and it consists most commonly of a captive taken in war, who, being substituted in place of the person who was murdered, assumes his name and is adopted into his family. (*Ibid.*, p. 274.) The resemblance holds in many other particulars. It is sufficient for my purpose to have pointed out the similarity of

those great features which distinguish and characterise both people. Bochart, and other philologists of the last century, who, with more erudition than science, endeavoured to trace the migrations of various nations, and who were apt upon the slightest appearance of resemblance to find an affinity between nations far removed from each other, and to conclude that they were descended from the same ancestors, would hardly have failed, on viewing such an amazing similarity, to pronounce with confidence "that the Germans and Americans must be the same people." But a philosopher will satisfy himself with observing "that the characters of nations depend on the state of society in which they live, and on the political institutions established among them; and that the human mind, whenever it is placed in the same situation, will, in ages the most distant and in countries the most remote, assume the same form and be distinguished by the same manners."

I have pushed the comparison between the Germans and Americans no further than was necessary for the illustration of my subject. I do not pretend that the state of society in the two countries was perfectly similar in every respect. Many of the German tribes were more civilised than the Americans. Some of them were not unacquainted with agriculture; almost all of them had flocks of tame cattle, and depended upon them for the chief part of their subsistence. Most of the American tribes subsist by hunting, and are in a ruder and more simple state than the ancient Germans. The resemblance, however, between their condition is greater, perhaps, than any that history affords an opportunity of observing between any two races of uncivilised people; and this has produced a surprising similarity of manners.

NOTE VII.—Sect. I. p. 14.

The booty gained by an army belonged to the army. The king himself had no part of it but what he acquired by lot. A remarkable instance of this occurs in the history of the Franks. The army of Clovis, the founder of the French monarchy, having plundered a church, carried off, among other sacred utensils, a vase of extraordinary size and beauty. The bishop sent deputies to Clovis beseeching him to restore the vase, that it might be again employed in the sacred services to which it had been consecrated. Clovis desired the deputies to follow him to Soissons, as the booty was to be divided in that place, and promised that if the lot should give him the disposal of the vase he would grant what the bishop desired. When he came to Soissons, and all the booty was placed in one great heap in the middle of the army, Clovis entreated that before making the division they would give him that vase over and above his share. All appeared willing to gratify the king and to comply with his request, when a fierce and haughty soldier lifted up his battle-axe, and, striking the vase with the utmost violence, cried out, with a loud voice, "You shall receive nothing here but that to which the lot gives you a right." Gregor. Turon., Histor. Francorum, lib. ii. c. 27, p. 70, Par. 1610.

Note VIII.—Sect I. p. 16.

The history of the establishment and progress of the feudal system is an interesting object to all the nations of Europe. In some countries their jurisprudence and laws are still in a great measure feudal. In others, many forms and practices established by custom, or founded on statutes, took their rise from the feudal law, and cannot be understood without attending to the ideas peculiar to it. Several authors of the highest reputation for genius and erudition have endeavoured to illustrate this subject, but still many parts of it are obscure. I shall endeavour to trace with precision the progress and variation of ideas concerning property in land among the barbarous nations, and shall attempt to point out the causes which introduced these changes, as well as the effects which followed upon them. Property in land seems to have gone through four successive changes among the people who settled in the various provinces of the Roman empire.

I. While the barbarous nations remained in their original countries, their property in land was only temporary, and they had no certain limits to their possession. After feeding their flocks in one district, they removed with them, and with their wives and families, to another, and abandoned that likewise in a short time. They were not, in consequence of this imperfect species of property, brought under any positive or formal obligation to serve the community; all their services were purely voluntary. Every individual was at liberty to choose how far he would contribute towards carrying on any military enterprise. If he followed a leader in any expedition, it was from attachment, not from a sense of obligation. The clearest proof of this has been produced in Note VI. While property continued in this state, we can discover nothing that bears any resemblance to a feudal tenure, or to the subordination and military service which the feudal system introduced.

II. Upon settling in the countries which they had subdued, the victorious troops divided the conquered lands. Whatever portion of them fell to a soldier, he seized as the recompense due to his valour, as a settlement acquired by his own sword. He took possession of it as a freeman in full property. He enjoyed it during his own life, and could dispose of it at pleasure, or transmit it as an inheritance to his children. Thus property in land became fixed. It was at the same time *allodial*; i.e., the possessor had the entire right of property and dominion; he held of no sovereign or superior lord to whom he was bound to do homage and perform service. But as these new proprietors were in some danger (as has been observed in the text) of being disturbed by the remainder of the ancient inhabitants, and in still greater danger of being attacked by successive colonies of barbarians as fierce and rapacious as themselves, they saw the necessity of coming under obligations to defend the community more explicit than those to which they had been subject in their original habitations. On this account, immediately upon their fixing in their new settlements, every freeman became bound to take arms in defence of the community, and, if he refused or neglected so to do, was liable to a con-

siderable penalty. I do not mean that any contract of this kind was formally concluded or mutually ratified by any legal solemnity. It was established by tacit consent, like the other compacts which hold society together. The mutual security and preservation made it the interest of all to recognize its authority and to enforce the observation of it. We can trace back this new obligation on the proprietors of land to a very early period in the history of the Franks. Chilperic, who began his reign A.D. 562, exacted a fine, *bannos jussit exigi*, from certain persons who had refused to accompany him in an expedition. (Gregor. Turon., lib. v. c. 26, p. 211.) Childebert, who began his reign A.D. 576, proceeded in the same manner against others who had been guilty of a like crime. (Ibid., lib. vii. c. 42, p. 342.) Such a fine could not have been exacted while property continued in its first state and military service was entirely voluntary. Charlemagne ordained that every freeman who possessed five mansi, i.e., sixty acres, of land, *in property*, should march in person against the enemy. (Capitul., A.D. 807.) Louis le Débonnaire, A.D. 815, granted lands to certain Spaniards who fled from the Saracens, and allowed them to settle in his territories, on condition that they should serve in the army *like other freemen*. (Capitul., vol. i. p. 500.) By land possessed *in property*, which is mentioned in the law of Charlemagne, we are to understand, according to the style of that age, allodial land; *alodes* and *proprietas*, *alodium* and *proprium*, being words perfectly synonymous. (Du Cange, voce *Alodis*.) The clearest proof of the distinction between allodial and beneficiary possession is contained in two charters published by Muratori, by which it appears that a person might possess one part of his estate as allodial, which he could dispose of at pleasure, the other as a *beneficium*, of which he had only the *usufruct*, the property returning to the superior lord on his demise. (Antiq. Ital. Medii Ævi, vol. i. pp. 559, 565.) The same distinction is pointed out in a capitulare of Charlemagne, A.D. 812, edit. Baluz., vol. i. p. 491. Count Everard, who married a daughter of Louis le Débonnaire, in the curious testament by which he disposes of his vast estate among his children, distinguishes between what he possessed *proprietate* and what he held *beneficio*; and it appears that the greater part was allodial, A.D. 837. Aub. Miræi Opera Diplomatica, Lovan., 1723, vol. i. p. 19.

In the same manner *liber homo* is commonly opposed to *vassus* or *vassallus*, the former denotes an allodial proprietor, the latter one who held of a superior. These *free* men were under an obligation to serve the state; and this duty was considered as so sacred that freemen were prohibited from entering into holy orders unless they had obtained the consent of the sovereign. The reason given for this in the statute is remarkable: "For we are informed that some do so not so much out of devotion as in order to avoid that military service which they are bound to perform." (Capitul., lib. i. § 114.) If upon being summoned into the field any freeman refused to obey, a full *herebannum*, i.e., a fine of sixty crowns, was to be exacted from him according to the law of the Franks. (Capit. Car. Magn., ap. Leg. Longob., lib. i. tit. 14, § 13, p. 539.) This expression, according to the law of the Franks, seems to imply that both the obligation to serve, and the penalty on those that disregarded it, were coeval with the laws made by the Franks at their first settlement in Gaul. This fine was levied with

such rigour "that if any person convicted of this crime was insolvent he was reduced to servitude, and continued in that state until such time as his labour should amount to the value of the *herebannum*." (*Ibid.*) The emperor Lotharius rendered the penalty still more severe; and if any person possessing such an extent of property as made it incumbent on him to take the field in person refused to obey the summons, all his goods were declared to be forfeited, and he himself might be punished with banishment. *Murat.*, *Script. Ital.*, vol. i. pars. ii. p. 153.

III. Property in land having thus become fixed, and subject to military service, another change was introduced, though slowly and step by step. We learn from Tacitus that the chief men among the Germans endeavoured to attach to their persons and interests certain adherents whom he calls *comites*. These fought under their standard and followed them in all their enterprises. The same custom continued among them in their new settlements, and those attached or devoted followers were called *fideles, antrustiones, homines in trustee dominica, leudes*. Tacitus informs us that the rank of a comes was deemed honourable. (*De Morib.*, *Germ.*, c. 13.) The composition, which is the standard by which we must judge of the rank and condition of persons in the Middle Ages, paid for the murder of one *in trustee dominica*, was triple to that paid for the murder of a freeman. (*Leg. Salicor.*, tit. 44, §§ 1 et 2.) While the Germans remained in their own country, they courted the favour of these comites by presents of arms and horses, and by hospitality. (See Note VI.) As long as they had no fixed property in land, these were the only gifts that they could bestow, and the only reward which their followers desired. But upon their settling in the countries which they conquered, and when the value of property came to be understood among them, instead of those slight presents, the kings and chieftains bestowed a more substantial recompense in land on their adherents. These grants were called *beneficia*, because they were gratuitous donations; and *honores*, because they were regarded as marks of distinction. What were the services originally exacted in return for these *beneficia* cannot be determined with absolute precision; because there are no records so ancient. When allodial possessions were first rendered feudal, they were not at once subjected to all the feudal services. The transition here, as in all other changes of importance, was gradual. As the great object of a feudal vassal was to obtain protection, when allodial proprietors first consented to become vassals of any powerful leader they continued to retain as much of their ancient independence as was consistent with that new relation. The homage which they did to their superior, of whom they chose to hold, was called *homagium planum*, and bound them to nothing more than fidelity, but without any obligation either of military service or attendance in the courts of their superior. Of this *homagium planum* some traces, though obscure, may still be discovered. (*Brussel*, tom. i. p. 97.) Among the ancient writs published by D. D. de Vic and Vaisette, *Hist. de Langued.*, are a great many which they call *homagia*. They seem to be an intermediate step between the *homagium planum* mentioned by Brussel, and the engagement to perform complete feudal service. The one party promises protection and grants certain castles or lands; the other engages to defend the person of the grantor, and to assist him likewise in defending his property as often as he shall be summoned to do so.

But these engagements are accompanied with none of the feudal formalities, and no mention is made of any of the other feudal services. They appear rather to be a mutual contract between equals than the engagement of a vassal to perform services to a superior lord. (*Preuves de l'Hist. de Lang.*, tom. ii. p. 173, et passim.) As soon as men were accustomed to these, the other feudal services were gradually introduced. M. de Montesquieu considers these *beneficia* as fiefs, which originally subjected those who held them to military service. (*L'Esprit des Loix*, l. xxx. c. 3 et 16.) M. l'Abbé de Mably contends that such as held these were at first subjected to no other service than what was incumbent on every freeman. (*Observations sur l'Histoire de France*, i. 356.) But upon comparing their proofs and reasonings and conjectures it seems to be evident that as every freeman, in consequence of his allodial property, was bound to serve the community under a severe penalty, no good reason can be assigned for conferring these *beneficia* if they did not subject such as received them to some new obligation. Why should a king have stripped himself of his domain, if he had not expected that by parcelling it out he might acquire a right to services to which he had formerly no title? We may then warrantably conclude, "That as allodial property subjected those who possessed it to serve the community, so *beneficia* subjected such as held them to personal service and fidelity to him from whom they received these lands." These *beneficia* were granted originally only during pleasure. No circumstance relating to the customs of the Middle Ages is better ascertained than this; and innumerable proofs of it might be added to those produced in *L'Esprit des Loix*, l. xxx. c. 16, and by Du Cange, voc. *Beneficium et Feudum*.

IV. But the possession of benefices did not continue long in this state. A precarious tenure during pleasure was not sufficient to satisfy such as held lands, and by various means they gradually obtained a confirmation of their benefices during life. (*Feudor.*, lib. i. tit. i.) Du Cange produces several quotations from ancient charters and chronicles in proof of this. (*Gloss.*, voc. *Beneficium*.) After this it was easy to obtain or extort charters rendering *beneficia* hereditary, first in the direct line, then in the collateral, and at last in the female line. *Leg. Longob.*, lib. iii. tit. 8; Du Cange, voc. *Beneficium*.

It is no easy matter to fix the precise time when each of these changes took place. M. l'Abbé Mably conjectures, with some probability, that Charles Martel first introduced the practice of granting *beneficia* for life. (*Observat.*, tom. i. pp. 103, 160.) And that Louis le Débonnaire was among the first who rendered them hereditary, is evident from the authorities to which he refers. (*Ibid.*, 429.) Mabillon, however, has published a placitum of Louis le Débonnaire, A.D. 860, by which it appears that he still continued to grant some *beneficia* only during life. (*De Re Diplomatica*, lib. vi. p. 353.) In the year 889, Odo, king of France, granted lands to "Ricabodo, fideli suo, jure beneficiario et fructuario," during his own life; and if he should die, and a son were born to him, that right was to continue during the life of his son. (Mabillon, *ut supra*, p. 556.) This was an intermediate step between fiefs merely during life and fiefs hereditary to perpetuity. While *beneficia* continued under their first form, and were held only during pleasure, he who granted them not only exercised the *dominium*, or prerogative of superior lord, but he retained the

property, giving his vassal only the *usufruct*. But under the latter form, when they became hereditary, although feudal lawyers continued to define a *beneficium* agreeably to its original nature, the property was in effect taken out of the hands of the superior lords and lodged in those of the vassal. As soon as the reciprocal advantages of the feudal mode of tenure came to be understood by superiors as well as vassals, that species of holding became so agreeable to both that not only lands, but casual rents, such as the profits of a toll, the fare paid at ferries, etc., the salaries or perquisites of offices, and even pensions themselves, were granted and held as fiefs; and military service was promised and exacted on account of these. (Morice, *Mém. pour servir de Preuves à l'Hist. de Bretagne*, tom. ii. pp. 78, 690; Brussel, tom. i. p. 41.) How absurd soever it may seem to grant or to hold such precarious and casual property as a fief, there are instances of feudal tenure still more singular. The profits arising from the masses said at an altar were properly an ecclesiastical revenue, belonging to the clergy of the church or monastery which performed that duty; but these were sometimes seized by the powerful barons. In order to ascertain their right to them, they held them as fiefs of the Church, and parcelled them out in the same manner as other property to their sub-vassals. (Bouquet, *Recueil des Hist.*, vol. x. pp. 238, 480.) The same spirit of encroachment which rendered fiefs hereditary led the nobles to extort from their sovereigns hereditary grants of offices. Many of the great offices of the crown became hereditary in most of the kingdoms in Europe; and so conscious were monarchs of this spirit of usurpation among the nobility, and so solicitous to guard against it, that on some occasions they obliged the persons whom they promoted to any office of dignity to grant an obligation that neither they nor their heirs should claim it as belonging to them by hereditary right. A remarkable instance of this is produced, *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript.*, tom. xxx. p. 595. Another occurs in the *Thesaur. Anecdot.*, published by Martene et Durand, vol. i. p. 873. This revolution in property occasioned a change corresponding to it in political government; the great vassals of the crown, as they acquired such extensive possessions, usurped a proportional degree of power, depressed the jurisdiction of the crown, and trampled on the privileges of the people. It is on account of this connection that it becomes an object of importance in history to trace the progress of feudal property; for upon discovering in what state property was at any particular period we may determine with precision what was the degree of power possessed by the king or by the nobility at that juncture.

One circumstance more, with respect to the changes which property underwent, deserves attention. I have shown that when the various tribes of barbarians divided their conquests in the fifth and sixth centuries the property which they acquired was allodial; but in several parts of Europe property had become almost entirely feudal by the beginning of the tenth century. The former species of property seems to be so much better and more desirable than the latter that such a change appears surprising, especially when we are informed that allodial property was frequently converted into feudal by a voluntary deed of the possessor. The motives which determined them to a choice so repugnant to the ideas of modern times concerning property have been investigated and explained by

M. de Montesquieu, with his usual discernment and accuracy, lib. xxxi. c. 8. The most considerable is that of which we have a hint in *Lambertus Ardensis*, an ancient writer quoted by Du Cange, voce *Alodis*. In those times of anarchy and disorder which became general in Europe after the death of Charlemagne, when there was scarcely any union among the different members of the community, and individuals were exposed, single and undefended by government, to rapine and oppression, it became necessary for every man to have a powerful protector, under whose banner he might range himself and obtain security against enemies whom singly he could not oppose. For this reason he relinquished his allodial independence, and subjected himself to the feudal services, that he might find safety under the patronage of some respectable superior. In some parts of Europe this change from allodial to feudal property became so general that he who possessed land had no longer any liberty of choice left : he was obliged to recognize some liege-lord and to hold of him. Thus, Beaumanoir informs us that in the counties of Clermont and Beauvois, if the lord or count discovered any land within his jurisdiction for which no service was performed, and which paid to him no taxes or customs, he might instantly seize it as his own ; for, says he, according to our custom, no man can hold allodial property. (*Coust.*, chap. 24, p. 123.) Upon the same principle is founded a maxim which has at length become general in the law of France, *Nulle terre sans seigneur*. In other provinces of France allodial property seems to have remained longer unalienated and to have been more highly valued. A great number of charters, containing grants or sales or exchanges of allodial lands in the province of Languedoc, are published in *Hist. génér. de Langued.*, par. D. D. de Vic et Vaisette, tom. ii. During the ninth, tenth, and great part of the eleventh century the property in that province seems to have been entirely allodial ; and scarcely any mention of feudal tenures occurs in the deeds of that country. The state of property during these centuries seems to have been perfectly similar in Catalonia and the country of Rousillon, as appears from the original charters published in the Appendix to Petr. de la Marca's treatise *de Marca sive Limite Hispanico*. Allodial property seems to have continued in the Low Countries to a period still later. During the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries this species of property appears to have been of considerable extent. (*Miræi Opera Diplom.*, vol. i. pp. 34, 74, 75, 83, 817, 296, 842, 847, 578.) Some vestiges of allodial property appear there as late as the fourteenth century. (*Ibid.*, p. 218.) Several facts which prove that allodial property subsisted in different parts of Europe long after the introduction of feudal tenures, and which tend to illustrate the distinction between these two different species of possession, are produced by M. Houard, *Anciennes Loix des François, conservées dans les Coutumes Angloises*, vol. i. p. 192, etc. The notions of men with respect to property vary according to the diversity of their understandings and the caprice of their passions. At the same time that some persons were fond of relinquishing allodial property in order to hold it by feudal tenure, others seem to have been solicitous to convert their fiefs into allodial property. An instance of this occurs in a charter of Louis le Débonnaire, published by Eckhard, *Commentarii de Rebus Franciæ Orientalis*, vol. ii. p. 885. Another occurs in the year 1299

(*Reliquiae MSS. omnis Aevi*, by Ludwig, vol. i. p. 209); and even one as late as the year 1337 (*ibid.*, vol. vii. p. 40). The same thing took place in the Low Countries. *Miræi Oper.*, i. 52.

In tracing these various revolutions of property I have hitherto chiefly confined myself to what happened in France, because the ancient monuments of that nation have either been more carefully preserved, or have been more clearly illustrated, than those of any people in Europe.

In Italy the same revolutions happened in property and succeeded each other in the same order. There is some ground, however, for conjecturing that allodial property continued longer in estimation among the Italians than among the French. It appears that many of the charters granted by the emperors in the ninth century conveyed an allodial right to land. (*Murat.*, *Antiq. Med. Aevi*, vol. i. p. 575, etc.) But in the eleventh century we find some examples of persons who resigned their allodial property and received it back as a feudal tenure. (*Ibid.*, p. 610, etc.) Muratori observes that the word *feudum*, which came to be substituted in place of *beneficium*, does not occur in any authentic charter previous to the eleventh century. (*Ibid.*, p. 594.) A charter of King Robert of France, A.D. 1008, is the earliest deed in which I have met with the word *feudum*. (*Bouquet, Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, tom. x. p. 593, b.) This word occurs, indeed, in an edict, A.D. 790, published by Brussel, vol. i. p. 77. But the authenticity of that deed has been called in question, and perhaps the frequent use of the word *feudum* in it is an additional reason for doing so. The account which I have given of the nature both of allodial and feudal possessions receives some confirmation from the etymology of the words themselves. *Alode* or *allodium* is compounded of the German particle *an* and *lot*, i.e., land obtained by lot. (*Wachteri Glossar. Germanicum*, voc. *Allodium*, p. 35.) It appears from the authorities produced by him, and by Du Cange, voc. *Sors*, that the Northern nations divided the lands which they had conquered in this manner. *Feodum* is compounded of *od*, possession or estate, and *feo*, wages, pay; intimating that it was stipendiary and granted as a recompense for service. *Wachterus, ibid.*, voc. *Feodum*, p. 441.

The progress of the feudal system among the Germans was perfectly similar to that which we have traced in France. But as the emperors of Germany, especially after the imperial crown passed from the descendants of Charlemagne to the house of Saxony, were far superior to the contemporary monarchs of France in abilities, the imperial vassals did not aspire so early to independence, nor did they so soon obtain the privilege of possessing their benefices by hereditary right. According to the compilers of the *Libri Feudorum*, Conrad II., or the Salic, was the first emperor who rendered fiefs hereditary. (*Lib. i. tit. i.*) Conrad began his reign A.D. 1024. Ludovicus Pius, under whose reign grants of hereditary fiefs were frequent in France, succeeded his father A.D. 814. Not only was this innovation so much later in being introduced among the vassals of the German emperors, but even after Conrad had established it the law continued favourable to the ancient practice; and unless the charter of the vassal bore expressly that the fief descended to his heirs, it was presumed to be granted only during life. (*Lib. Feud.*, *ibid.*) Even after the

alteration made by Conrad, it was not uncommon in Germany to grant fiefs only for life. A charter of this kind occurs as late as the year 1376. (*Charta, ap. Boehmer., Princip. Jur. Feud.*, p. 361.) The transmission of fiefs to collateral and female heirs took place very slowly among the Germans. There is extant a charter, A.D. 1201, conveying the right of succession to females; but it is granted as an extraordinary mark of favour and in reward of uncommon services. (*Boehmer., ibid.* p. 365.) In Germany, as well as in France and Italy, a considerable part of the lands continued to be allodial long after the feudal mode of tenure was introduced. It appears from the *Codex Diplomaticus Monasterii Buch* that a great part of the lands in the marquise of Misnia was still allodial as late as the thirteenth century. (Nos. 31, 36, 37, 46, etc., ap. *Scriptores Hist. German.*, cura Schoetgenii et Kreysigii, Altenb., 1755, vol. ii. p. 183, etc.) Allodial property seems to have been common in another district of the same province during the same period. *Reliquiae Diplomaticæ Sanctimonialis, Beutiz.*, Nos. 17, 36, 58, *ibid.* 374, etc.

NOTE IX.—Sect. I. p. 17.

As I shall have occasion, in another note, to represent the condition of that part of the people who dwelt in cities, I will confine myself in this to consider the state of the inhabitants of the country. The persons employed in cultivating the ground during the ages under review may be divided into three classes:—1. *Servi*, or slaves. This seems to have been the most numerous class, and consisted either of captives taken in war, or of persons the property in whom was acquired in some one of the various methods enumerated by Du Cange, *voc. Servus*, vol. vi. p. 447. The wretched condition of this numerous race of men will appear from several circumstances. 1. Their masters had absolute dominion over their persons. They had the power of punishing their slaves capitally, without the intervention of any judge. This dangerous right they possessed not only in the more early periods when their manners were fierce, but it continued as late as the twelfth century. (*Joach. Potgiesscrus de Statu Servorum, Lemgov.*, 1736, 4to, lib. ii. cap. 1, §§ 4, 10, 13, 24.) Even after this jurisdiction of masters came to be restrained, the life of a slave was deemed to be of so little value that a very slight compensation atoned for taking it away. (*Idem, lib. iii. c. 6.*) If masters had power over the lives of their slaves, it is evident that almost no bounds would be set to the rigour of the punishments which they might inflict upon them. The codes of ancient laws prescribed punishments for the crimes of slaves different from those which were inflicted on freemen. The latter paid only a fine or compensation; the former were subjected to corporal punishments. The cruelty of these was, in many instances, excessive. Slaves might be put to the rack on very slight occasions. The laws with respect to these points are to be found in *Potgiesscrus*, lib. iii. c. 7, § 2, and are shocking to humanity. 2. If the dominion of masters over the lives and persons of their slaves was thus extensive, it was no less so over their actions and property. They were not originally permitted to marry. Male and female slaves were allowed, and even encouraged, to cohabit together. But this union was

not considered as a marriage : it was called *contubernium*, not *nuptias* or *matrimonium*. (Potgiess., lib. ii. c. 2, § 1.) This notion was so much established that, during several centuries after the barbarous nations embraced the Christian religion, slaves who lived as husband and wife were not joined together by any religious ceremony, and did not receive the nuptial benediction from a priest. (Ibid., §§ 10, 11.) When this conjunction between slaves came to be considered as a lawful marriage, they were not permitted to marry without the consent of their master, and such as ventured to do so without obtaining that were punished with great severity, and sometimes were put to death. (Potgiess., ibid., § 12, etc.; Gregor. Turon., Hist., lib. v. c. 3.) When the manners of the European nations became more gentle, and their ideas more liberal, slaves who married without their master's consent were subjected only to a fine. (Potgiess., ibid., § 20; Du Cange, Gloss. voc. *Forismaritagium*.) 3. All the children of slaves were in the same condition with their parents, and became the property of the master. (Du Cange, Gloss., voc. *Servus*, vol. vi. p. 450; Murat., Antiq. Ital., vol. i. p. 766.) 4. Slaves were so entirely the property of their masters that they could sell them at pleasure. While domestic slavery continued, property in a slave was sold in the same manner with that which a person had in any other movable. Afterwards slaves became *adscripti glebae*, and were conveyed by sale together with the farm or estate to which they belonged. Potgiesserus has collected the laws and charters which illustrate this well-known circumstance in the condition of slaves. (Lib. ii. c. 4.) 5. Slaves had a title to nothing but subsistence and clothes from their master ; all the profits of their labour accrued to him. If a master, from indulgence, gave his slaves any *peculium*, or fixed allowance for their subsistence, they had no right of property in what they saved out of that. All that they accumulated belonged to their master. (Potgiess., lib. ii. c. 10; Murat., Antiq. Ital., vol. i. p. 768; Du Cange, voc. *Servus*, vol. vi. p. 451.) Conformably to the same principle, all the effects of slaves belonged to their masters at their death, and they could not dispose of them by testament. (Potgiess., lib. ii. c. 11.) 6. Slaves were distinguished from freemen by a peculiar dress. Among all the barbarous nations, long hair was a mark of dignity and of freedom ; slaves were, for that reason, obliged to shave their heads ; and by this distinction, how indifferent soever it may be in its own nature, they were reminded every moment of the inferiority of their condition. (Potgiess., lib. iii. c. 4.) For the same reason, it was enacted in the laws of almost all the nations of Europe that no slave should be admitted to give evidence against a freeman in a court of justice. Du Cange, voc. *Servus*, vol. vi. p. 451; Potgiess., lib. iii. c. 3.

II. *Villani*. They were likewise *adscripti glebae* or *villæ*, from which they derived their name, and were transferable along with it. (Du Cange, voc. *Villanus*.) But in this they differed from slaves, that they paid a fixed rent to their master for the land which they cultivated, and, after paying that, all the fruits of their labour and industry belonged to themselves in property. This distinction is marked by Pierre de Fontain's *Conseil Vie de St. Louis*, par Joinville, p. 119, édit. de Du Cange. Several cases decided agreeably to this principle are mentioned by Murat, ibid., p. 773.

III. The last class of persons employed in agriculture were freemen. These are distinguished by various names among the writers of the Middle Ages, *arimanni*, *conditionales*, *originarii*, *tributales*, etc. These seem to have been persons who possessed some small allodial property of their own, and, besides that, cultivated some farm belonging to their more wealthy neighbours, for which they paid a fixed rent, and bound themselves likewise to perform several small services *in prato vel in messe*, *in aratura vel in vinea*, such as ploughing a certain quantity of their landlord's ground, assisting him in harvest and vintage work, etc. The clearest proof of this may be found in Muratori, vol. i. p. 712, and in Du Cange, under the respective words above mentioned. I have not been able to discover whether these *arimanni*, etc., were removable at pleasure, or held their farms by lease for a certain number of years. The former, if we may judge from the genius and maxims of the age, seems to be the most probable. These persons, however, were considered as freemen in the most honourable sense of the word : they enjoyed all the privileges of that condition, and were even called to serve in war ; an honour to which no slave was admitted. (Murat., Antiq., vol. i. p. 743, vol. ii. p. 446). This account of the condition of these three different classes of persons will enable the reader to apprehend the full force of an argument which I shall produce in confirmation of what I have said in the text concerning the wretched state of the people during the Middle Ages. Notwithstanding the immense difference between the first of these classes and the third, such was the spirit of tyranny which prevailed among the great proprietors of lands, and so various their opportunities of oppressing those who were settled on their estates, and of rendering their condition intolerable, that many freemen, in despair, renounced their liberty and voluntarily surrendered themselves as slaves to their powerful masters. This they did in order that their masters might become more immediately interested to afford them protection, together with the means of subsisting themselves and their families. The forms of such a surrender, or *obnaciatio*, as it was then called, are preserved by Marculfus, lib. ii. c. 28, and by the anonymous author published by M. Bignon together with the collection of *formulae* compiled by Marculfus, c. 16. In both, the reason given for the *obnaciatio* is the wretched and indigent condition of the person who gives up his liberty. It was still more common for freemen to surrender their liberty to bishops or abbots, that they might partake of the security which the vassals and slaves of churches and monasteries enjoyed, in consequence of the superstitious veneration paid to the saint under whose immediate protection they were supposed to be taken. (Du Cange, voc. *Oblatus*, vol. iv. p. 1286.) That condition must have been miserable indeed which could induce a freeman voluntarily to renounce his liberty and to give up himself as a slave to the disposal of another. The number of slaves in every nation of Europe was immense. The greater part of the inferior class of people in France were reduced to this state at the commencement of the third race of kings. (L'Esprit des Loix, liv. xxx. c. 11.) The same was the case in England. (Brady, Pref. to Gen. Hist.) Many curious facts with respect to the ancient state of *villains* or slaves in England are published in Observations on the Statutes, chiefly the more ancient, 3d edit., p. 269, etc.

NOTE X.—Sect. I. p. 19.

Innumerable proofs of this might be produced. Many charters, granted by persons of the highest rank, are preserved, from which it appears that they could not subscribe their name. It was usual for persons who could not write to make the sign of the cross in confirmation of a charter. Several of these remain where kings and persons of great eminence affix *signum crucis manu propria pro ignorantia literarum*. (Du Cange, voc. *Croix*, vol. iii. p. 1191.) From this is derived the phrase of signing instead of subscribing a paper. In the ninth century, Herbaud, Comes Palatii, though supreme judge of the empire by virtue of his office, could not subscribe his name. (Nouveau Traité de Diplomatique, par deux Bénédictins, 4to, tom. ii. p. 422.) As late as the fourteenth century, Du Guesclin, constable of France, the greatest man in the state, and one of the greatest men of his age, could neither read nor write. (Ste. Palaye, Mémoires sur l'ancienne Chevalerie, tit. ii. p. 82.) Nor was this ignorance confined to laymen: the greater part of the clergy was not many degrees superior to them in science. Many dignified ecclesiastics could not subscribe the canons of those councils in which they sat as members. (Nouv. Traité de Diplom., tom. ii. p. 424.) One of the questions appointed by the canons to be put to persons who were candidates for orders was this: "Whether they could read the Gospels and Epistles, and explain the sense of them, at least literally?" (Regino Prumiensis, ap. Bruck., Hist. Philos., v. iii. p. 631.) Alfred the Great complained that from the Humber to the Thames there was not a priest who understood the liturgy in his mother-tongue or who could translate the easiest piece of Latin, and that from the Thames to the sea the ecclesiastics were still more ignorant. (Asserus de Rebus gestis Alfredi, ap. Camdeni *Anglica*, etc., p. 25.) The ignorance of the clergy is quaintly described by an author of the Dark Ages: "Potius dediti gulæ quam glossæ; potius colligunt libras quam legunt libros; libentiū intuentur Mārtham quam Marcum; malunt legere in Salmone quam in Solomone." (Alanus de Art. Predicat., ap. Lebeuf, Dissert., tom. ii. p. 21.) To the obvious causes of such universal ignorance, arising from the state of government and manners, from the seventh to the eleventh century, we may add the scarcity of books during that period, and the difficulty of rendering them more common. The Romans wrote their books either on parchment or on paper made of the Egyptian papyrus. The latter, being the cheapest, was of course the most commonly used. But after the Saracens conquered Egypt, in the seventh century, the communication between that country and the people settled in Italy or in other parts of Europe was almost entirely broken off, and the papyrus was no longer in use among them. They were obliged, on that account, to write all their books upon parchment, and, as the price of that was high, books became extremely rare and of great value. We may judge of the scarcity of the materials for writing them from one circumstance. There still remain several manuscripts of the eighth, ninth, and following centuries, written on parchment from which some former writing had been erased in order to substitute a new composition in its place. In this manner it is probable that several works of the ancients perished. A book of Livy or of Tacitus might be erased to make room for the legendary tale

of a saint or the superstitious prayers of a missal. (Murat., *Antiq. Ital.*, vol. iii. p. 833.) P. de Montfaucon affirms that the greater part of the manuscripts on parchment which he has seen, those of an ancient date excepted, are written on parchment from which some former treatise had been erased. (*Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript.*, tom. ix. p. 325.) As the want of materials for writing is one reason why so many of the works of the ancients have perished, it accounts likewise for the small number of manuscripts of any kind previous to the eleventh century, when they began to multiply, from a cause which shall be mentioned. (*Hist. littér. de France*, tom. vi. p. 6.) Many circumstances prove the scarcity of books during these ages. Private persons seldom possessed any books whatever. Even monasteries of considerable note had only one missal. (Murat., *Antiq.*, vol. ix. p. 789.) Luper, abbot of Ferrières, in a letter to the pope, A.D. 855, beseeches him to lend him a copy of Cicero de Oratore and Quintilian's Institutions; "for," says he, "although we have parts of those books, there is no complete copy of them in all France." (Murat., *Antiq.*, vol. iii. p. 835.) The price of books became so high that persons of a moderate fortune could not afford to purchase them. The countess of Anjou paid for a copy of the Homilies of Haimon, bishop of Halberstadt, two hundred sheep, five quarters of wheat, and the same quantity of rye and millet. (*Histoire littéraire de France*, par des Religieux Bénédictins, tom. vii. p. 3.) Even so late as the year 1471, when Louis XI. borrowed the works of Rasis, the Arabian physician, from the faculty of medicine in Paris, he not only deposited in pledge a considerable quantity of plate, but was obliged to procure a nobleman to join with him as surety in a deed, binding himself, under a great forfeiture, to restore it. (Gabr. Naudé Addit. à l'*Histoire de Louys XI.* par Comines, édit. de Fresnoy, tom. iv. p. 281.) Many curious circumstances with respect to the extravagant price of books in the Middle Ages are collected by that industrious compiler, to whom I refer such of my readers as deem this small branch of literary history an object of curiosity. When any person made a present of a book to a church or monastery, in which were the only libraries during several ages, it was deemed a donative of such value that he offered it on the altar *pro remedio animæ suæ*, in order to obtain the forgiveness of his sins. (Murat., vol. iii. p. 836; *Hist. littér. de France*, tom. vi. p. 6; *Nouv. Trait. de Diplomat.*, par deux Bénédictins, 4to, tom. i. p. 481.) In the eleventh century the art of making paper, in the manner now become universal, was invented; by means of that, not only the number of manuscripts increased, but the study of the sciences was wonderfully facilitated. (Murat., ib. p. 871.) The invention of the art of making paper, and the invention of the art of printing, are two considerable events in literary history. It is remarkable that the former preceded the first dawning of letters and improvement in knowledge towards the close of the eleventh century; the latter ushered in the light which spread over Europe at the era of the Reformation.

NOTE XI.—Sect. I. p. 20.

All the religious maxims and practices of the Dark Ages are a proof of this. I shall produce one remarkable testimony in confirmation of it,

from an author canonised by the Church of Rome, St. Eloy, or Egidius, bishop of Noyon, in the seventh century. "He is a good Christian who comes frequently to church; who presents the oblation which is offered to God upon the altar; who doth not taste the fruits of his own industry until he has consecrated a part of them to God; who, when the holy festivals approach, lives chastely even with his own wife during several days, that with a safe conscience he may draw near the altar of God; and who, in the last place, can repeat the Creed and the Lord's Prayer. Redeem then your souls from destruction while you have the means in your power: offer presents and tithes to churchmen; come more frequently to church; humbly implore the patronage of the saints; for, if you observe these things, you may come with security in the day of retribution to the tribunal of the Eternal Judge, and say, 'Give to us, O Lord, for we have given unto thee.'" (Dacherii Spicilegium Vet. Script., vol. ii. p. 94.) The learned and judicious translator of Dr. Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, to one of whose additional notes I am indebted for my knowledge of this passage, subjoins a very proper reflection: "We see here a large and ample description of a good Christian, in which there is not the least mention of the love of God, resignation to his will, obedience to his laws, or of justice, benevolence, and charity towards men." Mosh. Eccles. Hist., vol. i. p. 324.

NOTE XII.—Sect. I. p. 20.

That infallibility in all its determinations, to which the Church of Rome pretends, has been attended with one unhappy consequence. As it is impossible to relinquish any opinion or to alter any practice which has been established by authority that cannot err, all its institutions and ceremonies must be immutable and everlasting, and the Church must continue to observe in enlightened times those rites which were introduced during the ages of darkness and credulity. What delighted and edified the latter must disgust and shock the former. Many of the rites observed in the Romish Church appear manifestly to have been introduced by a superstition of the lowest and most illiberal species. Many of them were borrowed, with little variation, from the religious ceremonies established among the ancient heathens. Some were so ridiculous that, if every age did not furnish instances of the fascinating influence of superstition, as well as of the whimsical forms which it assumes, it must appear incredible that they should have been ever received or tolerated. In several churches of France they celebrated a festival in commemoration of the Virgin Mary's Flight into Egypt. It was called the Feast of the Ass. A young girl, richly dressed, with a child in her arms, was set upon an ass superbly caparisoned. The ass was led to the altar in solemn procession. High mass was said with great pomp. The ass was taught to kneel at proper places; a hymn no less childish than impious was sung in his praise; and, when the ceremony was ended, the priest, instead of the usual words with which he dismissed the people, brayed three times like an ass, and the people, instead of the usual response, "We bless the Lord," brayed three times in the same manner. (Du Cange, voc. *Festum*, vol. iii. p. 424.) This ridiculous ceremony was not, like the festival of fools, and some other pageants of those ages, a mere farcical entertainment exhibited in a church,

and mingled, as was then the custom, with an imitation of some religious rites : it was an act of devotion, performed by the ministers of religion and by the authority of the Church. However, as this practice did not prevail universally in the Catholic Church, its absurdity contributed at last to abolish it.

NOTE XIII.—Sect. I. p. 25.

As there is no event in the history of mankind more singular than that of the crusades, every circumstance that tends to explain or to give any rational account of this extraordinary frenzy of the human mind is interesting. I have asserted in the text that the minds of men were prepared gradually for the amazing effort which they made in consequence of the exhortations of Peter the Hermit, by several occurrences previous to his time. A more particular detail of this curious and obscure part of history may perhaps appear to some of my readers to be of importance. That the end of the world was expected about the close of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh century, and that this occasioned a general alarm, is evident from the authors to whom I have referred in the text. This belief was so universal and so strong that it mingled itself with civil transactions. Many charters in the latter part of the tenth century begin in this manner : “Appropinquante mundi termino,” etc. As the end of the world is now at hand, and by various calamities and judgments the signs of its approach are now manifest. (*Hist. de Langued.*, par D. D. de Vic et Vaisette, tom. ii. ; *Preuves*, pp. 86, 89, 90, 117, 158, etc.). One effect of this opinion was that a great number of pilgrims resorted to Jerusalem, with a resolution to die there, or to wait the coming of the Lord ; kings, earls, marquises, bishops, and even a great number of women, besides persons of an inferior rank, flocked to the Holy Land. (*Glaber. Rodulph.*, *Hist.*, apud *Bouquet, Recueil*, tom. x. pp. 50, 52.) Another historian mentions a vast cavalcade of pilgrims who accompanied the count of Angoulême to Jerusalem in the year 1026. (*Chronic. Ademari*, *ibid.*, p. 162.) Upon their return, these pilgrims filled Europe with lamentable accounts of the state of Christians in the Holy Land. (*Willerm. Tyr.*, *Hist.*, ap. *Gest. Dei per Franc*, vol. ii. p. 636 ; *Guibert. Abbat.*, *Hist.*, *ibid.*, vol. i. p. 476.) Besides this, it was usual for many of the Christian inhabitants of Jerusalem, as well as of other cities in the East, to travel as mendicants through Europe, and, by describing the wretched condition of the professors of the Christian faith under the dominion of infidels, to extort charity, and to excite zealous persons to make some attempt in order to deliver them from oppression. (*Baldrici Archiepiscopi Histor.*, ap. *Gesta Dei*, etc., vol. i. p. 86.) In the year 986, Gerbert, archbishop of Ravenna, afterwards Pope Silvester II., addressed a letter to all Christians in the name of the church of Jerusalem. It is eloquent and pathetic, and contains a formal exhortation to take arms against the pagan oppressors in order to rescue the holy city from their yoke. (*Gerberti Epistolæ*, ap. *Bouquet, Recueil*, tom. x. p. 426.) In consequence of this spirited call, some subjects of the republic of Pisa equipped a fleet and invaded the territories of the Mahometans in Syria. (*Murat.*, *Script. Rer. Italic.*, vol. iii. p. 400.) The alarm was taken in the East, and an opinion prevailed, A.D. 1010, that all the forces of Christendom were to unite in order to drive the Mahometans out of

Palestine. (Chron. Ademari, ap. Bouquet, tom. x. p. 152.) It is evident from all these particulars that the ideas which led the crusaders to undertake their wild enterprise did not arise, according to the description of many authors, from a sudden fit of frantic enthusiasm, but were gradually formed; so that the universal concourse to the standard of the cross, when erected by Urban II., will appear less surprising.

If the various circumstances which I have enumerated in this note, as well as in the history, are sufficient to account for the ardour with which such vast numbers engaged in such a dangerous undertaking, the extensive privileges and immunities granted to the persons who assumed the cross serve to account for the long continuance of this spirit in Europe. 1. They were exempted from prosecutions on account of debt during the time of their being engaged in this holy service. (Du Cange, voc. *Crucis Privilium*, vol. ii. p. 1194.) 2. They were exempted from paying interest for the money which they had borrowed in order to fit them for this sacred warfare. (Ibid.) 3. They were exempted either entirely, or at least during a certain time, from the payment of taxes. (Ibid.; *Ordonnances des Rois de France*, tom. i. p. 33.) 4. They might alienate their lands without the consent of the superior lord of whom they held. (Ibid.) 5. Their persons and effects were taken under the protection of St. Peter, and the anathemas of the Church were denounced against all who should molest them, or carry on any quarrel or hostility against them, during their absence on account of the holy war. (Du Cange, ibid.; *Guibertus Abbas*, ap. *Bongars.*, vol. i. pp. 480, 482.) 6. They enjoyed all the privileges of ecclesiastics, and were not bound to plead in any civil court, but were declared subject to the spiritual jurisdiction alone. (Du Cange, ibid.; *Ordon. des Rois*, tom. i. pp. 34, 174.) 7. They obtained a plenary remission of all their sins, and the gates of heaven were set open to them, without requiring any other proof of their penitence but their engaging in this expedition; and thus by gratifying their favourite passion, the love of war, they secured to themselves immunities which were not usually obtained but by paying large sums of money or by undergoing painful penances. (*Guibertus Abbas*, p. 480.) When we behold the civil and ecclesiastical powers vying with each other and straining their invention in order to devise expedients for encouraging and adding strength to the spirit of superstition, can we be surprised that it should become so general as to render it infamous, and a mark of cowardice, to decline engaging in the holy war? (*Willerm. Tyriensis*, ap. *Bongars.*, vol. ii. p. 641.) The histories of the crusades written by modern authors, who are apt to substitute the ideas and maxims of their own age in the place of those which influenced the persons whose actions they attempt to relate, convey a very imperfect notion of the spirit at that time predominant in Europe. The original historians, who were animated themselves with the same passions which possessed their contemporaries, exhibit to us a more striking picture of the times and manners which they describe. The enthusiastic rapture with which they account for the effects of the pope's discourse in the Council of Clermont, the exultation with which they mention the numbers who devoted themselves to this holy warfare, the confidence with which they express their reliance on the divine protection, the ecstasy of joy with which they describe their taking possession of the holy city, will enable

us to conceive in some degree the extravagance of that zeal which agitated the minds of men with such violence, and will suggest as many singular reflections to a philosopher as any occurrence in the history of mankind. It is unnecessary to select the particular passages in the several historians which confirm this observation. But, lest those authors may be suspected of adorning their narrative with any exaggerated description, I shall appeal to one of the leaders who conducted the enterprise. There is extant a letter from Stephen, the earl of Chartres and Blois, to Adela, his wife, in which he gives her an account of the progress of the crusaders. He describes the crusaders as the chosen army of Christ, as the servants and soldiers of God, as men who marched under the immediate protection of the Almighty, being conducted by his hand to victory and conquest. He speaks of the Turks as accursed, sacrilegious, and devoted by Heaven to destruction; and when he mentions the soldiers in the Christian army who had died or were killed, he is confident that their souls were admitted directly into the joys of Paradise. *Dacherii Spicilegium*, vol. iv. p. 257.

The expense of conducting numerous bodies of men from Europe to Asia must have been excessive, and the difficulty of raising the necessary sums must have been proportionally great, during ages when the public revenues in every nation of Europe were extremely small. Some account is preserved of the expedients employed by Humbert II., Dauphin of Vienne, in order to levy the money requisite towards equipping him for the crusade, A.D. 1346. These I shall mention, as they tend to show the considerable influence which the crusades had both on the state of property and of civil government. 1. He exposed to sale part of his domains; and, as the price was destined for such a sacred service, he obtained the consent of the French king, of whom these lands were held, ratifying the alienation. (*Hist. de Dauphiné*, tom. i pp. 332, 335.) 2. He issued a proclamation in which he promised to grant new privileges to the nobles, as well as new immunities to the cities and towns in his territories, in consideration of certain sums which they were instantly to pay on that account. (*Ibid.*, tom. ii. p. 512.) Many of the charters of community, which I shall mention in another note, were obtained in this manner. 3. He exacted a contribution towards defraying the charges of the expedition from all his subjects, whether ecclesiastics or laymen, who did not accompany him in person to the East. (*Ibid.*, tom. i. p. 335.) 4. He appropriated a considerable part of his usual revenues for the support of the troops to be employed in this service. (*Ibid.*, tom. ii. p. 518.) 5. He exacted considerable sums, not only of the Jews settled in his dominions, but also of the Lombards and other bankers who had fixed their residence there. (*Ibid.*, tom. i. p. 338, tom. ii. p. 528.) Notwithstanding the variety of these resources, the dauphin was involved in such expense by this expedition that on his return he was obliged to make new demands on his subjects and to pillage the Jews by fresh exactions. (*Ibid.*, tom. i. pp. 344, 347.) When the count de Foix engaged in the first crusade, he raised the money necessary for defraying the expenses of that expedition by alienating part of his territories. (*Hist. de Langued.*, par D. D. de Vic et Vaisette, tom. ii. p. 287.) In like manner Baldwin, count of Hainault, mortgaged or sold a considerable portion of his dominions to the bishop of Liege, A.D. 1096. (*Du Mont, Corps Diplomatique*, tom. i.

p. 59.) At a later period, Baldwin, count of Namur, sold part of his estate to a monastery, when he intended to assume the cross, A.D. 1239. *Mirri Oper.*, i. p. 313.

NOTE XIV.—Sect. I. p. 29.

The usual method of forming an opinion concerning the comparative state of manners in two different nations is by attending to the facts which historians relate concerning each of them. Various passages might be selected from the Byzantine historians, describing the splendour and magnificence of the Greek empire. P. de Montfaucon has produced from the writings of St. Chrysostom a very full account of the elegance and luxury of the Greeks in his age. That father, in his sermons, enters into such minute details concerning the manners and customs of his contemporaries as appear strange in discourses from the pulpit. P. de Montfaucon has collected these descriptions and ranged them under different heads. The court of the more early Greek emperors seems to have resembled those of Eastern monarchs, both in magnificence and in corruption of manners. The emperors in the eleventh century, though inferior in power, did not yield to them in ostentation and splendour. (*Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript.*, tom. xx. p. 197.) But we may decide concerning the comparative state of manners in the Eastern empire, and among the nations in the West of Europe, by another method, which if not more certain is at least more striking. As Constantinople was the place of rendezvous for all the armies of the crusaders, this brought together the people of the East and West as to one great interview. There are extant several contemporary authors, both among the Greeks and Latins, who were witnesses of this singular congress of people: formerly strangers in a great measure to each other. They describe with simplicity and candour the impression which that new spectacle made upon their own minds. This may be considered as the most lively and just picture of the real character and manners of each people. When the Greeks speak of the Franks, they describe them as barbarians, fierce, illiterate, impetuous, and savage. They assume a tone of superiority, as a more polished people, acquainted with the arts both of government and of elegance, of which the other was ignorant. It is thus Anna Comnena describes the manners of the Latins. (*Alexias*, pp. 224, 231, 237, ap. *Byz. Script.*, vol. ix.) She always views them with contempt as a rude people, the very mention of whose names was sufficient to contaminate the beauty and elegance of history (p. 229). Nicetas Choniatas inveighs against them with still more violence, and gives an account of their ferocity and devastations in terms not unlike those which preceding historians had employed in describing the incursions of the Goths and Vandals. (*Nicet. Chon.*, ap. *Byz. Script.*, vol. iii. p. 302, etc.) But, on the other hand, the Latin historians were struck with astonishment at the magnificence, wealth, and elegance which they discovered in the Eastern empire. “Oh, what a vast city is Constantinople!” exclaims Fulcherius Carnotensis when he first beheld it, “and how beautiful! How many monasteries are there in it, and how many palaces built with wonderful art! How many manufactures are there in the city amazing to behold! It would be astonishing to relate how it abounds with all good things, with gold, silver, and stuffs of various

kinds ; for every hour ships arrive in its port laden with all things necessary for the use of man." (Fulcher., ap. Bongars., vol. i. p. 386.) Willermus, archbishop of Tyre, the most intelligent historian of the Crusades, seems to be fond, on every occasion, of describing the elegance and splendour of the court of Constantinople, and adds that what he and his countrymen observed there exceeded any idea which they could have formed of it, "nostrarum enim rerum modum et dignitatem excedunt." (Willerm. Tyr., ap. Bong., vol. ii. pp. 657, 664.) Benjamin the Jew, of Tudela in Navarre, who began his travels A.D. 1173, appears to have been equally astonished at the magnificence of that city, and gives a description of its splendour in terms of high admiration. (Benj. Tudel., ap. Les Voyages faits dans les 12^e, 13^e, etc. Siècles, par Bergeron, p. 10, etc.) Guntherus, a French monk, who wrote a history of the conquest of Constantinople by the crusaders in the thirteenth century, speaks of the magnificence of that city in the same tone of admiration : "Structuram autem sedificiorum in corpore civitatis, in ecclesiis videlicet, et turribus, et in domibus magnatorum, vix ullus vel describere potest, vel credere descripti, nisi qui ea oculata fide cognoverit." (Hist. Constantinop., ap. Canisii Lectiones Antiquas, fol., Antw., 1725, vol. iv. p. 14.) Geoffrey de Villehardouin, a nobleman of high rank, and accustomed to all the magnificence then known in the West, describes in similar terms the astonishment and admiration of such of his fellow-soldiers as beheld Constantinople for the first time. "They could not have believed," says he, "that there was a city so beautiful and so rich in the whole world. When they viewed its high walls, its lofty towers, its rich palaces, its superb churches, all appeared so great that they could have formed no conception of this sovereign city unless they had seen it with their own eyes." (Histoire de la Conquête de Constantinople, p. 49.) From these undisguised representations of their own feelings it is evident that to the Greeks the crusaders appeared to be a race of rude, unpolished barbarians ; whereas the latter, how much soever they might condemn the unwarlike character of the former, could not help regarding them as far superior to themselves in elegance and arts. That the state of government and manners was much more improved in Italy than in the other countries of Europe is evident not only from the facts recorded in history, but it appears that the more intelligent leaders of the crusaders were struck with the difference. Jacobus de Vitriaco, a French historian of the holy war, makes an elaborate panegyric on the character and manners of the Italians. He views them as a more polished people, and particularly celebrates them for their love of liberty, and civil wisdom : "In consiliis circumspecti, in re sua publica procuranda diligentiores et studiosi ; sibi in posterum providentes ; aliis subjici renuentes ; ante omnia libertatem sibi defendantes ; sub uno quem eligunt capitaneo, communitati suæ jura et instituta dictantes et similiter observantes." Histor. Hierosol., ap. Gesta Dei per Francos, vol. ii. p. 1085.

NOTE XV.—Sect. I. p. 32.

The different steps taken by the cities of Italy in order to extend their power and dominions are remarkable. As soon as their liberties were established and they began to feel their own importance, they endeavoured

to render themselves masters of the territory round their walls. Under the Romans, when cities enjoyed municipal privileges and jurisdiction, the circumjacent lands belonged to each town and were the property of the community. But, as it was not the genius of the feudal policy to encourage cities or to show any regard for their possessions and immunities, these lands had been seized and shared among the conquerors. The barons to whom they were granted erected their castles almost at the gates of the city, and exercised their jurisdiction there. Under pretence of recovering their ancient property, many of the cities in Italy attacked these troublesome neighbours, and, dispossessing them, annexed their territories to the communities, and made thereby a considerable addition to their power. Several instances of this occur in the eleventh and beginning of the twelfth centuries. (Murat., *Antiq. Ital.*, vol. iv. p. 159, etc.) Their ambition increasing together with their power, the cities afterwards attacked several barons situated at a greater distance from their walls, and obliged them to engage that they would become members of their community ; that they would take the oath of fidelity to their magistrates ; that they would subject their lands to all burdens and taxes imposed by common consent ; that they would defend the community against all its enemies ; and that they would reside within the city during a certain specified time in each year. (Murat., *ibid.*, p. 163.) This subjection of the nobility to the municipal government established in cities became almost universal, and was often extremely grievous to persons accustomed to consider themselves as independent. Otto Frisingensis thus describes the state of Italy under Frederic I : “The cities so much affect liberty, and are so solicitous to avoid the insolence of power, that almost all of them have thrown off every other authority and are governed by their own magistrates. Inasmuch that all that country is now filled with free cities, most of which have compelled their bishops to reside within their walls, and there is scarcely any nobleman, how great soever his power may be, who is not subject to the laws and government of some city.” (De Gestis Frider. I. Imp., lib. ii. c. 13, p. 453.) In another place he observes of the marquis of Montferrat that he was almost the only Italian baron who had preserved his independence and had not become subject to the laws of any city. (See also Muratori, *Antichità Estensi*, vol. i. pp. 411, 412.) That state into which some of the nobles were compelled to enter, others embraced from choice. They observed the high degree of security, as well as of credit and estimation, which the growing wealth and dominion of the great communities procured to all the members of them. They were desirous to partake of these and to put themselves under such powerful protection. With this view they voluntarily became citizens of the towns to which their lands were most contiguous, and, abandoning their ancient castles, took up their residence in the cities, at least during part of the year. Several deeds are still extant by which some of the most illustrious families in Italy are associated as citizens of different cities. (Murat., *ibid.*, p. 165, etc.) A charter by which Atto de Macerata is admitted as a citizen of Osimia, A.D. 1198, in the Marcha di Ancona, is still extant. In this he stipulates that he will acknowledge himself to be a burgess of that community ; that he will to the utmost of his power promote its honour and welfare ; that he will obey its magistrates ; that he will

enter into no league with its enemies ; that he will reside in the town during two months in every year, or for a longer time, if required by the magistrates. The community, on the other hand, take him, his family, and friends, under their protection, and engage to defend him against every enemy. (Fr. Ant. Zacharias, *Anecdota Medii Ævi*, Aug. Taur., 1755, fol., p. 66.) This privilege was deemed so important that not only laymen, but ecclesiastics of the highest rank, condescended to be adopted as members of the great communities, in hopes of enjoying the safety and dignity which that condition conferred. (Murat., *ibid.*, p. 179.) Before the institution of communities, persons of noble birth had no other residence but their castles. They kept their petty courts there ; and the cities were deserted, having hardly any inhabitants but slaves or persons of low condition. But, in consequence of the practice which I have mentioned, cities not only became more populous, but were filled with inhabitants of better rank, and a custom which still subsists in Italy was then introduced, that all families of distinction reside more constantly in the great towns than is usual in other parts of Europe. As cities acquired new consideration and dignity by the accession of such citizens, they became more solicitous to preserve their liberty and independence. The emperors, as sovereigns, had anciently a palace in almost every great city of Italy : when they visited that country, they were accustomed to reside in these palaces, and the troops which accompanied them were quartered in the houses of the citizens. This the citizens deemed both ignominious and dangerous. They could not help considering it as receiving a master and an enemy within their walls. They laboured, therefore, to get free of this subjection. Some cities prevailed on the emperors to engage that they would never enter their gates but take up their residence without the walls. (Chart. Hen. IV., Murat., *ibid.*, p. 24.) Others obtained the imperial license to pull down the palace situated within their liberties, on condition that they built another in the suburbs for the occasional reception of the emperor. (Chart. Hen. IV., Murat., *ibid.*, p. 25.) These various encroachments of the Italian cities alarmed the emperors, and put them on schemes for re-establishing the imperial jurisdiction over them on its ancient footing. Frederic Barbarossa engaged in this enterprise with great ardour. The free cities of Italy joined together in a general league, and stood on their defence ; and after a long contest, carried on with alternate success, a solemn treaty of peace was concluded at Constance, A.D. 1183, by which all the privileges and immunities granted by former emperors to the principal cities in Italy were confirmed and ratified. (Murat., *Dissert. XLVIII.*) This treaty of Constance was considered as such an important article in the jurisprudence of the Middle Ages that it is usually published together with the *Libri Feudorum* at the end of the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. The treaty secured privileges of great importance to the confederate cities, and though it reserved a considerable degree of authority and jurisdiction to the empire, yet the cities persevered with such vigour in their efforts in order to extend their immunities, and the conjectures in which they made them were so favourable, that before the conclusion of the thirteenth century most of the great cities in Italy had shaken off all marks of subjection to the empire and were become independent sovereign republica. It is not requisite that I should trace the

various steps by which they advanced to this high degree of power, so fatal to the empire and so beneficial to the cause of liberty in Italy. Muratori, with his usual industry, has collected many original papers which illustrate this curious and little known part of history. *Murat., Antiq. Ital., Dissert. L.* See also *Jo. Bapt. Villanova Hist. Laudis Pompeii sive Lodi, in Grav. Thea. Antiquit. Ital.*, vol. iii. p. 888.

NOTE XVI.—Sect. I. p. 33.

Long before the institution of communities in France, charters of immunity or franchise were granted to some towns and villages by the lords on whom they depended. But these are very different from such as became common in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. They did not erect these towns into corporations; they did not establish a municipal government; they did not grant them the privilege of bearing arms. They contained nothing more than a manumission of the inhabitants from the yoke of servitude; an exemption from certain services which were oppressive and ignominious; and the establishment of a fixed tax or rent which the citizens were to pay to their lord in place of impositions which he could formerly lay upon them at pleasure. Two charters of this kind to two villages in the county of Rousaillon, one in A.D. 974, the other in A.D. 1025, are still extant. (*Petr. de Marca, Marca, sive Limes Hispanicus, App.*, pp. 909, 1038.) Such concessions, it is probable, were not unknown in other parts of Europe, and may be considered as a step towards the more extensive privileges conferred by Louis le Gros on the towns within his domains. The communities in France never aspired to the same independence with those in Italy. They acquired new privileges and immunities, but the right of sovereignty remained entire to the king or baron within whose territories the respective cities were situated and from whom they received the charter of their freedom. A great number of these charters, granted both by the kings of France and by their great vassals, are published by M. d'Achery in his *Spicilegium*, and many are found in the collection of the *Ordonnances des Rois de France*. These convey a very striking representation of the wretched condition of cities previous to the institution of communities, when they were subject to the judges appointed by the superior lords of whom they held, and who had scarcely any other law but their will. Each concession in these charters must be considered as a grant of some new privileges which the people did not formerly enjoy, and each regulation as a method of redressing some grievance under which the inhabitants of cities formerly laboured. The charters of communities contain likewise the first expedients employed for the introduction of equal laws and regular government. On both these accounts they merit particular attention, and therefore, instead of referring my readers to the many bulky volumes in which they are scattered, I shall give them a view of some of the most important articles in these charters, ranged under two general heads. I. Such as respect personal safety. II. Such as respect the security of property.

I. During that state of turbulence and disorder which the corruption of the feudal government introduced into Europe, personal safety was the first and great object of every individual; and, as the great military barons

alone were able to give sufficient protection to their vassals, this was one great source of their power and authority. But by the institution of communities effectual provision was made for the safety of individuals, independent of the nobles. For, 1. The fundamental article in every charter was that all the members of the community bound themselves by oath to assist, defend, and stand by each other against all aggressors, and that they should not suffer any person to injure, distress, or molest any of their fellow-citizens. (D'Acher., Spicil., x. 642, xi. 341, etc.) 2. Whoever resided in any town which was made free was obliged, under a severe penalty, to accede to the community and to take part in the mutual defence of its members. (D'Acher., Spicil., xi. 344.) 3. The communities had the privilege of carrying arms ; of making war on their private enemies ; and of executing by military force any sentence which their magistrates pronounced. (D'Acher., Spicil., x. 643, 644, xi. 343.) 4. The practice of making satisfaction by a pecuniary compensation for murder, assault, or other acts of violence, most inconsistent with the order of society and the safety of individuals, was abolished ; and such as committed these crimes were punished capitally, or with rigour adequate to their guilt. (D'Ach., xi. 362 ; Miræi Opera Diplomatica, i. 292.) 5. No member of a community was bound to justify or defend himself by battle or combat ; but if he was charged with any crime he could be convicted only by the evidence of witnesses and the regular course of legal proceedings. (Miræus, ibid. ; D'Ach., xi. 375, 349 ; Ordon., tom. iii. p. 265.) 6. If any man suspected himself to be in danger from the malice or enmity of another, upon his making oath to that effect before a magistrate the person suspected was bound under a severe penalty to give security for his peaceable behaviour. (D'Ach., xi. 346.) This is the same species of security which is still known in Scotland under the name of *law burrows*. In France it was first introduced among the inhabitants of communities, and, having been found to contribute considerably towards personal safety, it was extended to all the other members of the society. Etablissements de St. Louis, liv. i. cap. 28, ap. Du Cange, Vie de St. Louis, p. 15.

II. The provisions in the charters of communities concerning the security of property are not less considerable than those respecting personal safety. By the ancient law of France, no person could be arrested or confined in prison on account of any private debt. (Ordon. des Rois de France, tom. i. pp. 72, 80.) If any person was arrested upon any pretext but his having been guilty of a capital crime, it was lawful to rescue him out of the hands of the officers who had seized him. (Ordon., tom. iii. p. 17.) Freedom from arrest on account of debt seems likewise to have been enjoyed in other countries. (Gudenus, Sylloge Diplom., 473.) In society, while it remained in its rudest and most simple form, debt seems to have been considered as an obligation merely personal. Men had made some progress towards refinement before creditors acquired a right of seizing the property of their debtors in order to recover payment. The expedients for this purpose were all introduced originally in communities, and we can trace the gradual progress of them. 1. The simplest and most obvious species of security was that the person who sold any commodity should receive a pledge from him who bought it, which he restored upon receiving payment. Of this custom there are vestiges in

several charters of community. (D'Ach., ix. 185, xi. 377.) 2. When no pledge was given, and the debtor became refractory or insolvent, the creditor was allowed to seize his effects with a strong hand and by his private authority; the citizens of Paris are warranted by the royal mandate, "ut ubicumque, et quocumque modo poterunt, tantum capiant, unde pecuniam sibi debitam integrè et plenariè habeant, et inde sibi invicem adjutores existant." (Ordon., etc., tom. i. p. 6.) This rude practice, suitable only to the violence of that which has been called a state of nature, was tolerated longer than one can conceive to be possible in any society where laws and order were at all known. The ordinance authorizing it was issued A.D. 1134; and that which corrects the law, and prohibits creditors from seizing the effects of their debtors unless by a warrant from a magistrate and under his inspection, was not published until the year 1351. (Ordon., tom. ii. p. 438.) It is probable, however, that men were taught, by observing the disorders which the former mode of proceeding occasioned, to correct it in practice long before a remedy was provided by a law to that effect. Every discerning reader will apply this observation to many other customs and practices which I have mentioned. New customs are not always to be ascribed to the laws which authorize them. Those statutes only give a legal sanction to such things as the experience of mankind has previously found to be proper and beneficial. 3. As soon as the interposition of the magistrate became requisite, regular provision was made for attaching or distraining the movable effects of a debtor; and if his movables were not sufficient to discharge the debt, his immovable property, or estate in land, was liable to the same distress, and was sold for the benefit of his creditor. (D'Ach., ix. 184, 185, xi. 348, 380.) As this regulation afforded the most complete security to the creditor, it was considered as so severe that humanity pointed out several limitations in the execution of it. Creditors were prohibited from seizing the wearing-apparel of their debtors, their beds, the door of their house, their instruments of husbandry, etc. (D'Ach., ix. 184, xi. 377.) Upon the same principles, when the power of distraining effects became more general, the horse and arms of a gentleman could not be seized. (D'Ach., ix. 185.) As hunting was the favourite amusement of martial nobles, the emperor Ludovicus Pius prohibited the seizing of a hawk on account of any composition or debt. (Capitul., lib. iv. § 21.) But, if the debtor had no other movables, even these privileged articles might be seized. 4. In order to render the security of property complete within a community, every person who was admitted a member of it was obliged to buy or build a house, or to purchase lands within its precincts, or at least to bring into the town a considerable portion of his movables, *per quæ justiciari possit, si quid forte in eum querelas evenerit.* (D'Ach., xi. 326; Ordon., tom. i. p. 367; Libertates S. Georgii de Esperanchia, Hist. de Dauphiné, tom. i. p. 26.) 5. That security might be as perfect as possible, in some towns the members of the community seem to have been bound for each other. (D'Ach., x, 644.) 6. All questions with respect to property were tried within the community, by magistrates and judges whom the citizens elected or appointed. Their decisions were more equal and fixed than the sentences which depended on the capricious and arbitrary will of a baron, who

thought himself superior to all laws. (D'Ach., x. 644, 646, xi. 344, et passim; Ordon., tom. iii. p. 204.) 7. No member of a community could be burdened by any arbitrary tax; for the superior lord, who granted the charter of community, accepted of a fixed census or duty in lieu of all demands. (Ordon., tom. iii. p. 204; *Libertates de Calma*, Hist. de Dauphiné, tom. i. p. 19; *Libertates S. Georgii de Esperanchia*, ibid., p. 26.) Nor could the members of a community be distressed by an unequal imposition of the sum to be levied on the community. Regulations are inserted in the charters of some communities concerning the method of determining the quota of any tax to be levied on each inhabitant. (D'Ach., xi. 350, 365.) St. Louis published an ordinance concerning this matter, which extended to all the communities. (Ordon., tom. i. p. 186.) These regulations are extremely favourable to liberty, as they vest the power of proportioning the taxes in a certain number of citizens chosen out of each parish, who were bound by solemn oath to decide according to justice. That the more perfect security of property was one great object of those who instituted communities, we learn not only from the nature of the thing, but from the express words of several charters, of which I shall only mention that granted by Alienor, queen of England and duchess of Guienne, to the community of Poitiers, "ut sua propria melius defendere possint, et magis integrè custodire." (Du Cange, voc. *Communia*, vol. ii. p. 863.) Such are some of the capital regulations established in communities during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. These may be considered as the first expedients for the re-establishment of law and order, and contributed greatly to introduce regular government among all the members of society. As soon as communities were instituted, high sentiments of liberty began to manifest themselves. When Humbert, lord of Beaujeu, upon granting a charter of community to the town of Belleville, exacted of the inhabitants an oath of fidelity to himself and successors, they stipulated, on their part, that he should swear to maintain their franchises and liberties; and, for their greater security, they obliged him to bring twenty gentlemen to take the same oath and to be bound together with him. (D'Ach., ix. 183.) In the same manner, the lord of Moriens in Dauphiné produced a certain number of persons as his sureties for the observation of the articles contained in the charter of community to that town. These were bound to surrender themselves prisoners to the inhabitants of Moriens if their liege-lord should violate any of their franchises, and they promised to remain in custody until he should grant the members of the community redress. (Hist. de Dauphiné, tom. i. p. 17.) If the mayor or chief magistrate of a town did any injury to a citizen, he was obliged to give security for his appearance in judgment, in the same manner as a private person, and, if cast, was liable to the same penalty. (D'Ach., ix. 183.) These are ideas of equality uncommon in the feudal times. Communities were so favourable to freedom that they were distinguished by the name of *libertates*. (Du Cange, vol. ii. p. 863.) They were at first extremely odious to the nobles, who foresaw what a check they must prove to their power and domination. Guibert, abbot of Nogent, calls them execrable inventions, by which, contrary to law and justice, slaves withdrew themselves from that obedience which they owed to their masters. (Du Cange, ibid., p. 862.) The zeal with which some of the nobles and powerful

ecclesiastics opposed the establishment of communities and endeavoured to circumscribe their privileges was extraordinary. A striking instance of this occurs in the contests between the archbishop of Rheims and the inhabitants of that community. It was the chief business of every archbishop, during a considerable time, to abridge the rights and jurisdiction of the community; and the great object of the citizens, especially when the see was vacant, to maintain, to recover, and to extend their own jurisdiction. *Histoire civile et politique de la Ville de Reims*, par M. Anquetil, tom. i. p. 287, etc.

The observations which I have made concerning the low state of cities, and the condition of their inhabitants, are confirmed by innumerable passages in the historians and laws of the Middle Ages. It is not improbable, however, that some cities of the first order were in a better state and enjoyed a superior degree of liberty. Under the Roman government the municipal government established in cities was extremely favourable to liberty. The jurisdiction of the senate in each corporation, and the privileges of the citizens, were both extensive. There is reason to believe that some of the greater cities, which escaped the destructive rage of the barbarous nations, still retained their ancient form of government, at least in a great measure. They were governed by a council of citizens, and by magistrates whom they themselves elected. Very strong presumptions in favour of this opinion are produced by M. l'Abbé de Bos, *Hist. crit. de la Mon. Franç.*, tom. i. p. 18, etc., tom. ii. p. 524, edit. 1742. It appears from some of the charters of community to cities, granted in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, that these only confirm the privileges possessed by the inhabitants previous to the establishment of the community. (D'Acher., *Spicileg.*, vol. xi. p. 345.) Other cities claimed their privileges, as having possessed them without interruption from the times of the Romans. (*Hist. crit. de la Mon. Franç.*, tom. ii. p. 333.) But the number of cities which enjoyed such immunities was so small as hardly in any degree to diminish the force of my conclusions in the text.

NOTE XVII.—Sect. I. p. 33.

Having given a full account of the establishment, as well as effects, of communities in Italy and France, it will be necessary to inquire with some attention into the progress of cities and of municipal government in Germany. The ancient Germans had no cities. Even in their hamlets or villages they did not build their houses contiguous to each other. (Tacit., *de Mor. Germ.*, cap. 16.) They considered it as a badge of servitude to be obliged to dwell in a city surrounded with walls. When one of their tribes had shaken off the Roman yoke, their countrymen required of them, as an evidence of their having recovered liberty, to demolish the walls of a town which the Romans had built in their country. Even the fiercest animals, said they, lose their spirit and courage when they are confined. (Tacit., *Histor.*, lib. iv. c. 64.) The Romans built several cities of note on the banks of the Rhine. But in all the vast countries from that river to the coasts of the Baltic there was hardly one city previous to the ninth century of the Christian era. (Conringius, *Exercitatio de Urbibus Germaniae*, Oper., vol. i. §§ 25, 27, 31, etc.) Heineccius differs from Con-

ringius with respect to this. But, even after allowing to his arguments and authorities their utmost force, they prove only that there were a few places in those extensive regions on which some historians have bestowed the name of towns. (*Elem. Jur. German.*, lib. i. § 102.) Under Charlemagne and the emperors of his family, as the political state of Germany began to improve, several cities were founded, and men became accustomed to associate and to live together in one place. Charlemagne founded two archbishoprics and nine bishoprics in the most considerable towns of Germany. (*Aub. Miræi Opera Diplomatica*, vol. i. p. 16.) His successors increased the number of these; and as bishops fixed their residence in the chief town of their diocese, and performed religious functions there, that induced many people to settle in them. (*Conring.*, *ibid.*, § 48.) But Henry, surnamed the Fowler, who began his reign A.D. 920, must be considered as the great founder of cities in Germany. The empire was at that time infested by the incursions of the Hungarians and other barbarous people. In order to oppose them, Henry encouraged his subjects to settle in cities, which he surrounded with walls strengthened by towers. He enjoined or persuaded a certain proportion of the nobility to fix their residence in the towns, and thus rendered the condition of citizens more honourable than it had been formerly. (*Wittikindus, Annal.*, lib. i., ap. *Conring.*, § 82.) From this period the number of cities continued to increase, and they became more populous and more wealthy. But cities in Germany were still destitute of municipal liberty or jurisdiction. Such of them as were situated in the imperial demesnes were subject to the emperors. Their *comites*, *missi*, and other judges presided in them and dispensed justice. Towns situated on the estate of a baron were part of his fief, and he or his officers exercised a similar jurisdiction in them. (*Conring.*, *ibid.*, §§ 73, 74; *Heinec.*, *Elem. Jur. Germ.*, lib. i. § 104.) The Germans borrowed the institution of communities from the Italians. (*Knipschil-dius, Tractatus Politico-Histor. Jurid. de Civitatum Imperialium Juribus*, vol. i. lib. i. cap. 5, no. 23.) Frederic Barbarossa was the first emperor who, from the same political consideration that influenced Louis le Gros, multiplied communities in order to abridge the power of the nobles. (*Pfeffel, Abrégé de l'Histoire et du Droit public d'Allemagne*, 4to, p. 297.) From the reign of Henry the Fowler to the time when the German cities acquired full possession of their immunities, various circumstances contributed to their increase. The establishment of bishoprics (already mentioned), and the building of cathedrals, naturally induced many people to settle near the chief place of worship. It became the custom to hold councils and courts of judicature of every kind, ecclesiastical as well as civil, in cities. In the eleventh century many slaves were enfranchised, the greater part of whom settled in cities. Several mines were discovered and wrought in different provinces, which drew together such a concourse of people as gave rise to several cities and increased the number of inhabitants in others. (*Conring.*, § 105.) The cities began in the thirteenth century to form leagues for their mutual defence, and for repressing the disorders occasioned by the private wars among the barons, as well as by their exactions. This rendered the condition of the inhabitants of cities more secure than that of any other order of men, and allured many to become members of their communities. (*Conring.*, § 94.) There were

inhabitants of three different ranks in the towns of Germany : the nobles, or *familias*; the citizens, or *liberi*; and the artisans, who were slaves, or *homines propriae*. (Knipschild., lib. ii. cap. 29, no. 13.) Henry V., who began his reign A.D. 1106, enfranchised the slaves who were artisans or inhabitants in several towns, and gave them the rank of citizens or *liberi*. (Pfeffel, p. 254; Knipsch., lib. ii. c. 29, nos. 113, 119.) Though the cities in Germany did not acquire liberty so early as those in France, they extended their privileges much farther. All the imperial and free cities, the number of which is considerable, acquired the full right of being *immediate*; by which term, in the German jurisprudence, we are to understand that they are subject to the empire alone, and possess within their own precincts all the rights of complete and independent sovereignty. The various privileges of the imperial cities, the great guardians of the Germanic liberties, are enumerated by Knipschildius, lib. ii. The most important articles are generally known, and it would be improper to enter into any disquisition concerning minute particulars.

NOTE XVIII.—Sect. I. p. 33.

The Spanish historians are almost entirely silent concerning the origin and progress of communities in that kingdom; so that I cannot fix with any degree of certainty the time and manner of their first introduction there. It appears, however, from Mariana, vol. ii. p. 221, fol. Haga, 1736, that in the year 1350 eighteen cities had obtained a seat in the *cortes* of Castile. From the account which will be given of their constitution and pretensions, Sect. III. of this volume, it will appear that their privileges and form of government were the same with those of the other feudal corporations; and this, as well as the perfect similarity of political institutions and transactions in all the feudal kingdoms, may lead us to conclude that communities were introduced there in the same manner and probably about the same time as in the other nations of Europe. In Aragon, as I shall have occasion to observe in a subsequent note, cities seem early to have acquired extensive immunities, together with a share in the legislature. In the year 1118 the citizens of Saragossa had not only attained political liberty, but they were declared to be of equal rank with the nobles of the second class; and many other immunities, unknown to persons in their rank of life in other parts of Europe, were conferred upon them. (Zurita, Anales de Aragon, tom. i. p. 44.) In England, the establishment of communities or corporations was posterior to the Conquest. The practice was borrowed from France, and the privileges granted by the crown were perfectly similar to those which I have enumerated. But, as this part of history is well known to most of my readers, I shall, without entering into any critical or minute discussion, refer them to authors who have fully illustrated this interesting point in the English history. (Brady's Treatise of Boroughs; Madox, Firma Burgi, cap. i. sect. ix.; Hume's History of England, vol. i., Append. i. and ii.) It is not improbable that some of the towns in England were formed into corporations under the Saxon kings, and that the charters granted by the kings of the Norman race were not charters of enfranchisement from a state of slavery, but a confirmation of privileges which they already

enjoyed. (See Lord Lyttelton's History of Henry II., vol. ii. p. 317.) The English cities, however, were very inconsiderable in the twelfth century. A clear proof of this occurs in the history to which I last referred. Fitzstephen, a contemporary author, gives a description of the city of London in the reign of Henry II., and the terms in which he speaks of its trade, its wealth, and the splendour of its inhabitants, would suggest no inadequate idea of its state at present, when it is the greatest and most opulent city of Europe. But all ideas of grandeur and magnificence are merely comparative ; and every description of them in general terms is very apt to deceive. It appears from Peter of Blois, archdeacon of London, who flourished in the same reign, and who had good opportunity of being well informed, that this city, of which Fitzstephen gives such a pompous account, contained no more than forty thousand inhabitants. (*Ibid.*, pp. 315, 316.) The other cities were small in proportion, and were not in a condition to extort any extensive privileges. That the constitution of the boroughs in Scotland, in many circumstances, resembled that of the towns in France and England, is manifest from the *Leges Burgorum*, annexed to the *Regiam Majestatem*.

NOTE XIX.—Sect. I. p. 38.

Soon after the introduction of the third estate into the national council, the spirit of liberty which that excited in France began to produce conspicuous effects. In several provinces of France the nobility and communities formed associations whereby they bound themselves to defend their rights and privileges against the formidable and arbitrary proceedings of the king. The Count de Boulainvilliers has preserved a copy of one of these associations, dated in the year 1314, twelve years after the admission of the deputies from towns into the states-general. (*Histoire de l'ancien Gouvernement de la France*, tom. ii. p. 94.) The vigour with which the people asserted and prepared to maintain their rights obliged their sovereigns to respect them. Six years after this association, Philip the Long issued a writ of summons to the community of Narbonne, in the following terms : “ Philip, by the grace, etc., to our well-beloved, etc. As we desire with all our heart, and above all other things, to govern our kingdom and people in peace and tranquillity, by the help of God, and to reform our said kingdom in so far as it stands in need thereof, for the public good and for the benefit of our subjects, who in times past have been aggrieved and oppressed in divers manners by the malice of sundry persons, as we have learned by common report, as well as by the information of good men worthy of credit, and we having determined in our council which we have called to meet in our good city, etc., to give redress to the utmost of our power, by all ways and means possible, according to reason and justice, and willing that this should be done with solemnity and deliberation, by the advice of the prelates, barons, and good towns of our realm, and particularly of you, and that it should be transacted agreeably to the will of God and for the good of our people, therefore we command,” etc. (*Mably, Observat.*, vol. iii., App., p. 386.) I shall allow these to be only the formal words of a public and legal style ; but the ideas are singular, and much more liberal and enlarged than one could

expect in that age. A popular monarch of Great Britain could hardly address himself to parliament in terms more favourable to public liberty. There occurs in the history of France a striking instance of the progress which the principles of liberty had made in that kingdom, and of the influence which the deputies of towns had acquired in the states-general. During the calamities in which the war with England and the captivity of King John had involved France, the states-general made a bold effort to extend their own privileges and jurisdiction. The regulations established by the states held A.D. 1355, concerning the mode of levying taxes, the administration of which they vested, not in the crown, but in commissioners appointed by the states; concerning the coining of money; concerning the redress of the grievance of purveyance; concerning the regular administration of justice,—are much more suitable to the genius of a republican government than that of a feudal monarchy. This curious statute is published, *Ordon.*, tom. iii. p. 19. Such as have not an opportunity to consult that large collection will find an abridgment of it in *Hist. de France par Villaret*, tom. ix. p. 130, or in *Histoire de Boulainv.*, tom. ii. p. 213. The French historians represent the bishop of Laon, and Marcel, provost of the merchants of Paris, who had the chief direction of this assembly, as seditious tribunes, violent, interested, ambitious, and aiming at innovations subversive of the constitution and government of their country. That may have been the case; but these men possessed the confidence of the people; and the measures which they proposed as the most popular and acceptable, as well as most likely to increase their own influence, plainly prove that the spirit of liberty had spread wonderfully, and that the ideas which then prevailed in France concerning government were extremely liberal. The states-general held at Paris A.D. 1355 consisted of about eight hundred members, and above one-half of these were deputies from towns. (M. Secousse, *Préf. à Ordon.*, tom. iii. p. 48.) It appears that in all the different assemblies of the states held during the reign of John, the representatives of towns had great influence, and in every respect the third state was considered as co-ordinate and equal to either of the other two. (*Ibid.*, *passim*.) These spirited efforts were made in France long before the House of Commons in England acquired any considerable influence in the legislature. As the feudal system was carried to its utmost height in France sooner than in England, so it began to decline sooner in the former than in the latter kingdom. In England, almost all attempts to establish or to extend the liberty of the people have been successful; in France, they have proved unfortunate. What were the accidental events or political causes which occasioned this difference it is not my present business to inquire.

Note XX.—Sect. I. p. 40.

In a former Note [No. VIII.] I have inquired into the condition of that part of the people which was employed in agriculture, and have represented the various hardships and calamities of their situation. When charters of liberty or manumission were granted to such persons, they contained four concessions corresponding to the four capital grievances to which men in a state of servitude are subject. 1. The right of disposing of their persons

by sale or grant was relinquished. 2. Power was given to them of conveying their property and effects by will or any other legal deed. Or if they happened to die intestate, it was provided that their property should go to their lawful heirs, in the same manner as the property of other persons. 3. The services and taxes which they owed to their superior or liege-lord, which were formerly arbitrary and imposed at pleasure, are precisely ascertained. 4. They are allowed the privilege of marrying according to their own inclination: formerly they could contract no marriage without their lord's permission, and with no person but one of his slaves. All these particulars are found united in the charter granted "Habitatoribus Montis Britonis," A.D. 1376. (Hist. de Dauphiné, tom. i. p. 81.) Many circumstances concurred with those which I have mentioned in the text in procuring them deliverance from that wretched state. The gentle spirit of the Christian religion, the doctrines which it teaches concerning the original equality of mankind, its tenets with respect to the divine government and the impartial eye with which the Almighty regards men of every condition and admits them to a participation of his benefits, are all inconsistent with servitude. But in this, as in many other instances, considerations of interest and the maxims of false policy led men to a conduct inconsistent with their principles. They were so sensible, however, of this inconsistency, that to set their fellow-Christians at liberty from servitude was deemed an act of piety highly meritorious and acceptable to Heaven. The humane spirit of the Christian religion struggled long with the maxims and manners of the world, and contributed more than any other circumstance to introduce the practice of manumission. When Pope Gregory the Great, who flourished towards the end of the sixth century, granted liberty to some of his slaves, he gives this reason for it: "Cum Redemptor noster, totius conditor naturæ, ad hoc propitiatus humanam carnem voluerit assumere, ut divinitatis suæ gratia, dirempto (quo tenebamur captivi) vinculo, pristinæ nos restitueret libertati; salubriter agitur, si homines, quos ab initio liberos natura protulit, et jus gentium jugo substituit servitudinis, in ea, qua nati fuerant, manumittentis beneficio, libertati reddantur." (Gregor. Magn., ap. Potgiess., lib. iv. c. i, § 3.) Several laws or charters founded on reasons similar to this are produced by the same author. Accordingly, a great part of the charters of manumission, previous to the reign of Louis X., are granted "pro amore Dei, pro remedio animæ, et pro mercede animæ." (Murat., Antiq. Ital., vol. i. pp. 849, 850; Du Cange, voc. *Manumissio*.) The formality of manumission was executed in a church, as a religious solemnity. The person to be set free was led round the great altar with a torch in his hand, he took hold of the horns of the altar, and there the solemn words conferring liberty were pronounced. (Du Cange, ibid., vol. iv. p. 467.) I shall transcribe a part of a charter of manumission granted A.D. 1056, both as it contains a full account of the ceremonies used in this form of manumission, and as a specimen of the imperfect knowledge of the Latin tongue in that barbarous age. It is granted by Willa, the widow of Hugo, the duke and marquis, in favour of Clariza, one of her slaves. "Et ideo nos Domine Wille inclite cometisse—libera et absolvo te Cleriza filia Uberto—pro timore omnipotentis Dei, et remedio luminarie anime bone memorie quondam supra scripto Domini Ugo gloriissimo, ut quando illum Domi-

nus de hac vita migrare jusserrit, pars iniqua non abeat potestatem ullam, sed anguelus Domini nostri Jesu Christi colocare dignitur illum inter sanctos dilectos suos; et beatus Petrus principis apostolorum, qui habet potestatem omnium animarum ligandi et absolvendi, ut ipsi absolvat animæ ejus de peccatis sui, aperiad illum janua paradisi; pro eadem vero ratione, in mano mite te, Benzo presbiter, ut vadat tecum in ecclesia sancti Bartholomæi apostoli; traad de tribus vicibus circa altare ipsius ecclesie cum cæreo apprehensum in manibus tuis et manibus suis; deinde exite ambulate in via quadrubio, ubi quatuor vie se dividuntur. Statimque pro remedio luminarie anime bone memorie quondam supra scripto Domini Ugo et ipsi presbiter Benzo fecit omnia, et dixit, Ecce quatuor vie, ite et ambulate in quacunque partem tibi placuerit, tam sic supra scripta Cleriza, qua nosque tui heredes, qui ab ac hora in antea nati, vel procreati fuerit utriusque sexus," etc. (Murat., ibid., p. 853.) Many other charters might have been selected which in point of grammar or style are in no wise superior to this. Manumission was frequently granted on death-bed or by latter will. As the minds of men are at that time awakened to sentiments of humanity and piety, these deeds proceeded from religious motives, and were granted *pro redemptione animæ*, in order to obtain acceptance with God. (Du Cange, ubi supra, p. 470, et voc. *Servus*, vol. vi. p. 451.) Another method of obtaining liberty was by entering into holy orders, or taking the vow in a monastery. This was permitted for some time; but so many slaves escaped, by this means, out of the hands of their masters, that the practice was afterwards restrained, and at last prohibited, by the laws of almost all the nations of Europe. (Murat., ibid., p. 842.) Conformably to the same principles, princes, on the birth of a son, or upon any other agreeable event, appointed a certain number of slaves to be enfranchised, as a testimony of their gratitude to God for that benefit. (Marculfi Form., lib. i. cap. 39.) There are several forms of manumission published by Marculfus, and all of them are founded on religious considerations, in order to procure the favour of God or to obtain the forgiveness of their sins. (Lib. ii. c. 23, 33, 34, edit. Baluz.) The same observation holds with respect to the other collections of Formulæ annexed to Marculfus. As sentiments of religion induced some to grant liberty to their fellow-Christians who groaned under the yoke of servitude, so mistaken ideas concerning devotion led others to relinquish their liberty. When a person conceived an extraordinary respect for the saint who was the patron of any church or monastery in which he was accustomed to attend religious worship, it was not unusual, among men possessed with an excess of superstitious reverence, to give up themselves and their posterity to be the slaves of the saint. (Mabillon, De Re Diplomat., lib. vi. p. 632.) The *oblati*, or voluntary slaves of churches or monasteries, were very numerous, and may be divided into three different classes. The first were such as put themselves and effects under the protection of a particular church or monastery, binding themselves to defend its privileges and property against every aggressor. These were prompted to do so not merely by devotion, but in order to obtain that security which arose from the protection of the Church. They were rather vassals than slaves, and sometimes persons of noble birth found it prudent to secure the protection of the Church in this manner. Persons of the second class bound them-

selves to pay an annual tax or quit-rent out of their estates to a church or monastery. Besides this, they sometimes engaged to perform certain services. They were called *censuales*. The last class consisted of such as actually renounced their liberty and became slaves in the strict and proper sense of the word. These were called *ministeriales*, and enslaved their bodies, as some of the charters bear, that they might procure the liberty of their souls. (Potgiesserus, *De Statu Servorum*, lib. i. c. 1, §§ 6, 7.) How zealous the clergy were to encourage the opinions which led to this practice, will appear from a clause in a charter by which one gives up himself as a slave to a monastery : “*Cum sit omni carnali ingenuitate generosius extremum quodcumque Dei servitium, scilicet quod terrena nobilitas multos plerumque vitiorum servos facit, servitus vero Christi nobiles virtutibus reddit, nemo autem sani capit is virtutibus vitia comparaverit, claret pro certo eum esse generosorem, qui se Dei servitio præbuerit proniorem. Quod ego Ragnaldus intelligens,*” etc. Another charter is expressed in the following words : “*Eligens magis esse servus Dei quam libertus saeculi, firmiter credens et sciens, quod servire Deo, regnare est, summaque ingenuitas sit in qua servitus comparabatur Christi,*” etc. (Du Cange, *voc. Oblatus*, vol. iv. pp. 1286, 1287.) Great, however, as the power of religion was, it does not appear that the enfranchisement of slaves was a frequent practice while the feudal system preserved its vigour. On the contrary, there were laws which set bounds to it, as detrimental to society. (Potgiess., lib. iv. c. ii. § 6.) The inferior order of men owed the recovery of their liberty to the decline of that aristocratical policy which lodged the most extensive power in the hands of a few members of the society and depressed all the rest. When Louis X. issued his ordinance, several slaves had been so long accustomed to servitude, and their minds were so much debased by that unhappy situation, that they refused to accept of the liberty which was offered them. (D'Ach., *Spicil.*, vol. xi. p. 387.) Long after the reign of Louis X. several of the French nobility continued to assert their ancient dominion over their slaves. It appears from an ordinance of the famous Bertrand de Guesclin, constable of France, that the custom of enfranchising them was considered as a pernicious innovation. (Morice, *Mém. pour servir de Preuves à l'Hist. de Bret.*, tom. ii. p. 100.) In some instances, when the prædial slaves were declared to be freemen, they were still bound to perform certain services to their ancient masters, and were kept in a state different from other subjects, being restricted either from purchasing land or becoming members of a community within the precincts of the manor to which they formerly belonged. (Martene et Durand, *Thesaur. Anecdot.*, vol. i. p. 914.) This, however, seems not to have been common. There is no general law for the manumission of slaves in the Statute-book of England, similar to that which has been quoted from the Ordonnances of the kings of France. Though the genius of the English constitution seems early to have favoured personal liberty, personal servitude, nevertheless, continued long in England in some particular places. In the year 1514 we find a charter of Henry VIII. enfranchising two slaves belonging to one of his manors. (Rym., *Fœder.*, vol. xiii. p. 470.) As late as the year 1574, there is a commission from Queen Elizabeth with respect to the manumission of certain bondmen belonging to her. Rymer, in *Observat. on the Statutes*, etc., p. 251.

NOTE XXI.—Sect. I. p. 46.

There is no custom in the Middle Ages more singular than that of private war. It is a right of so great importance, and prevailed so universally, that the regulations concerning it occupy a considerable place in the system of laws during the Middle Ages. M. de Montesquieu, who has unravelled so many intricate points in feudal jurisprudence and thrown light on so many customs formerly obscure and unintelligible, was not led by his subject to consider this. I shall therefore give a more minute account of the customs and regulations which directed a practice so contrary to the present ideas of civilised nations concerning government and order.

1. Among the ancient Germans, as well as other nations in a similar state of society, the right of avenging injuries was a private and personal right exercised by force of arms, without any reference to an umpire or any appeal to a magistrate for decision. The clearest proofs of this were produced, Note VI.

2. This practice subsisted among the barbarous nations after their settlement in the provinces of the empire which they conquered ; and as the causes of dissension among them multiplied, their family feuds and private wars became more frequent. Proofs of this occur in their early historians (Greg. Turon., Hist., lib. vii. c. 2, lib. viii. c. 18, lib. x. c. 27), and likewise in the codes of their laws. It was not only allowable for the relations to avenge the injuries of their family, but it was incumbent on them. Thus, by the laws of the Angli and Werini, “ad quemcunque hereditas terræ pervenerit, ad illum vestis bellica, id est lorica et ultio proximi, et solatio leudis, debet pertinere” (tit. vi. § 5, ap. Lindenbr., Leg. Saliq., tit. 63 ; Leg. Longob., lib. ii. tit. 14, § 10).

3. None but gentlemen, or persons of noble birth, had the right of private war. All disputes between slaves, villani, the inhabitants of towns, and freemen of inferior condition, were decided in the courts of justice. All disputes between gentlemen and persons of inferior rank were terminated in the same manner. The right of private war supposed nobility of birth and equality of rank in both the contending parties. (Beaumanoir, Coustumes de Beauv., ch. lix. p. 300 ; Ordon. des Rois de France, tom. ii. p. 395, § xvii. p. 508, § xv., etc.) The dignified ecclesiastics likewise claimed and exercised the right of private war ; but, as it was not altogether decent for them to prosecute quarrels in person, *advocati* or *vidames* were chosen by the several monasteries or bishoprics. These were commonly men of high rank and reputation, who became the protectors of the churches and convents by which they were elected ; espoused their quarrels, and fought their battles ; “armis omnia quæ erant ecclesie viriliter defendebant, et vigilanter protegebant.” (Brussel, Usage des Fiefs, tom. i. p. 144 ; Du Cange, voc. *Advocatus*.) On many occasions the martial ideas to which ecclesiastics of noble birth were accustomed made them forget the pacific spirit of their profession, and led them into the field in person at the head of their vassals : “flamma, ferro, cæde, possessiones ecclesiarum prælati defendebant.” (Guido Abbas, ap. Du Cange, ibid., p. 179.)

4. It was not every injury or trespass that gave a gentleman a title to make war upon his adversary. Atrocious acts of violence, insults, and affronts, publicly committed, were legal and per-

mitted motives for taking arms against the authors of them. Such crimes as are now punished capitally in civilised nations at that time justified private hostilities. (Beauman., ch. lix.; Du Cange, Dissert. XXIX., sur Joinville, p. 331.) But though the avenging of injuries was the only motive that could legally authorise a private war, yet disputes concerning civil property often gave rise to hostilities and were terminated by the sword. (Du Cange, Dissert., p. 332.) 5. All persons present when any quarrel arose or any act of violence was committed were included in the war which it occasioned; for it was supposed to be impossible for any man in such a situation to remain neuter, without taking side with one or other of the contending parties. (Beauman., p. 300.) 6. All the kindred of the two principals in the war were included in it, and obliged to espouse the quarrel of the chieftain with whom they were connected. (Du Cange, ibid., p. 332.) This was founded on the maxim of the ancient Germans, "*suscipere tam inimicitias seu patris, seu propinqui, quam amicitias, necesse est;*" a maxim natural to all rude nations, among which the form of society, and political union, strengthen such a sentiment. This obligation was enforced by legal authority. If a person refused to take part in the quarrel of his kinsman and to aid him against his adversary, he was deemed to have renounced all the rights and privileges of kindredship, and became incapable of succeeding to any of his relations, or of deriving any benefit from any civil right or property belonging to them. (Du Cange, Dissert., p. 333.) The method of ascertaining the degree of affinity which obliged a person to take part in the quarrel of a kinsman was curious. While the Church prohibited the marriage of persons within the seventh degree of affinity, the vengeance of private war extended as far as this absurd prohibition, and all who had such a remote connection with any of the principals were involved in the calamities of war. But when the Church relaxed somewhat of its rigour, and did not extend its prohibition of marrying beyond the fourth degree of affinity, the same restriction took place in the conduct of private war. (Beauman., p. 303; Du Cange, Dissert., p. 333.) 7. A private war could not be carried on between two full brothers, because both have the same common kindred, and consequently neither had any persons bound to stand by him against the other in the contest; but two brothers of the half-blood might wage war, because each of them has a distinct kindred. (Beauman., p. 299.) 8. The vassals of each principal in any private war were involved in the contest, because, by the feudal maxims, they were bound to take arms in defence of the chieftain of whom they held, and to assist him in every quarrel. As soon, therefore, as feudal tenures were introduced, and this artificial connection was established between vassals and the baron of whom they held, vassals came to be considered as in the same state with relations. (Beauman., p. 303.) 9. Private wars were very frequent for several centuries. Nothing contributed more to increase those disorders in government or to encourage such ferocity of manners as reduced the nations of Europe to that wretched state which distinguished the period of history which I am reviewing. Nothing was such an obstacle to the introduction of a regular administration of justice. Nothing could more effectually discourage industry or retard the progress and cultivation of the arts of peace. Private wars were carried on with all the destructive rage which is to be dreaded

from violent resentment when armed with force and authorised by law. It appears from the statutes prohibiting or restraining the exercise of private hostilities that the invasion of the most barbarous enemy could not be more desolating to a country, or more fatal to its inhabitants, than those intestine wars. (Ordon., tom. i. p. 701, tom. ii. pp. 395, 408, 507, etc.) The contemporary historians describe the excesses committed in prosecution of these quarrels in such terms as excite astonishment and horror. I shall mention only one passage from the History of the Holy War, by Guibert, abbot of Nogent : "Erat eo tempore, maximis ad invicem hostilitatibus, totius Francorum regni facta turbatio ; crebra ubique latrocinia, viarum obsessio ; audiebantur passim, immo fiebant incendia infinita ; nullis praeter sola et indomita cupiditate existentibus causis, extruebantur prælia ; et ut brevi totum claudam, quicquid obtutibus cupidorum subjacebat, nusquam attendendo cuius esset, prædæ patebat." Gesta Dei per Francos, vol. i. p. 482.

Having thus collected the chief regulations which custom had established concerning the right and exercise of private war, I shall enumerate, in chronological order, the various expedients employed to abolish or restrain this fatal custom. 1. The first expedient employed by the civil magistrate, in order to set some bounds to the violence of private revenge, was the fixing by law the fine or composition to be paid for each different crime. The injured person was originally the sole judge concerning the nature of the wrong which he had suffered, the degree of vengeance which he should exact, as well as the species of atonement or reparation with which he might rest satisfied. Resentment became, of course, as implacable as it was fierce. It was often a point of honour not to forgive, nor to be reconciled. This made it necessary to fix those compositions which make so great a figure in the laws of barbarous nations. The nature of crimes and offences was estimated by the magistrate, and the sum due to the person offended was ascertained with a minute, and often a whimsical, accuracy. Rotharis, the legislator of the Lombards, who reigned about the middle of the seventh century, discovers his intention both in ascertaining the composition to be paid by the offender and in increasing its value : it is, says he, that the enmity may be extinguished, the prosecution may cease, and peace may be restored. (Leg. Longob., lib. i. tit. 7, § 10.) 2. About the beginning of the ninth century, Charlemagne struck at the root of the evil, and enacted "That when any person had been guilty of a crime, or had committed an outrage, he should immediately submit to the penance which the Church imposed, and offer to pay the composition which the law prescribed ; and if the injured person or his kindred should refuse to accept of this, and presume to avenge themselves by force of arms, their lands and properties should be forfeited." (Capitul., A.D. 802, edit. Baluz., vol. i. p. 371.) 3. But in this, as well as in other regulations, the genius of Charlemagne advanced before the spirit of his age. The ideas of his contemporaries concerning regular government were too imperfect, and their manners too fierce, to submit to this law. Private wars, with all the calamities which they occasioned, became more frequent than ever after the death of that great monarch. His successors were unable to restrain them. The Church found it necessary to interpose. The most early of these interpositions now extant is towards the end of

the tenth century. In the year 990, several bishops in the south of France assembled, and published various regulations in order to set some bounds to the violence and frequency of private wars: if any person within their dioceses should venture to transgress, they ordained that he should be excluded from all Christian privileges during his life, and be denied Christian burial after his death. (Du Mont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. i. p. 41.) These, however, were only partial remedies; and therefore a council was held at Limoges, A.D. 994. The bodies of the saints, according to the custom of those ages, were carried thither; and by these sacred relics men were exhorted to lay down their arms, to extinguish their animosities, and to swear that they would not, for the future, violate the public peace by their private hostilities. (Bouquet, *Recueil des Histor.*, vol. x. pp. 49, 147.) Several other councils issued decrees to the same effect. (Du Cange, *Dissert.*, 343.) 4. But the authority of councils, how venerable soever in those ages, was not sufficient to abolish a custom which flattered the pride of the nobles and gratified their favourite passions. The evil grew so intolerable that it became necessary to employ supernatural means for suppressing it. A bishop of Aquitaine, A.D. 1032, pretended that an angel had appeared to him and brought him a writing from Heaven, enjoining men to cease from their hostilities and to be reconciled to each other. It was during a season of public calamity that he published this revelation. The minds of men were disposed to receive pious impressions, and willing to perform anything in order to avert the wrath of Heaven. A general peace and cessation from hostilities took place, and continued for seven years; and a resolution was formed that no man should, in times to come, attack or molest his adversaries during the seasons set apart for celebrating the great festivals of the Church, or from the evening of Thursday in each week to the morning of Monday in the week ensuing, the intervening days being considered particularly holy, our Lord's passion having happened on one of these days, and his resurrection on another. A change in the dispositions of men so sudden, and which produced a resolution so unexpected, was considered as miraculous; and the respite from hostilities which followed upon it was called *the truce of God*. (Glaber. Rodulphus, *Histor.*, lib. v., ap. Bouquet, vol. x. p. 59.) This, from being a regulation or concert in one kingdom, became a general law in Christendom, was confirmed by the authority of several popes, and the violators were subjected to the penalty of excommunication. (Corpus Jur. Canon. *Decretal.*, lib. i. tit. 34, c. 1; Du Cange, *Glossar.*, voc. *Treuga*.) An act of the council of Touluges in Roussillon, A.D. 1041, containing all the stipulations required by the truce of God, is published by Dom de Vic et Dom Vaisette, *Hist. de Languedoc*, tom. ii., *Preuves*, p. 206. A cessation from hostilities during three complete days in every week allowed such a considerable space for the passions of the antagonists to cool, and for the people to enjoy a respite from the calamities of war, as well as to take measures for their own security, that if this truce of God had been exactly observed it must have gone far towards putting an end to private wars. This, however, seems not to have been the case: the nobles, disregarding the truce, prosecuted their quarrels without interruption, as formerly. “*Qua nimirum tempestate, universæ provinciæ adeo devastationis continuæ importunitate inquietantur, ut ne ipsa, pro observations*

divinæ pacis, professa sacramenta custodiantur." (*Abbas Uspurgensis, apud Datt., de Pace Imperii Publica*, p. 13, no. 35.) The violent spirit of the nobility could not be restrained by any engagements. The complaints of this were frequent; and bishops, in order to compel them to renew their vows and promises of ceasing from their private wars, were obliged to enjoin their clergy to suspend the performance of divine service and the exercise of any religious function within the parishes of such as were refractory and obstinate. (*Hist. de Langued., par D. D. de Vic et Vaisette, tom. ii., Preuves*, p. 118.) 5. The people, eager to obtain relief from their sufferings, called in a second time revelation to their aid. Towards the end of the twelfth century, a carpenter in Guienne gave out that Jesus Christ, together with the blessed Virgin, had appeared to him, and having commanded him to exhort mankind to peace, had given him, as a proof of his mission, an image of the Virgin, holding her Son in her arms, with this inscription, *Lamb of God, who takest away the sins of the world, give us peace.* This low fanatic addressed himself to an ignorant age, prone to credit what was marvellous. He was received as an inspired messenger of God. Many prelates and barons assembled at Puy and took an oath not only to make peace with all their enemies, but to attack such as refused to lay down their arms and to be reconciled to their enemies. They formed an association for this purpose, and assumed the honourable name of *the brotherhood of God.* (*Robertus de Monte Michaele, ap. M. de Laurière, Préf., tom. i., Ordon.*, p. 29.) But the influence of this superstitious terror or devotion was not of long continuance. 6. The civil magistrate was obliged to exert his authority in order to check a custom which threatened a dissolution of government. Philip Augustus, as some imagine, or St. Louis, as is more probable, published an ordinance, A.D. 1245, prohibiting any person to commence hostilities against the friends and vassals of his adversary until forty days after the commission of the crime or offence which gave rise to the quarrel: declaring that if any man presumed to transgress this statute, he should be considered as guilty of a breach of the public peace and be tried and punished by the judge ordinary as a traitor. (*Ordon.*, tom. i. p. 56.) This was called *the royal truce*, and afforded time for the violence of resentment to subside, as well as leisure for the good offices of such as were willing to compose the difference. The happy effects of this regulation seem to have been considerable, if we may judge from the solicitude of succeeding monarchs to enforce it. 7. In order to restrain the exercise of private war still farther, Philip the Fair, towards the close of the same century, A.D. 1296, published an ordinance commanding all private hostilities to cease while he was engaged in war against the enemies of the state. (*Ordon.*, tom. i. pp. 328, 390.) This regulation, which seems to be almost essential to the existence and preservation of society, was often renewed by his successors, and, being enforced by the regal authority, proved a considerable check to the destructive contests of the nobles. Both these regulations, introduced first in France, were adopted by the other nations of Europe. 8. The evil, however, was so inveterate that it did not yield to all these remedies. No sooner was public peace established in any kingdom than the barons renewed their private hostilities. They not only struggled to maintain this pernicious right, but to secure the exercise of it without any

restraint. Upon the death of Philip the Fair, the nobles of different provinces in France formed associations, and presented remonstrances to his successor demanding the repeal of several laws by which he had abridged the privileges of their order. Among these the right of private war is always mentioned as one of the most valuable; and they claim that the restraint imposed by the truce of God, the royal truce, as well as that arising from the ordinance of the year 1296, should be taken off. In some instances the two sons of Philip, who mounted the throne successively, eluded their demands; in others they were obliged to make concessions. (Ordon., tom. i. pp. 551, 557, 561, 573.) The ordinances to which I here refer are of such length that I cannot insert them; but they are extremely curious, and may be peculiarly instructive to an English reader, as they throw considerable light on that period of English history in which the attempts to circumscribe the regal prerogative were carried on, not by the people struggling for liberty, but by the nobles contending for power. It is not necessary to produce any evidence of the continuance and frequency of private wars under the successors of Philip the Fair. 9. A practice somewhat similar to the royal truce was introduced in order to strengthen and extend it. Bonds of assurance, or mutual security, were demanded from the parties at variance, by which they obliged themselves to abstain from all hostilities, either during a time mentioned in the bond, or for ever, and became subject to heavy penalties if they violated this obligation. These bonds were sometimes granted voluntarily, but more frequently exacted by the authority of the civil magistrate. Upon a petition from the party who felt himself weakest, the magistrate summoned his adversary to appear in court and obliged him to give him a bond of assurance. If, after that, he committed any further hostilities, he became subject to all the penalties of treason. This restraint on private war was known in the age of St. Louis. (Establissements, liv. i. c. 28.) It was frequent in Bretagne; and, what is very remarkable, such bonds of assurance were given mutually between vassals and the lord of whom they held. Oliver de Clisson grants one to the duke of Bretagne, his sovereign. (Morice, Mém. pour servir de Preuves à l'Hist. de Bret., tom. i. p. 846, tom. ii. p. 371.) Many examples of bonds of assurance in other provinces of France are collected by Brussel (tom. ii. p. 856). The nobles of Burgundy remonstrated against this practice, and obtained exemption from it as an encroachment on the privileges of their order. (Ordon., tom. i. p. 558.) This mode of security was first introduced into cities, and, the good effects of it having been felt there, was extended to the nobles. (See Note XVI.) 10. The calamities occasioned by private wars became at some times so intolerable that the nobles entered into voluntary associations, binding themselves to refer all matters in dispute, whether concerning civil property or points of honour to the determination of the majority of the associates. (Morice, Mém. pour servir de Preuves à l'Hist. de Bret., tom. ii. p. 728.) 11. But all these expedients proving ineffectual, Charles VI., A.D. 1413, issued an ordinance expressly prohibiting private wars on any pretext whatsoever, with power to the judge ordinary to compel all persons to comply with this injunction, and to punish such as should prove refractory or disobedient, by imprisoning their persons, seizing their goods, and appointing the officers of justice,

manageurs et gasteurs, to live at free quarters on their estate. If those who were disobedient to this edict could not be personally arrested, he appointed their friends and vassals to be seized, and detained until they gave surety for keeping the peace; and he abolished all laws, customs, or privileges which might be pleaded in opposition to this ordinance. (Ordon., tom. x. p. 138.) How slow is the progress of reason and of civil order! Regulations which to us appear so equitable, obvious, and simple required the efforts of civil and ecclesiastical authority, during several centuries, to introduce and establish them. Even posterior to this period, Louis XI. was obliged to abolish private wars in Dauphiné by a particular edict, A.D. 1451. Du Cange, Dissert., p. 348.

This note would swell to a disproportionate bulk if I should attempt to inquire with the same minute attention into the progress of this pernicious custom in the other countries of Europe. In England the ideas of the Saxons concerning personal revenge, the right of private wars, and the composition due to the party offended, seem to have been much the same with those which prevailed on the Continent. The law of *Ina de vindicantibus*, in the eighth century (Lamb., p. 3); those of Edmund in the tenth century, *de homicidio* (Lamb., p. 72), and *de inimicitiis* (p. 76); and those of Edward the Confessor, in the eleventh century, *de temporibus et diebus pacis*, or Treuga Dei (Lamb., p. 126), are perfectly similar to the *ordonnances* of the French kings their contemporaries. The laws of Edward, *de pace regis*, are still more explicit than those of the French monarchs, and, by several provisions in them, discover that a more perfect police was established in England at that period. (Lambard, p. 128, fol. ver.) Even after the Conquest, private wars, and the regulations for preventing them, were not altogether unknown, as appears from Madox, *Formulare Anglicanum*, No. CXLV., and from the extracts from Domesday Book published by Gale, *Scriptores Hist. Britan.*, pp. 759, 777. The well-known clause in the form of an English indictment, which, as an aggravation of the criminal's guilt, mentions his having assaulted a person who was in the peace of God and of the king, seems to be borrowed from the Treuga or Pax Dei, and the Pax Regis, which I have explained. But after the Conquest the mention of private wars among the nobility occurs more rarely in the English history than in that of any other European nation, and no laws concerning them are to be found in the body of their statutes. Such a change in their own manners, and such a variation from those of their neighbours, is remarkable. Is it to be ascribed to the extraordinary power that William the Norman acquired by right of conquest and transmitted to his successors, which rendered the execution of justice more vigorous and decisive, and the jurisdiction of the king's court more extensive, than under the monarchs on the Continent? Or was it owing to the settlement of the Normans in England, who, having never adopted the practice of private war in their own country, abolished it in the kingdom which they conquered? It is asserted in an ordinance of John, king of France, that in all times past persons of every rank in Normandy have been prohibited to wage private war, and the practice has been deemed unlawful. (Ordon., tom. ii. p. 407.) If this fact were certain, it would go far towards explaining the peculiarity which I have mentioned. But, as there are some English acts

of parliament which, according to the remark of the learned author of the *Observations on the Statutes, chiefly the more Ancient*, recite falsehoods, it may be added that this is not peculiar to the laws of that country. Notwithstanding the positive assertion contained in this public law of France, there is good reason for considering it as a statute which recites a falsehood. This, however, is not the place for discussing that point. It is an inquiry not unworthy the curiosity of an English antiquary.

In Castile the pernicious practice of private war prevailed, and was authorized by the customs and law of the kingdom. (*Leges Tauri*, tit. 76, cum commentario Anton. Gomezii, p. 551.) As the Castilian nobles were no less turbulent than powerful, their quarrels and hostilities involved their country in many calamities. Innumerable proofs of this occur in Mariana. In Aragon the right of private revenge was likewise authorized by law, exercised in its full extent, and accompanied with the same unhappy consequences. (*Hieron. Blanca, Comment. de Rebus Arag.*, ap. Schotti Hispan. illustrat., vol. iii. p. 733; *Lex Jacobi I.*, A.D. 1247; *Fueros y Observancias del Reyno de Aragon*, lib. ix. p. 182.) Several confederacies between the kings of Aragon and their nobles for the restoring of peace, founded on the truce of God, are still extant. (*Petr. de Marca, Marca, sive Limes Hispanic.*, App., 1303, 1388, 1428.) As early as the year 1165 we find a combination of the king and court of Aragon in order to abolish the right of private war and to punish those who presumed to claim that privilege. (*Anales de Aragon*, por Zurita, vol. i. p. 73.) But the evil was so inveterate that, as late as A.D. 1519, Charles V. was obliged to publish a law enforcing all former regulations tending to suppress this practice. *Fueros y Observancias*, lib. ix. 183, b.

The Lombards, and other Northern nations who settled in Italy, introduced the same maxims concerning the right of revenge into that country, and these were followed by the same effects. As the progress of the evil was perfectly similar to what happened in France, the expedients employed to check its career, or to extirpate it finally, resembled those which I have enumerated. *Murat.*, *Antiq. Ital.*, vol. ii. p. 306, etc.

In Germany the disorders and calamities occasioned by the right of private war were greater and more intolerable than in any other country of Europe. The imperial authority was so much shaken and enfeebled by the violence of the civil wars excited by the contests between the popes and the emperors of the Franconian and Suabian lines that not only the nobility but the cities acquired almost independent power and scorned all subordination and obedience to the laws. The frequency of these *faidæ*, or private wars, is often mentioned in the German annals, and the fatal effects of them are most pathetically described, *Datt.*, *de Pace Imper. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. 5, no. 30, et passim. The Germans early adopted the *Treuga Dei*, which was first established in France. This, however, proved but a temporary and ineffectual remedy. The disorders multiplied so fast and grew to be so enormous that they threatened the dissolution of society, and compelled the Germans to have recourse to the only remedy of the evil, namely, an absolute prohibition of private wars. The emperor William published his edict to this purpose, A.D. 1255, an hundred and sixty years previous to the ordinance of Charles VI. in France. (*Datt.*, lib. i. cap. 4, no. 20.) But neither he nor his successors had authority to secure

the observance of it. This gave rise to a practice in Germany which conveys to us a striking idea both of the intolerable calamities occasioned by private wars, and of the feebleness of government during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The cities and nobles entered into alliances and associations, by which they bound themselves to maintain the public peace and to make war on such as should violate it. This was the origin of the league of the Rhine, of Suabia, and of many smaller confederacies distinguished by various names. The rise, progress, and beneficial effects of these associations are traced by Datt with great accuracy. Whatever degree of public peace or of regular administration was preserved in the empire from the beginning of the twelfth century to the close of the fifteenth, Germany owes to these leagues. During that period, political order, respect for the laws, together with the equal administration of justice, made considerable progress in Germany. But the final and perpetual abolition of the right of private war was not accomplished until A.D. 1495. The imperial authority was by that time more firmly established, the ideas of men with respect to government and subordination were become more just. That barbarous and pernicious privilege of waging private war, which the nobles had so long possessed, was declared to be incompatible with the happiness and existence of society. In order to terminate any differences which might arise among the various members of the Germanic body, the Imperial Chamber was instituted with supreme jurisdiction, to judge without appeal in every question brought before it. That court has subsisted since that period, forming a very respectable tribunal of essential importance in the German constitution. Datt., lib. iii., iv., v.; Pfeffel, Abrégé de l'Histoire du Droit, etc., p. 556.

NOTE XXII.—Sect. I. p. 55.

It would be tedious and of little use to enumerate the various modes of appealing to the justice of God which superstition introduced during the ages of ignorance. I shall mention only one, because we have an account of it in a placitum, or trial, in the presence of Charlemagne, from which we may learn the imperfect manner in which justice was administered even during his reign. In the year 775 a contest arose between the bishop of Paris and the abbot of St. Denys concerning the property of a small abbey. Each of them exhibited deeds and records in order to prove the right to be in them. Instead of trying the authenticity or considering the import of these, the point was referred to the *judicium crucis*. Each produced a person who, during the celebration of mass, stood before the cross with his arms expanded; and he whose representative first became weary and altered his posture lost the cause. The person employed by the bishop on this occasion had less strength or less spirit than his adversary, and the question was decided in favour of the abbot. (Mabillon, de Re Diplomat., lib. vi. p. 498.) If a prince so enlightened as Charlemagne countenanced such an absurd mode of decision, it is no wonder that other monarchs should tolerate it so long. M. de Montesquieu has treated of the trial by judicial combat at considerable length. The two talents which distinguish that illustrious author, industry in tracing all the circumstances of ancient and obscure institutions, and sagacity in penetrating into the

causes and principles which contributed to establish them, are equally conspicuous in his observations on this subject. To these I refer the reader, as they contain most of the principles by which I have endeavoured to explain this practice. (*De l'Esprit des Loix*, liv. xxviii.) It seems to be probable, from the remarks of M. de Montesquieu, as well as from the facts produced by Muratori (tom. iii. Dissert. XXXVIII.), that appeals to the justice of God by the experiments with fire and water, etc., were frequent among the people who settled in the different provinces of the Roman empire, before they had recourse to the judicial combat; and yet the judicial combat seems to have been the most ancient mode of terminating any controversy among the barbarous nations in their original settlements. This is evident from Velleius Paterculus (lib. ii. c. 118), who informs us that all questions which were decided among the Romans by legal trial were terminated among the Germans by arms. The same thing appears in the ancient laws and customs of the Swedes, quoted by Jo. O. Stiernhöök *de Jure Sueonum et Gothorum vetusto*, 4to, Holmiae, 1682, lib. i. c. 7. It is probable that when the various tribes which invaded the empire were converted to Christianity their ancient custom of allowing judicial combats appeared so glaringly repugnant to the precepts of religion that for some time it was abolished, and by degrees several circumstances which I have mentioned led them to resume it.

It seems likewise to be probable, from a law quoted by Stiernhöök in the treatise which I have mentioned, that the judicial combat was originally permitted in order to determine points respecting the personal character or reputation of individuals, and was afterwards extended not only to criminal cases, but to questions concerning property. The words of the law are, "If any man shall say to another these reproachful words, 'You are not a man equal to other men,' or, 'You have not the heart of a man,' and the other shall reply, 'I am a man as good as you,' let them meet on the highway. If he who first gave offence appear, and the person offended absent himself, let the latter be deemed a worse man even than he was called; let him not be admitted to give evidence in judgment either for man or woman, and let him not have the privilege of making a testament. If he who gave the offence be absent, and only the person offended appear, let him call upon the other thrice with a loud voice, and make a mark upon the earth, and then let him who absented himself be deemed infamous, because he uttered words which he durst not support. If both shall appear properly armed, and the person offended shall fall in the combat, let a half compensation be paid for his death. But if the person who gave the offence shall fall, let it be imputed to his own rashness. The petulance of his tongue hath been fatal to him. Let him lie in the field without any compensation being demanded for his death" (*Lex Uplandica*, ap. Stiern., p. 76.) Martial people were extremely delicate with respect to every thing that affected their reputation as soldiers. By the law of the Salians, if any man called another a *hare*, or accused him of having left his shield in the field of battle, he was ordained to pay a large fine. (*Leg. Sal.*, tit. xxxii. §§ 4, 6.) By the law of the Lombards, if any one called another *arga*, i.e., a good-for-nothing fellow, he might immediately challenge him to combat. (*Leg. Longob.*, lib. i. tit. v. § 1.) By the law of the Salians, if one called another *cenitus*, a

term of reproach equivalent to *arga*, he was bound to pay a very high fine. (Tit. xxxii. § 1.) Paulus Diaconus relates the violent impression which this reproachful expression made upon one of his countrymen, and the fatal effects with which it was attended. (De Gestis Longobard, liv. vi. c. 34.) Thus the ideas concerning the point of honour, which we are apt to consider as a modern refinement, as well as the practice of duelling, to which it gave rise, are derived from the notions of our ancestors while in a state of society very little improved.

As M. de Montesquieu's view of this subject did not lead him to consider every circumstance relative to judicial combats, I shall mention some particular facts necessary for the illustration of what I have said with respect to them. A remarkable instance occurs of the decision of an abstract point of law by combat. A question arose in the tenth century concerning the *right of representation*, which was not then fixed, though now universally established in every part of Europe. "It was a matter of doubt and dispute," saith the historian, "whether the sons of a son ought to be reckoned among the children of the family, and succeed equally with their uncles, if their father happen to die while their grandfather was alive. An assembly was called to deliberate on this point, and it was the general opinion that it ought to be remitted to the examination and decision of judges. But the emperor, following a better course, and desirous of dealing honourably with his people and nobles, appointed the matter to be decided by battle between two champions. He who appeared in behalf of the right of children to represent their deceased father was victorious; and it was established, by a perpetual decree, that they should hereafter share in the inheritance together with their uncles." (Wittikindus Corbiensis, lib. Annal., ap. M. de Laurière, Préf. Ordon., vol. i. p. xxxiii.) If we can suppose the caprice of folly to lead men to any action more extravagant than this of settling a point in law by combat, it must be that of referring the truth or falsehood of a religious opinion to be decided in the same manner. To the disgrace of human reason, it has been capable even of this extravagance. A question was agitated in Spain in the eleventh century, whether the Musarabic liturgy and ritual which had been used in the churches of Spain, or that approved of by the see of Rome, which differed in many particulars from the other, contained the form of worship most acceptable to the Deity. The Spaniards contended zealously for the ritual of their ancestors. The popes urged them to receive that to which they had given their infallible sanction. A violent contest arose. The nobles proposed to decide the controversy by the sword. The king approved of this method of decision. Two knights in complete armour entered the lists. John Ruys de Matanca, the champion of the Musarabic liturgy, was victorious. But the queen and archbishop of Toledo, who favoured the other form, insisted on having the matter submitted to another trial, and had interest enough to prevail in a request, inconsistent with the laws of combat, which being considered as an appeal to God, the decision ought to have been acquiesced in as final. A great fire was kindled. A copy of each liturgy was cast into the flames. It was agreed that the book which stood this proof and remained untouched should be received in all the churches of Spain. The Musarabic liturgy triumphed likewise in this trial, and, if we may believe Roderigo de Toledo, remained

unhurt by the fire when the other was reduced to ashes. The queen and archbishop had power or art sufficient to elude this decision also, and the use of the Musarabic form of devotion was permitted only in certain churches,—a determination no less extraordinary than the whole transaction. (Roder. de Toledo, quoted by P. Orleans, *Hist. des Révolutions d'Espagne*, tom. i. p. 417; Mariana, lib. i. c. 18, vol. i. p. 378.) A remarkable proof of the general use of trial by combat, and of the predilection for that mode of decision, occurs in the laws of the Lombards. It was a custom in the Middle Ages that any person might signify publicly the law to which he chose to be subjected; and by the prescriptions of that law he was obliged to regulate his transactions, without being bound to comply with any practice authorized by other codes of law. Persons who had subjected themselves to the Roman law, and adhered to the ancient jurisprudence, as far as any knowledge of it was retained in those ages of ignorance, were exempted from paying any regard to the forms of proceedings established by the laws of the Burgundians, Lombards, and other barbarous people. But the emperor Otho, in direct contradiction to this received maxim, ordained "That all persons, under whatever law they lived, even although it were the Roman law, should be bound to conform to the edicts concerning the trial by combat." (Leg. Longob., lib. ii. tit. 55, § 38.) While the trial by judicial combat subsisted, proof by charters, contracts, or other deeds became ineffectual; and even this species of written evidence, calculated to render the proceedings of courts certain and decisive, was eluded. When a charter or other instrument was produced by one of the parties, his opponent might challenge it, affirm that it was false and forged, and offer to prove this by combat. (Leg. Longob., ibid., § 34.) It is true that, among the reasons enumerated by Beaumanoir on account of which judges might refuse to permit a trial by combat, one is, "If the point in contest can be clearly proved or ascertained by other evidence." (Coust. de Beauv., ch. 63, p. 323.) But that regulation removed the evil only a single step. For the party who suspected that a witness was about to depose in a manner unfavourable to his cause might accuse him of being suborned, give him the lie, and challenge him to combat; if the witness was vanquished in battle, no other evidence could be admitted, and the party by whom he was summoned to appear lost his cause. (Leg. Baivar., tit. 16, § 2; Leg. Burgund. tit. 45; Beauman., ch. 61, p. 315.) The reason given for obliging a witness to accept of a defiance, and to defend himself by combat, is remarkable, and contains the same idea which is still the foundation of what is called the point of honour: "for it is just that if any one affirms that he perfectly knows the truth of anything, and offers to give oath upon it, he should not hesitate to maintain the veracity of his affirmation in combat." Leg. Burgund., tit. 45.

That the trial by judicial combat was established in every country of Europe is a fact well known, and requires no proof. That this mode of decision was frequent appears not only from the codes of ancient laws which established it, but from the earliest writers concerning the practice of law in the different nations of Europe. They treat of this custom at great length; they enumerate the regulations concerning it with minute accuracy and explain them with much solicitude. It made a capital and extensiv-

article in jurisprudence. There is not any one subject in their system of law which Beaumanoir, Defontaines, or the compilers of the Assizes de Jérusalem seem to have considered as of greater importance; and none upon which they have bestowed so much attention. The same observation will hold with respect to the early authors of other nations. It appears from Madox that trials of this kind were so frequent in England that fines paid on these occasions made no inconsiderable branch of the king's revenue. (*Hist. of the Excheq.*, vol. i. p. 349.) A very curious account of a judicial combat between Messire Robert de Beaumanoir and Messire Pierre Tournemine, in presence of the duke of Bretagne, A.D. 1385, is published by Morice (*Mém. pour servir de Preuves à l'Hist. de Bretagne*, tom. ii. p. 498.) All the formalities observed in such extraordinary proceedings are there described more minutely than in any ancient monument which I have had an opportunity of considering. Tournemine was accused by Beaumanoir of having murdered his brother. The former was vanquished, but was saved from being hanged upon the spot by the generous intercession of his antagonist. A good account of the origin of the laws concerning judicial combat is published in the History of Pavia, by Bernardo Sacci, lib. ix. c. 8, in *Græv. Thes. Antiquit. Ital.*, vol. iii. p. 743.

This mode of trial was so acceptable that ecclesiastics, notwithstanding the prohibitions of the Church, were constrained not only to connive at the practice, but to authorize it. A remarkable instance of this is produced by Pasquier, *Recherches*, lib. iv. ch. i. p. 350. The abbot Wittikindus, whose words I have produced in this note, considered the determination of a point in law by combat as the best and most honourable mode of decision. In the year 978 a judicial combat was fought in the presence of the emperor. The archbishop Aldebert advised him to terminate a contest which had arisen between two noblemen of his court by this mode of decision. The vanquished combatant, though a person of high rank, was beheaded on the spot. (*Chronic. Ditmari, Episc. Mersb.*, apud Bouquet, *Recueil des Hist.*, tom. x. p. 121.) Questions concerning the property of churches and monasteries were decided by combat. In the year 961 a controversy concerning the church of St. Médard, whether it belonged to the abbey of Beaulieu or not, was terminated by judicial combat. (Bouquet, *Recueil des Hist.*, tom. ix. p. 729; *ibid.*, p. 612, etc.) The emperor Henry I. declares that this law, authorizing the practice of judicial combats, was enacted with consent and applause of many faithful bishops. (*Ibid.*, p. 231.) So remarkably did the martial ideas of those ages prevail over the genius and maxims of the canon law, which in other instances was in the highest credit and authority with ecclesiastics. A judicial combat was appointed in Spain, by Charles V., A.D. 1522. The combatants fought in the emperor's presence, and the battle was conducted with all the rites prescribed by the ancient laws of chivalry. The whole transaction is described at great length by Pontus Heuterus, *Rer. Austriac.*, lib. viii. c. 17, p. 205.

The last instance which occurs in the history of France of a judicial combat authorized by the magistrate was the famous one between M. Jarnac and M. de la Chaistaignerie, A.D. 1547. A trial by combat was appointed in England, A.D. 1571, under the inspection of the judges in the Court of Common Pleas; and though it was not carried to the same extremity

with the former, Queen Elizabeth having interposed her authority and enjoined the parties to compound the matter, yet, in order to preserve their honour, the lists were marked out, and all the forms previous to the combat were observed with much ceremony. (Spelm., Glos., voc. *Campus*, p. 103.) In the year 1631 a judicial combat was appointed between Donald Lord Rea and David Ramsay, Esq., by the authority of the lord high constable and earl marshal of England; but that quarrel likewise terminated without bloodshed, being accommodated by Charles I. Another instance occurs seven years later. Rushworth, in *Observations on the Statutes, etc.*, p. 266.

NOTE XXIII.—Sect. I. p. 60.

The text contains the great outlines which mark the course of private and public jurisdiction in the several nations of Europe. I shall here follow more minutely the various steps of this progress, as the matter is curious and important enough to merit this attention. The payment of a fine by way of satisfaction to the person or family injured was the first device of a rude people in order to check the career of private resentment, and to extinguish those *faides*, or deadly feuds, which were prosecuted among them with the utmost violence. This custom may be traced back to the ancient Germans (Tacit., *de Morib. Germ.*, c. 21), and prevailed among other uncivilised nations. Many examples of this are collected by the ingenious and learned author of *Historical Law Tracts* (vol. i. p. 41). These fines were ascertained and levied in three different manners. At first they were settled by voluntary agreement between the parties at variance. When their rage began to subside, and they felt the bad effects of their continuing in enmity, they came to terms of concord, and the satisfaction made was called a *composition*, implying that it was fixed by mutual consent. (*De l'Esprit des Loix*, liv. xxx. c. 19.) It is apparent from some of the more ancient codes of laws that at the time when these were compiled matters still remained in that simple state. In certain cases the person who had committed an offence was left exposed to the resentment of those whom he had injured, until he should recover their favour, “*quoquo modo potuerit.*” (*Leg. Frision.*, tit. 11, § 1.) The next mode of levying these fines was by the sentence of arbiters. An arbiter is called in the *Regiam Majestatem amicabilis compositor* (lib. xi. c. 4, § 10.) He could estimate the degree of offence with more impartiality than the parties interested, and determine with greater equity what satisfaction ought to be demanded. It is difficult to bring an authentic proof of a custom previous to the records preserved in any nation of Europe. But one of the *Formulæ Andegavenses* compiled in the sixth century seems to allude to a transaction carried on, not by the authority of a judge, but by the mediation of arbiters chosen by mutual consent. (*Bouquet, Recueil des Histor.*, tom. iv. p. 566.) But, as an arbiter wanted authority to enforce his decisions, judges were appointed with compulsive power to oblige both parties to acquiesce in their decisions. Previous to this last step, the expedient of paying compositions was an imperfect remedy against the pernicious effects of private resentment. As soon as this important change was introduced, the magistrate, putting himself in place of the person injured,

ascertained the composition with which he ought to rest satisfied. Every possible injury that could occur in the intercourse of civil society was considered, and estimated, and the compositions due to the persons aggrieved were fixed with such minute attention as discovers, in most cases, amazing discernment and delicacy, in some instances unaccountable caprice. Besides the composition payable to the private party, a certain sum, called a *fredum*, was paid to the king or state, as Tacitus expresses it, or to the *fiscus*, in the language of the barbarous laws. Some authors, blending the refined ideas of modern policy with their reasonings concerning ancient transactions, have imagined that the *fredum* was a compensation due to the community on account of the violation of the public peace. But it is manifestly nothing more than the price paid to the magistrates for the protection which he afforded against the violence of resentment. The enacting of this was a considerable step towards improvement in criminal jurisprudence. In some of the more ancient codes of laws the *freda* are altogether omitted, or so seldom mentioned that it is evident they were but little known. In the latter codes the *fredum* is as precisely specified as the composition. In common cases it was equal to the third part of the composition. (Capitul., vol. i. p. 52.) In some extraordinary cases, where it was more difficult to protect the person who had committed violence, the *fredum* was augmented. (Capitul., vol. i. p. 515.) These *freda* made a considerable branch in the revenues of the barons; and in whatever district territorial jurisdiction was granted, the royal judges were prohibited from levying any *freda*. In explaining the nature of the *fredum*, I have followed in a great measure the opinion of M. de Montesquieu, though I know that several learned antiquaries have taken the word in a different sense. (De l'Esprit des Loix, liv. xxx. c. 20, etc.) The great object of judges was to compel the one party to give, and the other to accept, the satisfaction prescribed. They multiplied regulations to this purpose, and enforced them by grievous penalties. (Leg. Longob., lib. i. tit. 9, § 34; ibid., tit. 37, §§ 1, 2; Capitul., vol. i. p. 371, § 22.) The person who received a composition was obliged to cease from all further hostility, and to confirm his reconciliation with the adverse party by an oath. (Leg. Longob., lib. i. tit. 9, § 8.) As an additional and more permanent evidence of reconciliation, he was required to grant a bond of security to the person from whom he received a composition, absolving him from all further prosecution. Marculfus, and the other collectors of ancient writs, have preserved several different forms of such bonds. (Marc., lib. xi. § 18; Append., § 23; Form. Sirmundicæ, § 39.) The letters of Slanes, known in the law of Scotland, are perfectly similar to these bonds of security. By the letters of Slanes, the heirs and relations of a person who had been murdered bound themselves, in consideration of an *assyment*, or composition paid to them, to forgive, "pass over, and forever forget, and in oblivion inter, all rancour, malice, revenge, prejudice, grudge, and resentment that they have or may conceive against the aggressor or his posterity, for the crime which he had committed, and discharge him of all action, civil or criminal, against him or his estate, for now and ever." (System of Stiles, by Dallas of St. Martin's, p. 862.) In the ancient form of letters of Slanes, the private party not only forgives and forgets, but pardons and grants remission of the crime. This practice Dallas, reasoning according to the principles

of his own age, considers as an encroachment on the rights of sovereignty, as none, says he, could pardon a criminal but the king. (*Ibid.*) But in early and rude times the prosecution, the punishment, and the pardon of criminals were all deeds of the private person who was injured. Madox has published two writs, one in the reign of Edward I., the other in the reign of Edward III., by which private persons grant a release or pardon of all trespasses, felonies, robberies, and murders committed. (*Formul. Anglican.*, no. 702, 705.) In the last of these instruments, some regard seems to be paid to the rights of the sovereign, for the pardon is granted *en quant que en nous est*. Even after the authority of the magistrate was interposed in punishing crimes, the punishment of criminals is long considered chiefly as a gratification to the resentment of the persons who have been injured. In Persia a murderer is still delivered to the relations of the person whom he has slain, who put him to death with their own hands. If they refuse to accept of a sum of money as a compensation, the sovereign, absolute as he is, cannot pardon the murderer. (*Voyages de Chardin*, iii. 417, edit. 1735, 4to; *Voyages de Tavernier*, liv. v. c. 5, 10.) Among the Arabians, though one of the first polished people in the East, the same custom still subsists. (*Description de l'Arabie*, par M. Niebuhr, p. 28.) By a law in the kingdom of Aragon as late as the year 1564, the punishment of one condemned to death cannot be mitigated but by consent of the parties who have been injured. *Fueros y Observancias del Reyno de Aragon*, p. 204, 6.

If, after all the engagements to cease from enmity which I have mentioned, any person renewed hostilities, and was guilty of any violence, either towards the person from whom he had received a composition, or towards his relations and heirs, this was deemed a most heinous crime, and punished with extraordinary rigour. It was an act of direct rebellion against the authority of the magistrate, and was repressed by the interposition of all his power. (*Leg. Longob.*, lib. i. tit. 9, § 8, p. 34; *Capit.*, vol. i. p. 371, § 22.) Thus the avenging of injuries was taken out of private hands, a legal composition was established, and peace and amity were restored under the inspection and by the authority of a judge. It is evident that at the time when the barbarians settled in the provinces of the Roman empire they had fixed judges established among them with compulsive authority. Persons vested with this character are mentioned by the earliest historians. (*Du Cange*, voc. *Judices*.) The right of territorial jurisdiction was not altogether an usurpation of the feudal barons, or an invasion of the prerogative of the sovereign. There is good reason to believe that the powerful leaders who seized different districts of the countries which they conquered, and kept possession of them as *allodial* property, assumed from the beginning the right of jurisdiction, and exercised it within their own territories. This jurisdiction was supreme, and extended to all causes. The clearest proofs of this are produced by M. Bouquet, *Le Droit public de France éclairci*, etc., tom. i. p. 206, etc. The privilege of judging his own vassals appears to have been originally a right inherent in every baron who held a fief. As far back as the archives of nations can conduct us with any certainty, we find the jurisdiction and fief united. One of the earliest charters to a layman which I have met with is that of Ludovicus Pius, A.D. 814; and it contains the right of territorial jurisdic-

tion in the most express and extensive terms. (*Capitul.*, vol. ii. p. 1405.) There are many charters to churches and monasteries of a more early date, containing grants of similar jurisdiction, and prohibiting any royal judge to enter the territories of those churches or monasteries or to perform any act of judicial authority there. (*Bouquet, Recueil des Hist.*, tom. iv. pp. 628, 631, 633, tom. v. pp. 703, 710, 752, 762.) *Muratori* has published many very ancient charters containing the same immunities. (*Antiq. Ital., Dissert. LXX.*) In most of these deeds the royal judge is prohibited from exacting the *frede* due to the possessor of territorial jurisdiction, which shows that they constituted a valuable part of the revenue of each superior lord at that juncture. The expense of obtaining a sentence in a court of justice during the Middle Ages was so considerable that this circumstance alone was sufficient to render men unwilling to decide any contest in judicial form. It appears from a charter in the thirteenth century that the baron who had the right of justice received the fifth part of the value of every subject the property of which was tried and determined in his court. If after the commencement of a lawsuit the parties terminated the contest in an amicable manner, or by arbitration, they were nevertheless bound to pay the fifth part of the subject contested to the court before which the suit had been brought. (*Hist. de Dauphiné, Genève*, 1722, tom. i. p. 22.) Similar to this is a regulation in the charter of liberty granted to the town of Friburg, A.D. 1120. If two of the citizens shall quarrel, and if one of them shall complain to the superior lord or to his judge, and after commencing the suit shall be privately reconciled to his adversary, the judge, if he does not approve of this reconciliation, may compel him to go on with his lawsuit, and all who were present at the reconciliation shall forfeit the favour of the superior lord. *Historia Zaringo-Badensis, Auctor. Jo. Dan. Schoepflinus, Carolsr.*, 1765, 4to, vol. v. p. 55.

What was the extent of that jurisdiction which those who held fiefs possessed originally we cannot now determine with certainty. It is evident that during the disorders which prevailed in every kingdom of Europe the great vassals took advantage of the feebleness of their monarchs and enlarged their jurisdictions to the utmost. As early as the tenth century the more powerful barons had usurped the right of deciding all causes, whether civil or criminal. They had acquired the *high justice* as well as the *low*. (*Establ. de St. Louis, liv. i. c. 24, 25.*) Their sentences were final, and there lay no appeal from them to any superior court. Several striking instances of this are collected by Brussel (*Traité des Fiefs, liv. iii. c. 11, 12, 13.*) Not satisfied with this, the more potent barons got their territories created into *regalities*, with almost every royal prerogative and jurisdiction. Instances of these were frequent in France. (*Bruss., ibid.*) In Scotland, where the power of the feudal nobles became exorbitant, they were very numerous (*Historical Law Tracts, vol. i. tract vi.*) Even in England, though the authority of the Norman kings circumscribed the jurisdiction of the barons within more narrow limits than in any other feudal kingdom, several counties palatine were erected, into which the king's judges could not enter, and no writ could come in the king's name until it received the seal of the county palatine. (*Spelman, Gloss., voc. Comites Palatini; Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. iii. p. 78.*)

These lords of regalities had a right to claim or rescue their vassals from the king's judges, if they assumed any jurisdiction over them. (Brussel, *ubi supra.*) In the law of Scotland, this privilege was termed the right of *repleging*; and the frequency of it not only interrupted the course of justice, but gave rise to great disorders in the exercise of it. (Hist. Law Tracts, *ibid.*) The jurisdiction of the counties palatine seems to have been productive of like inconveniences in England.

The remedies provided by princes against the bad effects of these usurpations of the nobles, or inconsiderate grants of the crown, were various and gradually applied. Under Charlemagne and his immediate descendants, the regal prerogative still retained great vigour, and the *duces*, *comites*, and *missi dominici*, the former of whom were ordinary and fixed judges, the latter extraordinary and itinerant judges, in the different provinces of their extensive dominions, exercised a jurisdiction co-ordinate with the barons in some cases, and superior to them in others. (Du Cange, voc. *Dux, Comites, et Missi*; Murat., *Antiq.*, *Dissert. VIII. et IX.*) But under the feeble race of monarchs who succeeded them, the authority of the royal judges declined, and the barons acquired that unlimited jurisdiction which has been described. Louis VI. of France attempted to revive the function of the *missi dominici*, under the title of *juges des exempti*, but the barons were become too powerful to bear such an encroachment on their jurisdiction, and he was obliged to desist from employing them. (Hainault, *Abrége Chron.*, tom. ii. p. 730.) His successor (as has been observed) had recourse to expedients less alarming. The appeal *de défaute de droit*, or on account of the refusal of justice, was the first which was attended with any considerable effect. According to the maxims of feudal law, if a baron had not as many vassals as enabled him to try by their peers the parties who offered to plead in his court, or if he delayed or refused to proceed in the trial, the cause might be carried, by appeal, to the court of the superior lord of whom the baron held, and tried there. (De l'Esprit des Loix, liv. xxviii. c. 28; Du Cange, voc. *Defectus Justitiae*.) The number of peers or assessors in the courts of barons was frequently very considerable. It appears from a criminal trial in the court of the Viscount de Lautrec, A.D. 1299, that upwards of two hundred persons were present, and assisted in the trial, and voted in passing judgment. (Hist. de Langued., par D. D. de Vic et Vaisette, tom. iv., *Preuves*, p. 114.) But, as the right of jurisdiction had been usurped by many inconsiderable barons, they were often unable to hold courts. This gave frequent occasion to such appeals, and rendered the practice familiar. By degrees, such appeals began to be made from the courts of the more powerful barons; and it is evident from a decision recorded by Brussel that the royal judges were willing to give countenance to any pretext for them. (Traité des Fiefs, tom. i. pp. 235, 261.) This species of appeal had less effect in abridging the jurisdiction of the nobles than the appeal on account of the injustice of the sentence. When the feudal monarchs were powerful and their judges possessed extensive authority, such appeals seem to have been frequent. (Capitul., vol. i. pp. 175, 180.) And they were made in a manner suitable to the rudeness of a simple age. The persons aggrieved resorted to the palace of their sovereign and with outcries and loud noise called 'em him for redress.

(Capitul., lib. iii. c. 59; Chronic. Lawterbergiense, ap. Mencken., Script. German., vol. ii. p. 284, b.) In the kingdom of Aragon, the appeals to the *justiza*, or supreme judge, were taken in such a form as supposed the appellant to be in immediate danger of death or of some violent outrage: he rushed into the presence of the judge, crying with a loud voice, *Avi, Avi, Fuerza, Fuerza*, thus imploring (as it were) the instant interposition of that supreme judge in order to save him. (Hier. Blanca, Comment. de Rebus Aragon., ap. Script. Hispanic., Pistorii, vol. iii. p. 753.) The abolition of the trial by combat facilitated the revival of appeals of this kind. The effects of the subordination which appeals established, in introducing attention, equity, and consistency of decision into courts of judicature, were soon conspicuous; and almost all causes of importance were carried to be finally determined in the king's courts. (Brussel, tom. i. p. 252.) Various circumstances which contributed towards the introduction and frequency of such appeals are enumerated De l'Esprit des Loix, liv. xxviii. c. 27. Nothing, however, was of such effect as the attention which monarchs gave to the constitution and dignity of their courts of justice. It was the ancient custom for the feudal monarchs to preside themselves in their courts, and to administer justice in person. (Marculf., lib. i. § 25; Murat., Dissert. XXXI.) Charlemagne, whilst he was dressing, used to call parties into his presence, and, having heard and considered the subject of litigation, gave judgment concerning it. (Eginhartus, Vita Caroli Magni, cited by Madox, Hist. of Exchequer, vol. i. p. 91.) This trial and decision of causes by the sovereigns themselves could not fail of rendering their courts respectable. St. Louis, who encouraged to the utmost the practice of appeals, revived this ancient custom, and administered justice in person with all the ancient simplicity. "I have often seen the saint," says Joinville, "sit under the shade of an oak in the wood of Vincennes, when all who had any complaint freely approached him. At other times he gave orders to spread a carpet in a garden, and, seating himself upon it, heard the causes that were brought before him." (Hist. de St. Louis, p. 13, edit. 1761.) Princes of inferior rank, who possessed the right of justice, sometimes dispensed it in person, and presided in their tribunals. Two instances of this occur with respect to the dauphins of Vienne. (Hist. de Dauphiné, tom. i. p. 18. tom. ii. p. 257.) But as kings and princes could not decide every cause in person, nor bring them all to be determined in the same court, they appointed *baillis*, with a right of jurisdiction, in different districts of their kingdom. These possessed powers somewhat similar to those of the ancient *comites*. It was towards the end of the twelfth century and beginning of the thirteenth that this office was first instituted in France. (Brussel, liv. ii. c. 35.) When the king had a court established in different quarters of his dominions, this invited his subjects to have recourse to it. It was the private interest of the *baillis*, as well as an object of public policy, to extend their jurisdiction. They took advantage of every defect in the rights of the barons, and of every error in their proceedings, to remove causes out of their courts, and to bring them under their own cognizance. There was a distinction in the feudal law, and an extremely ancient one, between the high justice and the low. (Capitul. 3, A.D. 812, § 4, A.D. 815, § 3; Establ. de St. Louis, liv. i. c. 40.) Many

barons possessed the latter jurisdiction who had no title to the former. The former included the right of trying crimes of every kind, even the highest; the latter was confined to petty trespasses. This furnished endless pretexts for obstructing, restraining, and reviewing the proceedings in the baron courts. (Ordon., ii. 457, § 25; 458, § 29.) A regulation of greater importance succeeded the institution of *baillis*. The king's supreme court or parliament was rendered fixed as to the place and constant as to the time of its meetings. In France, as well as in the other feudal kingdoms, the king's court of justice was originally ambulatory, followed the person of the monarch, and was held only during some of the great festivals. Philip Augustus, A.D. 1305, rendered it stationary at Paris, and continued its terms during the greater part of the year. (Pasquier, *Recherches*, liv. ii. c. 2 et 3, etc.; Ordon., tom. i. p. 366, § 62.) He and his successors vested extensive powers in that court; they granted the members of it several privileges and distinctions which it would be tedious to enumerate. (Pasquier, *ibid.*; Velly, *Hist. de France*, tom. vii. p. 307.) Persons eminent for integrity and skill in law were appointed judges there. (*Ibid.*) By degrees the final decision of all causes of importance was brought into the parliament of Paris, and the other parliaments which administered justice in the king's name, in different provinces of the kingdom. This jurisdiction, however, the parliament of Paris acquired very slowly, and the great vassals of the crown made violent efforts in order to obstruct the attempts of that parliament to extend its authority. Towards the close of the thirteenth century, Philip the Fair was obliged to prohibit his parliament from taking cognizance of certain appeals brought into it from the courts of the count of Bretagne, and to recognize and respect his right of supreme and final jurisdiction. (*Mémoires pour servir de Preuves à l'Histoire de Bretagne*, par Morice, tom. i. pp. 1037, 1074.) Charles VI., at the end of the following century, was obliged to confirm the rights of the dukes of Bretagne in still more ample form. (*Ibid.*, tom. ii. pp. 580, 581.) So violent was the opposition of the barons to this right of appeal, which they considered as fatal to their privileges and power, that the authors of the *Encyclopédie* have mentioned several instances in which barons put to death or mutilated such persons as ventured to appeal from the sentences pronounced in their courts to the parliament of Paris (tom. xii., art. *Parlement*, p. 25).

The progress of jurisdiction in the other feudal kingdoms was in a great measure similar to that which we have traced in France. In England the territorial jurisdiction of the barons was both ancient and extensive. (Leg. Edw. Conf., nos. 5 and 9.) After the Norman Conquest it became more strictly feudal; and it is evident from facts recorded in the English history, as well as from the institution of counties paatine, which I have already mentioned, that the usurpations of the nobles in England were not less bold or extensive than those of their contemporaries on the continent. The same expedients were employed to circumscribe or abolish those dangerous jurisdictions. William the Conqueror established a constant court in the hall of his palace; from which the four courts now intrusted with the administration of justice in England took their rise. Henry II. divided his kingdom into six circuits, and sent itinerant

judges to hold their courts in them at stated seasons. (Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. iii. p. 57.) Justices of the peace were appointed in every county by subsequent monarchs, to whose jurisdiction the people gradually had recourse in many civil causes. The privileges of the counties palatine were gradually limited; with respect to some points they were abolished, and the administration of justice was brought into the king's courts, or before judges of his appointment. The several steps taken for this purpose are enumerated in Dalrymple's History of Feudal Property, chap. vii.

In Scotland the usurpations of the nobility were more exorbitant than in any other feudal kingdom. The progress of their encroachments, and the methods taken by the crown to limit or abolish their territorial and independent jurisdictions, both which I had occasion to consider and explain in a former work, differed very little from those of which I have now given the detail. History of Scotland, vol. i. p. 37.

I should perplex myself and my readers in the labyrinth of German jurisprudence if I were to attempt to delineate the progress of jurisdiction in the empire with a minute accuracy. It is sufficient to observe that the authority which the aulic council and imperial chamber now possess took its rise from the same desire of redressing the abuses of territorial jurisdiction, and was acquired in the same manner that the royal courts attained influence in other countries of Europe. All the important facts with respect to both these particulars may be found in Phil. Datt. de Pace Publica Imperii, lib. iv. The capital articles are pointed out in Pfeffel, *Abrégé de l'Histoire du Droit public d'Allemagne*, pp. 556, 581; and in *Traité du Droit public de l'Empire*, par M. le Coq de Villeray. The two last treatises are of great authority, having been composed under the eye of M. Schoepflin of Strasburg, one of the ablest public lawyers in Germany.

NOTE XXIV.—Sect. I. p. 63.

It is not easy to fix with precision the period at which ecclesiastics first began to claim exemption from the civil jurisdiction. It is certain that during the early and purest ages of the Church they pretended to no such immunity. The authority of the civil magistrate extended to all persons and to all causes. This fact has not only been clearly established by Protestant authors, but is admitted by many Roman Catholics of eminence, and particularly by the writers in defence of the liberties of the Gallican Church. There are several original papers published by Muratori, which show that in the ninth and tenth centuries causes of the greatest importance relating to ecclesiastics were still determined by civil judges. (Antiq. Ital., vol. v. Dissert. LXX.) Proofs of this are produced likewise by M. Houard (*Anciennes Lois des François*, etc., vol. i. p. 209.) Ecclesiastics did not shake off all at once their subjection to civil courts. This privilege, like their other usurpations, was acquired slowly, and step by step. This exemption seems at first to have been merely an act of complaisance, flowing from veneration for their character. Thus, from a charter of Charlemagne in favour of the church of Mans, A.D. 796. to which M. l'Abbé de Foy refers in his *Notice de Diplomes*, tom i.,

p. 201, that monarch directs his judges, if any difference should arise between the administrators of the revenues of that church and any person whatever, not to summon the administrators to appear in "mallo publico," but first of all to meet with them, and to endeavour to accommodate the difference in an amicable manner. This indulgence was in process of time improved into a legal exemption; which was founded on the same superstitious respect of the laity for the clerical character and function. A remarkable instance of this occurs in a charter of Frederic Barbarossa, A.D. 1172, to the monastery of Altenburg. He grants them "judicium non tantum sanguinolentis plagæ, sed vitæ et mortis;" he prohibits any of the royal judges from disturbing their jurisdiction; and the reason which he gives for this ample concession is, "nam quorum, ex Dei gratia, ratione divini ministerii onus leve est, et jugum suave; nos penitus nolumus illos oppressionis contumelia, vel manu laica, fatigari." Mencken, *Script. Rer. Germ.*, vol. iii. p. 1067.

It is not necessary for illustrating what is contained in the text, that I should describe the manner in which the code of the canon law was compiled, or show that the doctrines in it most favourable to the power of the clergy are founded on ignorance, or supported by fraud and forgery. The reader will find a full account of these in Gerard. van Maastricht, *Historia Juris Ecclesiastici*, and in *Science du Gouvernement*, par M. Réal, tom. vii. c. 1 et 3, §§ 2, 3, etc. The history of the progress and extent of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, with an account of the arts which the clergy employed in order to draw causes of every kind into the spiritual courts, is no less curious, and would throw great light upon many of the customs and institutions of the Dark Ages; but it is likewise foreign from the present subject. Du Cange, in his Glossary, voc. *Curia Christianitatis*, has collected most of the causes with respect to which the clergy arrogated an exclusive jurisdiction, and refers to the authors, or original papers, which confirm his observations. Giannone, in his Civil History of Naples, lib. xix. § 3, has ranged these under proper heads, and scrutinizes the pretensions of the Church with his usual boldness and discernment. M. Fleury observes that the clergy multiplied the pretexts for extending the authority of the spiritual courts with so much boldness that it was soon in their power to withdraw almost every person and every cause from the jurisdiction of the civil magistrate. (*Hist. Ecclés.*, tom. xix., Disc. Prelim., 16.) But, how ill founded soever the jurisdiction of the clergy may have been, or whatever might be the abuses to which their manner of exercising it gave rise, the principles and forms of their jurisprudence were far more perfect than that which was known in the civil courts. It seems to be certain that ecclesiastics never submitted, during any period in the Middle Ages, to the laws contained in the codes of the barbarous nations, but were governed entirely by the Roman law. They regulated all their transactions by such of its maxims as were preserved by tradition or were contained in the Theodosian Code and other books extant among them. This we learn from a custom which prevailed universally in those ages. Every person was permitted to choose, among the various codes of laws then in force, that to which he was willing to conform. In any transaction of importance, it was usual for the persons contracting to mention the law to which they submitted that it might be known how any controversy that should

arise between them was to be decided. Innumerable proofs of this occur in the charters of the Middle Ages. But the clergy considered it as such a valuable privilege of their order to be governed by the Roman law, that when any person entered into holy orders it was usual for him to renounce the code of laws to which he had been formerly subject, and to declare that he now submitted to the Roman law. “Constat me Johannem clericum, filium quondam Verandi, qui professus sum, ex natione mea, lege vivere Longobardorum, sed tamen, pro honore ecclesiastico, lege nunc videor vivere Romana.” (Charta, A.D. 1072.) “Farulfus presbyter qui professus sum, more sacerdotii mei, lege vivere Romana.” Charta, A.D. 1075; Muratori, Antichita Estensi, vol. i. p. 78. See likewise Houard, Anciennes Loix des François, etc., vol. i. p. 203.

The code of the canon law began to be compiled early in the ninth century. (Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscript., tom. xviii. p. 346, etc.) It was above two centuries after that before any collection was made of those customs which were the rule of judgments in the courts of the barons. Spiritual judges decided, of course, according to written and known laws : lay judges, left without any fixed guide, were directed by loose traditionary customs. But, besides this general advantage of the canon law, its forms and principles were more consonant to reason, and more favourable to the equitable decision of every point in controversy, than those which prevailed in lay courts. It appears from notes XXI. and XXIII., concerning private wars and the trial by combat, that the whole spirit of ecclesiastical jurisprudence was adverse to those sanguinary customs, which were destructive of justice ; and the whole force of ecclesiastical authority was exerted to abolish them, and to substitute trials by law and evidence in their room. Almost all the forms in lay courts which contribute to establish and continue to preserve order in judicial proceedings are borrowed from the canon law. (Fleury, Instit. du Droit Canon., part iii. c. 6, p. 52.) St. Louis, in his Establissemens, confirms many of his new regulations concerning property and the administration of justice by the authority of the canon law, from which he borrowed them. Thus, for instance, the first hint of attaching movables for the recovery of a debt was taken from the canon law. (Estab., liv. ii. c. 21 et 40.) And likewise the *cessio bonorum*, by a person who was insolvent. (Ibid.) In the same manner, he established new regulations with respect to the effects of persons dying intestate (liv. i. c. 89). These and many other salutary regulations the canonists had borrowed from the Roman law. Many other examples might be produced of more perfect jurisprudence in the canon law than was known in lay courts. For that reason it was deemed a high privilege to be subject to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Among the many immunities by which men were allured to engage in the dangerous expeditions for the recovery of the Holy Land, one of the most considerable was the declaring such as took the cross to be subject only to the spiritual courts, and to the rules of decision observed in them. See Note XIII., and Du Cange, voc. *Crucis Privilegia*.

NOTE XXV.—Sect. I. p. 65.

The rapidity with which the knowledge and study of the Roman law spread over Europe is amazing. The copy of the Pandects was found at Amalfi, A.D. 1137. Irnerius opened a college of civil law at Bologna a few years after. (Giann., Hist., book xi. c. 2.) It began to be taught as a part of academical learning in different parts of France before the middle of the century. Vaccarius gave lectures on the civil law at Oxford as early as the year 1147. A regular system of feudal law, formed plainly in imitation of the Roman code, was composed by two Milanese lawyers about the year 1150. Gratian published the code of canon law, with large additions and emendations, about the same time. The earliest collection of those customs which served as the rules of decision in the courts of justice is the *Assises de Jérusalem*. They were compiled, as the preamble informs us, in the year 1099, and are called “*Jus Consuetudinarium quo regebatur Regnum Orientale.*” (Willerm. Tyr., lib. xix. c. 2.) But peculiar circumstances gave occasion to this early compilation. The victorious crusaders settled as a colony in a foreign country, and adventurers from all the different nations of Europe composed this new society. It was necessary on that account to ascertain the laws and customs which were to regulate the transactions of business and the administration of justice among them. But in no country of Europe was there, at that time, any collection of customs, nor had any attempt been made to render law fixed. The first undertaking of that kind was by Glanville, lord chief justice of England, in his *Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae*, composed about the year 1181. The *Regiam Majestatem* in Scotland, ascribed to David I., seems to be an imitation, and a servile one, of Glanville. Several Scottish antiquaries, under the influence of that pious credulity which disposes men to assent without hesitation to whatever they deem for the honour of their native country, contend zealously that the *Regiam Majestatem* is a production prior to the treatise of Glanville, and have brought themselves to believe that a nation in a superior state of improvement borrowed its laws and institutions from one considerably less advanced in its political progress. The internal evidence (were it my province to examine it) by which this theory might be refuted is, in my opinion, decisive. The external circumstances which have seduced Scottish authors into this mistake have been explained with so much precision and candour by Sir David Dalrymple, in his examination of some of the arguments for the high antiquity of the *Regiam Majestatem* (Edin., 1769, 4to), that it is to be hoped the controversy will not be again revived. Pierre de Fontaines, who tells us that he was the first who had attempted such a work in France, composed his *Conseil*, which contains an account of the customs of the country of Vermandois in the reign of St. Louis, which began A.D. 1226. Beaumanoir, the author of the *Coustumes de Beauvoisis*, lived about the same time. The *Establishemens* of St. Louis, containing a large collection of the customs which prevailed within the royal domains, were published by the authority of that monarch. As soon as men became acquainted with the advantages of having written customs and laws to which they could have recourse on every occasion, the practice of col-

lecting them became common. Charles VII. of France, by an ordinance A.D. 1453, appointed the customary laws in every province of France to be collected and arranged. Velly et Villaret, *Histoire*, tom. xvi. p. 113.

His successor, Louis XI., renewed the injunction. But this salutary undertaking hath never been fully executed, and the jurisprudence of the French nation remains more obscure and uncertain than it would have been if these prudent regulations of their monarchs had taken effect. A mode of judicial determination was established in the Middle Ages, which affords the clearest proof that judges, while they had no other rule to direct their decrees but unwritten and traditionary customs, were often at a loss how to find out the facts and principles according to which they were bound to decide. They were obliged, in dubious cases, to call a certain number of old men, and to lay the case before them, that they might inform them what was the practice or custom with regard to the point. This was called *enquête par tourbe*. (Du Cange, voc. *Turba*.) The effects of the revival of the Roman jurisprudence have been explained by M. de Montesquieu (liv. xxviii. c. 42), and by Mr. Hume (*Hist. of England*, vol. ii. p. 441). I have adopted many of their ideas. Who can pretend to review any subject which such writers have considered, without receiving from them light and information? At the same time, I am convinced that the knowledge of the Roman law was not so entirely lost in Europe during the Middle Ages as is commonly believed. My subject does not require me to examine this point. Many striking facts with regard to it are collected by Donato Antonio d' Asti, *Dell' Uso e Autorità della Ragione civile nelle Provincie dell' Imperio Occidentale*, Nap., 1751, 2 vols. 8vo.

That the civil law is intimately connected with the municipal jurisprudence in several countries of Europe is a fact so well known that it needs no illustration. Even in England, where the common law is supposed to form a system perfectly distinct from the Roman code, and although such as apply in that country to the study of the common law boast of this distinction with some degree of affectation, it is evident that many of the ideas and maxims of the civil law are incorporated into the English jurisprudence. This is well illustrated by the ingenious and learned author of *Observations on the Statutes*, chiefly the more Ancient, 3d edit., p. 76, etc.

NOTE XXVI. —Sect. I. p. 66.

The whole history of the Middle Ages makes it evident that war was the sole profession of gentlemen, and almost the only object attended to in their education. Even after some change in manners began to take place, and the civil arts of life had acquired some reputation, the ancient ideas with respect to the accomplishments necessary for a person of noble birth continued long in force. In the *Mémoires de Fleuranges*, p. 9, etc., we have an account of the youthful exercises and occupations of Francis I., and they were altogether martial and athletic. That father of letters owed his relish for them, not to education, but to his own good sense and good taste. The manners of the superior order of ecclesiastics during the Middle Ages furnish the strongest proof that, in some instances, the distinction of professions was not completely ascertained in Europe. The

functions and character of the clergy are obviously very different from those of laymen ; and among the inferior orders of churchmen this constituted a distinct character separate from that of other citizens. But the dignified ecclesiastics, who were frequently of noble birth, were above such a distinction ; they retained the idea of what belonged to them as gentlemen, and, in spite of the decrees of popes or the canons of councils, they bore arms, led their vassals to the field, and fought at their head in battle. Among them the priesthood was scarcely a separate profession ; the military accomplishments which they thought essential to them as gentlemen were cultivated ; the theological science and pacific virtues suitable to their spiritual function were neglected and despised.

As soon as the science of law became a laborious study, and the practice of it a separate profession, such persons as rose to eminence in it obtained honours which had formerly been appropriated to soldiers. Knighthood was the most illustrious mark of distinction during several ages, and conferred privileges to which rank or birth alone was not entitled. To this high dignity persons eminent for their knowledge of law were advanced, and were thereby placed on a level with those whom their military talents had rendered conspicuous. *Miles justitiae, miles literatus*, became common titles. Matthew Paris mentions such knights as early as A.D. 1251. If a judge attained a certain rank in the courts of justice, that alone gave him a right to the honour of knighthood. (Pasquier, Recherches, liv. xi. c. 16, p. 130 ; Dissertations historiques sur la Chevalerie, par Honoré de Sainte-Marie, p. 164, etc.) A profession that led to offices which ennobled the persons who held them grew into credit, and the people of Europe became accustomed to see men rise to eminence by civil as well as military talents.

NOTE XXVII.—Sect. I. p. 69.

The chief intention of these notes was to bring at once under the view of my readers such facts and circumstances as tend to illustrate or confirm what is contained in that part of the history to which they refer. When these lay scattered in many different authors, and were taken from books not generally known, or which many of my readers might find it disagreeable to consult, I thought it would be of advantage to collect them together. But when every thing necessary for the proof or illustration of my narrative or reasoning may be found in any one book which is generally known, or deserves to be so, I shall satisfy myself with referring to it. This is the case with respect to chivalry. Almost every fact which I have mentioned in the text, together with many other curious and instructive particulars concerning this singular institution, may be found in Mémoires sur l'ancienne Chevalerie considérée comme une Establissement politique et militaire, par M. de la Curne de Ste. Palaye.

NOTE XXVIII.—Sect. I. p. 74.

The subject of my inquiries does not call me to write a history of the progress of science. The facts and observations which I have produced are sufficient to illustrate the effects of its progress upon manners and the state

of society. While science was altogether extinct in the western parts of Europe, it was cultivated in Constantinople and other parts of the Grecian empire. But the subtle genius of the Greeks turned almost entirely to theological disputation. The Latins borrowed that spirit from them, and many of the controversies which still occupy and divide theologians took their rise among the Greeks, from whom the other Europeans derived a considerable part of their knowledge. (See the testimony of *Æneas Silvius*, ap. *Coringium de Antiq. Academicis*, p. 43; *Histoire littéraire de France*, tom. vii. p. 113, etc., tom. ix. p. 151, etc.) Soon after the empire of the Caliphs was established in the East, some illustrious princes arose among them, who encouraged science. But when the Arabians turned their attention to the literature cultivated by the ancient Greeks and Romans, the chaste and correct taste of their works of genius appeared frigid and unanimated to a people of a more warm imagination. Though they could not admire the poets and historians of Greece or of Rome, they were sensible to the merit of their philosophers. The operations of the intellect are more fixed and uniform than those of the fancy or taste. Truth makes an impression nearly the same in every place; the ideas of what is beautiful, elegant, or sublime vary in different climates. The Arabians, though they neglected Homer, translated the most eminent of the Greek philosophers into their own language, and, guided by their precepts and discoveries, applied themselves with great ardour to the study of geometry, astronomy, medicine, dialectics, and metaphysics. In the three former they made considerable and useful improvements, which have contributed not a little to advance those sciences to that high degree of perfection which they have attained. In the two latter they chose Aristotle for their guide, and, refining on the subtle and distinguishing spirit which characterizes his philosophy, they rendered it in a great degree frivolous and unintelligible. The schools established in the East for teaching and cultivating these sciences were in high reputation. They communicated their love of science to their countrymen, who conquered Africa and Spain; and the schools instituted there were little inferior in fame to those in the East. Many of the persons who distinguished themselves by their proficiency in science during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were educated among the Arabians. Bruckerus collects many instances of this (*Histor. Philos.*, vol. iii. p. 681, etc.). Almost all the men eminent for science during several centuries, if they did not resort in person to the schools in Africa and Spain, were instructed in the philosophy of the Arabians. The first knowledge of the Aristotelian philosophy in the Middle Ages was acquired by translations of Aristotle's works out of the Arabic. The Arabian commentators were deemed the most skilful and authentic guides in the study of his system. (Conring., *Antiq. Acad.*, Diss. III. p. 95, etc.; Suppl., p. 241, etc.; Murat., *Antiquit. Ital.*, vol. iii. p. 932, etc.) From them the schoolmen derived the genius and principles of their philosophy, which contributed so much to retard the progress of true science.

The establishment of colleges or universities is a remarkable era in literary history. The schools in cathedrals and monasteries confined themselves chiefly to the teaching of grammar. There were only one or two masters employed in that office. But in colleges, professors were appointed to teach all the different parts of science. The course or order of education

was fixed. The time that ought to be allotted to the study of each science was ascertained. A regular form of trying the proficiency of students was prescribed; and academical titles and honours were conferred on such as acquitted themselves with approbation. A good account of the origin and nature of these is given by Seb. Bacmeisterus, *Antiquitates Rostochienses, sive Historia Urbis et Academæ Rostoch.* ap. *Monumenta inedita Rer. Germ.*, per E. J. de Westphalen, vol. iii. p. 781, Lips., 1743. The first obscure mention of these academical degrees in the University of Paris (from which the other universities in Europe have borrowed most of their customs and institutions) occurs A.D. 1215. (Crevier, *Hist. de l'Univ. de Paris*, tom. i. p. 296, etc.) They were completely established A.D. 1231. (*Ibid.*, 248.) It is unnecessary to enumerate the several privileges to which bachelors, masters, and doctors were entitled. One circumstance is sufficient to demonstrate the high degree of estimation in which they were held. Doctors in the different faculties contended with knights for precedence, and the dispute was terminated in many instances by advancing the former to the dignity of knighthood, the high prerogatives of which I have mentioned. It was even asserted that a doctor had a right to that title without creation. Bartolus taught "doctorem actualiter regentem in jure civili per decennium effici militem ipso facto." (Honore de Sta. Marie, *Dissert.*, p. 165.) This was called "chevalerie de lectures," and the persons advanced to that dignity, "milites clerici." These new establishments for education, together with the extraordinary honours conferred on learned men, greatly increased the number of scholars. In the year 1262 there were ten thousand students in the university of Bologna; and it appears from the history of that university that law was the only science taught in it at that time. In the year 1340 there were thirty thousand in the University of Oxford. (Speed's *Chron.*, ap. Anderson's *Chronol. Deduction of Commerce*, vol. i. p. 172.) In the same century, ten thousand persons voted in a question agitated in the University of Paris; and, as graduates alone were admitted to that privilege, the number of students must have been very great. (Velly, *Hist. de France*, tom. xi. p. 147.) There were indeed few universities in Europe at that time; but such a number of students may nevertheless be produced as a proof of the extraordinary ardour with which men applied to the study of science in those ages; it shows, likewise, that they already began to consider other professions beside that of a soldier as honourable and useful.

NOTE XXIX.—Sect. I. p. 75.

The great variety of subjects which I have endeavoured to illustrate, and the extent of this upon which I now enter, will justify my adopting the words of M. de Montesquieu when he begins to treat of commerce. "The subject which follows would require to be discussed more at large; but the nature of this work does not permit it. I wish to glide on a tranquil stream; but I am hurried along by a torrent."

Many proofs occur in history of the little intercourse between nations during the Middle Ages. Towards the close of the tenth century, Count Bouchard, intending to found a monastery at St. Maur des Fosses, near

Paris, applied to an abbot of Clugny, in Burgundy, famous for his sanctity, entreating him to conduct the monks thither. The language in which he addressed that holy man is singular : he tells him that he had undertaken the labour of such a great journey ; that he was fatigued with the length of it, therefore hoped to obtain his request, and that his journey into such a distant country should not be in vain. The answer of the abbot is still more extraordinary. He refused to comply with his desire, as it would be extremely fatiguing to go along with him into a strange and unknown region. (*Vita Burchardi venerabilis Comitis*, ap. Bouquet, *Rec. des Hist.*, vol. x. p. 351.) Even so late as the beginning of the twelfth century, the monks of Ferrières, in the diocese of Sens, did not know that there was such a city as Tournay in Flanders ; and the monks of St. Martin of Tournay were equally unacquainted with the situation of Ferrièrea. A transaction in which they were both concerned made it necessary for them to have some intercourse. The mutual interest of both monasteries prompted each to find out the situation of the other. After a long search, which is particularly described, the discovery was made by accident. (*Herimannus Abbas, de Restaurazione St. Martini Tornacensis*, ap. Dacher. *Spicil.*, vol. xii. p. 400.) The ignorance of the Middle Ages with respect to the situation and geography of remote countries was still more remarkable. The most ancient geographical chart which now remains as a monument of the state of that science in Europe during the Middle Ages is found in a manuscript of the *Chronique de St. Denys*. There the three parts of the earth then known are so represented that Jerusalem is placed in the middle of the globe, and Alexandria appears to be as near to it as Nazareth. (*Mém. de l'Acad. des Belles-Lettres*, tom. xvi. p. 185.) There seems to have been no inns or houses of entertainment for the reception of travellers during the Middle Ages. (*Murat.*, *Antiq. Ital.*, vol. iii. p. 581, etc.) This is a proof of the little intercourse which took place between different nations. Among people whose manners are simple, and who are seldom visited by strangers, hospitality is a virtue of the first rank. This duty of hospitality was so necessary in that state of society which took place during the Middle Ages that it was not considered as one of those virtues which men may practise or not, according to the temper of their minds and the generosity of their hearts. Hospitality was enforced by statutes, and such as neglected this duty were liable to punishment. “*Quicunque hospiti venienti lectum aut focum negaverit, trium solidorum inlatione mulctetur.*” (*Leg. Burgund. tit. xxxviii. § 1.*) “*Si quis homini aliquo pergenti in itinere mansionem vetaverit, sexaginta solidos componat in publico.*” (*Capitul.*, lib. vi. § 82.) This increase of the penalty, at a period so long after that in which the laws of the Burgundians were published, and when the state of society was much improved, is very remarkable. Other laws of the same purport are collected by Jo. Fred. Polac., *Systema Jurisprud. Germanicæ*, Lips., 1733, p. 75. The laws of the Slavi were more rigorous than any that he mentions : they ordained that the movables of an inhospitable person should be confiscated, and his house burnt. They were even so solicitous for the entertainment of strangers that they permitted the landlord to steal for the support of his guest. “*Quod noctu furatus fueris, cras appone hospitibus.*” (*Rerum Mecleburgicar.*, lib. viii. a Mat. Jo. Beehr., Lips., 1751, p. 50.) In consequence of these laws, or of the state of society

which made it proper to enact them, hospitality abounded while the intercourse among men was inconsiderable, and secured the stranger a kind reception under every roof where he chose to take shelter. This, too, proves clearly that the intercourse among men was rare ; for as soon as this became frequent, what was a pleasure became a burden, and the entertaining of travellers was converted into a branch of commerce.

But the laws of the Middle Ages afford a proof still more convincing of the small intercourse between different nations. The genius of the feudal system, as well as the spirit of jealousy which always accompanies ignorance, concurred in discouraging strangers from settling in any new country. If a person removed from one province in a kingdom to another, he was bound within a year and a day to acknowledge himself the vassal of the baron in whose estate he settled ; if he neglected to do so, he became liable to a penalty ; and if at his death he neglected to leave a certain legacy to the baron within whose territory he had resided, all his goods were confiscated. The hardships imposed on foreigners settling in a country were still more intolerable. In more early times the superior lord of any territory in which a foreigner settled might seize his person and reduce him to servitude. Very striking instances of this occur in the history of the Middle Ages. The cruel depredations of the Normans in the ninth century obliged many inhabitants of the maritime provinces of France to fly into the interior parts of the kingdom. But, instead of being received with that humanity to which their wretched condition entitled them, they were reduced to a state of servitude. Both the civil and ecclesiastical powers found it necessary to interpose in order to put a stop to this barbarous practice. (Potgiesser., *de Statu Servorum*, lib. i. c. 1, § 16.) In other countries the laws permitted the inhabitants of the maritime provinces to reduce such as were shipwrecked on their coast to servitude. (*Ibid.*, § 17.) This barbarous custom prevailed in many countries of Europe. The practice of seizing the goods of persons who had been shipwrecked, and of confiscating them as the property of the lord on whose manor they were thrown, seems to have been universal. (*De Westphalen, Monum. inedita Rer. Germ.*, vol. iv. p. 907, etc., and *Du Cange*, *voc. Laganum*; *Beehr.*, *Rer. Mecleb.*, lib. viii. p. 512.) Among the ancient Welsh three sorts of persons, a madman, a stranger, and a leper, might be killed with impunity. (*Leges Hoel Dda*, quoted in *Observat. on the Statutes*, chiefly the more Ancient, p. 22.) M. de Laurière produces several ancient deeds which prove that in different provinces of France strangers became the slaves of the lord on whose lands they settled. (*Glossaire du Droit François*, art. *Aubaine*, p. 92.) Beau-manoir says, "That there are several places in France in which if a stranger fixes his residence for a year and a day, he becomes the slave of the lord of the manor." (*Coust. de Beauv.*, ch. 45, p. 254.) As a practice so contrary to humanity could not subsist long, the superior lords found it necessary to rest satisfied, instead of enslaving aliens, with levying certain annual taxes upon them, or imposing upon them some extraordinary duties or services. But when any stranger died, he could not convey his effects by will ; and all his real as well as personal estate fell to the king, or to the lord of the barony, to the exclusion of his natural heirs. This is termed in France *droit d'aubaine*. (*Préf. de Laurière, Ordon.*, tom. i. p. 15; *Brussel*, tom. ii. p. 944; *Du Cange*, *voc. Albani*; *Pasquier, Recherches*,

p. 367.) This practice of confiscating the effects of strangers upon their death was very ancient. It is mentioned, though very obscurely, in a law of Charlemagne, A.D. 813, Capitul. Baluz., p. 507, § 5. Not only persons who were born in a foreign country were subject to the "droit d'aubaine," but in some countries such as removed from one diocese to another, or from the lands of one baron to another. (Brussel, vol. ii. pp. 947, 949.) It is hardly possible to conceive any law more unfavourable to the intercourse between nations. Something similar to it, however, may be found in the ancient laws of every kingdom in Europe. With respect to Italy, see Murat., Ant., vol. ii. p. 14. As nations advanced in improvement, this practice was gradually abolished. It is no small disgrace to the French jurisprudence that this barbarous, inhospitable custom should have so long remained among a people so highly civilized.

The confusion and outrage which abounded under a feeble form of government, incapable of framing or executing salutary laws, rendered the communication between the different provinces of the same kingdom extremely dangerous. It appears from a letter of Lupus, abbot of Ferrières, in the ninth century, that the highways were so much infested by banditti that it was necessary for travellers to form themselves into companies or caravans, that they might be safe from the assaults of robbers. (Bouquet, Recueil des Hist., vol. vii. p. 515.) The numerous regulations published by Charles the Bald in the same century discover the frequency of these disorders; and such acts of violence were become so common that by many they were hardly considered as criminal. For this reason the inferior judges, called "centenarii," were required to take an oath that they would neither commit any robbery themselves, nor protect such as were guilty of that crime. (Capitul., edit. Baluz., vol. ii. pp. 63, 68.) The historians of the ninth and tenth centuries give pathetic descriptions of these disorders. Some remarkable passages to this purpose are collected by Mat. Jo. Beehr., Rer. Mecleb., lib. viii. p. 603. They became so frequent and audacious that the authority of the civil magistrate was unable to repress them. The ecclesiastical jurisdiction was called in to aid it. Councils were held with great solemnity, the bodies of the saints were brought thither, and, in presence of their sacred relics, anathemas were denounced against robbers and other violators of the public peace. (Bouquet, Recueil des Hist., tom. x. pp. 360, 431, 536.) One of these forms of excommunication, issued A.D. 988, is still preserved, and is so singular, and composed with eloquence of such a peculiar kind, that it will not perhaps be deemed unworthy of a place here. After the usual introduction, and mentioning the outrage which gave occasion to the anathema, it runs thus: "Obtenebrescant oculi vestri, qui concupiverunt; arescant manus, quæ rapuerunt; debilitentur omnia membra, quæ adjuverunt. Semper laboreatis, nec requiem inventiatis, fructuque vestri laboris privemini. Formidetis, et paveatis, a facie persequentis et non persequentis hostis, ut tabescendo deficiatis. Sit portio vestra cum Juda traditore Domini, in terra mortis et tenebrarum; donec corda vestra ad satisfactionem plenam convertantur.—Ne cessent a vobis hæ maledictiones, scelerum vestrorum persecu'ries, quamdiu permanebitis in peccato pervasionis. Amen, Fiat, Fiat." Bouquet, ibid., p. 517.

NOTE XXX.—Sect. I. p. 79.

With respect to the progress of commerce, which I have described, p. 74, etc., it may be observed that the Italian states carried on some commerce with the cities of the Greek empire as early as the age of Charlemagne, and imported into their own country the rich commodities of the East. (Murat., *Antiq.*, Ital., vol. ii. p. 882.) In the tenth century the Venetians had opened a trade with Alexandria in Egypt. (*Ibid.*) The inhabitants of Amalfi and Pisa had likewise extended their trade to the same ports. (Murat., *ib.*, pp. 884, 885.) The effects of the crusades in increasing the wealth and commerce of the Italian states, and particularly that which they carried on with the East, I have explained, p. 29 of this volume. They not only imported the Indian commodities from the East, but established manufactories of curious fabric in their own country. Some of these are enumerated by Muratori in his *Dissertations concerning the arts and the weaving of the Middle Ages*. (*Antiq. Ital.*, vol. ii. pp. 349, 399.) They made great progress particularly in the manufacture of silk, which had long been peculiar to the eastern provinces of Asia. Silk stuffs were of such high price in ancient Rome that only a few persons of the first rank were able to purchase them. Under Aurelian, A.D. 270, a pound of silk was equal in value to a pound of gold. “*Absit ut auro fila pensentur. Libra enim auri tunc libra serici fuit.*” (*Vopiscus. in Aureliano.*) Justinian, in the sixth century, introduced the art of rearing silk-worms into Greece, which rendered the commodity somewhat more plentiful, though still it was of such great value as to remain an article of luxury or magnificence, reserved only for persons of the first order, or for public solemnities. Roger I., king of Sicily, about the year 1130, carried off a number of artificers in the silk-trade from Athens, and settling them in Palermo, introduced the culture of silk into his kingdom, from which it was communicated to other parts of Italy. (*Giannon. Hist. of Naples*, b. xi. c. 7.) This seems to have rendered silk so common, that about the middle of the fourteenth century a thousand citizens of Genoa appeared in one procession clad in silk robes. Sugar is likewise a production of the East. Some plants of the sugar-cane were brought from Asia; and the first attempt to cultivate them in Sicily was made about the middle of the twelfth century. From thence they were transplanted into the southern provinces of Spain. From Spain they were carried to the Canary and Madeira Isles, and at length into the New World. Ludovico Guicciardini, in enumerating the goods imported into Antwerp about the year 1500, mentions the sugar which they received from Spain and Portugal as a considerable article. He describes that sugar as the product of the Madeira and Canary Islands. (*Descritt. de' Paesi Bassi*, pp. 180, 181.) The sugar-cane was introduced into the West Indies before that time; but the cultivation of it was not so improved or so extensive as to furnish an article of much consequence in commerce. In the Middle Ages, though sugar was not raised in such quantities, or employed for so many purposes as to become one of the common necessaries of life, it

appears to have been a considerable article in the commerce of the Italian states.

These various commodities with which the Italians furnished the other nations of Europe procured them a favourable reception in every kingdom. They were established in France in the thirteenth century with most extensive immunities. They not only obtained every indulgence favourable to their commerce, but personal rights and privileges were granted to them which the natives of the kingdom did not enjoy. (Ordon., tom. iv. p. 668.) By a special proviso they were exempted from the *droit d'aubaine*. (Ibid., p. 670.) As the Lombards (a name frequently given to all Italian merchants in many parts of Europe) engrossed the trade of every kingdom in which they settled, they became masters of its cash. Money, of course, was in their hands not only a sign of the value of other commodities, but became an object of commerce itself. They dealt largely as bankers. In an ordinance, A.D. 1295, we find them styled *mercatores* and *campsores*. They carried on this as well as other branches of their commerce with somewhat of that rapacious spirit which is natural to monopolizers who are not restrained by the competition of rival traders. An absurd opinion which prevailed in the Middle Ages was, however, in some measure the cause of their exorbitant demands, and may be pleaded in apology for them. Trade cannot be carried on with advantage unless the persons who lend a sum of money are allowed a certain premium for the use of it, as a compensation for the risk which they run in permitting another to traffic with their stock. This premium is fixed by law in all commercial countries, and is called the legal interest of money. But the fathers of the Church had preposterously applied the prohibitions of usury in Scripture to the payment of legal interest, and condemned it as a sin. The schoolmen, misled by Aristotle, whose sentiments they followed implicitly, and without examination, adopted the same error, and enforced it. (Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. ii. p. 455.) Thus the Lombards found themselves engaged in a traffic which was everywhere deemed criminal and odious. They were liable to punishment if detected. They were not satisfied, therefore, with that moderate premium which they might have claimed if their trade had been open and authorized by law. They exacted a sum proportional to the danger and infamy of a discovery. Accordingly, we find that it was usual for them to demand twenty per cent. for the use of money in the thirteenth century. (Murat., Antiq. Ital., vol. i. p. 893.) About the beginning of that century the countess of Flanders was obliged to borrow money in order to pay her husband's ransom. She procured the sum requisite either from Italian merchants or from Jews. The lowest interest which she paid to them was above twenty per cent., and some of them exacted near thirty. (Martene and Durand., Thesaur. Anecdotorum, vol. i. p. 886.) In the fourteenth century, A.D. 1311, Philip IV. fixed the interest which might be legally exacted in the fair of Champagne at twenty per cent. (Ordon., tom. i. p. 484.) The interest of money in Aragon was somewhat lower. James I., A.D. 1242, fixed it by law at eighteen per cent. (Petr. de Marca, *Marca, sive Limes Hispan.*, App. 1433.) As late as the year 1490, it appears that the interest of money in Placentia was at the rate of forty per cent. This is the more

extraordinary because at that time the commerce of the Italian states was become considerable. (*Memorie storiche de Piacenza*, tom. viii. p. 104, Piac., 1760.) It appears from Lud. Guicciardini that Charles V. had fixed the rate of interest in his dominions in the Low Countries at twelve per cent., and at the time when he wrote, about the year 1560, it was not uncommon to exact more than that sum. He complains of this as exorbitant, and points out its bad effects both on agriculture and commerce. (*Descritt. de' Paesi Bassi*, p. 172.) This high interest of money is alone a proof that the profits on commerce were exorbitant, and that it was not carried on to great extent. The Lombards were likewise established in England in the thirteenth century, and a considerable street in the city of London still bears their name. They enjoyed great privileges, and carried on an extensive commerce, particularly as bankers. (See Anderson's *Chronol. Deduction*, vol. i. pp. 137, 160, 204, 231, where the statutes or other authorities which confirm this are quoted.) But the chief mart for Italian commodities was at Bruges. Navigation was then so imperfect that to sail from any port in the Baltic, and to return again was a voyage too great to be performed in one summer. For that reason, a magazine or storehouse, half-way between the commercial cities in the North and those in Italy, became necessary. Bruges was pitched upon as the most convenient station. That choice introduced vast wealth into the Low Countries. Bruges was at once the staple for English wool, for the woollen and linen manufactures of the Netherlands, for the naval stores and other bulky commodities of the North, and for the Indian commodities as well as domestic productions imported by the Italian states. The extent of its commerce in Indian goods with Venice alone appears from one fact. In the year 1318 five Venetian galleasses laden with Indian commodities arrived at Bruges in order to dispose of their cargoes at the fair. These galleasses were vessels of very considerable burden. (L. Guic., *Descritt. de' Paesi Bassi*, p. 174.) Bruges was the greatest emporium in all Europe. Many proofs of this occur in the historians and records of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But, instead of multiplying quotations, I shall refer my readers to Anderson, vol. i. pp. 12, 137, 213, 246, etc. The nature of this work prevents me from entering into any more minute detail, but there are some detached facts which give a high idea of the wealth both of the Flemish and Italian commercial states. The duke of Brabant contracted his daughter to the Black Prince, son of Edward III. of England, A.D. 1339, and gave her a portion which we may reckon to be of equal value with three hundred thousand pounds of our present money. (Rymer's *Fœdera*, vol. v. p. 113.) John Galeazzo Visconti, duke of Milan, concluded a treaty of marriage between his daughter and Lionel, duke of Clarence, Edward's third son, A.D. 1367, and granted her a portion equal to two hundred thousand pounds of our present money. (Rymer's *Fœdera*, vol. vi. p. 547.) These exorbitant sums, so far exceeding what was then granted by the most powerful monarchs, and which appear extraordinary even in the present age, when the wealth of Europe is so much increased, must have arisen from the riches which flowed into those countries from their extensive and lucrative commerce. The first source of wealth to the towns situated on the Baltic Sea seems to have been the herring-fishery,—the shoals of herrings frequenting at

that time the coasts of Sweden and Denmark in the same manner as they now resort to the British coasts. The effects of this fishery are thus described by an author of the thirteenth century. The Danes, says he, who were formerly clad in the poor garb of sailors, are now clothed in scarlet, purple, and fine linen. For they abound with wealth flowing from their annual fishery on the coast of Schonen; so that all nations resort to them, bringing their gold, silver, and precious commodities, that they may purchase herrings, which the Divine bounty bestows upon them. *Arnoldus Lubecensis, ap. Conring., de Urbib. German., § 87.*

The Hanseatic League is the most powerful commercial confederacy known in history. Its origin towards the close of the twelfth century, and the objects of its union, are described by Knipschildt, *Tractatus Historico-Politico-Juridicus de Juribus Civitat. Imper., lib. i. cap. 4.* Anderson has mentioned the chief facts with respect to their commercial progress, the extent of the privileges which they obtained in different countries, their successful wars with several monarchs, as well as the spirit and zeal with which they contended for those liberties and rights without which it is impossible to carry on commerce to advantage. The vigorous efforts of a society of merchants attentive only to commercial objects could not fail of diffusing new and more liberal ideas concerning justice and order in every country of Europe where they settled.

In England the progress of commerce was extremely slow; and the causes of this are obvious. During the Saxon Heptarchy, England, split into many petty kingdoms, which were perpetually at variance with each other, exposed to the fierce incursions of the Danes and other Northern pirates, and sunk in barbarity and ignorance, was in no condition to cultivate commerce, or to pursue any system of useful and salutary policy. When a better prospect began to open, by the union of the kingdom under one monarch, the Norman Conquest took place. This occasioned such a violent shock, as well as such a sudden and total revolution of property, that the nation did not recover from it during several reigns. By the time that the constitution began to acquire some stability, and the English had so incorporated with their conquerors as to become one people, the nation engaged with no less ardour than imprudence in support of the pretensions of their sovereigns to the crown of France, and long wasted its vigour and genius in its wild efforts to conquer that kingdom. When, by ill success and repeated disappointments, a period was at last put to this fatal frenzy, and the nation, beginning to enjoy some repose, had leisure to breathe and to gather new strength, the destructive wars between the houses of York and Lancaster broke out, and involved the kingdom in the worst of all calamities. Thus, besides the common obstructions of commerce occasioned by the nature of the feudal government, and the state of manners during the Middle Ages, its progress in England was retarded by peculiar causes. Such a succession of events adverse to the commercial spirit was sufficient to have checked its growth although every other circumstance had favoured it. The English were accordingly one of the last nations in Europe who availed themselves of those commercial advantages which were natural or peculiar to their country. Before the reign of Edward III., all the wool of England, except a small quantity wrought into coarse cloths for

home consumption, was sold to the Flemings or Lombards, and manufactured by them. Though Edward, A.D. 1326, began to allure some of the Flemish weavers to settle in England, it was long before the English were capable of fabricating cloth for foreign markets, and the export of unwrought wool still continued to be the chief article of their commerce. (Anderson, *passim.*) All foreign commodities were brought into England by the Lombards or Hanseatic merchants. The English ports were frequented by ships both from the North and South of Europe, and they tamely allowed foreigners to reap all the profits arising from the supply of their wants. The first commercial treaty of England on record is that with Haquin, king of Norway, A.D. 1217. (Andera, vol. i. p. 108.) But the English did not venture to trade in their own ships to the Baltic until the beginning of the fourteenth century. (*Ibid.*, p. 151.) It was after the middle of the fifteenth before they sent any ship into the Mediterranean. (*Ibid.*, p. 177.) Nor was it long before this period that their vessels began to visit the ports of Spain or Portugal. But though I have pointed out the slow progress of the English commerce as a fact little attended to, and yet meriting consideration, the concourse of foreigners to the ports of England, together with the communication among all the different countries in Europe, which went on increasing from the beginning of the twelfth century, is sufficient to justify all the observations and reasonings in the text concerning the influence of commerce on the state of manners and of society.

NOTE XXXI.—Sect. III. p. 144.

I have not been able to discover the precise manner in which the *justiza* was appointed. Among the claims of the *junta* or *union* formed against James I., A.D. 1264, this was one: that the king should not nominate any person to be *justiza* without the consent or approbation of the *ricos hombres*, or nobles. (Zurita, *Anales de Aragon*, vol. i. p. 180.) But the king, in his answer to their remonstrance, asserts “that it was established by immemorial practice, and was conformable to the laws of the kingdom, that the king, in virtue of his royal prerogative, should name the *justiza*. ” (Zurita, *ibid.*, 181; Blanca, 656.) From another passage in Zurita, it appears that while the Aragonese enjoyed the privilege of the *union*, *i.e.*, the power of confederating against their sovereign as often as they conceived that he had violated any of their rights and immunities, the *justiza* was not only nominated by the king, but held his office during the king’s pleasure. Nor was this practice attended with any bad effects, as the privilege of the *union* was a sufficient and effectual check to any abuse of the royal prerogative. But when the privilege of the *union* was abolished as dangerous to the order and peace of society, it was agreed that the *justiza* should continue in office during life. Several kings, however, attempted to remove *justizas* who were obnoxious to them, and they sometimes succeeded in the attempt. In order to guard against this encroachment, which would have destroyed the intention of the institution, and have rendered the *justiza* the dependant and tool of the crown, instead of the guardian of the people, a law was enacted in the *cortes*, A.D. 1442, ordaining that the *justiza* should continue

in office during life, and should not be removed from it unless by the authority of the cortes. (*Fueros y Observancias del Reyno de Aragon*, lib. i. p. 22.) By former laws, the person of the justiza had been declared sacred, and he was responsible only to the cortes. (*Ibid.*, p. 15, b.) Zurita and Blanca, who both published their histories while the justiza of Aragon retained the full exercise of his privileges and jurisdiction, have neglected to explain several circumstances with regard to the office of that respectable magistrate, because they addressed their works to their countrymen, who were well acquainted with every particular concerning the functions of a judge to whom they looked up as to the guardian of their liberties. It is vain to consult the later historians of Spain about any point with respect to which the excellent historians whom I have named are silent. The ancient constitution of their country was overturned, and despotism established on the ruin of its liberties, when the writers of this and the preceding century composed their histories, and on that account they had little curiosity to know the nature of those institutions to which their ancestors owed the enjoyment of freedom, or they were afraid to describe them with much accuracy. The spirit with which Mariana, his continuator Miniana, and Ferreras, write their histories, is very different from that of the two historians of Aragon from whom I have taken my account of the constitution of that kingdom.

Two circumstances concerning the justiza, besides those which I have mentioned in the text, are worthy of observation. 1. None of the *ricos hombres*, or noblemen of the first order, could be appointed justiza. He was taken out of the second class of *cavalleros*, who seem to have been nearly of the same condition or rank with gentlemen or commoners in Great Britain. (*Fueros y Observancias del Reyno*, etc. lib. i. p. 21, b.) The reason was, by the laws of Aragon the *ricos hombres* were not subject to capital punishment; but, as it was necessary for the security of liberty that the justiza should be accountable for the manner in which he executed the high trust reposed in him, it was a powerful restraint upon him to know that he was liable to be punished capitally. (Blanca, pp. 657, 756; Zurita, tom. ii. p. 229; *Fueros y Observancias*, lib. ix. pp. 182, b. 183.) It appears, too, from many passages in Zurita that the justiza was appointed to check the domineering and oppressive spirit of the nobles, as well as to set bounds to the power of the monarch, and therefore he was chosen from an order of citizens equally interested in opposing both.

2. A magistrate possessed of such vast powers as the justiza might have exercised them in a manner pernicious to the state if he himself had been subject to no control. A constitutional remedy was on that account provided against this danger. Seventeen persons were chosen by lot in each meeting of the cortes. These formed a tribunal called the court of inquisition into the office of justiza. This court met at three stated terms in each year. Every person had liberty of complaining to it of any iniquity or neglect of duty in the justiza, or in the inferior judges who acted in his name. The justiza and his deputies were called to answer for their conduct. The members of the court passed sentence by ballot. They might punish by degradation, confiscation of goods, or even with death. The law which erected this court and regulated the form of its procedure was enacted A.D. 1461. (Zurita, *Anales*, iv. 102; Blanca,

Comment. Rer. Aragon., 770.) Previous to this period, inquiry was made into the conduct of the justiza, though not with the same formality. He was, from the first institution of the office, subject to the review of the cortes. The constant dread of such an impartial and severe inquiry into his behaviour was a powerful motive to the vigilant and faithful discharge of his duty. A remarkable instance of the authority of the justiza when opposed to that of the king occurs in the year 1386. By the constitution of Aragon, the eldest son or heir-apparent of the crown possessed considerable power and jurisdiction in the kingdom. (Fueros y Observancias del Reyno de Aragon, lib. i. p. 16.) Peter IV., instigated by a second wife, attempted to deprive his son of this, and enjoined his subjects to yield him no obedience. The prince immediately applied to the justiza, "the safeguard and defence," says Zurita, "against all violence and oppression." The justiza granted him the *firma de derecho*, the effect of which was that upon his giving surety to appear in judgment he could not be deprived of any immunity or privilege which he possessed, but in consequence of a legal trial before the justiza and of a sentence pronounced by him. This was published throughout the kingdom, and, notwithstanding the proclamation in contradiction to this which had been issued by the king, the prince continued in the exercise of all his rights, and his authority was universally recognised. Zurita, Anales de Aragon, tom. ii. p. 385.

NOTE XXXII.—Sect. III. p. 145.

I have been induced, by the concurring testimony of many respectable authors, to mention this as the constitutional form of the oath of allegiance which the Aragonese took to their sovereigns. I must acknowledge, however, that I have not found this singular oath in any Spanish author whom I have had an opportunity of consulting. It is mentioned neither by Zurita, nor Blanca, nor Argensola, nor Sayas, who were all historiographers appointed by the cortes of Aragon to record the transactions of the kingdom. All these writers possess a merit which is very rare among historians. They are extremely accurate in tracing the progress of the laws and constitution of their country. Their silence with respect to this creates some suspicion concerning the genuineness of the oath. But as it is mentioned by so many authors, who produce the ancient Spanish words in which it is expressed, it is probable that they have taken it from some writer of credit whose works have not fallen into my hands. The spirit of the oath is perfectly agreeable to the genius of the Aragonese constitution. Since the publication of the first edition, the learned M. Totze, Professor of History at Batzow, in the duchy of Mecklenburg, has been so good as to point out to me a Spanish author of great authority who has published the words of this oath. It is Antonio Perez, a native of Aragon, secretary to Philip II. The words of the oath are, "Nos que valemos tanto como vos, os hazemos nuestro rey y señor, con tal que nos guardeys nuestros fueros y libertades, y si No, No." Las Obras y Relaciones de Ant. Perez, 8vo, por Juan de la Planche, 1631, p. 143.

The privilege of union which I have mentioned in the preceding note and alluded to in the text is indeed one of the most singular which could

take place in a regular government, and the oath that I have quoted expresses nothing more than this constitutional privilege entitled the Aragonese to perform. If the king or his ministers violated any of the laws or immunities of the Aragonese, and did not grant immediate redress in consequence of their representations and remonstrances, the nobles of the first rank, or *ricos hombres de natura, y de mesnada*, the equestrian order, or the nobility of the second class, called *hidalgos y infanciones*, together with the magistrates of cities, might, either in the cortes or in a voluntary assembly, join in union, and, binding themselves by mutual oaths and the exchange of hostages to be faithful to each other, they might require the king, in the name and by the authority of this body corporate, to grant them redress. If the king refused to comply with their request, or took arms in order to oppose them, they might, in virtue of the privilege of union, instantly withdraw their allegiance from the king, refuse to acknowledge him as their sovereign, and proceed to elect another monarch; nor did they incur any guilt or become liable to any prosecution on that account. (Blanca, Com. Rer. Arag., 661, 669.) This union did not resemble the confederacies in other feudal kingdoms. It was a constitutional association, in which legal privileges were vested, which issued its mandates under a common seal, and proceeded in all its operations by regular and ascertained forms. This dangerous right was not only claimed, but exercised. In the year 1287 the Aragonese formed a union in opposition to Alfonso III., and obliged that king not only to comply with their demands, but to ratify a privilege so fatal to the power of the crown. (Zurita, Anales, tom. i. p. 322.) In the year 1347 a union was formed against Peter IV. with equal success, and a new ratification of the privilege was extorted. (Zurita, tom. ii. p. 202.) But soon after, the king having defeated the leaders of the union in battle, the privilege of union was finally abrogated in the cortes, and all the laws or records which contained any confirmation of it were cancelled or destroyed. The king, in presence of the cortes, called for the act whereby he had ratified the union, and, having wounded his hand with his poniard, he held it above the record. "That privilege," says he, "which has been so fatal to the kingdom, and so injurious to royalty, should be effaced with the blood of a king." (Zurita, tom. ii. p. 229.) The law abolishing the union is published, *Fueros y Observancias*, lib. ix. p. 178. From that period the justiza became the constitutional guardian of public liberty, and his power and jurisdiction occasioned none of those violent convulsions which the tumultuary privilege of the union was apt to produce. The constitution of Aragon, however, still remained extremely free. One source of this liberty arose from the early admission of the representatives of cities into the cortes. It seems probable from Zurita that burgesses were constituent members of the cortes from its first institution. He mentions a meeting of cortes, A.D. 1133, in which the *procuradores de las ciudades y villas* were present. (Tom. i. p. 51.) This is the constitutional language in which their presence is declared in the cortes, after the journals of that court were regularly kept. It is probable that an historian so accurate as Zurita would not have used these words if he had not taken them from some authentic record. It was more than a century after this period before the representatives of cities formed a constituent part in the supreme assemblies of the other

European nations. The free spirit of the Aragonese government is conspicuous in many particulars. The cortes not only opposed the attempts of their kings to increase their revenue or to extend their prerogative, but they claimed rights and exercised powers which will appear extraordinary even in a country accustomed to the enjoyment of liberty. In the year 1286 the cortes claimed the privilege of naming the members of the king's council and the officers of his household, and they seem to have obtained it for some time. (Zurita, tom. i. pp. 303, 307.) It was the privilege of the cortes to name the officers who commanded the troops raised by their authority. This seems to be evident from a passage in Zurita. When the cortes, in the year 1503, raised a body of troops to be employed in Italy, it passed an act empowering the king to name the officers who should command them (Zurita, tom. v. p. 274); which plainly implies that without this warrant it did not belong to him in virtue of his prerogative. In the *Fueros y Observancias del Reyno de Aragon*, two general declarations of the rights and privileges of the Aragonese are published,—the one in the reign of Pedro I., A.D. 1283, and the other in that of James II., A.D. 1325. They are of such a length that I cannot insert them; but it is evident from these that not only the privileges of the nobility, but the rights of the people, personal as well as political, were at that period more extensive and better understood than in any kingdom in Europe. (Lib. i. pp. 7, 9.) The oath by which the king bound himself to observe those rights and liberties of the people was very solemn. (*Ibid.*, p. 14, b, and p. 15.) The cortes of Aragon discovered not only the jealousy and vigilance which are peculiar to free states, in guarding the essential parts of the constitution, but they were scrupulously attentive to observe the most minute forms and ceremonies to which they were accustomed. According to the established laws and customs of Aragon, no foreigner had liberty to enter the hall in which the cortes assembled. Ferdinand, in the year 1481, appointed his queen, Isabella, regent of the kingdom while he was absent during the course of the campaign. The law required that a regent should take the oath of fidelity in presence of the cortes; but, as Isabella was a foreigner, before she could be admitted the cortes thought it necessary to pass an act authorizing the serjeant-porter to open the door of the hall and to allow her to enter: "so attentive were they," says Zurita, "to observe their laws and forms, even such as may seem the most minute." Tom. iv. p. 313.

The Aragonese were no less solicitous to secure the personal rights of individuals than to maintain the freedom of the constitution; and the spirit of their statutes with respect to both was equally liberal. Two facts relative to this matter merit observation. By an express statute in the year 1335 it was declared to be unlawful to put any native Aragonese to the torture. If he could not be convicted by the testimony of witnesses, he was instantly absolved. (Zurita, tom. ii. p. 66.) Zurita records the regulation with the satisfaction natural to an historian when he contemplates the humanity of his countrymen. He compares the laws of Aragon to those of Rome, as both exempted citizens and freemen from such ignominious and cruel treatment and had recourse to it only in the trial of slaves. Zurita had reason to bestow such an encomium on the laws of his country. Torture was at that time permitted by the laws of every

other nation in Europe. Even in England, from which the mild spirit of legislation has long banished it, torture was not at that time unknown. *Observations on the Statutes, chiefly the more Ancient, etc.*, p. 66.

The other fact shows that the same spirit which influenced the legislature prevailed among the people. In the year 1485 the religious zeal of Ferdinand and Isabella prompted them to introduce the Inquisition into Aragon. Though the Aragonese were no less superstitiously attached than the other Spaniards to the Roman Catholic faith, and no less desirous to root out the seeds of error and of heresy which the Jews and Moors had scattered, yet they took arms against the inquisitors, murdered the chief inquisitor, and long opposed the establishment of that tribunal. The reason which they gave for their conduct was, that the mode of trial in the Inquisition was inconsistent with liberty. The criminal was not confronted with the witnesses, he was not acquainted with what they deposed against him, he was subjected to torture, and the goods of persons condemned were confiscated. *Zurita, Anales, tom. iv. p. 341.*

The form of government in the kingdom of Valencia and principality of Catalonia, which were annexed to the crown of Aragon, was likewise extremely favourable to liberty. The Valencians enjoyed the privilege of *union* in the same manner with the Aragonese. But they had no magistrate resembling the *justiza*. The Catalonians were no less jealous of their liberties than the two other nations, and no less bold in asserting them. But it is not necessary for illustrating the following history to enter into any further detail concerning the peculiarities in the constitution of these kingdoms.

NOTE XXXIII.—Sect. III. p. 146.

I have searched in vain among the historians of Castile for such information as might enable me to trace the progress of laws and government in Castile, or to explain the nature of the constitution with the same degree of accuracy wherewith I have described the political state of Aragon. It is manifest, not only from the historians of Castile, but from its ancient laws, particularly the *Fuero Juzgo*, that its monarchs were originally elective. (*Leyes, 2, 5, 8.*) They were chosen by the bishops, the nobility, and the people. (*Ibid.*) It appears from the same venerable code of laws that the prerogative of the Castilian monarchs was extremely limited. Villaldiego, in his commentary on the *Fuero Juzgo*, produces many facts and authorities in confirmation of both these particulars. Dr. Geddes, who was well acquainted with Spanish literature, complains that he could find no author who gave a distinct account of the *cortes* or supreme assembly of the nation, or who described the manner in which it was held, or mentioned the precise number of members who had a right to sit in it. He produces, however, from Gil Gonzales d'Avila, who published a history of Henry II., the writ of summons to the town of Abula, requiring it to choose representatives to appear in the *cortes* which he called to meet A.D. 1390. From this we learn that prelates, dukes, marquises, the masters of the three military orders, condes, and *ricos hombres*, were required to attend. These composed the bodies of ecclesiastics and nobles, which formed two members of the legislature. The cities which sent

members to that meeting of the cortes were forty-eight. The number of representatives (for the cities had right to choose more or fewer according to their respective dignity) amounted to a hundred and twenty-five. (Geddes, *Miscellaneous Tracts*, vol. i. p. 331.) Zurita, having occasion to mention the cortes which Ferdinand held at Toro, A.D. 1505, in order to secure for himself the government of Castile after the death of Isabella, records, with his usual accuracy, the names of the members present, and of the cities which they represented. From that list it appears that only eighteen cities had deputies in this assembly. (*Anales de Aragon*, tom. vi. p. 3.) What was the occasion of this great difference in the number of cities represented in these two meetings of the cortes, I am unable to explain.

NOTE XXXIV.—Sect. III. p. 148.

A great part of the territory in Spain was engrossed by the nobility. L. Marinæus Siculus, who composed his treatise *De Rebus Hispaniæ* during the reign of Charles V., gives a catalogue of the Spanish nobility, together with the yearly rent of their estates. According to his account, which he affirms was as accurate as the nature of the subject would admit, the sum total of the annual revenue of their lands amounted to one million four hundred and eighty-two thousand ducats. If we make allowance for the great difference in the value of money in the fifteenth century from that which it now bears, and consider that the catalogue of Marinæus includes only the *titulados*, or nobility whose families were distinguished by some honorary title, their wealth must appear very great. (L. Marinæus, ap. Schott., *Script. Hispan.*, vol. i. p. 323.) The commons of Castile, in their contests with the crown, which I shall hereafter relate, complain of the extensive property of the nobility as extremely pernicious to the kingdom. In one of their manifestoes they assert that from Valladolid to St. Jago in Galicia, which was a hundred leagues, the crown did not possess more than three villages. All the rest belonged to the nobility, and could be subjected to no public burden. (Sandoval, *Vida del Emperador Carlos V.*, vol. i. p. 422.) It appears from the testimony of authors quoted by Bovadilla that these extensive possessions were bestowed upon the *ricos hombres*, *hidalgos*, and *cavalleros* by the kings of Castile in reward for the assistance which they had received from them in expelling the Moors. They likewise obtained by the same means a considerable influence in the cities, many of which anciently depended upon the nobility. *Politica para Corregidores*, Amb., 1750, fol., vol. i. pp. 440, 442.

NOTE XXXV.—Sect. III. p. 150.

I have been able to discover nothing certain, as I observed, Note XVIII., with respect to the origin of communities or free cities in Spain. It is probable that as soon as the considerable towns were recovered from the Moors the inhabitants who fixed their residence in them, being persons of distinction and credit, had all the privilege of municipal government and jurisdiction conferred upon them. Many striking proofs occur of the splendour, wealth, and power of the Spanish cities. Hieronymus Paulus

wrote a description of Barcelona in the year 1491, and compares the dimensions of the town to that of Naples, and the elegance of its buildings, the variety of its manufactures, and the extent of its commerce, to Florence. (Hieron. Paulus, ap. Schott., *Script. Hisp.*, vol. ii. p. 844.) Marinæus describes Toledo as a large and populous city. A great number of its inhabitants were persons of quality and of illustrious rank. Its commerce was great. It carried on with great activity and success the manufactures of silk and wool; and the number of inhabitants employed in these two branches of trade amounted nearly to ten thousand. (Marin., *ubi supra*, p. 308.) "I know no city," says he, "that I would prefer to Valladolid for elegance and splendour." (Ibid., p. 312.) We may form some estimate of its populousness from the following circumstances. The citizens having taken arms in the year 1516 in order to oppose a measure concerted by Cardinal Ximenes, they mustered in the city, and in the territory which belonged to it, thirty-thousand fighting-men. (Sandoval, *Vida del Emper. Carlos V.*, tom. i. p. 81.) The manufactures carried on in the towns of Spain were not intended merely for home consumption; they were exported to foreign countries, and their commerce was a considerable source of wealth to the inhabitants. The maritime laws of Barcelona are the foundation of mercantile jurisprudence in modern times, as the *Leges Rhodiæ* were among the ancients. All the commercial states in Italy adopted these laws and regulated their trade according to them. (Sandi, *Storia civile Veneziana*, vol. ii. p. 865.) It appears from several ordinances of the kings of France that the merchants of Aragon and Castile were received on the same footing and admitted to the same privileges with those of Italy. (*Ordonnances des Roys, etc.*, tom. ii. p. 135, tom. iii. pp. 166, 504, 635.) Cities in such a flourishing state became a respectable part of the society, and were entitled to a considerable share in the legislature. The magistrates of Barcelona aspired to the highest honour a Spanish subject can enjoy, that of being covered in the presence of their sovereign, and of being treated as grandes of the kingdom. *Origen de la Dignidad de Grande de Castilla, por Don Alonso Carillo, Madrid, 1657.* p. 18.

NOTE XXXVI.—Sect. III. p. 152.

The military order of St. Jago, the most honourable and opulent of the three Spanish orders, was instituted about the year 1170. The bull of confirmation by Alexander III. is dated A.D. 1176. At that time a considerable part of Spain still remained under subjection to the Moors, and the whole country was much exposed to depredations not only of the enemy, but of banditti. It is no wonder, then, that an institution the object of which was to oppose the enemies of the Christian faith, and to restrain and punish those who disturbed the public peace, should be extremely popular and meet with general encouragement. The wealth and power of the order became so great that, according to one historian, the Grand Master of St. Jago was the person in Spain of greatest power and dignity next to the king. (Æl. Anton. Nebrissensis, ap. Schott., *Script. Hisp.*, i. 812.) Another historian observes that the order possessed every thing in Castile that a king would most desire to obtain. (Zurita, *Anales*,

v. 22.) The knights took the vows of obedience, of poverty, and of conjugal chastity. By the former they were bound implicitly to obey the commands of their grand master. The order could bring into the field a thousand men-at-arms. (*Æl. Ant. Nebriss.*, p. 813.) If, as we have reason to believe, these men-at-arms were accompanied as was usual at that age, this was a formidable body of cavalry. There belonged to this order eighty-four commanderies, and two hundred priories and other benefices. (*Dissertations sur la Chevalerie*, par Hon. de Ste. Marie, p. 262.) It is obvious how formidable to his sovereign the command of these troops, the administration of such revenues, and the disposal of so many offices must have rendered a subject. The other two orders, though inferior to that of St. Jago in power and wealth, were nevertheless very considerable fraternities. When the conquest of Granada deprived the knights of St. Jago of those enemies against whom their zeal was originally directed, superstition found out a new object in defence of which they engaged to employ their courage. To their usual oath they added the following clause: "We do swear to believe, to maintain, and to contend in public and private, that the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, our Lady, was conceived without the stain of original sin." This addition was made about the middle of the seventeenth century. (Honore de Ste. Marie, *Dissertations*, etc., p. 263.) Nor is such a singular engagement peculiar to the order of St. Jago. The members of the second military order in Spain, that of Calatrava, equally zealous to employ their prowess in defence of the honours of the Blessed Virgin, have likewise professed themselves her true knights. Their vow, conceived in terms more theologically accurate than that of St. Jago, may afford some amusement to an English reader. "I vow to God, to the grand master, and to you who here represent his person, that now, and forever, I will maintain and contend that the Virgin Mary, Mother of God, our Lady, was conceived without original sin, and never incurred the pollution of it; but that in the moment of her happy conception, and of the union of her soul with her body, the Divine grace prevented and preserved her from original guilt, by the merits of the passion and death of Christ, our Redeemer, her future Son, foreseen in the Divine counsel, by which she was truly redeemed, and by a more noble kind of redemption than any of the children of Adam. In the belief of this truth, and in maintaining the honour of the most Holy Virgin, through the strength of Almighty God, I will live and will die." (*Definiciones de la Orden de Calatrava, conforme al Capitulo General en 1652*, fol., Madr., 1748, p. 153.) Though the Church of Rome hath prudently avoided to give its sanction to the doctrine of the immaculate conception, and the two great monastic orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis have espoused opposite opinions concerning it, the Spaniards are such ardent champions for the honour of the Virgin that when the present king of Spain instituted a new military order in the year 1771, in commemoration of the birth of his grandson, he put it under the immediate protection of the most Holy Mary in the mystery of her immaculate conception. (*Constituciones de la real y distinguida Orden Espaola de Carlos III.*, p. 7.) To undertake the defence of the Virgin Mary's honour had such a resemblance to that species of refined gallantry which was the original object of chivalry, that the zeal with which the military orders bound themselves, by a solemn vow, to

defend it, was worthy of a true knight in those ages when the spirit of the institution subsisted in full vigour. But in the present age it must excite some surprise to see the institution of an illustrious order connected with a doctrine so extravagant and destitute of any foundation in Scripture.

NOTE XXXVII.—Sect. III. p. 154.

I have frequently had occasion to take notice of the defects in police during the Middle Ages, occasioned by the feebleness of government and the want of proper subordination among the different ranks of men. I have observed in a former note that this greatly interrupted the intercourse between nations, and even between different places in the same kingdom. The descriptions which the Spanish historians give of the frequency of rapine, murder, and every act of violence, in all the provinces of Spain, are amazing, and present to us the idea of a society but little removed from the disorder and turbulence of that which has been called a state of nature. (Zurita, *Anales de Arag.*, i. 175; *Æl. Ant. Nebrissensis, Rer. a Ferdin., Gestar. Hist.*, ap. Schottum, ii. 849.) Though the excess of these disorders rendered the institution of the *santa hermandad* necessary, great care was taken at first to avoid giving any offence or alarm to the nobility. The jurisdiction of the judges of the hermandad was expressly confined to crimes which violated the public peace. All other offences were left to the cognizance of the ordinary judges. If a person was guilty of the most notorious perjury, in any trial before a judge of the hermandad, he could not punish him, but was obliged to remit the case to the ordinary judge of the place. (*Commentaria in Regias Hispan. Constitut.*, per Alph. de Azevedo, pars. v. p. 223, etc., fol., Duaci, 1612.) Notwithstanding these restrictions, the barons were early sensible how much the establishment of the hermandad would encroach on their jurisdiction. In Castile some opposition was made to the institution; but Ferdinand had the address to obtain the consent of the constable to the introduction of the hermandad into that part of the kingdom where his estate lay; and by that means, as well as the popularity of the institution, he surmounted every obstacle that stood in its way. (*Æl. Ant. Nebrissen*, 851.) In Aragon the nobles combined against it with great spirit; and Ferdinand, though he supported it with vigour, was obliged to make some concessions in order to reconcile them. (Zurita, *Anales de Arag.*, iv. 356.) The power and revenue of the hermandad in Castile seem to have been very great. Ferdinand, when preparing for the war against the Moors of Granada, required of the hermandad to furnish him sixteen thousand beasts of burden, together with eight thousand men to conduct them, and he obtained what he demanded. (*Æl. Ant. Nebriss.*, 881.) The hermandad has been found to be of so much use in preserving peace and restraining or detecting crimes that it is still continued in Spain; but, as it is no longer necessary either for moderating the power of the nobility or extending that of the crown, the vigour and authority of the institution diminish gradually.

NOTE XXXVIII.—Sect. III. p. 156.

Nothing is more common among antiquaries, and there is not a more copious source of error, than to decide concerning the institutions and manners of past ages by the forms and ideas which prevail in their own timea. The French lawyers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, having found their sovereigns in possession of absolute power, seem to think it a duty incumbent on them to maintain that such unbounded authority belonged to the crown in every period of their monarchy. “The government of France,” says M. de Réal, very gravely, “is purely monarchical at this day, as it was from the beginning. Our kings were absolute originally, as they are at present.” (Science du Gouvernement, tom. ii. p. 31.) It is impossible, however, to conceive two states of civil society more unlike to each other than that of the French nation under Clovis and that under Louis XV. It is evident from the codes of laws of the various tribes which settled in Gaul and the countries adjacent to it, as well as from the history of Gregory of Tours, and other early annalists, that among all these people the form of government was extremely rude and simple, and that they had scarcely began to acquire the first rudiments of that order and police which are necessary in extensive societies. The king or leader had the command of soldiers or companions, who followed his standard from choice, not by constraint. I have produced the clearest evidence of this, Note VI. An event related by Gregory of Tours, lib. iv. c. 14, affords the most striking proof of the dependence of the early French kings on the sentiments and inclination of their people. Clotaire I. having marched at the head of his army, in the year 553, against the Saxons, that people, intimidated at his approach, sued for peace, and offered to pay a large sum to the offended monarch. Clotaire was willing to close with what they proposed. But his army insisted to be led forth to battle. The king employed all his eloquence to persuade them to accept of what the Saxons were ready to pay. The Saxons, in order to soothe them, increased their original offer. The king renewed his solicitations; but the army, enraged, rushed upon the king, tore his tent in pieces, dragged him out of it, and would have slain him on the spot, if he had not consented to lead them instantly against the enemy.

If the early monarchs of France possessed such limited authority, even while at the head of their army, their prerogative during peace will be found to be still more confined. They ascended the throne not by any hereditary right, but in consequence of the election of their subjects. In order to avoid an unnecessary number of quotations, I refer my readers to Hottomanni Franco-Gallia, cap. vi. p. 47, edit. 1573, where they will find the fullest proof of this from Gregory of Tours, Amoinus, and the most authentic historians of the Merovingian kings. The effect of this election was not to invest them with absolute power. Whatever related to the general welfare of the nation was submitted to public deliberation, and determined by the suffrage of the people, in the annual assemblies called “les champs de Mars” and “les champs de Mai.” These assemblies were called *champs*, because, according to the custom of all the barbarous nations, they were held in the open air in some plain capable of containing the

vast number of persons who had a right to be present. (Jo. Jac. Sorberus de Comitiis Veterum Germanorum, vol. i § 19, etc.) They were denominated Champs de Mars and de Mai, from the months in which they were held. Every freeman seems to have had a right to be present in these assemblies. (Sorberus, *ibid.*, § 133, etc.) The ancient annals of the Franks describe the persons who were present in the assembly held A.D. 788, in these words ; “In placito Ingelheimensi convenient pontifices, maiores, minores, sacerdotes, reguli, duces, comites, præfecti, cives, oppidani.” (Apud Sorber., § 304.) There every thing that concerned the happiness of their country, says an ancient historian, every thing that could be of benefit to the Franks, was considered and enjoined. (Fredegarius, ap. Du Cange, Glossar., voc. *Campus Martii*.) Chlotharius II. describes the business and acknowledges the authority of these assemblies. “They are called,” says he, “that whatever relates to the common safety may be considered and resolved by common deliberation ; and whatever they determined, to that I will conform.” (Amoinus de Gest. Franc., lib. iv. c. i., ap. Bouquet, Recueil, iii. 116.) The statutory clauses or words of legislative authority in the decrees issued in these assemblies run not in the name of the king alone. “We have treated,” says Childebert, in a decree, A.D. 532, in the assembly of March, “together with our nobles, concerning some affairs, and we now publish the conclusion, that it may come to the knowledge of all.” (Childeb. Decret., ap. Bouquet, Recueil des Histor., tom. iv. p. 3.) “We have agreed together with our vassals.” (*Ibid.*, § 2.) “It is agreed in the assembly in which we are all united.” (*Ibid.*, § 4.) The Salic laws, the most venerable monument of French jurisprudence, were enacted in the same manner. “Dictaverunt Salicam legem proceres ipsius gentis, qui tunc temporis apud eam erant rectores. Sunt autem electi de pluribus viri quatuor—qui per tres Mallos convenientes, omnes causarum origines solcile discurrendo, tractantes de singulis, judicium decreverunt hoc modo.” (Præf. Leg. Salic., ap. Bouquet, *ibid.*, p. 122.) “Hoc decretum est apud regem et principes ejus, et apud cunctum populum christianum, qui intra regnum Merwingorum consistunt.” (*Ibid.*, p. 124.) Nay, even in their charters the kings of the first race are careful to specify that they were granted with the consent of their vassals. “Ego Childebertus, rex, una cum consensu et voluntate Francorum,” etc., A.D. 558. (Bouquet, *ibid.*, 622.) “Chlotharius III. una cum patribus nostris, episcopis, optimatibus, cæterisque palatii nostri ministris,” A.D. 664. (*Ibid.*, 648.) “De consensu fidelium nostrorum.” (Mably, Observ., tom. i. p. 239.) The historians likewise describe the functions of the king in the national assemblies in such terms as imply that his authority there was extremely small, and that every thing depended on the court itself. “Ipse rex,” says the author of Annales Francorum, speaking of the Field of March, “sedebat in sella regia, circumstante exercitu, præcipiebatque is, die illo, quicquid a Francis decretum erat.” Bouquet, Recueil, tom. ii. p. 647.

That the general assemblies exercised supreme jurisdiction over all persons and with respect to all causes is so evident as to stand in need of no proof. The trial of Brunehaut, A.D. 613, how unjust soever the sentence against her may be, as related by Fredegarius (Chron., cap. 42, Bouquet, *ibid.*, 430), is in itself sufficient proof of this. The notorious

violence and iniquity of the sentence serve to demonstrate the extent of jurisdiction which this assembly possessed, as a prince so sanguinary as Clothaire II. thought the sanction of its authority would be sufficient to justify his rigorous treatment of the mother and grandmother of so many kings.

With respect to conferring donatives on the prince, we may observe that among nations whose manners and political institutions are simple, the public, as well as individuals, having few wants, they are little acquainted with taxes, and free uncivilized tribes disdain to submit to any stated imposition. This was remarkably the case of the Germans, and of all the various people that issued from that country. Tacitus pronounces two tribes not to be of German origin, because they submitted to pay taxes. (*De Morib. Germ.*, c. 43.) And, speaking of another tribe according to the ideas prevalent in Germany, he says, "They were not degraded by the imposition of taxes." (*Ibid.*, c. 29.) Upon the settlement of the Franks in Gaul we may conclude that, while elated with the consciousness of victory, they would not renounce the high-spirited ideas of their ancestors or voluntarily submit to a burden which they regarded as a badge of servitude. The evidence of the earliest records and historians justifies this conclusion. M. de Montesquieu, in the twelfth and subsequent chapters of the thirteenth book of *L'Esprit des Loix*, and M. de Mably, *Observations sur l'Histoire de France*, tom. i. p. 247, have investigated this fact with great attention, and have proved clearly that the property of freemen among the Franks was not subject to any stated tax; that the state required nothing from persons of this rank but military service at their own expense, and that they should entertain the king in their houses when he was upon any progress through his dominions, or his officers when sent on any public employment, furnishing them with carriages and horses. Monarchs subsisted almost entirely upon the revenues of their own domains, and upon the perquisites arising from the administration of justice, together with a few small fines and forfeitures exacted from such as had been guilty of certain trespasses. It is foreign from my subject to enumerate these. The reader may find them in *Observations de M. de Mably*, vol. i. p. 267.

When any extraordinary aid was granted by freemen to their sovereign it was purely voluntary. In the annual assembly of March or May it was the custom to make the king a present of money, of horses or arms, or of some other thing of value. This was an ancient custom, and derived from their ancestors the Germans. "Mos est civitatibus, ultro ac viritim conferre principibus, vel armentorum, vel frugum, quod pro honore acceptum, etiam necessitatibus subvenit." (*Tacit., de Mor. Germ.*, c. 15.) These gifts, if we may form a judgment concerning them from the general terms in which they are mentioned by the ancient historians, were considerable, and made no small part of the royal revenue. Many passages to this purpose are produced by M. Du Cange, *Dissert. IV. sur Joinville*, p. 153. Sometimes a conquered people specified the gift which they bound themselves to pay annually, and it was exacted as a debt if they failed. (*Anales Metenses*, ap. Du Cange, *ibid.*, p. 155.) It is probable that the first step towards taxation was to ascertain the value of these gifts, which were originally gratuitous. and to compel the people

to pay the sum at which they were rated. Still, however, some memory of their original was preserved, and the aids granted to monarchs in all the kingdoms of Europe were termed *benevolences* or *free gifts*.

The kings of the second race in France were raised to the throne by the election of the people. "Pepinus rex pius," says an author who wrote a few years after the transaction which he records, "per autoritatem papæ, et unctionem sancti chrismatis et electionem omnium Francorum in regni solio sublimatus est." (*Clausula de Pepini Consecratione*, ap. Bouq., *Recueil des Histor.*, tom. v. p. 9.) At the same time, as the chief men of the nation had transferred the crown from one family to another, an oath was exacted of them that they should maintain on the throne the family which they had now promoted: "ut nunquam de alterius lumbis regem in ævo præsumant eligere." (*Ibid.*, p. 10.) This oath the nation faithfully observed during a considerable space of time. The posterity of Pepin kept possession of the throne; but with respect to the manner of dividing their dominions among their children, princes were obliged to consult the general assembly of the nation. Thus, Pepin himself, A.D. 768, appointed his two sons, Charles and Carlomannus, to reign as joint sovereigns; but he did this "una cum consensu Francorum et procerum suorum seu et episcoporum," before whom he laid the matter in their general assembly. (*Conventus apud Sanctum Dionysium*, *Capitular.*, vol. i. p. 187.) This destination the French confirmed in a subsequent assembly, which was called upon the death of Pepin; for, as Eginhart relates, they not only appointed them kings, but by their authority they regulated the limits of their respective territories. (*Vita Car. Magni*, ap. Bouquet, *Recueil*, tom. v. p. 90.) In the same manner, it was by the authority of the supreme assemblies that any dispute which arose among the descendants of the royal family was determined. Charlemagne recognizes this important part of their jurisdiction, and confirms it, in his charter concerning the partition of his dominions; for he appoints that, in case of any uncertainty with respect to the right of the several competitors, he whom the people choose shall succeed to the crown. *Capitular.*, vol. i. p. 442.

Under the second race of kings, the assemblies of the nation, distinguished by the name of *conventus*, *malli*, *placita*, were regularly assembled once a year at least, and frequently twice in the year. One of the most valuable monuments of the history of France is the treatise of Hincmarus, archbishop of Rheims, *De Ordine Palatii*. He died A.D. 882, only sixty-eight years after Charlemagne, and he relates in that short discourse the facts which were communicated to him by Adalhardus, a minister and confidant of Charlemagne. From him we learn that this great monarch never failed to hold the general assembly of his subjects every year. "In quo placito generalitas universorum majorum tam clericorum quam laicorum conveniebat." (*Hincm.*, *Oper.*, edit. Sirmondi, vol. ii. c. 29, p. 211.) In these assemblies matters which related to the general safety and state of the kingdom were always discussed before they entered upon any private or less important business. (*Ibid.*, c. 33, p. 213.) His immediate successors imitated his example, and transacted no affair of importance without the advice of their great council.

Under the second race of kings the genius of the French government

continued to be in a good measure democratical. The nobles, the dignified ecclesiastics, and the great officers of the crown were not the only members of the national council; the people, or the whole body of freemen, either in person or by their representatives, had a right to be present in it. Hincmarus, in describing the manner of holding the general assemblies, says that if the weather was favourable they met in the open air; but if otherwise, they had different apartments allotted to them; so that the dignified clergy were separated from the laity, and the “*comites vel hujusmodi principes sibimet honorificabiliter a cetera multitudine segregantur.*” (*Ibid.*, c. 35, p. 114.) Agobardus, archbishop of Lyons, thus describes a national council in the year 833, wherein he was present: “*Qui ubique conventus extitit ex reverendissimis episcopis, et magnificientissimis viris illustribus, collegio quoque abbatum et comitum, promiscueque aetatis et dignitatis populo.*” The *cetera multitudo* of Hincmarus is the same with the *populus* of Agobardus, and both describe the inferior order of freemen, the same who were afterwards known in France by the name of the third estate, and in England by the name of commons. The people, as well as the members of higher dignity, were admitted to a share of the legislative power. Thus, by a law, A.D. 803, it is ordained, “That the question shall be put to the people with respect to every new law, and if they shall agree to it they shall confirm it by their signature.” (*Capit.*, vol. i. p. 394.) There are two capitularia which convey to us a full idea of the part which the people took in the administration of government. When they felt the weight of any grievance, they had a right to petition the sovereign for redress. One of these petitions, in which they desire that ecclesiastics might be exempted from bearing arms and from serving in person against the enemy, is still extant. It is addressed to Charlemagne, A.D. 803, and expressed in such terms as could have been used only by men conscious of liberty, and of the extensive privileges which they possessed. They conclude with requiring him to grant their demand if he wished that they should any longer continue faithful subjects to him. That great monarch, instead of being offended or surprised at the boldness of their petition, received it in a most gracious manner, and signified his willingness to comply with it. But, sensible that he himself did not possess legislative authority, he promises to lay the matter before the next general assembly, that such things as were of common concern to all might be there considered and established by common consent. (*Capitul.*, tom. i. pp. 405—409.) As the people by their petitions brought matters to be proposed in the general assembly, we learn from another capitulare the form in which they were approved there and enacted as laws. The propositions were read aloud, and then the people were required to declare whether they assented to them or not. They signified their assent by crying three times, “We are satisfied;” and then the capitulare was confirmed by the subscription of the monarch, the clergy, and the chief men of the laity. (*Capitul.*, tom. i. p. 627, A.D. 822.) It seems probable from a capitulare of Carolus Calvus, A.D. 851, that the sovereign could not refuse his assent to what was proposed and established by his subjects in the general assembly. (*Tit. ix. § 6*; *Capitul.*, vol. ii. p. 47.) It is unnecessary to multiply quotations concerning the legislative power of the national assembly of France under

the second race, or concerning its right to determine with regard to peace and war. The uniform style of the *Capitularia* is an abundant confirmation of the former. The reader who desires any further information with respect to the latter may consult *Les Origines ou l'ancien Gouvernement de la France*, etc., tom. iii. p. 87, etc. What has been said with respect to the admission of the people or their representatives into the supreme assembly merits attention, not only in tracing the progress of the French government, but on account of the light which it throws upon a similar question agitated in England concerning the time when the commons became part of the legislative body in that kingdom.

NOTE XXXIX.—SECT. III. p. 158

That important change which the constitution of France underwent when the legislative power was transferred from the great council of the nation to the king has been explained by the French antiquaries with less care than they bestow in illustrating other events in their history. For that reason I have endeavoured with greater attention to trace the steps which led to this memorable revolution. I shall here add some particulars which tend to throw additional light upon it. The *Leges Salicæ*, the *Leges Burgundionum*, and other codes published by the several tribes which settled in Gaul were general laws extending to every person, to every province and district where the authority of those tribes was acknowledged. But they seem to have become obsolete; and the reason of their falling into disuse is very obvious. Almost the whole property of the nation was allodial when these laws were framed. But when the feudal institutions became general, and gave rise to an infinite variety of questions peculiar to that species of tenure, the ancient codes were of no use in deciding with regard to these, because they could not contain regulations applicable to cases which did not exist at the time when they were compiled. This considerable change in the nature of property made it necessary to publish the new regulations contained in the *capitularia*. Many of these, as is evident from the perusal of them, were public laws extending to the whole French nation, in the general assembly of which they were enacted. The weakness of the greater part of the monarchs of the second race, and the disorder into which the nation was thrown by the depredations of the Normans, encouraged the barons to usurp an independent power formerly unknown in France. The nature and extent of that jurisdiction which they assumed I have formerly considered. The political union of the kingdom was at an end, its ancient constitution was dissolved, and only a feudal relation subsisted between the king and his vassals. The regal jurisdiction extended no further than the domains of the crown. Under the last kings of the second race these were reduced almost to nothing. Under the first kings of the third race they comprehended little more than the patrimonial estate of Hugh Capet, which he annexed to the crown. Even with this accession they continued to be of small extent. (Velly, *Hist. de France*, tom. iii. p. 32.) Many of the most considerable provinces in France did not at first acknowledge Hugh Capet as a lawful monarch. There are still extant several charters, granted during the first years of his reign, with this remarkable clause in

the form of dating the charter: “*Deo regnante, rege expectante, regnante Domino nostro Jesu Christo Francis autem contra jus regnum usurpante Ugone rege.*” (Bouquet, Recueil, tom. x. p. 544.) A monarch whose title was thus openly disputed was not in a condition to assert the royal jurisdiction, or to limit that of the barons.

All these circumstances rendered it easy for the barons to usurp the rights of royalty within their own territories. The Capitularia became no less obsolete than the ancient laws; local customs were everywhere introduced, and became the sole rule by which all civil transactions were conducted and all causes were tried. The wonderful ignorance which became general in France during the ninth and tenth centuries contributed to the introduction of customary law. Few persons, except ecclesiastics, could read; and as it was not in the power of such illiterate persons to have recourse to written laws, either as their guide in business or their rule in administering justice, the customary law, the knowledge of which was preserved by tradition, universally prevailed.

During this period the general assembly of the nation seems not to have been called, nor to have once exerted its legislative authority. Local customs regulated and decided everything. A striking proof of this occurs in tracing the progress of the French jurisprudence. The last of the Capitularia collected by M. Baluze was issued in the year 921, by Charles the Simple. A hundred and thirty years elapsed from that period to the publication of the first ordinance of the kings of the third race, contained in the great collection of M. Laurière, and the first ordinance which appears to be an act of legislation extending to the whole kingdom is that of Philip Augustus, A.D. 1190. (Ordon., tom. i. pp. 1, 18.) During that long period of two hundred and sixty-nine years all transactions were directed by local customs, and no addition was made to the statutory law of France. The ordinances previous to the reign of Philip Augustus contain regulations the authority of which did not extend beyond the king's domains.

Various instances occur of the caution with which the kings of France ventured at first to exercise legislative authority. M. l'Abbé de Mably produces an ordinance of Philip Augustus, A.D. 1206, concerning the Jews, who in that age were in some measure the property of the lord in whose territories they resided. But it is rather a treaty of the king with the Countess of Champagne and the Compte de Dampierre, than an act of royal power; and the regulations in it seem to be established not so much by his authority as by their consent. (Observat. sur l'Hist. de France, ii. p. 355.) In the same manner an ordinance of Louis VIII. concerning the Jews, A.D. 1223, is a contract between the king and his nobles with respect to their manner of treating that unhappy race of men. (Ordon., tom. i. p. 47.) The Establissemens of St. Louis, though well adapted to serve as general laws to the whole kingdom, were not published as such, but only as a complete code of customary law, to be of authority within the king's domains. The wisdom, the equity, and the order conspicuous in that code of St. Louis procured it a favourable reception throughout the kingdom. The veneration due to the virtues and good intentions of its author contributed not a little to reconcile the nation to that legislative authority which the king began to assume. Soon after the reign of

St. Louis, the idea of the king's possessing supreme legislative power became common. "If," says Beaumanoir, "the king makes any establishment specially for his own domain, the barons may nevertheless adhere to their ancient customs; but if the establishment be general it shall be current throughout the whole kingdom, and we ought to believe that such establishments are made with mature deliberation, and for the general good." (Coust. de Beauvoisis, c. 48, p. 265.) Though the kings of the third race did not call the general assembly of the nation during the long period from Hugh Capet to Philip the Fair, yet they seem to have consulted the bishops and barons who happened to be present in their court, with respect to any new law which they published. Examples of this occur, Ordon., tom. i. p. 3 et 5. This practice seems to have continued as late as the reign of St. Louis, when the legislative authority of the crown was well established. (Ordon., tom. i. p. 58, A.D. 1246.) This attention paid to the barons facilitated the kings' acquiring such full possession of the legislative power as enabled them afterwards to exercise it without observing that formality.

The assemblies distinguished by the name of the states-general were first called A.D. 1302, and were held occasionally from that period to the year 1614, since which time they have not been summoned. These were very different from the ancient assemblies of the French nation under the kings of the first and second race. There is no point with respect to which the French antiquaries are more generally agreed than in maintaining that the states-general had no suffrage in the passing of laws and possessed no proper legislative jurisdiction. The whole tenor of the French history confirms this opinion. The form of proceeding in the states-general was this. The king addressed himself, at opening the meeting, to the whole body assembled in one place, and laid before them the affairs on account of which he had summoned them. Then the deputies of each of the three orders, of nobles, of clergy, and of the third estate, met apart, and prepared their *cahier*, or memorial, containing their answer to the propositions which had been made to them, together with the representations which they thought proper to lay before the king. These answers and representations were considered by the king in his council, and generally gave rise to an ordinance. These ordinances were not addressed to the three estates in common. Sometimes the king addressed an ordinance to each of the estates in particular. Sometimes he mentioned the assembly of the three estates. Sometimes mention is made only of the assembly of that estate to which the ordinance is addressed. Sometimes no mention at all is made of the assembly of estates, which suggested the propriety of enacting the law. *Préface au tom. iii. des Ordons.*, p. xx.

Thus the states-general had only the privilege of advising and remonstrating; the legislative authority resided in the king alone.

NOTE XL.—Sect. III. p. 162.

If the parliament of Paris be considered only as the supreme court of justice, everything relative to its origin and jurisdiction is clear and obvious. It is the ancient court of the king's palace, new-modelled,

rendered stationary, and invested with an extensive and ascertained jurisdiction. The power of this court while employed in this part of its functions is not the object of present consideration. The pretensions of the parliament to control the exercise of the legislative authority, and its claim of a right to interpose with respect to public affairs and the political administration of the kingdom, lead to inquiries attended with great difficulty. As the officers and members of the parliament of Paris were anciently nominated by the king, were paid by him, and on several occasions were removed by him at pleasure (*Chronique scandaleuse de Louis XI.* chez les Mém. de Comines, tom. ii. p. 51, édit. de M. Lenglet de Fresnoy), they cannot be considered as representatives of the people, nor could they claim any share in the legislative power as acting in their name. We must therefore search for some other source of this high privilege. 1. The parliament was originally composed of the most eminent persons in the kingdom. The peers of France, ecclesiastics of the highest order, and noblemen of illustrious birth, were members of it, to whom were added some clerks and councillors learned in the laws. (*Pasquier, Recherches*, p. 44, etc.; *Encyclopédie*, tom. xii. art. *Parlement*, pp. 3, 5.) A court thus constituted was properly a committee of the states-general of the kingdom, and was composed of those barons and *fideles* whom the kings of France were accustomed to consult with regard to every act of jurisdiction or legislative authority. It was natural, therefore, during the intervals between the meetings of the states-general, or during those periods when that assembly was not called, to consult the parliament, to lay matters of public concern before it, and to obtain its approbation and concurrence, before any ordinance was published, to which the people were required to conform. 2. Under the second race of kings, every new law was reduced into proper form by the chancellor of the kingdom, was proposed by him to the people, and, when enacted, was committed to him to be kept among the public records, that he might give authentic copies of it to all who should demand them. (*Hincmar, de Ord. Palat.*, c. 16; *Capitul. Car. Calv.*, tit. xiv. § 11, tit. xxxiii.) The chancellor presided in the parliament of Paris at its first institution. (*Encyclopédie*, tom. iii. art. *Chancelier*, p. 88.) It was, therefore, natural for the king to continue to employ him in his ancient functions of framing, taking into his custody, and publishing the ordinances which were issued. To an ancient copy of the Capitularia of Charlemagne the following words are subjoined: "Anno tertio clementissimi domini nostri Caroli Augusti, sub ipso anno, hæc facta Capitula sunt, et consignata Stephano comiti, ut hæc manifesta faceret Parisiis mallo publico, et illa legere faceret coram scabineis, quod ita et fecit, et omnes in uno consenserunt, quod ipsi voluissent observare usque in posterum, etiam omnes scabinei, episcopi, abbates, comites, manu propria subter signaverunt." (*Bouquet, Recueil*, tom. v. p. 663.) *Mallus* signifies not only the public assembly of the nation, but the court of justice held by the comes, or missus dominicus. *Scabinei* were the judges, or the assessors of the judges, in that court. Here, then, seenis to be a very early instance not only of laws being published in a court of justice, but of their being verified or confirmed by the subscription of the judges. If this was the common practice, it naturally introduced the verifying of edicts in the parliament of Paris. But this conjecture I propose with that diffidence

which I have felt in all my reasonings concerning the laws and institutions of foreign nations. 3. This supreme court of justice in France was dignified with the appellation of parliament, the name by which the general assembly of the nation was distinguished towards the close of the second race of kings ; and men, both in reasoning and in conduct, were wonderfully influenced by the similarity of names. The preserving the ancient names of the magistrates established while the republican government subsisted in Rome enabled Augustus and his successors to assume new powers with less observation and greater ease. The bestowing the same name in France upon two courts which were extremely different contributed not a little to confound their jurisdictions and functions.

All these circumstances concurred in leading the kings of France to avail themselves of the parliament of Paris as the instrument of reconciling the people to the exercise of legislative authority by the crown. The French, accustomed to see all new laws examined and authorized before they were published, did not sufficiently distinguish between the effect of performing this in the national assembly or in a court appointed by the king. But as that court was composed of respectable members, and who were well skilled in the laws of their country, when any new edict received its sanction, that was sufficient to dispose the people to submit to it.

When the practice of *verifying* and *registering* the royal edicts in the parliament of Paris became common, the parliament contended that this was necessary in order to give them legal authority. It was established as a fundamental maxim in French jurisprudence that no law could be published in any other manner ; that without this formality no edict or ordinance could have any effect ; that the people were not bound to obey it, and ought not to consider it as an edict or ordinance, until it was verified in the supreme court after free deliberation. (*Roche-flavin des Parlemens de France*, 4to, Gen., 1621, p. 921.) The parliament, at different times, hath, with great fortitude and integrity, opposed the will of their sovereigns, and, notwithstanding their repeated and peremptory requisitions and commands, hath refused to verify and publish such edicts as it conceived to be oppressive to the people or subversive of the constitution of the kingdom. Roche-flavin reckons that between the year 1562 and the year 1589 the parliament refused to verify more than a hundred edicts of the kings. (*Ibid.*, 925.) Many instances of the spirit and constancy with which the parliaments of France opposed pernicious laws and asserted their own privileges are enumerated by Limnaeus in his *Notitiae Regni Francie*, lib. i. c. 9, p. 224.

But the power of the parliament to maintain and defend this privilege bore no proportion to its importance, or to the courage with which the members asserted it. When any monarch was determined that an edict should be carried into execution, and found the parliament inflexibly resolved not to verify or publish it, he could easily supply this defect by the plenitude of his regal power. He repaired to the parliament in person, he took possession of his seat of justice, and commanded the edict to be read, verified, registered, and published in his presence. Then, according to another maxim of French law, the king himself being present, neither the parliament nor any magistrate whatever can exercise any authority or perform any function. “*Adveniente principe, cessat magistratus.*” (Roche-

flavin, *ibid.*, pp. 928, 929; *Encyclopédie*, tom. ix., art. *Lit de Justice*, p. 581.) Roche-flavin mentions several instances of kings who actually exerted this prerogative, so fatal to the residue of the rights and liberties transmitted to the French by their ancestors. Pasquier produces some instances of the same kind. (Rech., p. 61.) Limnæus enumerates many other instances; but the length to which this note has swelled prevents me from inserting them at length, though they tend greatly to illustrate this important article in the French history (p. 245). Thus, by an exertion of prerogative which, though violent, seems to be constitutional, and is justified by innumerable precedents, all the efforts of the parliament to limit and control the king's legislative authority are rendered ineffectual.

I have not attempted to explain the constitution or jurisdiction of any parliament in France but that of Paris. All of them are formed upon the model of that most ancient and respectable tribunal, and all my observations concerning it will apply with full force to them.

NOTE XLI.—Sect. III. p. 166.

The humiliating posture in which a great emperor implored absolution is an event so singular that the words in which Gregory himself describes it merit a place here, and convey a striking picture of the arrogance of that pontiff: “Per triduum, ante portam castri, deposito omni regio cultu, miserabiliter, utpote discalceatus, et laneis indutus, persistens, non prius cum multo fletu apostolicæ miserationis auxilium et consolationem implorari destitit, quam omnes qui ibi aderant, et ad quos rumor ille pervenit, ad tantam pietatem, et compassionis misericordiam movit, ut pro eo multis precibus et lacrymis intercedentes, omnes quidem insolitam nostræ mentis duritatem mirarentur; nonnulli vero in nobis non apostolicæ sedis gravitatem, sed quasi tyrannicæ feritatis crudelitatem esse clamarent.” Epist. Gregor., ap. Memorie della Contessa Matilda da Fran. Mar. Fiorentini, Lucca, 1756, vol. i. p. 174.

NOTE XLII.—Sect. III. p. 174.

As I have endeavoured in the history to trace the various steps in the progress of the constitution of the empire, and to explain the peculiarities in its policy very fully, it is not necessary to add much by way of illustration. What appears to be of any importance I shall range under distinct heads.

1. With respect to the power, jurisdiction, and revenue of the emperors. A very just idea of these may be formed by attending to the view which Pfeffel gives of the rights of the emperors at two different periods. The first at the close of the Saxon race, A.D. 1024. These, according to his enumeration, were the right of conferring all the great ecclesiastical benefices in Germany; of receiving the revenues of them during a vacancy; of mortmain, or of succeeding to the effects of ecclesiastics who died intestate. The right of confirming or of annulling the elections of the popes. The right of assembling councils, and of appointing them to decide concerning the affairs of the Church. The right of conferring the title of king upon their vassals. The right of granting vacant fiefs. The right of receiving

the revenues of the empire, whether arising from the imperial domains, from imposts and tolls, from gold or silver mines, from the taxes paid by the Jews, or from forfeitures. The right of governing Italy as its proper sovereigns. The right of erecting free cities and of establishing fairs in them. The right of assembling the diets of the empire and of fixing the time of their duration. The right of coining money, and of conferring that privilege on the states of the empire. The right of administering both high and low justice within the territories of the different states. (*Abrége*, p. 160.) The other period is at the extinction of the emperors of the families of Luxemburg and Bavaria, A.D. 1437. According to the same author, the imperial prerogatives at that time were the right of conferring all dignities and titles, except the privilege of being a state of the empire. The right of *preces primariae*, or of appointing once during their reign a dignitary in each chapter or religious house. The right of granting dispensations with respect to the age of majority. The right of erecting cities, and of conferring the privilege of coining money. The right of calling the meetings of the diet and of presiding in them. (*Abrége*, etc., p. 507.) It were easy to show that Mr. Pfeffel is well founded in all these assertions, and confirm them by the testimony of the most respectable authors. In the one period the emperors appear as mighty sovereigns with extensive prerogatives; in the other, as the heads of a confederacy with very limited powers.

The revenues of the emperors decreased still more than their authority. The early emperors, and particularly those of the Saxon line, besides their great patrimonial or hereditary territories, possessed an extensive domain both in Italy and Germany, which belonged to them as emperors. Italy belonged to the emperors as their proper kingdom, and the revenues which they drew from it were very considerable. The first alienations of the imperial revenue were made in that country. The Italian cities, having acquired wealth, and aspiring at independence, purchased their liberty from different emperors, as I have observed, Note XV. The sums which they paid, and the emperors with whom they concluded these bargains, are mentioned by Casp. Klockius de Ærario, Norimb., 1671, p. 85, etc. Charles IV. and his son Wenceslaus dissipated all that remained of the Italian branch of the domain. The German domain lay chiefly upon the banks of the Rhine, and was under the government of the counts palatine. It is not easy to mark out the boundaries or to estimate the value of this ancient domain, which has been so long incorporated with the territories of different princes. Some hints with respect to it may be found in the glossary of Speidelius, which he has entitled *Speculum Juridico-Philologico-Politico-Historicum Observationum*, etc., Norimb., 1673, vol. i. pp. 679, 1045. A more full account of it is given by Klockius de Ærario, p. 84. Besides this, the emperors possessed considerable districts of land lying intermixed with the estates of the dukes and barons. They were accustomed to visit these frequently, and drew from their vassals in each what was sufficient to support their court during the time of their residence among them. (*Annalistæ*, ap. Struv., tom. i. p. 611.) A great part of these detached possessions was seized by the nobles during the long interregnum, or during the wars occasioned by the contests between the emperors and the court of Rome. At the same time that such encroachments were made on the fixed

or territorial property of the emperors, they were robbed almost entirely of their casual revenues, the princes and barons appropriating to themselves taxes and duties of every kind, which had usually been paid to them. (Pfeffel, *Abrége*, p. 374.) The profuse and inconsiderate ambition of Charles IV. squandered whatever remained of the imperial revenues after so many defalcations. He, in the year 1376, in order to prevail with the electors to choose his son Wenceslaus king of the Romans, promised each of them a hundred thousand crowns. But being unable to pay so large a sum, and eager to secure the election to his son, he alienated to the three ecclesiastical electors, and to the count palatine, such countries as still belonged to the imperial domain on the banks of the Rhine, and likewise made over to them all the taxes and tolls then levied by the emperors in that district. Trithemius, and the author of the Chronicle of Magdeburg, enumerate the territories and the taxes which were thus alienated, and represent this as the last and fatal blow to the imperial authority. (Struv., Corp., vol. i. p. 437.) From that period the shreds of the ancient revenues possessed by the emperors have been so inconsiderable that, in the opinion of Speidelius, all that they yield would be so far from defraying the expense of supporting their household that they would not pay the charge of maintaining the posts established in the empire. (Speidelii Speculum, etc., vol. i. p. 680.) These funds, inconsiderable as they were, continued to decrease. Granvelle, the minister of Charles V., asserted in the year 1546, in presence of several of the German princes, that his master drew no money at all from the empire. (Sleid., History of the Reformation, Lond., 1689, p. 372.) The same is the case at present. (Traité du Droit public de l'Empire, par M. le Coq de Villeray, p. 55.) From the reign of Charles IV., whom Maximilian called the "pest of the empire," the emperors have depended entirely on their hereditary dominions as the chief and almost the only source of their power, and even of their subsistence.

2. The ancient mode of electing the emperors, and the various changes which it underwent, require some illustration. The imperial crown was originally attained by election, as well as those of most monarchies in Europe. An opinion long prevailed among the antiquaries and public lawyers of Germany that the right of choosing the emperors was vested in the archbishops of Mentz, Cologne, and Treves, the king of Bohemia, the duke of Saxony, the marquis of Brandenburg, and the count palatine of the Rhine, by an edict of Otho III., confirmed by Gregory V. about the year 996. But the whole tenor of history contradicts this opinion. It appears that from the earliest period in the history of Germany the person who was to reign over all was elected by the suffrage of all. Thus, Conrad I. was elected by all the people of the Franks, say some annalists; by all the princes and chief men, say others; by all the nations, say others. (See their words, Struv., Corp., p. 211; Conringius de German. Imper. Repub. Acroamata Sex., Ebroduni, 1654, p. 103.) In the year 1024, posterior to the supposed regulations of Otho III., Conrad II. was elected by all the chief men, and his election was approved and confirmed by the people. (Struv., Corp., p. 284.) At the election of Lotharius II., A.D. 1125, sixty thousand persons of all ranks were present. He was named by the chief men, and their nomination was approved by the people. (Struv., Corp., p. 357.) The first author who mentions the seven electors is Martinus

Polonus, who flourished in the reign of Frederic II., which ended A.D. 1250. We find that in all the ancient elections to which I have referred the princes of the greatest power and authority were allowed by their countrymen to name the person whom they wished to appoint emperor, and the people approved or disapproved of their nomination. This privilege of voting first is called by the German lawyers the right of *prætaxation*. (Pfeffel, Abrégé, p. 316.) This was the first origin of the exclusive right which the electors acquired. The electors possessed the most extensive territories of any princes in the empire; all the great offices of the state were in their hands by hereditary right; as soon as they obtained or engrossed so much influence in the election as to be allowed the right of *prætaxation*, it was vain to oppose their will, and it even became unnecessary for the inferior ecclesiastics and barons to attend, when they had no other function but that of confirming the deed of these more powerful princes by their assent. During times of turbulence, the subordinate members of the Germanic body could not resort to the place of election without a retinue of armed vassals, the expense of which they were obliged to defray out of their own revenues; and, finding their attendance to be unnecessary, they were unwilling to waste them to no purpose. The rights of the seven electors were supported by all the descendants and allies of their powerful families, who shared in the splendour and influence which they enjoyed by this distinguishing privilege. (Pfeffel, Abrégé, p. 376.) The seven electors were considered as the representatives of all the orders which composed the highest class of German nobility. There were three archbishops, chancellors of the three great districts into which the empire was anciently divided, one king, one duke, one marquis, and one count. All these circumstances contributed to render the introduction of this considerable innovation into the constitution of the Germanic body extremely easy. Every thing of importance relating to this branch of the political state of the empire is well illustrated by Onuphrius Panvanius, an Augustinian monk of Verona, who lived in the reign of Charles V. His treatise, if we make some allowance for that partiality which he expresses in favour of the powers which the popes claimed in the empire, has the merit of being one of the first works in which a controverted point in history is examined with critical precision and with a proper attention to that evidence which is derived from records or the testimony of contemporary historians. It is inserted by Goldastus in his *Politica Imperialia*, p. 2.

As the electors have engrossed the sole right of choosing the emperors, they have assumed likewise that of deposing them. This high power the electors have not only presumed to claim, but have ventured, in more than one instance, to exercise. In the year 1298 a part of the electors deposed Adolphus of Nassau and substituted Albert of Austria in his place. The reasons on which they found their sentence show that this deed flowed from factious, not from public-spirited, motives. (Struv., Corp., vol. i. p. 540.) In the first year of the fifteenth century the electors deposed Wenceslaus and placed the imperial crown on the head of Rupert, elector palatine. The act of deposition is still extant. (Goldasti Constit., vol. i. p. 379.) It is pronounced in the name and by the authority of the electors, and confirmed by several prelates and barons of the empire,

who were present. These exertions of the electoral power demonstrate that the imperial authority was sunk very low.

The other privileges of the electors, and the rights of the electoral college, are explained by the writers on the public law in Germany.

3. With respect to the diets, or general assemblies of the empire, it would be necessary, if my object were to write a particular history of Germany, to enter into a minute detail concerning the forms of assembling them, the persons who have a right to be present, their division into several colleges or benches, the objects of their deliberation, the mode in which they carry on their debates or give their suffrages, and the authority of their decrees or recesses. But, as my only object is to give the outlines of the constitution of the German empire, it will be sufficient to observe that originally the diets of the empire were exactly the same with the assemblies of March and of May, held by the kings of France. They met at least once a year. Every freeman had a right to be present. They were assemblies in which a monarch deliberated with his subjects concerning their common interest. (*Arumæus de Comitiis Rom. German. Imperii*, 4to, Jenæ, 1660, cap. 7, no. 20, etc.) But when the princes, dignified ecclesiastics, and barons acquired territorial and independent jurisdiction, the diet became an assembly of the separate states, which formed the confederacy of which the emperor was head. While the constitution of the empire remained in its primitive form, attendance on the diets was a duty, like the other services due from feudal subjects to their sovereign, which the members were bound to perform in person; and if any member who had a right to be present in the diet neglected to attend in person, he not only lost his vote, but was liable to a heavy penalty. (*Arumæus de Comit.*, c. 5, no. 40.) Whereas, from the time that the members of the diet became independent states, the right of suffrage was annexed to the territory or dignity, not to the person. The members, if they could not, or would not, attend in person, might send their deputies, as princes send ambassadors, and they were entitled to exercise all the rights belonging to their constituents. (*Ibid.*, no. 42, 46, 49.) By degrees, and upon the same principle of considering the diet as an assembly of independent states, in which each confederate had the right of suffrage, if any member possessed more than one of those states or characters which entitle to a seat in the diet, he was allowed a proportional number of suffrages. (*Pfeffel, Abrégé*, p. 622.) From the same cause, the imperial cities, as soon as they became free and acquired supreme and independent jurisdiction within their own territories, were received as members of the diet. The powers of the diet extend to every thing relative to the common concern of the Germanic body or that can interest or affect it as a confederacy. The diet takes no cognizance of the interior administration in the different states, unless that happens to disturb or threaten the general safety.

4. With respect to the imperial chamber, the jurisdiction of which has been the great source of order and tranquillity in Germany, it is necessary to observe that this court was instituted in order to put an end to the calamities occasioned by private wars in Germany. I have already traced the rise and progress of this practice, and pointed out its pernicious effects as fully as their extensive influence during the Middle Ages required. In

Germany, private wars seem to have been more frequent and productive of worse consequences than in the other countries of Europe. There are obvious reasons for this. The nobility of Germany were extremely numerous, and the causes of their dissension multiplied in proportion. The territorial jurisdiction which the German nobles acquired was more complete than that possessed by their order in other nations. They became, in reality, independent powers, and they claimed all the privileges of that character. The long interregnum from A.D. 1256 to A.D. 1273 accustomed them to an uncontrolled license, and led them to forget that subordination which is necessary in order to maintain public tranquillity. At the time when the other monarchs of Europe began to acquire such an increase of power and revenues as added new vigour to their government, the authority and revenues of the emperors continued gradually to decline. The diets of the empire, which alone had authority to judge between such mighty barons, and power to enforce its decisions, met very seldom. (Conring., *Acroamata*, p. 234.) The diets, when they did assemble, were often composed of several thousand members (Chronic. Constant., ap. Struv., Corp., i. 546), and were tumultuary assemblies, ill qualified to decide concerning any question of right. The session of the diet continued only two or three days (Pfeffel, *Abregé*, p. 244); so that they had no time to hear or discuss any cause that was in the smallest degree intricate. Thus Germany was left, in some measure, without any court of judicature capable of deciding the contests between its more powerful members, or of repressing the evils occasioned by their private wars.

All the expedients which were employed in other countries of Europe in order to restrain this practice, and which I have described, Note XXI., were tried in Germany with little effect. The confederacies of the nobles and of the cities, and the division of Germany into various circles, which I mentioned in that note, were found likewise insufficient. As a last remedy, the Germans had recourse to arbiters, whom they called *austregae*. The barons and states in different parts of Germany joined in conventions, by which they bound themselves to refer all controversies that might arise between them to the determination of *austregae*, and to submit to their sentences as final. These arbiters are named sometimes in the treaty of convention, an instance of which occurs in Ludewig, *Reliquiae Manuscr. omnis Ævi*, vol. ii. p. 212; sometimes they were chosen by mutual consent upon occasion of any contest that arose; sometimes they were appointed by neutral persons; and sometimes the choice was left to be decided by lot. (Datt., *de Pace Publica Imperii*, lib. i. cap. 27, no. 60, etc.; Speidelius, *Speculum*, etc., voc. *Austrag.*, p. 95.) Upon the introduction of this practice, the public tribunals of justice became in a great measure useless, and were almost entirely deserted.

In order to re-establish the authority of government, Maximilian I. instituted the imperial chamber at the period which I have mentioned. This tribunal consisted originally of a president, who was always a nobleman of the first order, and of sixteen judges. The president was appointed by the emperor, and the judges partly by him, and partly by the states, according to forms which it is unnecessary to describe. A sum was imposed, with their own consent, on the states of the empire, for paying the salaries of the judges and officers in this court. The imperial

chamber was established first at Frankfort-on-the-Main. During the reign of Charles V. it was removed to Spires, and continued in that city above a century and a half. It is now fixed at Wetzlar. This court takes cognizance of all questions concerning civil right between the states of the empire, and passes judgment in the last resort, and without appeal. To it belongs likewise the privilege of judging in criminal causes, which may be considered as connected with the preservation of the public peace. Pfeffel, Abrégé, p. 560.

All causes relating to points of feudal right or jurisdiction, together with such as respect the territories which hold of the empire in Italy, belong properly to the jurisdiction of the aulic council. This tribunal was formed upon the model of the ancient court of the palace instituted by the emperors of Germany. It depended not upon the states of the empire, but upon the emperor, he having the right of appointing at pleasure all the judges of whom it is composed. Maximilian, in order to procure some compensation for the diminution of his authority by the powers vested in the imperial chamber, prevailed on the diet, A.D. 1512, to give its consent to the establishment of the aulic council. Since that time it has been a great object of policy in the court of Vienna to extend the jurisdiction and support the authority of the aulic council, and to circumscribe and weaken those of the imperial chamber. The tedious forms and dilatory proceedings of the imperial chamber have furnished the emperors with pretexts for doing so. "Lites Spiræ," according to the witticism of a German lawyer, "spirant, sed nunquam expirant." Such delays are unavoidable in a court composed of members named by many different states jealous of each other. Whereas the judges of the aulic council, depending upon one master, and being responsible to him alone, are more vigorous and decisive. Puffendorf, *De Statu Imper. German.*, cap. v. § 20; Pfeffel, Abrégé, p. 581.

NOTE XLIII.—Sect. III. p. 177.

The description which I have given of the Turkish government is conformable to the accounts of the most intelligent travellers who have visited that empire. The Count de Marsigli, in his treatise concerning the military state of the Turkish empire, ch. vi., and the author of *Observations on the Religion, Laws, Government, and Manners of the Turks*, published at London, 1768, vol. i. p. 81, differ from other writers who have described the political constitution of that powerful monarchy. As they had opportunity, during their long residence in Turkey, to observe the order and justice conspicuous in several departments of administration, they seem unwilling to admit that it should be denominated a despotism. But when the form of government in any country is represented to be despotic, this does not suppose that the power of the monarch is continually exerted in acts of violence, injustice, and cruelty. Under political constitutions of every species, unless when some frantic tyrant happens to hold the sceptre, the ordinary administration of government must be conformable to the principles of justice, and, if not active in promoting the welfare of the people, cannot certainly have their destruction for its object. A state in which the sovereign possesses the absolute command of a vast military

force, together with the disposal of an extensive revenue, in which the people have no privileges and no part either immediate or remote in legislation, in which there is no body of hereditary nobility, jealous of their own rights and distinctions, to stand as an intermediate order between the prince and the people, cannot be distinguished by any name but that of a despotism. The restraints, however, which I have mentioned, arising from the *capiculy* and from religion, are powerful. But they are not such as change the nature or denomination of the government. When a despotic prince employs an armed force to support his authority, he commits the supreme power to their hands. The prætorian bands in Rome dethroned, murdered, and exalted their princes in the same wanton manner with the soldiery of the Porte at Constantinople. But, notwithstanding this, the Roman emperors have been considered by all political writers as possessing despotic powers.

The author of *Observations on the Religion, Laws, Government, and Manners of the Turks*, in a preface to the second edition of his work, hath made some remarks on what is contained in this note and in that part of the text to which it refers. It is with diffidence I set my opinion in opposition to that of a person who has observed the government of the Turks with attention and has described it with abilities. But, after a careful review of the subject, to me the Turkish government still appears of such a species as can be ranged in no class but that to which political writers have given the name of *despotism*. There is not in Turkey any constitutional restraint upon the will of the sovereign, or any barrier to circumscribe the exercise of his power, but the two which I have mentioned: one afforded by religion, the principle upon which the authority of the sultan is founded, the other by the army, the instrument which he must employ to maintain his power. The author represents the *ulema*, or body of the law, as an intermediate order between the monarch and the people. (Pref., p. 30.) But whatever restraint the authority of the *ulema* may impose upon the sovereign is derived from religion. The *moulahs* out of whom the mufti and other chief officers of the law must be chosen, are ecclesiastics. It is as interpreters of the Koran or divine will that they are objects of veneration. The check, then, which they give to the exercise of arbitrary power is not different from one of those of which I took notice. Indeed, this restraint cannot be very considerable. The mufti, who is the head of the order, as well as every inferior officer of law, is named by the sultan, and is removable at his pleasure. The strange means employed by the *ulema* in 1746 to obtain the dismission of a minister whom they hated is a manifest proof that they possess but little constitutional authority which can serve as a restraint upon the will of the sovereign. (*Observat.*, p. 92 of 2d edit.) If the author's idea be just, it is astonishing that the *body of the law* should have no method of remonstrating against the errors of administration but by setting fire to the capital.

The author seems to consider the *capiculy*, or soldiery of the Porte, neither as formidable instruments of the sultan's power nor as any restraint upon the exercise of it. His reasons for this opinion are that the number of the *capiculy* is small in proportion to the other troops which compose the Turkish armies, and that in time of peace they are undisciplined.

(Pref., 2d edit., p. 23, etc.) But the troops stationed in a capital, though their number be not great, are always masters of the sovereign's person and power. The praetorian bands bore no proportion to the legionary troops in the frontier provinces. The soldiery of the Porte are more numerous, and must possess power of the same kind, and be equally formidable, sometimes to the sovereign, and oftener to the people. However much the discipline of the janizaries may be neglected at present, it certainly was not so in that age to which alone my description of the Turkish government applies. The author observes (Pref., p. 29) that the janizaries never deposed any sultan of themselves, but that some form of law, true or false, has been observed, and that either the mufti, or some other minister of religion, has announced to the unhappy prince the law which renders him unworthy of the throne. (Observ., p. 102.) This will always happen. In every revolution, though brought about by military power, the deeds of the soldiery must be confirmed and carried into execution with the civil and religious formalities peculiar to the constitution.

This addition to the note may serve as a further illustration of my own sentiments, but is not made with an intention of entering into any controversy with the author of Observations, etc., to whom I am indebted for the obliging terms in which he has expressed his remarks upon what I had advanced. Happy were it for such as ventured to communicate their opinions to the world, if every animadversion upon them were conveyed with the same candid and liberal spirit. In one particular, however, he seems to have misapprehended what I meant. (Pref., p. 17.) I certainly did not mention his or Count Marsigli's long residence in Turkey as a circumstance which should detract from the weight of their authority. I took notice of it in justice to my readers, that they might receive my opinion with distrust, as it differed from that of persons whose means of information were so far superior to mine.

NOTE XLIV.—Sect. III. p. 178.

The institution, the discipline, and privileges of the janizaries are described by all the authors who give any account of the Turkish government. The manner in which enthusiasm was employed in order to inspire them with courage is thus related by Prince Cantemir: "When Amurath I. had formed them into a body, he sent them to Haji Bektash, a Turkish saint, famous for his miracles and prophecies, desiring him to bestow on them a banner, to pray God for their success, and to give them a name. The saint, when they appeared in his presence, put the sleeve of his gown upon one of their heads, and said, Let them be called *Yengicheri*. Let their countenance be ever bright, their hands victorious, their swords keen; let their spear always hang over the heads of their enemies, and wherever they go, may they return with a shining face." (History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 38.) The number of janizaries at the first institution of the body was not considerable. Under Solymann, in the year 1521, they amounted to twelve thousand. Since that time their number has greatly increased. (Marsigli, Etat. etc., ch. xvi. p. 68.) Though Solymann possessed such abilities and authority as to restrain this formidable body within the bounds of obedience, yet its tendency to limit the power

of the sultans was, even in that age, foreseen by sagacious observers. Nicolas Daulphinois, who accompanied M. d'Aramon, ambassador from Henry II. of France to Solyman, published an account of his travels, in which he describes and celebrates the discipline of the janizaries, but at the same time predicts that they would one day become formidable to their masters, and act the same part at Constantinople as the praetorian bands had done at Rome. Collection of Voyages from the Earl of Oxford's Library, vol. i. p. 599.

NOTE XLV.—Sect. III. p. 166.

Solyman the Magnificent, to whom the Turkish historians have given the surname of *canuni*, or institutor of rules, first brought the finances and military establishment of the Turkish empire into a regular form. He divided the military force into the *capiculy*, or soldiery of the Porte, which was properly the standing army, and *serrataculy*, or soldiers appointed to guard the frontiers. The chief strength of the latter consisted of those who held timariots and ziams. These were portions of land granted to certain persons for life, in much the same manner as the military fiefs among the nations of Europe, in return for which military service was performed. Solyman, in his *Canun-Name*, or book of regulations, fixed with great accuracy the extent of these lands in each province of his empire, appointed the precise number of soldiers each person who held a timariot or a ziam should bring into the field, and established the pay which they should receive while engaged in service. Count Marsigli and Sir Paul Rycaut have given extracts from this book of regulations, and it appears that the ordinary establishment of the Turkish army exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand men. When these were added to the soldiery of the Porte, they formed a military power greatly superior to what any Christian state could command in the sixteenth century. (Marsigli, *Etat Militaire*, etc., p. 136; Rycaut's State of the Ottoman Empire, book iii. ch. ii.) As Solyman, during his active reign, was engaged so constantly in war, that his troops were always in the field, the *serrataculy* became almost equal to the janizaries themselves in discipline and valour.

It is not surprising, then, that the authors of the sixteenth century should represent the Turks as far superior to the Christians both in the knowledge and in the practice of the art of war. Guicciardini informs us that the Italians learned the art of fortifying towns from the Turks. (*Histor.*, lib. xv. p. 266.) Busbequius, who was ambassador from the emperor Ferdinand to Solyman, and who had opportunity to observe the state both of the Christian and Turkish armies, published a discourse concerning the best manner of carrying on war against the Turks, in which he points out at great length the immense advantages which the infidels possessed with respect to discipline and military improvements of every kind. (Busbequii *Opera*, edit. Elzevir, p. 393, etc.) The testimony of other authors might be added, if the matter were in any degree doubtful.

Before I conclude these Proofs and Illustrations, I ought to explain the reason of two omissions in them: one of which it is necessary to mention

on my own account, the other to obviate an objection to this part of the work.

In all my inquiries and disquisitions concerning the progress of government, manners, literature, and commerce during the Middle Ages, as well as in my delineations of the political constitution of the different states of Europe at the opening of the sixteenth century, I have not once mentioned M. de Voltaire, who in his *Essai sur l'Histoire générale* has reviewed the same period, and has treated of all these subjects. This does not proceed from an inattention to the works of that extraordinary man, whose genius, no less enterprising than universal, has attempted almost every different species of literary composition. In many of these he excels. In all, if he had left religion untouched, he is instructive and agreeable. But, as he seldom imitates the example of modern historians in citing the authors from whom they derived their information, I could not with propriety appeal to his authority in confirmation of any doubtful or unknown fact. I have often, however, followed him as my guide in these researches; and he has not only pointed out the facts with respect to which it was of importance to inquire, but the conclusions which it was proper to draw from them. If he had at the same time mentioned the books which relate these particulars, a great part of my labour would have been unnecessary, and many of his readers who now consider him only as an entertaining and lively writer would find that he is a learned and well-informed historian.

As to the other omission, every intelligent reader must have observed that I have not entered, either in the historical part of this volume or in the Proofs and Illustrations, into the same detail with respect to the ancient laws and customs of the British kingdoms as concerning those of the other European nations. As the capital facts with regard to the progress of government and manners in their own country are known to most of my readers, such a detail appeared to me to be less essential. Such facts and observations, however, as were necessary towards completing my design in this part of the work, I have mentioned under the different articles which are the subjects of my disquisitions. The state of government in all the nations of Europe having been nearly the same during several ages, nothing can tend more to illustrate the progress of the English constitution than a careful inquiry into the laws and customs of the kingdoms on the Continent. This source of information has been too much neglected by the English antiquaries and lawyers. Filled with admiration of that happy constitution now established in Great Britain, they have been more attentive to its forms and principles than to the condition and ideas of remote times, which in almost every particular differ from the present. While engaged in perusing the laws, charters, and early historians of the Continental kingdoms, I have often been led to think that an attempt to illustrate the progress of English jurisprudence and policy by a comparison with those of other kingdoms in a similar situation would be of great utility, and might throw much light on some points which are now obscure, and decide others which have been long controverted.

HISTORY OF THE REIGN
OF THE
EMPEROR CHARLES THE FIFTH.



HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES THE FIFTH.

BOOK I.

Birth of Charles V.—His Hereditary Dominions.—Philip and Joanna, his Parents.—Birth of Ferdinand, his Brother.—Death of Isabella.—Philip's Attempts to obtain the Government of Castile.—The Regent Ferdinand marries a Niece of the French King to exclude Philip and his Daughter.—The Castilian Nobility declare for Philip.—Philip and Joanna proclaimed.—Death of Philip.—Incapacity of Joanna.—Ferdinand made Regent.—His Acquisition of Territory.—His Death.—Education of Charles V.—Cardinals Ximenes and Adrian.—Charles acknowledged King.—Ximenes strengthens the Royal Power; is opposed by the Nobles.—War in Navarre and in Africa.—Peace with France.—Charles visits Spain.—His Ingratitude towards Ximenes.—Death of the Latter.—Discontent of the Castilians.—Corruption of the King's Flemish Favourite.—Reception of Charles in Aragon.—Death of the Emperor Maximilian.—Charles and Francis I. Competitors for the Empire.—Views of the other Reigning Potentates.—Assembly of the Electors.—The Crown offered to Frederic of Saxony.—He declines in Favour of Charles, who is chosen.—Discontent of the Spaniards.—Insurrection in Valencia.—The Cortes of Castile summoned to meet in Galicia.—Charles appoints Regents, and embarks for the Low Countries.

CHARLES V. was born at Ghent on the 24th day of February, in the year 1500. His father, Philip the Handsome, archduke of Austria, was the son of the emperor Maximilian, and of Mary, the only child of Charles the Bold, the last prince of the house of Burgundy. His mother, Joanna, was the second daughter

of Ferdinand, king of Aragon, and of Isabella, queen of Castile.

A long train of fortunate events had opened the way for this young prince to the inheritance of more extensive dominions than any European monarch since Charlemagne had possessed. Each of his ancestors had acquired kingdoms or provinces towards which their prospect of succession was extremely remote. The rich possessions of Mary of Burgundy had been destined for another family, she having been contracted by her father to the only son of Louis XI. of France; but that capricious monarch, indulging his hatred to her family, chose rather to strip her of part of her territories by force than to secure the whole by marriage; and by this misconduct, fatal to his posterity, he threw all the Netherlands and Franche-Comté into the hands of a rival. Isabella, the daughter of John II. of Castile, far from having any prospect of that noble inheritance which she transmitted to her grandson, passed the early part of her life in obscurity and indigence. But the Castilians, exasperated against her brother, Henry IV., an ill-advised and vicious prince, publicly charged him with impotence and his queen with adultery. Upon his demise, rejecting Joanna, whom Henry had uniformly, and even on his death-bed, owned to be his lawful daughter, and whom an assembly of the states had acknowledged to be the heir of his kingdom, they obliged her to retire into Portugal and placed Isabella on the throne of Castile. Ferdinand owed the crown of Aragon to the unexpected death of his elder brother, and acquired the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily by violating the faith of treaties and disregarding the ties of blood. To all these kingdoms Christopher Columbus, by an effort of genius and of intrepidity the boldest and most successful that is recorded in the annals of mankind, added a new world, the wealth of which became one

considerable source of the power and grandeur of the Spanish monarchs.

Don John, the only son of Ferdinand and Isabella, and their eldest daughter, the Queen of Portugal, being cut off, without issue, in the flower of youth, all their hopes centred in Joanna and her posterity. But as her husband, the archduke, was a stranger to the Spaniards, it was thought expedient to invite him into Spain, that by residing among them he might accustom himself to their laws and manners; and it was expected that the cortes, or assembly of states, whose authority was then so great in Spain that no title to the crown was reckoned valid unless it received their sanction, would acknowledge his right of succession, together with that of the infanta, his wife. Philip and Joanna, passing through France in their way to Spain, were entertained in that kingdom with the utmost magnificence. The archduke did homage to Louis XII. for the earldom of Flanders, and took his seat as a peer of the realm in the parliament of Paris. They were received in Spain with every mark of honour that the parental affection of Ferdinand and Isabella, or the respect of their subjects, could devise; and their title to the crown was soon after acknowledged by the cortes of both kingdoms.

But amidst these outward appearances of satisfaction and joy some secret uneasiness preyed upon the mind of each of these princes. The stately and reserved ceremonial of the Spanish court was so burdensome to Philip, a prince young, gay, affable, fond of society and of pleasure, that he soon began to express a desire of returning to his native country, the manners of which were more suited to his temper. Ferdinand, observing the declining health of his queen, with whose life he knew that his right to the government of Castile must cease, easily foresaw that a prince of Philip's disposition, and who already discovered an extreme impatience to

reign, would never consent to his retaining any degree of authority in that kingdom ; and the prospect of this diminution of his power awakened the jealousy of that ambitious monarch.

Isabella beheld with the sentiments natural to a mother the indifference and neglect with which the archduke treated her daughter, who was destitute of those beauties of person as well as those accomplishments of mind which fix the affections of a husband. Her understanding, always weak, was often disordered. She doted on Philip with such an excess of childish and indiscreet fondness as excited disgust rather than affection. Her jealousy, for which her husband's behaviour gave her too much cause, was proportioned to her love, and often broke out in the most extravagant actions. Isabella, though sensible of her defects, could not help pitying her condition, which was soon rendered altogether deplorable by the archduke's abrupt resolution of setting out in the middle of winter for Flanders and of leaving her in Spain. Isabella entreated him not to abandon his wife to grief and melancholy, which might prove fatal to her, as she was near the time of her delivery. Joanna conjured him to put off his journey for three days only, that she might have the pleasure of celebrating the festival of Christmas in his company. Ferdinand, after representing the imprudence of his leaving Spain before he had time to become acquainted with the genius or to gain the affections of the people who were one day to be his subjects, besought him at least not to pass through France, with which kingdom he was then at open war. Philip, without regarding either the dictates of humanity or the maxims of prudence, persisted in his purpose, and on the 22nd of December set out for the Low Countries by the way of France.¹

¹ Petri Martyris Anglerii Epistola, 250, 253.

From the moment of his departure, Joanna sunk into a deep and sullen melancholy,² and while she was in that situation bore Ferdinand, her second son, for whom the power of his brother Charles afterwards procured the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, and to whom he at last transmitted the imperial sceptre. Joanna was the only person in Spain who discovered no joy at the birth of this prince. Insensible to that, as well as to every other pleasure, she was wholly occupied with the thoughts of returning to her husband; nor did she in any degree recover tranquillity of mind until she arrived at Brussels next year.³ [1504.]

Philip, in passing through France, had an interview with Louis XII., and signed a treaty with him, by which he hoped that all the differences between France and Spain would have been finally terminated. But Ferdinand, whose affairs at that time were extremely prosperous in Italy, where the superior genius of Gon-salvo de Còrdova, the great captain, triumphed on every occasion over the arms of France, did not pay the least regard to what his son-in-law had concluded, and carried on hostilities with greater ardour than ever.

From this time Philip seems not to have taken any part in the affairs of Spain, waiting in quiet till the death either of Ferdinand or of Isabella should open the way to one of their thrones. The latter of these events was not far distant. The untimely death of her son and eldest daughter had made a deep impression on the mind of Isabella; and as she could derive but little consolation for the losses which she had sustained either from her daughter Joanna, whose infirmities daily increased, or from her son-in-law, who no longer preserved even the appearance of a decent respect towards that unhappy princess, her spirits and health began

² Petri Martyris Anglerii Epis-
tolæ, 255.

³ Mariana, lib. 27, c. 11, 14.—
Fléchier, Vie de Ximénès, i. 191.

gradually to decline, and, after languishing some months, she died at Medina del Campo on the 26th of November, 1504. She was no less eminent for virtue than for wisdom; and, whether we consider her behaviour as a queen, as a wife, or as a mother, she is justly entitled to the high encomiums bestowed upon her by the Spanish historians.⁴

A few weeks before her death, she made her last will, and, being convinced of Joanna's incapacity to assume the reins of government into her own hands, and having no inclination to commit them to Philip, with whose conduct she was extremely dissatisfied, she appointed Ferdinand regent or administrator of the affairs of Castile until her grandson Charles should attain the age of twenty. She bequeathed to Ferdinand likewise one-half of the revenues which should arise from the Indies, together with the grand masterships of the three military orders,—dignities which rendered the person who possessed them almost independent, and which Isabella had for that reason annexed to the crown.⁵ But before she signed a deed so favourable to Ferdinand she obliged him to swear that he would not, by a second marriage, or by any other means, endeavour to deprive Joanna or her posterity of their right of succession to any of his kingdoms.⁶

Immediately upon the queen's death, Ferdinand resigned the title of king of Castile, and issued orders to proclaim Joanna and Philip the sovereigns of that kingdom. But at the same time he assumed the character of regent, in consequence of Isabella's testament; and not long after, he prevailed on the cortes of Castile to acknowledge his right to that office. This, however, he did not procure without difficulty, nor without dis-

⁴ P. Martyr. Ep., 279.

⁵ P. Martyr, Ep., 277.—Mariana, Hist., lib. 28. c. 11.—Ferre-

ras, Hist. génér. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 263.

⁶ Mariana, Hist., lib. 28, c. 14.

covering such symptoms of alienation and disgust among the Castilians as filled him with great uneasiness. The union of Castile and Aragon for almost thirty years had not so entirely extirpated the ancient and hereditary enmity which subsisted between the natives of these kingdoms that the Castilian pride could submit without murmuring to the government of a king of Aragon. Ferdinand's own character, with which the Castilians were well acquainted, was far from rendering his authority desirable. Suspicious, discerning, severe, and parsimonious, he was accustomed to observe the most minute actions of his subjects with a jealous attention, and to reward their highest services with little liberality; and they were now deprived of Isabella, whose gentle qualities, and partiality to her Castilian subjects, often tempered his austerity or rendered it tolerable. The maxims of his government were especially odious to the grandes; for that artful prince, sensible of the dangerous privileges conferred upon them by the feudal institutions, had endeavoured to curb their exorbitant power⁷ by extending the royal jurisdiction, by protecting their injured vassals, by increasing the immunities of cities, and by other measures equally prudent. From all these causes a formidable party among the Castilians united against Ferdinand, and, though the persons who composed it had not hitherto taken any public step in opposition to him, he plainly saw that upon the least encouragement from their new king they would proceed to the most violent extremities.

There was no less agitation in the Netherlands upon receiving the accounts of Isabella's death and of Ferdinand's having assumed the government of Castile. Philip was not of a temper tamely to suffer himself to be supplanted by the ambition of his father-in-law. If Joanna's infirmities and the nonage of Charles rendered

⁷ Mariana, Hist., lib. 28, c. 12.

them incapable of government, he, as a husband, was the proper guardian of his wife, and, as a father, the natural tutor of his son. Nor was it sufficient to oppose to these just rights, and to the inclination of the people of Castile, the authority of a testament the genuineness of which was perhaps doubtful, and its contents to him appeared certainly to be iniquitous. A keener edge was added to Philip's resentment, and new vigour infused into his councils, by the arrival of Don John Manuel. He was Ferdinand's ambassador at the imperial court, but upon the first notice of Isabella's death repaired to Brussels, flattering himself that under a young and liberal prince he might attain to power and honours which he could never have expected in the service of an old and frugal master. He had early paid court to Philip, during his residence in Spain, with such assiduity as entirely gained his confidence, and, having been trained to business under Ferdinand, could oppose his schemes with equal abilities, and with arts not inferior to those for which that monarch was distinguished.*

By the advice of Manuel, ambassadors were despatched to require Ferdinand to retire into Aragon, and to resign the government of Castile to those persons whom Philip should intrust with it until his own arrival in that kingdom. Such of the Castilian nobles as had discovered any dissatisfaction with Ferdinand's administration were encouraged by every method to oppose it. At the same time a treaty was concluded with Louis XIII., by which Philip flattered himself that he had secured the friendship and assistance of that monarch.

Meanwhile, Ferdinand employed all the arts of address and policy in order to retain the power of which he had got possession. By means of Conchillos, an

* Zurita. *Anales de Aragon*, tom. vi. p. 12.

Aragonian gentleman, he entered into a private negotiation with Joanna, and prevailed on that weak princess to confirm, by her authority, his right to the regency. But this intrigue did not escape the penetrating eye of Don John Manuel: Joanna's letter of consent was intercepted, Conchillos was thrown into a dungeon, she herself confined to an apartment in the palace, and all her Spanish domestics secluded from her presence.⁹

The mortification which the discovery of this intrigue occasioned to Ferdinand was much increased by his observing the progress which Philip's emissaries made in Castile. Some of the nobles retired to their castles; others to the towns in which they had influence; they formed themselves into confederacies and began to assemble their vassals. Ferdinand's court was almost totally deserted,—not a person of distinction but Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo, the duke of Alva, and the marquis of Denia, remaining there; while the houses of Philip's ambassadors were daily crowded with noblemen of the highest rank.

Exasperated at this universal defection, and mortified, perhaps, with seeing all his schemes defeated by a younger politician, Ferdinand resolved, in defiance of the law of nature and of decency, to deprive his daughter and her posterity of the crown of Castile, rather than renounce the regency of that kingdom. His plan for accomplishing this was no less bold than the intention itself was wicked. He demanded in marriage Joanna, the supposed daughter of Henry IV., on the belief of whose illegitimacy Isabella's right to the crown of Castile was founded; and by reviving the claim of this princess, in opposition to which he himself had formerly led armies and fought battles, he hoped once more to get possession of the throne of

⁹ P. Martyr, Ep., 287.—Zurita, Anales, vi. 14.

that kingdom. But Emanuel, king of Portugal, in whose dominions Joanna resided at that time, having married one of Ferdinand's daughters by Isabella, refused his consent to that unnatural match; and the unhappy princess herself, having lost all relish for the objects of ambition by being long immured in a convent, discovered no less aversion to it.¹⁰

The resources, however, of Ferdinand's ambition were not exhausted. Upon meeting with a repulse in Portugal, he turned towards France, and sought in marriage Germaine de Foix, a daughter of the viscount of Narbonne, and of Mary, the sister of Louis XII. The war which that monarch had carried on against Ferdinand in Naples had been so unfortunate that he listened with joy to a proposal which furnished him with an honourable pretence for concluding peace; and though no prince was ever more remarkable than Ferdinand for making all his passions bend to the maxims of interest or become subservient to the purposes of ambition, yet so vehement was his resentment against his son-in-law that the desire of gratifying it rendered him regardless of every other consideration. In order to be revenged of Philip by detaching Louis from his interest, and in order to gain a chance of excluding him from his hereditary throne of Aragon and the dominions annexed to it, he was ready once more to divide Spain into separate kingdoms, though the union of these was the great glory of his reign and had been the chief object of his ambition; he consented to restore the Neapolitan nobles of the French faction to their possessions and honours, and submitted to the ridicule of marrying, in an advanced age, a princess of eighteen.¹¹

¹⁰ Sandoval, Hist. of Civil Wars in Castile, Lond., 1655, p. 5.—Zurita, *Anales de Aragon*, vi. 213.

¹¹ P. Martyr. Ep., 290, 292.—Mariana, lib. 28, c. 16, 17.

The conclusion of this match, which deprived Philip of his only ally and threatened him with the loss of so many kingdoms, gave him a dreadful alarm, and convinced Don John Manuel that there was now a necessity of taking other measures with regard to the affairs of Spain.¹² He accordingly instructed the Flemish ambassadors in the court of Spain to testify the strong desire which their master had of terminating all differences between him and Ferdinand in an amicable manner, and his willingness to consent to any conditions that would re-establish the friendship which ought to subsist between a father and a son-in-law. Ferdinand, though he had made and broken more treaties than any prince of any age, was apt to confide so far in the sincerity of other men, or to depend so much upon his own address and their weakness, as to be always extremely fond of a negotiation. He listened with eagerness to the declarations, and soon concluded a treaty at Salamanca, in which it was stipulated that the government of Castile should be carried on in the joint names of Joanna, of Ferdinand, and of Philip, and that the revenues of the crown, as well as the right of conferring offices, should be shared between Ferdinand and Philip by an equal division.¹³

Nothing, however, was farther from Philip's thoughts than to observe this treaty. His sole intention in proposing it was to amuse Ferdinand and to prevent him from taking any measures for obstructing his voyage into Spain. It had that effect. Ferdinand, sagacious as he was, did not for some time suspect his design; and though, when he perceived it, he prevailed on the king of France not only to remonstrate against the archduke's journey, but to threaten hostilities if he should undertake it,—though he solicited the duke of

¹² P. Martyr. Ep., 293.

19.—P. Martyr. Ep., 293, 294.

¹³ Zurita, *Anales de Aragon*, vi.

Gueldres to attack his son-in-law's dominions in the Low Countries,—Philip and his consort nevertheless set sail with a numerous fleet and a good body of land-forces. They were obliged by a violent tempest to take shelter in England, where Henry VII., in compliance with Ferdinand's solicitations, detained them upwards of three months:¹⁴ at last they were permitted to depart, and, after a more prosperous voyage, they arrived in safety at Corunna in Galicia, nor durst Ferdinand attempt, as he once intended, to oppose their landing by force of arms. [1506.]

The Castilian nobles, who had been obliged hitherto to conceal or to dissemble their sentiments, now declared openly in favour of Philip. From every corner of the kingdom, persons of the highest rank, with numerous retinues of their vassals, repaired to their new sovereign. The treaty of Salamanca was universally condemned, and all agreed to exclude from the government of Castile a prince who, by consenting to disjoin Aragon and Naples from that crown, discovered so little concern for its true interests. Ferdinand, meanwhile, abandoned by almost all the Castilians, disconcerted by their revolt, and uncertain whether he should peaceably relinquish his power or take arms in order to maintain it, earnestly solicited an interview with his son-in-law, who, by the advice of Manuel, studiously avoided it. Convinced at last, by seeing the number and zeal of Philip's adherents daily increase, that it was vain to think of resisting such a torrent, Ferdinand consented, by treaty, to resign the regency of Castile into the hands of Philip, to retire into his hereditary dominions of Aragon, and to rest satisfied with the masterships of the military orders, and that share of the revenue of the Indies which Isabella had bequeathed to him. Though an interview between the

¹⁴ Ferreras, Hist., viii. 285.

princes was no longer necessary, it was agreed to on both sides from motives of decency. Philip repaired to the place appointed with a splendid retinue of Castilian nobles and a considerable body of armed men. Ferdinand appeared without any pomp, attended by a few followers mounted on mules, and unarmed. On that occasion Don John Manuel had the pleasure of displaying before the monarch whom he had deserted the extensive influence which he had acquired over his new master; while Ferdinand suffered, in presence of his former subjects, the two most cruel mortifications which an artful and ambitious prince can feel,—being at once overreached in conduct and stripped of power.¹⁵

Not long after, he retired into Aragon; and, hoping that some favourable accident would soon open the way to his return into Castile, he took care to protest, though with great secrecy, that the treaty concluded with his son-in-law, being extorted by force, ought to be deemed void of all obligation.¹⁶

Philip took possession of his new authority with a youthful joy. The unhappy Joanna, from whom he derived it, remained, during all these contests, under the dominion of a deep melancholy; she was seldom allowed to appear in public; her father, though he had often desired it, was refused access to her; and Philip's chief object was to prevail on the cortes to declare her incapable of government, that an undivided power might be lodged in his hands until his son should attain to full age. But such was the partial attachment of the Castilians to their native princess that, though Manuel had the address to gain some members of the cortes assembled at Valladolid, and others were willing

¹⁵ Zurita, *Anales de Aragon*, vi. 64.—Mariana, lib. 28, c. 19, 20.—P. Martyr. Ep., 304, 305, etc.

¹⁶ Zurita, *Anales de Aragon*, vi. 68.—Ferreras, *Hist.* viii. 290.

to gratify their new sovereign in his first request, the great body of the representatives refused their consent to a declaration which they thought so injurious to the blood of their monarchs.¹⁷ They were unanimous, however, in acknowledging Joanna and Philip queen and king of Castile, and their son Charles prince of Asturias.

This was almost the only memorable event during Philip's administration. A fever put an end to his life in the twenty-eighth year of his age, when he had not enjoyed the regal dignity, which he had been so eager to obtain, full three months.¹⁸

The whole royal authority in Castile ought, of course, to have devolved upon Joanna. But the shock occasioned by a disaster so unexpected as the death of her husband completed the disorder of her understanding and her incapacity for government. During all the time of Philip's sickness, no entreaty could prevail on her, though in the sixth month of her pregnancy, to leave him for a moment. When he expired, however, she did not shed one tear or utter a single groan. Her grief was silent and settled. She continued to watch the dead body with the same tenderness and attention as if it had been alive,¹⁹ and, though at last she permitted it to be buried, she soon removed it from the tomb to her own apartment. There it was laid upon a bed of state, in a splendid dress; and, having heard from some monk a legendary tale of a king who revived after he had been dead fourteen years, she kept her eyes almost constantly fixed on the body, waiting for the happy moment of its return to life. Nor was this capricious affection for her dead husband less tinctured with jealousy than that which she had borne to him when alive. She did not permit any of her female

¹⁷ Zurita, *Anales de Aragon*, vi. 75.

¹⁸ Mariana, lib. 28, c. 23. [1506.]
¹⁹ P. Martyr, Ep., 316.

attendants to approach the bed on which his corpse was laid; she would not suffer any woman who did not belong to her family to enter the apartment; and, rather than grant that privilege to a midwife, though a very aged one had been chosen on purpose, she bore the princess Catharine without any other assistance than that of her own domestics.²⁰

A woman in such a state of mind was little capable of governing a great kingdom; and Joanna, who made it her sole employment to bewail the loss and to pray for the soul of her husband, would have thought her attention to public affairs an impious neglect of those duties which she owed to him. But though she declined assuming the administration herself, yet, by a strange caprice of jealousy, she refused to commit it to any other person; and no entreaty of her subjects could persuade her to name a regent, or even to sign such papers as were necessary for the execution of justice and the security of the kingdom.

The death of Philip threw the Castilians into the greatest perplexity. It was necessary to appoint a regent, both on account of Joanna's frenzy and the infancy of her son; and as there was not among the nobles any person so eminently distinguished, either by superiority in rank or abilities, as to be called by the public voice to that high office, all naturally turned their eyes either towards Ferdinand or towards the emperor Maximilian. The former claimed that dignity as administrator for his daughter, and by virtue of the testament of Isabella; the latter thought himself the legal guardian of his grandson, whom, on account of his mother's infirmities, he already considered as king of Castile. Such of the nobility as had lately been most active in compelling Ferdinand to resign the government of the kingdom trembled at the thoughts

²⁰ Mariana, Hist., lib. 29, c. 3, 5.—P. Martyr, Ep., 318, 324, 328, 332.

of his being restored so soon to his former dignity. They dreaded the return of a monarch not apt to forgive, and who to those defects with which they were already acquainted added that resentment which the remembrance of their behaviour, and reflection upon his own disgrace, must naturally have excited. Though none of these objections lay against Maximilian, he was a stranger to the laws and manners of Castile; he had not either troops or money to support his pretensions, nor could his claim be admitted without a public declaration of Joanna's incapacity for government, an indignity to which, notwithstanding the notoriety of her distemper, the delicacy of the Castilians could not bear the thoughts of subjecting her.

Don John Manuel, however, and a few of the nobles who considered themselves most obnoxious to Ferdinand's displeasure, declared for Maximilian, and offered to support his claim with all their interest. Maximilian, always enterprising and decisive in council, though feeble and dilatory in execution, eagerly embraced the offer. But a series of ineffectual negotiations was the only consequence of this transaction. The emperor, as usual, asserted his right in a high strain, promised a great deal, and performed nothing.²¹

A few days before the death of Philip, Ferdinand had set out for Naples, that by his own presence he might put an end with greater decency to the vice-royalty of the Great Captain, whose important services and cautious conduct did not screen him from the suspicions of his jealous master. Though an account of his son-in-law's death reached him at Porto-fino, in the territories of Genoa, he was so solicitous to discover the secret intrigues which he supposed the Great Captain to have been carrying on, and to establish his own authority on a firm foundation in the Neapolitan do-

²¹ Mariana, lib. 29, c. 7.—Zurita, Anales de Aragon, vi. 93.

minions by removing him from the supreme command there, that rather than discontinue his voyage he chose to leave Castile in a state of anarchy, and even to risk by this delay his obtaining possession of the government of that kingdom.²²

Nothing but the great abilities and prudent conduct of his adherents could have prevented the bad effects of this absence. At the head of these was Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo, who, though he had been raised to that dignity by Isabella contrary to the inclination of Ferdinand, and though he could have no expectation of enjoying much power under the administration of a master little disposed to distinguish him by extraordinary marks of attention, was nevertheless so disinterested as to prefer the welfare of his country before his own grandeur, and to declare that Castile could never be so happily governed as by a prince whom long experience had rendered thoroughly acquainted with its true interest. The zeal of Ximenes to bring over his countrymen to this opinion induced him to lay aside somewhat of his usual austerity and haughtiness. He condescended on this occasion to court the disaffected nobles, and employed address, as well as arguments, to persuade them. Ferdinand seconded his endeavours with great art; and by concessions to some of the grandes, by promises to others, and by letters full of complaisance to all, he gained many of his most violent opponents.²³ Though many cabals were formed, and some commotions were excited, yet when Ferdinand, after having settled the affairs of Naples, arrived in Castile, he entered upon the administration without opposition. The prudence with which he exercised his authority in that kingdom equalled the good fortune by which he had recovered it. By a moderate but steady

²² Zurita, *Anales de Aragon*, vi. 85.

²³ Ibid., vi. 87, 94, 109.

administration, free from partiality and from resentment, he entirely reconciled the Castilians to his person, and secured to them, during the remainder of his life, as much domestic tranquillity as was consistent with the genius of the feudal government, which still subsisted among them in full vigour.²⁴

Nor was the preservation of tranquillity in his hereditary kingdoms the only obligation which the Archduke Charles owed to the wise regency of his grandfather. It was his good fortune, during that period, to have very important additions made to the dominions over which he was to reign. On the coast of Barbary, Oran, and other conquests of no small value, were annexed to the crown of Castile by Cardinal Ximenes, who, with a spirit very uncommon in a monk, led in person a numerous army against the Moors of that country, and, with a generosity and magnificence still more singular, defrayed the whole expense of the expedition out of his own revenues.²⁵ In Europe, Ferdinand, under pretences no less frivolous than unjust, as well as by artifices the most shameful and treacherous, expelled John d'Albret, the lawful sovereign, from the throne of Navarre, and, seizing that kingdom, extended the limits of the Spanish monarchy from the Pyrenees on the one hand to the frontiers of Portugal on the other.²⁶

It was not, however, the desire of aggrandizing the archduke which influenced Ferdinand in this or in any other of his actions. He was more apt to consider that young prince as a rival who might one day wrest out of his hands the government of Castile, than as a grandson for whose interest he was entrusted with the administration. This jealousy soon begot aversion, and even hatred, the symptoms of which he was at no pains to conceal. Hence proceeded his immoderate joy when

²⁴ Mariana, lib. 29, c. 10.

²⁵ Ibid., lib. 29, c. 18.

²⁶ Ibid., lib. 30, c. 11, 12, 18,
24.

his young queen was delivered of a son, whose life would have deprived Charles of the crowns of Aragon, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia; and upon the untimely death of that prince he discovered, for the same reason, an excessive solicitude to have other children. This impatience hastened, in all probability, the accession of Charles to the crown of Spain. Ferdinand, in order to procure a blessing of which, from his advanced age and the intemperance of his youth, he could have little prospect, had recourse to his physicians, and by their prescription took one of those potions which are supposed to add vigour to the constitution, though they more frequently prove fatal to it. This was its effect on a frame so feeble and exhausted as that of Ferdinand; for though he survived a violent disorder which it at first occasioned, it brought on such an habitual langour and dejection of mind as rendered him averse from any serious attention to public affairs, and fond of frivolous amusements, on which he had not hitherto bestowed much time.²⁷ Though he now despaired of having any son of his own, his jealousy of the archduke did not abate, nor could he help viewing him with that aversion which princes often bear to their successors. In order to gratify this unnatural passion, he made a will appointing Prince Ferdinand, who, having been born and educated in Spain, was much beloved by the Spaniards, to be regent of all his kingdoms until the arrival of the archduke his brother; and by the same deed he settled upon him the grand-mastership of the three military orders. The former of these grants might have put it in the power of the young prince to have disputed the throne with his brother; the latter would, in any event, have rendered him almost independent of him.

Ferdinand retained to the last that jealous love of

²⁷ Zurita, *Anales de Aragon*, vi. gensola, *Anales de Aragon*, lib. i. 347.—P. Martyr. Ep., 531.—Ar. p. 4.

power which was so remarkable through his whole life. Unwilling, even at the approach of death, to admit a thought of relinquishing any portion of his authority, he removed continually from place to place, in order to fly from his distemper, or to forget it. Though his strength declined every day, none of his attendants durst mention his condition; nor would he admit his father-confessor, who thought such silence criminal and unchristian, into his presence. At last the danger became so imminent that it could be no longer concealed. Ferdinand received the intimation with a decent fortitude; and, touched, perhaps, with compunction at the injustice which he had done his grandson, or influenced by the honest remonstrances of Carvajal, Zapara, and Vargas, his most ancient and faithful councillors, who represented to him that by investing Prince Ferdinand with the regency he would infallibly entail a civil war on the two brothers, and by bestowing on him the grand-mastership of the military orders would strip the crown of its noblest ornament and chief strength, he consented to alter his will with respect to both these particulars. By a new deed he left Charles the sole heir of all his dominions, and allotted to Prince Ferdinand, instead of that throne of which he thought himself almost secure, an inconsiderable establishment of fifty thousand ducats a year.²⁸ He died a few hours after signing this will, on the 23rd day of January, 1516.

Charles, to whom such a noble inheritance descended by his death, was near the full age of sixteen. He had hitherto resided in the Low Countries, his paternal dominions. Margaret of Austria, his aunt, and Margaret of York, the sister of Edward IV. of England,

²⁸ Mariana, Hist., lib. 30, c. ult. Argensola, Anales de Aragon, lib. —Zurita, Anales de Aragon, vi. i. p. 11.
401.—P. Martyr. Ep., 565, 566.—

and widow of Charles the Bold, two princesses of great virtue and abilities, had the care of forming his early youth. Upon the death of his father the Flemings committed the government of the Low Countries to his grandfather, the Emperor Maximilian, with the name rather than the authority of regent.²⁹ Maximilian made choice of William de Croy, lord of Chièvres, to superintend the education of the young prince his grandson.³⁰ That nobleman possessed in an eminent

²⁹ Pontius Heuterus, *Rerum Austriacarum Lib. XV.*, Lov., 1649, lib. vii c. 2, p. 155.

³⁰ The French historians, upon the authority of M. de Bellay, *Mémoires*, p. 11, have unanimously asserted that, Philip by his last will having appointed the king of France to have the direction of his son's education, Louis XII., with a disinterestedness suitable to the confidence reposed in him, named Chièvres for that office. Even the President Hénault has adopted this opinion. (*Abrégé Chron.*, A.D. 1507.) Varillas, in his usual manner, pretends to have seen Philip's testament. (*Pract. de l'Educa-*
tion des Princes, p. 16.) But the Spanish, German, and Flemish historians concur in contradicting this assertion of the French authors. It appears from Heuterus, a contemporary Flemish historian of great authority, that Louis XII., by consenting to the marriage of Germaine de Foix with Ferdinand, had lost much of that confidence which Philip once placed in him; that his disgust was increased by the French king's giving in marriage to the count of Angoulême his eldest daughter, whom he had formerly betrothed to Charles (Heuter., *Rer. Austr. lib. v.* p. 151); that the French, a short time before Philip's

death, had violated the peace which subsisted between them and the Flemings, and Philip had complained of this injury and was ready to resent it. (Heuter., *ibid.*) All these circumstances render it improbable that Philip, who made his will a few days before he died (Heuter., p. 152), should commit the education of his son to Louis XII. In confirmation of these plausible conjectures positive testimony can be produced. It appears from Heuterus that Philip, when he set out for Spain, had intrusted Chièvres both with the care of his son's education and with the government of his dominions in the Low Countries (Heuter., lib. vii. p. 153); that an attempt was made, soon after Philip's death, to have the emperor Maximilian appointed regent during the minority of his grandson, but, this being opposed, Chièvres seems to have continued to discharge both the offices which Philip had committed to him (Heuter., *ibid.*, 153, 155); that in the beginning of the year 1508 the Flemings invited Maximilian to accept of the regency, to which he consented, and appointed his daughter Margaret, together with a council of Flemings, to exercise the supreme authority when he himself should at any time be absent.

degree the talents which fitted him for such an important office, and discharged the duties of it with great fidelity. Under Chièvres, Adrian of Utrecht acted as preceptor. This preferment, which opened his way to the highest dignities an ecclesiastic can attain, he owed not to his birth, for that was extremely mean, nor to his interest, for he was a stranger to the arts of a court, but to the opinion which his countrymen entertained of his learning. He was indeed no inconsiderable proficient in those frivolous sciences which during several centuries assumed the name of philosophy, and had published a commentary, which was highly esteemed, upon *The Book of Sentences*, a famous treatise of Petrus Lombardus, considered at that time as the standard system of metaphysical theology. But, whatever admiration these procured him in an illiterate age, it was soon found that a man accustomed to the retirement of a college, unacquainted with the world, and without any tincture of taste or elegance, was by no means qualified for rendering science agreeable to a young prince. Charles, accordingly, discovered an early aversion to learning, and an excessive fondness for those violent and martial exercises to excel in which was the chief pride, and almost the only study, of persons of rank in that age. Chièvres encouraged this taste, either from a desire of gaining his pupil by indulgence, or from too slight an opinion of the advantages of literary accomplishments.³¹ He instructed him, however, with great care

He likewise named Chièvres as governor, and Adrian of Utrecht as preceptor to his son. (Heuter., *ibid.*, 155, 157.) What Heuterus relates with respect to this matter is confirmed by Moringus, in *Vita Adriani apud Analecta Casp. Burmanni de Adriano*, cap. 10; by

Barlandus, *Chronic. Brabant.*, *ibid.*, p. 25; and by Harœus, *Annal. Brab.*, vol. ii. p. 520, etc.

³¹ Jovii *Vita Adriani*, p. 91.—Struvii *Corpus Hist. Germ.*, ii. 967.—P. Heuter., *Rer. Austr.*, lib. vii. c. 3, p. 157.

Charles V. in his Youth.





in the arts of government; he made him study the history not only of his own kingdoms, but of those with which they were connected; he accustomed him, from the time of his assuming the government of Flanders, in the year 1515, to attend to business; he persuaded him to peruse all papers relating to public affairs, to be present at the deliberations of his privy-councillors, and to propose to them himself those matters concerning which he required their opinion.²² From such an education Charles contracted habits of gravity and recollection which scarcely suited his time of life. The first openings of his genius did not indicate that superiority which its maturer age displayed.²³ He did not discover in his youth the impetuosity of spirit which commonly ushers in an active and enterprising manhood. Nor did his early obsequiousness to Chièvres and his other favourites promise that capacious and decisive judgment which afterwards directed the affairs of one-half of Europe. But his subjects, dazzled with the external accomplishments of a graceful figure and manly address, and viewing his character with that partiality which is always shown to princes during their youth, entertained sanguine hopes of his adding lustre to those crowns which descended to him by the death of Ferdinand.

The kingdoms of Spain, as is evident from the view which I have given of their political constitution, were at that time in a situation which required an administration no less vigorous than prudent. The feudal institutions, which had been introduced into all its different provinces by the Goths, the Suevi, and the Vandals, subsisted in great force. The nobles, who were powerful and warlike, had long possessed all the exorbitant privileges which these institutions vested in their

²² Mémoires de Bellay, 8vo, Par., c 1, p. 184.
1573, p. 11.—P. Heuter., lib. viii. ²³ P. Martyr. Ep., 569, 655.

order. The cities in Spain were more numerous and more considerable than the genius of feudal government, naturally unfavourable to commerce and to regular police, seemed to admit. The personal rights and political influence which the inhabitants of these cities had acquired were extensive. The royal prerogative, circumscribed by the privileges of the nobility and by the pretensions of the people, was confined within very narrow limits. Under such a form of government, the principles of discord were many, the bond of union was extremely feeble, and Spain felt not only all the inconveniences occasioned by the defects in the feudal system, but was exposed to disorders arising from the peculiarities in its own constitution.

During the long administration of Ferdinand, no internal commotion, it is true, had arisen in Spain. His superior abilities had enabled him to restrain the turbulence of the nobles and to moderate the jealousy of the commons. By the wisdom of his domestic government, by the sagacity with which he conducted his foreign operations, and by the high opinion that his subjects entertained of both, he had preserved among them a degree of tranquillity greater than was natural to a constitution in which the seeds of discord and disorder were so copiously mingled. But by the death of Ferdinand these restraints were at once withdrawn; and faction and discontent, from being long repressed, were ready to break out with fiercer animosity.

In order to prevent these evils, Ferdinand had in his last will taken a most prudent precaution, by appointing Cardinal Ximenes, Archbishop of Toledo, to be sole regent of Castile until the arrival of his grandson in Spain. The singular character of this man, and the extraordinary qualities which marked him out for that office at such a juncture, merit a particular description.

He was descended of an honourable, not of a wealthy, family ; and, the circumstances of his parents, as well as his own inclinations, having determined him to enter into the Church, he early obtained benefices of great value, and which placed him in the way of the highest preferment. All these, however, he renounced at once, and, after undergoing a very severe novitiate, assumed the habit of St. Francis in a monastery of Observantine friars, one of the most rigid orders in the Romish Church. There he soon became eminent for his uncommon austerity of manners, and for those excesses of superstitious devotion which are the proper characteristics of the monastic life. But, notwithstanding these extravagances, to which weak and enthusiastic minds alone are usually prone, his understanding, naturally penetrating and decisive, retained its full vigour, and acquired him such great authority in his own order as raised him to be their provincial. His reputation for sanctity soon procured him the office of father-confessor to Queen Isabella, which he accepted with the utmost reluctance. He preserved in a court the same austerity of manners which had distinguished him in the cloister. He continued to make all his journeys on foot ; he subsisted only upon alms ; his acts of mortification were as severe as ever, and his penances as rigorous. Isabella, pleased with her choice, conferred on him, not long after, the archbishopric of Toledo, which, next to the papacy, is the richest dignity in the Church of Rome. This honour he declined with the firmness which nothing but the authoritative injunction of the pope was able to overcome. Nor did this height of promotion change his manners. Though obliged to display in public that magnificence which became his station, he himself retained his monastic severity. Under his pontifical robes he constantly wore the coarse frock of St. Francis, the rents in which he used to patch

with his own hands. He at no time used linen, but was commonly clad in hair-cloth. He slept always in his habit, most frequently on the ground, or on boards, rarely in a bed. He did not taste any of the delicacies which appeared at his table, but satisfied himself with that simple diet which the rule of his order prescribed.³⁴ Notwithstanding these peculiarities, so opposite to the manners of the world, he possessed a thorough knowledge of its affairs; and no sooner was he called by his station, and by the high opinion which Ferdinand and Isabella entertained of him, to take a principal share in the administration, than he displayed talents for business which rendered the fame of his wisdom equal to that of his sanctity. His political conduct, remarkable for the boldness and originality of all his plans, flowed from his real character, and partook both of its virtues and its defects. His extensive genius suggested to him schemes vast and magnificent. Conscious of the integrity of his intentions, he pursued these with unremitting and undaunted firmness. Accustomed from his early youth to mortify his own passions, he showed little indulgence towards those of other men. Taught by his system of religion to check even his most innocent desires, he was the enemy of everything to which he could affix the name of elegance or pleasure. Though free from any suspicion of cruelty, he discovered in all his commerce with the world a severe inflexibility of mind, and austerity of character, peculiar to the monastic profession, and which can hardly be conceived in a country where that is unknown.

Such was the man to whom Ferdinand committed the regency of Castile; and though Ximenes was then near fourscore, and perfectly acquainted with the labour and difficulty of the office, his natural intrepidity of

³⁴ *Histoire de l'Administration du Cardinal Ximénès, par Mich.* Baudier, 4to, 1635, p. 13.

mind, and zeal for the public good, prompted him to accept of it without hesitation. Adrian of Utrecht, who had been sent into Spain a few months before the death of Ferdinand, produced full powers from the archduke to assume the name and authority of regent upon the demise of his grandfather; but such was the aversion of the Spaniards to the government of a stranger, and so unequal the abilities of the two competitors, that Adrian's claim would at once have been rejected if Ximenes himself, from complaisance to his new master, had not consented to acknowledge him as regent and to carry on the government in conjunction with him. By this, however, Adrian acquired a dignity merely nominal. Ximenes, though he treated him with great decency, and even respect, retained the whole power in his own hands.³⁵

The cardinal's first care was to observe the motions of the infant Don Ferdinand, who, having been flattered with so near a prospect of supreme power, bore the disappointment of his hopes with greater impatience than a prince at a period of life so early could have been supposed to feel. Ximenes, under pretence of providing more effectually for his safety, removed him from Guadalupe, the place in which he had been educated, to Madrid, where he fixed the residence of the court. There he was under the cardinal's own eye, and his conduct, with that of his domestics, was watched with the utmost attention.³⁶

The first intelligence he received from the Low Countries gave greater disquiet to the cardinal, and convinced him how difficult a task it would be to conduct the affairs of an inexperienced prince under the influence of councillors unacquainted with the laws

³⁵ Gometius de Reb. gest Ximènii, p. 150, fol., Compl., 1569. ³⁶ Minianæ Contin. Marianæ, lib. i. a. 2.—Baudier, Hist. de Ximènes, p. 118.

and manners of Spain. No sooner did the account of Ferdinand's death reach Brussels, than Charles, by the advice of his Flemish ministers, resolved to assume the title of king. By the laws of Spain, the sole right of the crowns both of Castile and of Aragon belonged to Joanna; and, though her infirmities disqualified her from governing, this incapacity had not been declared by any public act of the cortes in either kingdom; so that the Spaniards considered this resolution not only as a direct violation of their privileges, but as an unnatural usurpation in a son on the prerogatives of a mother, towards whom, in her present unhappy situation, he manifested a less delicate regard than her subjects had always expressed.³⁷ The Flemish court, however, having prevailed both on the pope and on the emperor to address letters to Charles as king of Castile,—the former of whom it was pretended had a right as head of the Church, and the latter as head of the empire, to confer this title,—instructions were sent to Ximenes to prevail on the Spaniards to acknowledge it. Ximenes, though he had earnestly remonstrated against the measure, as no less unpopular than unnecessary, resolved to exert all his authority and credit in carrying it into execution, and immediately assembled such of the nobles as were then at court. What Charles required was laid before them; and when, instead of complying with his demands, they began to murmur against such an unprecedented encroachment on their privileges, and to talk high of the rights of Joanna and their oath of allegiance to her, Ximenes hastily interposed, and, with that firm and decisive tone which was natural to him, told them that they were not called now to deliberate, but to obey; that their sovereign did not apply to them for advice, but expected submission; and “this day,”

³⁷ P. Martyr. Ep., 568.

added he, “Charles shall be proclaimed king of Castile in Madrid ; and the rest of the cities, I doubt not, will follow its example.” On the spot he gave orders for that purpose;³⁸ and, notwithstanding the novelty of the practice, and the secret discontents of many persons of distinction, Charles’s title was universally recognized. In Aragon, where the privileges of the subject were more extensive, and the abilities as well as authority of the archbishop of Saragossa, whom Ferdinand had appointed regent, were far inferior to those of Ximenes, the same obsequiousness to the will of Charles did not appear, nor was he acknowledged there under any other character but that of prince, until his arrival in Spain.³⁹

Ximenes, though possessed only of delegated power, which, from his advanced age, he could not expect to enjoy long, assumed, together with the character of regent, all the ideas natural to a monarch, and adopted schemes for extending the regal authority, which he pursued with as much intrepidity and ardour as if he himself had been to reap the advantages resulting from their success. The exorbitant privileges of the Castilian nobles circumscribed the prerogative of the prince within very narrow limits. These privileges the cardinal considered as so many unjust extortions from the crown, and determined to abridge them. Dangerous as the attempt was, there were circumstances in his situation which promised him greater success than any king of Castile could have expected. His strict and prudent economy of his archiepiscopal revenues furnished him with more ready money than the crown could at any time command ; the sanctity of his manners, his charity and munificence, rendered him the idol of the people ; and the nobles themselves,

³⁸ Gometius, p. 152, etc.—Baudier, Hist. de Ximénes, p. 121.

³⁹ P. Martyr. Ep., 572.

not suspecting any danger from him, did not observe his motions with the same jealous attention as they would have watched those of one of their monarchs.

Immediately upon his accession to the regency, several of the nobles, fancying that the reins of government would, of consequence, be somewhat relaxed, began to assemble their vassals, and to prosecute, by force of arms, private quarrels and pretensions which the authority of Ferdinand had obliged them to dissemble or to relinquish. But Ximenes, who had taken into pay a good body of troops, opposed and defeated all their designs with unexpected vigour and facility ; and, though he did not treat the authors of these disorders with any cruelty, he forced them to acts of submission extremely mortifying to the haughty spirit of Castilian grandees.

But while the cardinal's attacks were confined to individuals, and every act of rigour was justified by the appearance of necessity, founded on the forms of justice and tempered with a mixture of lenity, there was scarcely room for jealousy or complaint. It was not so with his next measure, which, by striking at a privilege essential to the nobility, gave a general alarm to the whole order. By the feudal constitution, the military power was lodged in the hands of the nobles, and men of an inferior condition were called into the field only as their vassals and to follow their banners. A king with scanty revenues and a limited prerogative depended on these potent barons in all his operations. It was with their forces he attacked his enemies, and with them he defended his kingdom. While at the head of troops attached warmly to their own immediate lords and accustomed to obey no other commands, his authority was precarious and his efforts feeble. From this state Ximenes resolved to deliver the crown ; and as mercenary standing armies were unknown under the feudal government, and would

have been odious to a martial and generous people, he issued a proclamation commanding every city in Castile to enrol a certain number of its burgesses, in order that they might be trained to the use of arms on Sundays and holidays; he engaged to provide officers to command them at the public expense, and, as an encouragement to the private men, promised them an exemption from all taxes and impositions. The frequent incursions of the Moors from Africa, and the necessity of having some force always ready to oppose them, furnished a plausible pretence for this innovation. The object really in view was to secure the king a body of troops independent of his barons and which might serve to counterbalance their power.⁴⁰ The nobles were not slow in perceiving what was his intention, and saw how effectually the scheme which he had adopted would accomplish his end; but as a measure which had the pious appearance of resisting the progress of the infidels was extremely popular, and as any opposition to it arising from their order alone would have been imputed wholly to interested motives, they endeavoured to excite the cities themselves to refuse obedience and to inveigh against the proclamation as inconsistent with their charters and privileges. In consequence of their instigation, Burgos, Valladolid, and several other cities rose in open mutiny. Some of the grandees declared themselves their protectors. Violent remonstrances were presented to the king. His Flemish councillors were alarmed. Ximenes alone continued firm and undaunted; and, partly by terror, partly by entreaty, by force in some instances, and by forbearance in others, he prevailed on all the refractory cities to comply.⁴¹ During his administration he con-

⁴⁰ Minianæ Continuatio Marianæ, fol., Hag., 1733, p. 3.

⁴¹ P. Martyr. Ep., 556, etc.—Gometius, p. 160, etc.

tinued to execute his plan with vigour; but soon after his death it was entirely dropped.

His success in this scheme for reducing the exorbitant power of the nobility encouraged him to attempt a diminution of their possessions, which were no less exorbitant. During the contests and disorders inseparable from the feudal government, the nobles, ever attentive to their own interest, and taking advantage of the weakness or distress of their monarchs, had seized some parts of the royal demesnes, obtained grants of others, and, having gradually wrested almost the whole out of the hands of the prince, had annexed them to their own estates. The titles by which most of the grandees held these lands were extremely defective: it was from some successful usurpation which the crown had been too feeble to dispute, that many derived their only claim to possession. An inquiry carried back to the origin of these encroachments, which were almost coeval with the feudal system, was impracticable; and, as it would have stripped every nobleman in Spain of great part of his lands, it must have excited a general revolt. Such a step was too bold even for the enterprising spirit of Ximenes. He confined himself to the reign of Ferdinand, and, beginning with the pensions granted during that time, refused to make any farther payment, because all right to them expired with his life. He then called to account such as had acquired crown lands under the administration of that monarch, and at once resumed whatever he had alienated. The effects of these revocations extended to many persons of high rank; for though Ferdinand was a prince of little generosity, yet he and Isabella having been raised to the throne of Castile by a powerful faction of the nobles, they were obliged to reward the zeal of their adherents with great liberality, and the royal demesnes were their only fund for that purpose. The

addition made to the revenue of the crown by these revocations, together with his own frugal economy, enabled Ximenes not only to discharge all the debts which Ferdinand had left, and to remit considerable sums to Flanders, but to pay the officers of his new militia, and to establish magazines not only more numerous, but better furnished with artillery, arms, and warlike stores, than Spain had ever possessed in any former age.⁴² The prudent and disinterested application of these sums was a full apology to the people for the rigour with which they were exacted.

The nobles, alarmed at these repeated attacks, began to think of precautions for the safety of their order. Many cabals were formed, loud complaints were uttered, and desperate resolutions taken; but before they proceeded to extremities they appointed some of their number to examine the powers in consequence of which the cardinal exercised acts of such high authority. The admiral of Castile, the Duke de Infantado, and the Conde de Benevento, grandees of the first rank, were intrusted with this commission. Ximenes received them with cold civility, and, in answer to their demand, produced the testament of Ferdinand, by which he was appointed regent, together with the ratification of that deed by Charles. To both these they objected; and he endeavoured to establish their validity. As the conversation grew warm, he led them insensibly towards a balcony, from which they had a view of a large body of troops under arms, and of a formidable train of artillery. “Behold,” says he, pointing to these, and raising his voice, “the powers which I have received from his Catholic majesty. With these I govern Castile; and with these I will govern it until the king, your master and mine, takes possession of his king-

• Flechier, *Vie de Ximenes*, ii. 600.

dom.”⁴⁴ A declaration so bold and haughty silenced them and astonished their associates. To take arms against a man aware of his danger and prepared for his defence was what despair alone would dictate. All thoughts of a general confederacy against the cardinal’s administration were laid aside ; and, except for some slight commotions excited by the private resentment of particular noblemen, the tranquillity of Castile suffered no interruption.

It was not only from the opposition of the Spanish nobility that obstacles arose to the execution of the cardinal’s schemes ; he had a constant struggle to maintain with the Flemish ministers, who, presuming upon their favour with the young king, aimed at directing the affairs of Spain, as well as those of their own country. Jealous of the great abilities and independent spirit of Ximenes, they considered him rather as a rival who might circumscribe their power than as a minister who by his prudence and vigour was adding to the grandeur and authority of their master. Every complaint against his administration was listened to with pleasure by the courtiers in the Low Countries. Unnecessary obstructions were thrown by their means in the way of all his measures ; and though they could not either with decency or safety deprive him of the office of regent, they endeavoured to lessen his authority by dividing it. They soon discovered that Adrian of Utrecht, already joined with him in office, had neither genius nor spirit sufficient to give the least check to his proceedings ; and therefore Charles, by their advice, added to the commission of regency La Chau, a Flemish gentleman, and afterwards Amerstorf, a nobleman of Holland, the former distinguished for his address, the latter for his firmness. Ximenes, though no stranger to the malevolent intention of the Flemish courtiers, received

⁴⁴ Fléchier, ii. 551.—Ferreras, Hist., viii. 433.

these new associates with all the external marks of distinction due to the office with which they were invested; but when they came to enter upon business he abated nothing of that air of superiority with which he had treated Adrian, and still retained the sole direction of affairs. The Spaniards, more averse, perhaps, than any other people to the government of strangers, approved of all his efforts to preserve his own authority. Even the nobles, influenced by this national passion and forgetting their jealousies and discontents, chose rather to see the supreme power in the hands of one of their countrymen whom they feared than in those of foreigners, whom they hated.

Ximenes, though engaged in such great schemes of domestic policy and embarrassed by the artifices and intrigues of the Flemish ministers, had the burden of two foreign wars to support. The one was in Navarre, which was invaded by its unfortunate monarch, John d'Albret. The death of Ferdinand, the absence of Charles, the discord and disaffection which reigned among the Spanish nobles, seemed to present him with a favourable opportunity of recovering his dominions. The cardinal's vigilance, however, defeated a measure so well concerted. As he foresaw the danger to which that kingdom might be exposed, one of his first acts of administration was to order thither a considerable body of troops. While the king was employed with one part of his army in the siege of St. Jean Pied en Port, Villalva, an officer of great experience and courage, attacked the other by surprise and cut it to pieces. The king instantly retreated with precipitation, and an end was put to the war.* But as Navarre was filled at that time with towns and castles slightly fortified and weakly garrisoned, which, being unable to resist an enemy, served only to furnish him with places of retreat,

* P. Martyr. Ep., 570.

Ximenes, always bold and decisive in his measures, ordered every one of these to be dismantled, except Pampeluna, the fortifications of which he proposed to render very strong. To this uncommon precaution Spain owes the possession of Navarre. The French, since that period, have often entered and have as often overrun the open country. While they were exposed to all the inconveniences attending an invading army, the Spaniards have easily drawn troops from the neighbouring provinces to oppose them; and the French, having no place of any strength to which they could retire, have been obliged repeatedly to abandon their conquest with as much rapidity as they gained it.

The other war, which he carried on in Africa against the famous adventurer Horuc Barbarossa, who from a private corsair raised himself, by his singular valour and address, to be king of Algiers and Tunis, was far from being equally successful. The ill conduct of the Spanish general and the rash valour of his troops presented Barbarossa with an easy victory. Many perished in the battle, more in the retreat, and the remainder returned into Spain covered with infamy. The magnanimity, however, with which the cardinal bore this disgrace, the only one he experienced during his administration, added new lustre to his character.⁴⁵ Great composure of temper under a disappointment was not expected from a man so remarkable for the eagerness and impatience with which he urged on the execution of all his schemes.

This disaster was soon forgotten; while the conduct of the Flemish court proved the cause of constant uneasiness not only to the cardinal but to the whole Spanish nation. All the great qualities of Chièvres, the prime minister and favourite of the young king, were sullied with an ignoble and sordid avarice. The accession of

⁴⁵ Gometius, lib. vi. p. 179.

his master to the crown of Spain opened a new and copious source for the gratification of this passion. During the time of Charles's residence in Flanders the whole tribe of pretenders to offices or to favour resorted thither. They soon discovered that without the patronage of Chièvres it was vain to hope for preferment; nor did they want sagacity to find out the proper method of securing his protection. Great sums of money were drawn out of Spain. Every thing was venal and disposed of to the highest bidder. After the example of Chièvres, the inferior Flemish ministers engaged in this traffic, which became as general and avowed as it was infamous.⁴⁶ The Spaniards were filled with rage when they beheld offices of great importance to the welfare of their country set to sale by strangers, unconcerned for its honour or its happiness. Ximenes, disinterested in his whole administration, and a stranger, from his native grandeur of mind, to the passion of avarice, inveighed with the utmost boldness against the venality of the Flemings. He represented to the king, in strong terms, the murmurs and indignation which their behaviour excited among a free and high-spirited people, and besought him to set out without loss of time for Spain, that by his presence he might dissipate the clouds which were gathering all over the kingdom.⁴⁷

Charles was fully sensible that he had delayed too long to take possession of his dominions in Spain. Powerful obstacles, however, stood in his way and detained him in the Low Countries. The war which the League of Cambray had kindled in Italy still subsisted; though during its course the armies of all the parties engaged in it had changed their destination and their objects. France was now in alliance with Venice, which it had at first combined to destroy. Maximilian and Ferdinand had for some years carried on hostilities

⁴⁶ Miniana, Contin., lib. i. c. 2.

⁴⁷ P. Martyr. Ep., 576.

against France, their original ally, to the valour of whose troops the confederacy had been indebted in a great measure for its success. Together with his kingdoms, Ferdinand transmitted this war to his grandson ; and there was reason to expect that Maximilian, always fond of new enterprises, would persuade the young monarch to enter into it with ardour. But the Flemings, who had long possessed an extensive commerce, which during the League of Cambray had grown to a great height upon the ruins of the Venetian trade, dreaded a rupture with France ; and Chièvres, sagacious to discern the true interest of his country, and not warped on this occasion by his love of wealth, warmly declared for maintaining peace with the French nation. Francis I., destitute of allies, and solicitous to secure his late conquests in Italy by a treaty, listened with joy to the first overtures of accommodation. Chièvres himself conducted the negotiation in the name of Charles. Gouffier appeared as plenipotentiary for Francis. Each of them had presided over the education of the prince whom he represented. They had both adopted the same pacific system, and were equally persuaded that the union of the two monarchs was the happiest event for themselves, as well as for their kingdoms. In such hands the negotiation did not languish. A few days after opening their conferences at Noyon, they concluded a treaty of confederacy and mutual defence between the two monarchs, the chief articles in which were that Francis should give in marriage to Charles his eldest daughter, the princess Louise, an infant of a year old, and, as her dowry, should make over to him all his claims and pretensions upon the kingdom of Naples ; that, in consideration of Charles's being already in possession of Naples, he should, until the accomplishment of the marriage, pay a hundred thousand crowns a year to the French king, and the half of that sum annually as long

Entry of Charles V. into Antwerp.





as the princess had no children ; that when Charles shall arrive in Spain the heirs of the king of Navarre may represent to him their right to that kingdom, and if, after examining their claim, he does not give them satisfaction, Francis shall be at liberty to assist them with all his forces.⁴⁸ This alliance not only united Charles and Francis, but obliged Maximilian, who was unable alone to cope with the French and Venetians, to enter into a treaty with those powers, which put a final period to the bloody and tedious war that the League of Cambray had occasioned. Europe enjoyed a few years of universal tranquillity, and was indebted for that blessing to two princes whose rivalship and ambition kept it in perpetual discord and agitation during the remainder of their reigns.

By the treaty of Noyon, Charles secured a safe passage into Spain. It was not, however, the interest of his Flemish ministers that he should visit that kingdom soon. While he resided in Flanders, the revenues of the Spanish crown were spent there, and they engrossed, without any competitors, all the effects of their monarch's generosity ; their country became the seat of government, and all favours were dispensed by them. Of all these advantages they ran the risk of seeing themselves deprived from the moment that their sovereign entered Spain. The Spaniards would naturally assume the direction of their own affairs ; the Low Countries would be considered only as a province of that mighty monarchy ; and they who now distributed the favours of the prince to others must then be content to receive them from the hands of strangers. But what Chièvres chiefly wished to avoid was an interview between the king and Ximenes. On the one hand, the wisdom, the integrity, and the magnanimity of that prelate gave him a wonderful ascendant over the minds

⁴⁸ Léonard, Recueil des Traitées, tom. ii. p. 69.

of men ; and it was extremely probable that these great qualities, added to the reverence due to his age and office, would command the respect of a young prince who, capable of noble and generous sentiments himself, would, in proportion to his admiration of the cardinal's virtues, lessen his deference towards persons of another character. Or, on the other hand, if Charles should allow his Flemish favourites to retain all the influence over his councils which they at present possessed, it was easy to foresee that the cardinal would remonstrate loudly against such an indignity to the Spanish nation, and vindicate the rights of his country with the same intrepidity and success with which he had asserted the prerogatives of the crown. For these reasons, all his Flemish councillors combined to retard his departure ; and Charles, unsuspecting, from want of experience, and fond of his native country, suffered himself to be unnecessarily detained in the Netherlands a whole year after signing the treaty of Noyon.

The repeated entreaties of Ximenes, the advice of his grandfather Maximilian, and the impatient murmurs of his Spanish subjects, prevailed on him at last to embark. He was attended not only by Chièvres, his prime minister, but by a numerous and splendid train of the Flemish nobles, fond of beholding the grandeur or of sharing in the bounty of their prince. After a dangerous voyage, he landed at Villa Viciosa, in the province of Asturias, and was received with such loud acclamations of joy as a new monarch, whose arrival was so ardently desired, had reason to expect. The Spanish nobility resorted to their sovereign from all parts of the kingdom, and displayed a magnificence which the Flemings were unable to emulate.⁴⁹

Ximenes, who considered the presence of the king as the greatest blessing to his dominions, was advancing

" P. Martyr. Ep., 599, 601.

towards the coast as fast as the infirm state of his health would permit, in order to receive him. During his regency, and notwithstanding his extreme old age, he had abated in no degree the rigour or frequency of his mortifications ; and to these he added such laborious assiduity in business as would have worn out the most youthful and vigorous constitution. Every day he employed several hours in devotion ; he celebrated mass in person ; he even allotted some space for study. Notwithstanding these occupations, he regularly attended the council ; he received and read all papers presented to him ; he dictated letters and instructions, and took under his inspection all business, civil, ecclesiastical, or military. Every moment of his time was filled up with some serious employment. The only amusement in which he indulged himself, by way of relaxation after business, was to canvass, with a few friars and other divines, some intricate article in scholastic theology. Wasted by such a course of life, the infirmities of age daily grew upon him. On his journey, a violent disorder seized him at Bos Equillos, attended with uncommon symptoms, which his followers considered as the effect of poison,⁵⁰ but could not agree whether the crime ought to be imputed to the hatred of the Spanish nobles or to the malice of the Flemish courtiers. This accident obliging him to stop short, he wrote to Charles, and with his usual boldness advised him to dismiss all the strangers in his train, whose numbers and credit gave offence already to the Spaniards and would ere long alienate the affections of the whole people. At the same time, he earnestly desired to have an interview with the king, that he might inform him of the state of the nation and the temper of his subjects. To prevent this, not only the Flemings but the Spanish grandees employed all their address, and industriously kept

⁵⁰ Miniana, Contin., lib. i. c. 3.

Charles at a distance from Aranda, the place to which the cardinal had removed. Through their suggestions, every measure that he recommended was rejected, the utmost care was taken to make him feel, and to point out to the whole nation, that his power was on the decline; even in things purely trivial, such a choice was always made as was deemed most disagreeable to him. Ximenes did not bear this treatment with his usual fortitude of spirit. Conscious of his own integrity and merit, he expected a more grateful return from a prince to whom he delivered a kingdom more flourishing than it had been in any former age, together with authority more extensive and better established than the most illustrious of his ancestors had ever possessed. He could not therefore, on many occasions, refrain from giving vent to his indignation and complaints. He lamented the fate of his country, and foretold the calamities which it would suffer from the insolence, the rapaciousness, and ignorance of strangers. While his mind was agitated by these passions, he received a letter from the king, in which, after a few cold and formal expressions of regard, he was allowed to retire to his diocese, that, after a life of such continued labour, he might end his days in tranquillity. This message proved fatal to Ximenes. His haughty mind, it is probable, could not survive disgrace; perhaps his generous heart could not bear the prospect of the misfortunes ready to fall on his country. Whichever of these opinions we embrace, certain it is that he expired a few hours after reading the letter.⁵¹ The variety, the grandeur, and the success of his schemes, during a regency of only twenty months, leave it doubtful whether his sagacity in council, his prudence in conduct, or his boldness in execution deserve the greatest praise. His reputation is still high in Spain, not only

⁵¹ Marsollier, *Vie de Ximénès*, etc.—Baudier, *Hist. de Ximénès*, p. 447.—Gometius, lib. vii. p. 206, ii p. 208.

for wisdom, but for sanctity ; and he is the only prime minister mentioned in history whom his contemporaries reverenced as a saint,⁵² and to whom the people under his government ascribed the power of working miracles.

Soon after the death of Ximenes, Charles made his public entry, with great pomp, into Valladolid, whither he had summoned the cortes of Castile. Though he assumed on all occasions the name of king, that title had never been acknowledged in the cortes. The Spaniards considering Joanna as possessed of the sole right to the crown, and no example of a son's having enjoyed the title of king during the life of his parents occurring in their history, the cortes discovered all that scrupulous respect for ancient forms, and that aversion to innovation, which are conspicuous in popular assemblies. The presence, however, of their prince, the address, the artifices, and the threats of his ministers, prevailed on them at last to proclaim him king, in conjunction with his mother, whose name they appointed to be placed before that of her son in all public acts. But when they made this concession they declared that if at any future period Joanna should recover the exercise of reason, the whole authority should return into her hands. At the same time, they voted a free gift of six hundred thousand ducats, to be paid in three years, a sum more considerable than had ever been granted to any former monarch.⁵³

Notwithstanding this obsequiousness of the cortes to the will of the king, the most violent symptoms of dissatisfaction with his government began to break out in the kingdom. Chièvres had acquired over the mind of the young monarch the ascendant not only of a tutor, but of a parent. Charles seemed to have no sentiments

⁵² Fléchier, *Vie de Ximénes*, ii. P. Martyr. Ep., 608.—Sandoval, 746. p. 12.

⁵³ Miniana, Contin., lib. i. c. 3.—

but those which his minister inspired, and scarcely uttered a word but what he put into his mouth. He was constantly surrounded by Flemings; no person got access to him without their permission; nor was any admitted to audience but in their presence. As he spoke the Spanish language very imperfectly, his answers were always extremely short, and often delivered with hesitation. From all these circumstances, many of the Spaniards were led to believe that he was a prince of a slow and narrow genius. Some pretended to discover a strong resemblance between him and his mother, and began to whisper that his capacity for government would never be far superior to hers; and though they who had the best opportunity of judging concerning his character maintained that, notwithstanding such unpromising appearances, he possessed a large fund of knowledge as well as of sagacity,⁵⁴ yet all agreed in condemning his partiality towards the Flemings, and his attachment to his favourites, as unreasonable and immoderate. Unfortunately for Charles, these favourites were unworthy of his confidence. To amass wealth seems to have been their only aim; and, as they had reason to fear that either their master's good sense or the indignation of the Spaniards might soon abridge their power, they hastened to improve the present opportunity, and their avarice was the more rapacious because they expected their authority to be of no long duration. All honours, offices, and benefices were either engrossed by the Flemings or publicly sold by them. Chièvres, his wife, and Sauvage, whom Charles, on the death of Ximenes, had imprudently raised to be chancellor of Castile, vied with each other in all the refinements of extortion and venality. Not only the Spanish historians, who, from resentment, may be suspected of exaggeration, but Peter Martyr Angleria, an Italian, who resided at that time in

⁵⁴ Sandoval, p. 31.—P. Martyr. Ep. 655.

Saragossa.



the court of Spain and who was under no temptation to deceive the persons to whom his letters are addressed, give a description which is almost incredible of the insatiable and shameless covetousness of the Flemings. According to Angleria's calculation, which he asserts to be extremely moderate, they remitted into the Low Countries, in the space of ten months, no less a sum than a million and one hundred thousand ducats. The nomination of William de Croy, Chièvres's nephew, a young man not of canonical age, to the archbishopric of Toledo, exasperated the Spaniards more than all these exactions. They considered the elevation of a stranger to the head of their Church and to the richest benefice in the kingdom not only as an injury, but as an insult to the whole nation; both clergy and laity, the former from interest, the latter from indignation, joined in exclaiming against it.⁵⁵

Charles, leaving Castile thus disgusted with his administration, set out for Saragossa, the capital of Aragon, that he might be present in the cortes of that kingdom. On his way thither he took leave of his brother Ferdinand, whom he sent into Germany on the pretence of visiting their grandfather, Maximilian, in his old age. To this prudent precaution Charles owed the preservation of his Spanish dominions. During the violent commotions which arose there soon after this period, the Spaniards would infallibly have offered the crown to a prince who was the darling of the whole nation; nor did Ferdinand want ambition, or counsellors, that might have prompted him to accept of the offer.⁵⁶

The Aragonese had not hitherto acknowledged Charles as king, nor would they allow the cortes to be assembled.

⁵⁵ Sandoval, pp. 28-31.—P. Martyr. Ep., 608, 611, 613, 614, 622, 623, 639.—Miniana, Contin., lib. i.

c. 3, p. 8.

⁵⁶ P. Martyr. Ep., 619.—Ferreras, viii. 460.

in his name, but in that of the *justiza*, to whom during an interregnum this privilege belonged.⁵⁷ The opposition Charles had to struggle with in the *cortes* of Aragon was more violent and obstinate than that which he had overcome in Castile: after long delays, however, and with much difficulty, he persuaded the members to confer on him the title of king, in conjunction with his mother. At the same time he bound himself, by that solemn oath which the Aragonese exacted of their kings, never to violate any of their rights or liberties. When a donative was demanded, the members were still more intractable; many months elapsed before they would agree to grant Charles two hundred thousand ducats, and that sum they appropriated so strictly for paying debts of the crown, which had long been forgotten, that a very small part of it came into the king's hands. What had happened in Castile taught them caution, and determined them rather to satisfy the claims of their fellow-citizens, how obsolete soever, than to furnish strangers the means of enriching themselves with the spoils of their country.⁵⁸

During these proceedings of the *cortes*, ambassadors arrived at Saragossa from Francis I. and the young king of Navarre, demanding the restitution of that kingdom in terms of the treaty of Noyon. But neither Charles, nor the Castilian nobles whom he consulted on this occasion, discovered any inclination to part with this acquisition. A conference held soon after at Montpellier, in order to bring this matter to an amicable issue, was altogether fruitless: while the French urged the injustice of the usurpation, the Spaniards were attentive only to its importance.⁵⁹

From Aragon, Charles proceeded to Catalonia, where he wasted much time, encountered more difficulties,

⁵⁷ P. Martyr. Ep., 605.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 605, 633, 640.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 615-634.

and gained less money. The Flemings were now become so odious in every province of Spain by their exactions that the desire of mortifying them and of disappointing their avarice augmented the jealousy with which a free people usually conduct their deliberations.

The Castilians, who had felt most sensibly the weight and rigour of the oppressive schemes carried on by the Flemings, resolved no longer to submit with a tameness fatal to themselves, and which rendered them the objects of scorn to their fellow-subjects in the other kingdoms of which the Spanish monarchy was composed. Segovia, Toledo, Seville, and several other cities of the first rank, entered into a confederacy for the defence of their rights and privileges; and, notwithstanding the silence of the nobility, who on this occasion discovered neither the public spirit nor the resolution which became their order, the confederates laid before the king a full view of the state of the kingdom and of the maladministration of his favourites. The preferment of strangers, the exportation of the current coin, the increase of taxes, were the grievances of which they chiefly complained; and of these they demanded redress with that boldness which is natural to a free people. These remonstrances, presented at first at Saragossa, and renewed afterwards at Barcelona, Charles treated with great neglect. The confederacy, however, of these cities, at this juncture, was the beginning of that famous union among the commons of Castile, which not long after threw the kingdom into such violent convulsions as shook the throne and almost overturned the constitution.⁶⁰

Soon after Charles's arrival at Barcelona he received the account of an event which interested him much more than the murmurs of the Castilians or the scruples

⁶⁰ P. Martyr. Ep., 630.—Ferreras, viii. 464.

of the cortes of Catalonia. This was the death of the emperor Maximilian,—an occurrence of small importance in itself, for he was a prince conspicuous neither for his virtues, nor his power, nor his abilities, but rendered by its consequences more memorable than any that had happened during several ages. It broke that profound and universal peace which then reigned in the Christian world; it excited a rivalship between two princes, which threw all Europe into agitation, and kindled wars more general and of longer duration than had hitherto been known in modern times.

The revolutions occasioned by the expedition of the French king, Charles VIII., into Italy, had inspired the European princes with new ideas concerning the importance of the imperial dignity. The claims of the empire upon some of the Italian states were numerous; its jurisdiction over others was extensive; and though the former had been almost abandoned, and the latter seldom exercised, under princes of slender abilities and of little influence, it was obvious that in the hands of an emperor possessed of power or of genius they might be employed as engines for stretching his dominion over the greater part of that country. Even Maximilian, feeble and unsteady as his conduct always was, had availed himself of the infinite pretensions of the empire, and had reaped advantage from every war and every negotiation in Italy during his reign. These considerations, added to the dignity of the station, confessedly the first among Christian princes, and to the rights inherent in the office, which, if exerted with vigour, were far from being inconsiderable, rendered the imperial crown more than ever an object of ambition.

Not long before his death, Maximilian had discovered great solicitude to preserve this dignity in the Austrian family, and to procure the king of Spain to be chosen

his successor. But he himself having never been crowned by the pope, a ceremony deemed essential in that age, was considered only as emperor *elect*. Though historians have not attended to that distinction, neither the Italian nor German chancery bestowed any other title upon him than that of King of the Romans; and, no example occurring in history of any person's being chosen a successor to a king of the Romans, the Germans, always tenacious of their forms, and unwilling to confer upon Charles an office for which their constitution knew no name, obstinately refused to gratify Maximilian in that point.⁶¹

By his death this difficulty was at once removed, and Charles openly aspired to that dignity which his grandfather had attempted, without success, to secure for him. At the same time, Francis I., a powerful rival, entered the lists against him; and the attention of all Europe was fixed upon this competition, no less illustrious from the high rank of the candidates than from the importance of the prize for which they contended. Each of them urged his pretensions with sanguine expectations and with no unpromising prospect of success. Charles considered the imperial crown as belonging to him of right, from its long continuance in the Austrian line; he knew that none of the German princes possessed power or influence enough to appear as his antagonist; he flattered himself that no consideration would induce the natives of Germany to exalt any foreign prince to a dignity which during so many ages had been deemed peculiar to their own nation, and least of all that they would confer this honour upon Francis I., the sovereign of a people whose genius and laws and manners differed so widely from those of the

⁶¹ Guicciardini, lib. xiii. p. 15.— P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. vii. & Hist. génér. d'Allemagne, par. P. Barre, tom. viii. part 1, p. 1087.— 17, p. 179, lib. viii. c. 2, p. 183.

Germans that it was hardly possible to establish any cordial union between them ; he trusted not a little to the effect of Maximilian's negotiations, which, though they did not attain their ends, had prepared the minds of the Germans for his elevation to the imperial throne ; but what he relied on as a chief recommendation was the fortunate situation of his hereditary dominions in Germany, which served as a natural barrier to the empire against the encroachments of the Turkish power. The conquests, the abilities, and the ambition of Sultan Selim II. had spread over Europe, at that time, a general and well-founded alarm. By his victories over the Mamelukes, and the extirpation of that gallant body of men, he had not only added Egypt and Syria to his empire, but had secured to it such a degree of internal tranquillity that he was ready to turn against Christendom the whole force of his arms, which nothing hitherto had been able to resist. The most effectual expedient for stopping the progress of this torrent seemed to be the election of an emperor possessed of extensive territories in that country where its first impression would be felt, and who, besides, could combat this formidable enemy with all the forces of a powerful monarchy and with all the wealth furnished by the mines of the New World or the commerce of the Low Countries. These were the arguments by which Charles publicly supported his claim ; and to men of integrity and reflection they appeared to be not only plausible, but convincing. He did not, however, trust the success of his cause to these alone. Great sums of money were remitted from Spain ; all the refinements and artifices of negotiation were employed ; and a considerable body of troops, kept on foot at that time by the states of the circle of Suabia, was secretly taken into his pay. The venal were gained by presents ; the objections of the more scrupulous were answered or

eluded; some feeble princes were threatened and overawed.⁶²

On the other hand, Francis supported his claim with equal eagerness and no less confidence of its being well founded. His emissaries contended that it was now high time to convince the princes of the house of Austria that the imperial crown was elective, and not hereditary; that other persons might aspire to an honour which their arrogance had accustomed them to regard as the property of their family; that it required a sovereign of mature judgment and of approved abilities to hold the reins of government in a country where such unknown opinions concerning religion had been published as had thrown the minds of men into an uncommon agitation, which threatened the most violent effects; that a young prince, without experience, and who had hitherto given no specimens of his genius for command, was no fit match for Selim, a monarch grown old in the art of war and in course of victory; whereas a king who in his early youth had triumphed over the valour and discipline of the Swiss, till then reckoned invincible, would be an antagonist not unworthy the conqueror of the East; that the fire and impetuosity of the French cavalry, added to the discipline and stability of the German infantry, would form an army so irresistible that instead of waiting the approach of the Ottoman forces it might carry hostilities into the heart of their dominions; that the election of Charles would be inconsistent with a fundamental constitution, by which the person who holds the crown of Naples is excluded from aspiring to the imperial dignity; that his elevation to that honour would soon kindle a war in Italy, on account of his pretensions to the duchy of Milan, the effects of which could not fail of reaching

⁶² Guicc., lib. xiii. p. 159.—Sleidan, History of the Reformation,

14.—Struvii, Corp. Hist. German., ii. 971, note 20.

the empire and might prove fatal to it.⁶³ But while the French ambassadors enlarged upon these and other topics of the same kind in all the courts of Germany, Francis, sensible of the prejudices entertained against him as a foreigner, unacquainted with the German language or manners, endeavoured to overcome these, and to gain the favour of the princes, by immense gifts and by infinite promises. As the expeditious method of transmitting money, and the decent mode of conveying a bribe, by bills of exchange, were then little known, the French ambassadors travelled with a train of horses loaded with treasure, an equipage not very honourable for that prince by whom they were employed, and infamous for those to whom they were sent.⁶⁴

The other European princes could not remain indifferent spectators of a contest the decision of which so nearly affected every one of them. Their common interest ought naturally to have formed a general combination, in order to disappoint both competitors and to prevent either of them from obtaining such a pre-eminence in power and dignity as might prove dangerous to the liberties of Europe. But the ideas with respect to a proper distribution and balance of power were so lately introduced into the system of European policy that they were not hitherto objects of sufficient attention. The passions of some princes, the want of foresight in others, and the fear of giving offence to the candidates, hindered such a salutary union of the powers of Europe, and rendered them either totally negligent of the public safety or kept them from exerting themselves with vigour in its behalf.

⁶³ Guicc., lib. xiii. p. 160.—⁶⁴ p. 4.
Sleid., p. 16.—Geor. Sabini de "Mémoires du Maréchal de
Elect. Car. V.—Historia apud Scar- Fleuranges, p. 296.
dii Script. Rer. German., vol. ii.

The Swiss cantons, though they dreaded the elevation of either of the contending monarchs, and though they wished to have seen some prince whose dominions were less extensive, and whose power was more moderate, seated on the imperial throne, were prompted, however, by their hatred of the French nation, to give an open preference to the pretensions of Charles, while they used their utmost influence to frustrate those of Francis.⁶⁵

The Venetians easily discerned that it was the interest of their republic to have both the rivals set aside ; but their jealousy of the house of Austria, whose ambition and neighbourhood had been fatal to their grandeur, would not permit them to act up to their own ideas, and led them hastily to give the sanction of their approbation to the claim of the French king.

It was equally the interest, and more in the power, of Henry VIII. of England to prevent either Francis or Charles from acquiring a dignity which would raise them so far above other monarchs. But, though Henry often boasted that he held the balance of Europe in his hands, he had neither the steady attention, the accurate discernment, nor the dispassionate temper which that delicate function required. On this occasion it mortified his vanity so much, to think that he had not entered early into that noble competition which reflected such honour upon the two antagonists, that he took a resolution of sending an ambassador into Germany and of declaring himself a candidate for the imperial throne. The ambassador, though loaded with caresses by the German princes and the pope's nuncio, informed his master that he could hope for no success in a claim which he had been so late in preferring. Henry, imputing his disappointment to that circum-

⁶⁵ Sabinus, p. 6.

stance alone, and soothed with this ostentatious display of his own importance, seems to have taken no further part in the matter, either by contributing to thwart both his rivals or to promote one of them.⁶⁶

Leo X., a pontiff no less renowned for his political abilities than for his love of the arts, was the only prince of the age who observed the motions of the two contending monarchs with a prudent attention or who discovered a proper solicitude for the public safety. The imperial and papal jurisdiction interfered in so many instances, the complaints of usurpation were so numerous on both sides, and the territories of the Church owed their security so little to their own force and so much to the weakness of the powers around them, that nothing was so formidable to the court of Rome as an emperor with extensive dominions or of enterprising genius. Leo trembled at the prospect of beholding the imperial crown placed on the head of the king of Spain and of Naples and the master of the New World; nor was he less afraid of seeing a king of France, who was duke of Milan and lord of Genoa, exalted to that dignity. He foretold that the election of either of them would be fatal to the independence of the holy see, to the peace of Italy, and perhaps to the liberties of Europe. But to oppose them with any prospect of success required address and caution in proportion to the greatness of their power and their opportunities of taking revenge. Leo was defective in neither. He secretly exhorted the German princes to place one of their own number on the imperial throne, which many of them were capable of filling with honour. He put them in mind of the constitution by which the kings of Naples were forever excluded from that dignity.⁶⁷ He warmly exhorted the French king

⁶⁶ Mémoires de Fleuranges, 314.—Herbert, History of Henry VIII.

⁶⁷ Goldasti, Constitutiones Imperiales, Francof., 1763, vol. i. p. 439.

Leo X. at the Bier of Raphael.



to persist in his claim, not from any desire that he should gain his end, but, as he foresaw that the Germans would be more disposed to favour the king of Spain, he hoped that Francis himself, when he discovered his own chance of success to be desperate, would be stimulated by resentment and the spirit of rivalry to concur with all his interest in raising some third person to the head of the empire; or, on the other hand, if Francis should make an unexpected progress, he did not doubt but that Charles would be induced, by similar motives, to act the same part; and thus, by a prudent attention, the mutual jealousy of the two rivals might be so dexterously managed as to disappoint both. But this scheme, the only one which a prince in Leo's situation could adopt, though concerted with great wisdom, was executed with little discretion. The French ambassadors in Germany fed their master with vain hopes; the pope's nuncio, being gained by them, altogether forgot the instructions which he had received; and Francis persevered so long and with such obstinacy in urging his own pretensions as rendered all Leo's measures abortive.⁶⁸

Such were the hopes of the candidates, and the views of the different princes, when the diet was opened according to form at Frankfort. The right of choosing an emperor had long been vested in seven great princes, distinguished by the name of electors, the origin of whose office, as well as the nature and extent of their powers, have already been explained. These were, at that time, Albert of Brandenburg, archbishop of Mentz; Herman Count de Wied, archbishop of Cologne; Richard de Greiffenklau, archbishop of Triers; Lewis, king of Bohemia; Lewis, count palatine of the Rhine; Frederic, duke of Saxony; and Joachim I., marquis of Brandenburg. Notwith-

⁶⁸ Guicciar., lib. xiii. 161.

standing the artful arguments produced by the ambassadors of the two kings in favour of their respective masters, and in spite of all their solicitations, intrigues, and presents, the electors did not forget that maxim on which the liberty of the German constitution was thought to be founded. Among the members of the Germanic body, which is a great republic composed of states almost independent, the first principle of patriotism is to depress and limit the power of the emperor; and of this idea, so natural under such a form of government, a German politician seldom loses sight. No prince of considerable power or extensive dominions had for some ages been raised to the imperial throne. To this prudent precaution many of the great families in Germany owed the splendour and independence which they had acquired during that period. To elect either of the contending monarchs would have been a gross violation of that salutary maxim, would have given to the empire a master instead of a head, and would have reduced themselves from the rank of being almost his equals to the condition of his subjects.

Full of these ideas, all the electors turned their eyes towards Frederic, duke of Saxony, a prince of such eminent virtue and abilities as to be distinguished by the name of the *sage*, and with one voice they offered him the imperial crown. He was not dazzled with that object, which monarchs so far superior to him in power courted with such eagerness; and, after deliberating upon the matter a short time, he rejected it with a magnanimity and disinterestedness no less singular than admirable. “Nothing,” he observed, “could be more impolitic than an obstinate adherence to a maxim which, though sound and just in many cases, was not applicable to all. In times of tranquillity,” said he, “we wish for an emperor who has

not power to invade our liberties ; times of danger demand one who is able to secure our safety. The Turkish armies, led by a gallant and victorious monarch, are now assembling. They are ready to pour in upon Germany with a violence unknown in former ages. New conjunctures call for new expedients. The imperial sceptre must be committed to some hand more powerful than mine or that of any other German prince. We possess neither dominions, nor revenues, nor authority, which enable us to encounter such a formidable enemy. Recourse must be had in this exigency to one of the rival monarchs. Each of them can bring into the field forces sufficient for our defence. But as the king of Spain is of German extraction, as he is a member and prince of the empire by the territories which descend to him from his grandfather, as his dominions stretch along that frontier which lies most exposed to the enemy, his claim is preferable, in my opinion, to that of a stranger to our language, to our blood, and to our country ; and therefore I give my vote to confer on him the imperial crown."

This opinion, dictated by such uncommon generosity and supported by arguments so plausible, made a deep impression on the electors. The king of Spain's ambassadors, sensible of the important service which Frederic had done their master, sent him a considerable sum of money, as the first token of that prince's gratitude. But he who had greatness of mind to refuse a crown disdained to receive a bribe ; and, upon their entreating that at least he would permit them to distribute part of that sum among his attendants, he replied that he could not prevent them from accepting what should be offered, but whoever took a single florin should be dismissed next morning from his service.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ P. Daniel, an historian of considerable name, seems to call in question the truth of this account of Frederic's behaviour in refusing

No prince in Germany could now aspire to a dignity which Frederic had declined, for reasons applicable to them all. It remained to make a choice between the two great competitors. But besides the prejudice in Charles's favour arising from his birth, as well as the situation of his German dominions, he owed not a little to the abilities of the Cardinal de Gurk, and the zeal of Erard de la Mark, bishop of Liège, two of his ambassadors, who had conducted their negotiations with more prudence and address than those intrusted by the French king. The former, who had long been the minister and favourite of Maximilian, was well acquainted with the art of managing the Germans; and the latter, having been disappointed of a cardinal's hat by Francis, employed all the malicious ingenuity with which the desire for revenge inspires an ambitious mind, in thwarting the measures of that monarch. The Spanish party among the electors daily gained ground; and even the pope's nuncio, being convinced that it was vain to make any further opposition, endeavoured to acquire some merit with the future emperor, by offering voluntarily, in the name of his master, a dispensation to hold the imperial crown in conjunction with that of Naples.⁷⁰

the imperial crown, because it is not mentioned by Georgius Sabinus in his History of the Election and Coronation of Charles V., tom. iii. p. 63. But no great stress ought to be laid on an omission in a superficial author, whose treatise, though dignified with the name of History, contains only such an account of the ceremonial of Charles's election as is usually published in Germany on like occasions. (Scard. Rer. Germ. Script., vol. ii. p. 1.) The testimony of Erasmus, lib. xiii. epist. 4, and that of Sleidan, p. 18, are

express. Seckendorf, in his *Commentarius Historicus et Apologeticus de Lutheranismo*, p. 121, has examined this fact with his usual industry, and has established its truth by the most undoubted evidence. To these testimonies which he has collected, I may add the decisive one of Cardinal Cajetan, the pope's legate at Frankfort, in his letter, July 5th, 1519. *Epistres des Princes, &c., recueillies par Ruscelli, traduictes par Belforest, Par., 1572*, p. 60.

⁷⁰ Freheri Rer. German. Scrip-

On the 28th of June, five months and ten days after the death of Maximilian, this important contest, which had held all Europe in suspense, was decided. Six of the electors had already declared for the king of Spain; and the archbishop of Triers, the only firm adherent to the French interest, having at last joined his brethren, Charles was, by the unanimous voice of the electoral college, raised to the imperial throne.⁷¹

But though the electors consented, from various motives, to promote Charles to that high station, they discovered at the same time great jealousy of his extraordinary power, and endeavoured, with the utmost solicitude, to provide against his encroaching on the privileges of the Germanic body. It had long been the custom to demand of every new emperor a confirmation of these privileges, and to require a promise that he never would violate them in any instance. While princes who were formidable neither from extent of territory nor of genius possessed the imperial throne, a general and verbal engagement to this purpose was deemed sufficient security. But, under an emperor so powerful as Charles, other precautions seemed necessary. A *capitulation*, or claim of right, was formed, in which the privileges and immunities of the electors, of the princes of the empire, of the cities, and of every other member of the Germanic body, are enumerated. This capitulation was immediately signed by Charles's ambassadors in the name of their master, and he himself, at his coronation, confirmed it in the most solemn manner. Since that period, the electors have continued to prescribe the same conditions to all his successors; and the capitulation, or mutual contract between the emperor and his subjects, is considered in Germany as

tores, vol. iii. 172, cur. Struvii, Ar-
gent., 1717.—Giannone, Hist. of
Naples, ii. 498.

⁷¹ Jac. Aug. Thuan., Hist. sui
Temporis, edit. Bulkley, lib. i. c. 9.

a strong barrier against the progress of the imperial power, and as the great charter of their liberties, to which they often appeal.⁷²

The important intelligence of his election was conveyed in nine days from Frankfort to Barcelona, where Charles was still detained by the obstinacy of the Catalonian cortes, which had not hitherto brought to an issue any of the affairs which came before it. He received the account with the joy natural to a young and aspiring mind on an accession of power and dignity which raised him so far above the other princes of Europe. Then it was that those vast prospects which allured him during his whole administration began to open, and from this era we may date the formation, and are able to trace the gradual progress, of a grand system of enterprising ambition, which renders the history of his reign so worthy of attention.

A trivial circumstance first discovered the effects of this great elevation on the mind of Charles. In all the public writs which he now issued as king of Spain, he assumed the title of *majesty*, and required it from his subjects as a mark of their respect. Before that time, all the monarchs of Europe were satisfied with the appellation of *highness* or *grace*; but the vanity of other courts soon led them to imitate the example of the Spanish. The epithet of majesty is no longer a mark of pre-eminence. The most inconsiderable monarchs in Europe enjoy it, and the arrogance of the greater potentates has invented no higher denominations.⁷³

The Spaniards were far from viewing the promotion of their king to the imperial throne with the same

⁷² Pfeffel, Abrégé de l'Histoire du Droit public d'Allemagne, 590.—Limnei Capitulat. Imp.—Epistres des Princes par Ruscelli, p. 60.

⁷³ Minianæ Contin. Mar., p. 13.—Ferreras, viii. 475.—Mémoires Hist. de la Houssaie, tom. i. p. 53, etc.

satisfaction which he himself felt. To be deprived of the presence of their sovereign, and to be subjected to the government of a viceroy and his council, a species of administration often oppressive and always disagreeable, were the immediate and necessary consequences of this new dignity. To see the blood of their countrymen shed in quarrels wherein the nation had no concern, to behold its treasures wasted in supporting the splendour of a foreign title, to be plunged in the chaos of Italian and German politics, were effects of this event almost as unavoidable. From all these considerations, they concluded that nothing could have happened more pernicious to the Spanish nation; and the fortitude and public spirit of their ancestors, who, in the cortes of Castile, prohibited Alphonso the Wise from leaving the kingdom in order to receive the imperial crown, were often mentioned with the highest praise, and pronounced to be extremely worthy of imitation at this juncture.⁷⁴

But Charles, without regarding the sentiments or murmurs of his Spanish subjects, accepted of the imperial dignity which the count palatine, at the head of a solemn embassy, offered him in the name of the electors, and declared his intention of setting out soon for Germany in order to take possession of it. This was the more necessary because, according to the forms of the German constitution, he could not, before the ceremony of a public coronation, exercise any act of jurisdiction or authority.⁷⁵

Their certain knowledge of this resolution augmented so much the disgust of the Spaniards that a sullen and refractory spirit prevailed among persons of all ranks. The pope having granted the king the tenths of all ecclesiastical benefices in Castile, to assist him in carry-

⁷⁴ Sandoval, i. p. 32.—Minianæ
Contin., p. 14.

⁷⁵ Sabinus, P. Barre, viii. 1085.

ing on war with greater vigour against the Turks, a convocation of the clergy unanimously refused to levy that sum, upon pretence that it ought never to be exacted but at those times when Christendom was actually invaded by the infidels; and though Leo, in order to support his authority, laid the kingdom under an interdict, so little regard was paid to a censure which was universally deemed unjust, that Charles himself applied to have it taken off. Thus the Spanish clergy, besides their merit in opposing the usurpations of the pope and disregarding the influence of the crown, gained the exemption which they had claimed.⁷⁶

The commotions which arose in the kingdom of Valencia, annexed to the crown of Aragon, were more formidable, and produced more dangerous and lasting effects. A seditious monk having by his sermons excited the citizens of Valencia, the capital city, to take arms, and to punish certain criminals in a tumultuary manner, the people, pleased with this exercise of power, and with such a discovery of their own importance, not only refused to lay down their arms, but formed themselves into troops and companies, that they might be regularly trained to martial exercises. To obtain some security against the oppression of the grandees was the motive of this association, and proved a powerful bond of union; for as the aristocratical privileges and independence were more complete in Valencia than in any other of the Spanish kingdoms, the nobles, being scarcely accountable for their conduct to any superior, treated the people not only as vassals but as slaves. They were alarmed, however, at the progress of this unexpected insurrection, as it might encourage the people to attempt shaking off the yoke altogether; but, as they could not repress them without taking arms, it became necessary to have recourse to the emperor, and

* P. Martyr. Ep., 462.—Ferreras, viii. 473.

to desire his permission to attack them. At the same time the people made choice of deputies to represent their grievances and to implore the protection of their sovereign. Happily for the latter, they arrived at court when Charles was exasperated to a high degree against the nobility. As he was eager to visit Germany, where his presence became every day more necessary, and as his Flemish courtiers were still more impatient to return into their native country, that they might carry thither the spoils which they had amassed in Castile, it was impossible for him to hold the cortes of Valencia in person. He had for that reason empowered the Cardinal Adrian to represent him in that assembly, and in his name to receive their oath of allegiance, to confirm their privileges with the usual solemnities, and to demand of them a free gift. But the Valencian nobles, who considered this measure as an indignity to their country, which was no less entitled than his other kingdoms to the honour of their sovereign's presence, declared that by the fundamental laws of the constitution they could neither acknowledge as king a person who was absent, nor grant him any subsidy; and to this declaration they adhered with a haughty and inflexible obstinacy. Charles, piqued by their behaviour, decided in favour of the people, and rashly authorized them to continue in arms. Their deputies returned in triumph, and were received by their fellow-citizens as the deliverers of their country. The insolence of the multitude increasing with their success, they expelled all the nobles out of the city, committed the government to magistrates of their own election, and entered into an association, distinguished by the name of *germanada* or *brotherhood*, which proved the source not only of the wildest disorders, but of the most fatal calamities, in that kingdom.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ P. Martyr. Ep., 651.—Ferreras, viii. 376, 485.

Meanwhile, the kingdom of Castile was agitated with no less violence. No sooner was the emperor's intention to leave Spain made known, than several cities of the first rank resolved to remonstrate against it, and to crave redress once more of those grievances which they had formerly laid before him. Charles artfully avoided admitting their deputies to audience; and, as he saw from this circumstance how difficult it would be at this juncture to restrain the mutinous spirit of the greater cities, he summoned the cortes of Castile to meet at Compostella, a town in Galicia. His only reason for calling that assembly was the hope of obtaining another donative; for, as his treasury had been exhausted in the same proportion that the riches of his ministers increased, he could not, without some additional aid, appear in Germany with splendour suited to the imperial dignity. To appoint a meeting of the cortes in so remote a province, and to demand a new subsidy before the time for paying the former was expired, were innovations of a most dangerous tendency, and among a people not only jealous of their liberties, but accustomed to supply the wants of their sovereigns with a very frugal hand, excited a universal alarm. The magistrates of Toledo remonstrated against both these measures in a very high tone; the inhabitants of Valladolid, who expected that the cortes should have been held in that city, were so enraged that they took arms in a tumultuary manner; and if Charles, with his foreign counsellors, had not fortunately made their escape during a violent tempest, they would have massacred all the Flemings, and have prevented him from continuing his journey towards Compostella.

Every city through which he passed petitioned against holding a cortes in Galicia, a point with regard to which Charles was inflexible. But though the utmost influence had been exerted by the ministers in order to pro-

cure a choice of representatives favourable to their designs, such was the temper of the nation that at the opening of the assembly there appeared among many of the members unusual symptoms of ill-humour, which threatened a fierce opposition to all the measures of the court. No representatives were sent by Toledo; for the lot, according to which, by ancient custom, the election was determined in that city, having fallen upon two persons devoted to the Flemish ministers, their fellow-citizens refused to grant them a commission in the usual form, and in their stead made choice of two deputies, whom they empowered to repair to Compostella and to protest against the lawfulness of the cortes assembled there. The representatives of Salamanca refused to take the usual oath of fidelity unless Charles consented to change the place of meeting. Those of Toro, Madrid, Cordova, and several other places declared the demand of another donative to be unprecedented, unconstitutional, and unnecessary. All the arts, however, which influence popular assemblies, bribes, promises, threats, and even force, were employed in order to gain members. The nobles, soothed by the respectful assiduity with which Chièvres and the other Flemings paid court to them, or instigated by a mean jealousy of that spirit of independence which they saw rising among the commons, openly favoured the pretensions of the court, or at the utmost did not oppose them; and at last, in contempt not only of the sentiments of the nation, but of the ancient forms of the constitution, a majority voted to grant the donative for which the emperor had applied.⁷⁸ Together with this grant, the cortes laid before Charles a representation of those grievances whereof his people complained, and in their name craved redress; but he, having obtained from them all that he could expect, paid no attention to this

⁷⁸ P. Martyr. Ep., 663.—Sandoval, p. 32, etc.

ill-timed petition, which it was no longer dangerous to disregard.⁷⁹

As nothing now retarded his embarkation, he disclosed his intention with regard to the regency of Castile during his absence, which he had hitherto kept secret, and nominated Cardinal Adrian to that office. The viceroyalty of Aragon he conferred on Don John de Lanuza; that of Valencia on Don Diego de Mendoza, Conde de Melito. The choice of the two latter was universally acceptable; but the advancement of Adrian, though the only Fleming who had preserved any reputation among the Spaniards, animated the Castilians with new hatred against foreigners; and even the nobles, who had so tamely suffered other inroads upon the constitution, felt the indignity offered to their own order by his promotion, and remonstrated against it as being illegal. But Charles's desire of visiting Germany, as well as the impatience of his ministers to leave Spain, were now so much increased that, without attending to the murmurs of the Castilians, or even taking time to provide any remedy against an insurrection in Toledo, which at that time threatened, and afterwards produced, most formidable effects, he sailed from Corunna on the 22d of May; and by setting out so abruptly in quest of a new crown he endangered a more important one of which he was already in possession.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Sandoval, p. 84.

⁸⁰ P. Martyr. Ep., 670.—Sandoval, p. 86.

BOOK II.

Rivalry between Charles and Francis I. for the Empire.—They negotiate with the Pope, the Venetians, and Henry VIII. of England.—Character of the latter.—Cardinal Wolsey.—Charles visits England.—Meeting between Henry VIII. and Francis I.—Coronation of Charles.—Solyman the Magnificent.—The Diet convoked at Worms.—The Reformation.—Sale of Indulgences by Leo X.—Tetzel.—Luther.—Progress of his Opinions.—Is summoned to Rome.—His Appearance before the Legate.—He appeals to a General Council.—Luther questions the Papal Authority.—Reformation in Switzerland.—Excommunication of Luther.—Reformation in Germany.—Causes of the Progress of the Reformation.—The Corruption in the Roman Church.—Power and Ill-Conduct of the Clergy.—Venality of the Roman Court.—Effects of the Invention of Printing.—Erasmus.—The Diet at Worms.—Edict against Luther.—He is seized and confined at Wartburg.—His Doctrines condemned by the University of Paris, and controverted by Henry VIII. of England.—Henry VIII. favours the Emperor Charles against Francis I.—Leo X. makes a Treaty with Charles.—Death of Chièvres.—Hostilities in Navarre and in the Low Countries.—Siege of Mézières.—Congress at Calais.—League against France.—Hostilities in Italy.—Death of Leo X.—Defeat of the French.—Henry VIII. declares War against France.—Charles visits England.—Conquest of Rhodes by Solyman.

MANY concurring circumstances not only called Charles's thoughts towards the affairs of Germany, but rendered his presence in that country necessary. The electors grew impatient of so long an interregnum; his hereditary dominions were disturbed by intestine commotions; and the new opinions concerning religion made such rapid progress as required the most serious consideration. But, above all, the motions of the French king drew his attention, and convinced him that it was necessary to take measures for his own defence with no less speed than vigour.

When Charles and Francis entered the lists as candi-

dates for the imperial dignity, they conducted their rivalship with many professions of regard for each other, and with repeated declarations that they would not suffer any tincture of enmity to mingle itself with this honourable emulation. “We both court the same mistress,” said Francis, with his usual vivacity; “each ought to urge his suit with all the address of which he is master: the most fortunate will prevail, and the other must rest contented.”¹ But though two young and high-spirited princes, and each of them animated with the hope of success, might be capable of forming such a generous resolution, it was soon found that they promised upon a moderation too refined and disinterested for human nature. The preference given to Charles in the sight of all Europe mortified Francis extremely, and inspired him with all the passions natural to disappointed ambition. To this was owing the personal jealousy and rivalship which subsisted between the two monarchs during their whole reign; and the rancour of these, augmented by a real opposition of interest, which gave rise to many unavoidable causes of discord, involved them in almost perpetual hostilities. Charles had paid no regard to the principal article in the treaty of Noyon, by refusing oftener than once to do justice to John d’Albret, the excluded monarch of Navarre, whom Francis was bound in honour and prompted by interest to restore to his throne. The French king had pretensions to the crown of Naples, of which Ferdinand had deprived his predecessor by a most unjustifiable breach of faith. The emperor might reclaim the duchy of Milan as a fief of the empire, which Francis had seized, and still kept in possession, without having received investiture of it from the emperor. Charles considered the duchy of Burgundy as the patrimonial domain of his ancestors, wrested from them by the unjust policy of

¹ Guic., lib. xiii. p. 159.

Louis XI., and observed with the greatest jealousy the strict connections which Francis had formed with the duke of Gueldres, the hereditary enemy of his family.

When the sources of discord were so many and various, peace could be of no long continuance, even between princes the most exempt from ambition or emulation. But as the shock between two such mighty antagonists could not fail of being extremely violent, they both discovered no small solicitude about its consequences, and took time not only to collect and to ponder their own strength and to compare it with that of their adversary, but to secure the friendship or assistance of the other European powers.

The pope had equal reason to dread the two rivals, and saw that he who prevailed would become absolute master in Italy. If it had been in his power to engage them in hostilities without rendering Lombardy the theatre of war, nothing would have been more agreeable to him than to see them waste each other's strength in endless quarrels. But this was impossible. Leo foresaw that on the first rupture between the two monarchs the armies of France and Spain would take the field in the Milanese; and while the scene of their operations was so near, and the subject for which they contended so interesting to him, he could not long remain neuter. He was obliged, therefore, to adapt his plan of conduct to his political situation. He courted and soothed the emperor and king of France with equal industry and address. Though warmly solicited by each of them to espouse his cause, he assumed all the appearances of entire impartiality, and attempted to conceal his real sentiments under that profound dissimulation which seems to have been affected by most of the Italian politicians in that age.

The views and interests of the Venetians were not different from those of the pope; nor were they less

solicitous to prevent Italy from becoming the seat of war, and their own republic from being involved in the quarrel. But through all Leo's artifices, and notwithstanding his high pretensions to a perfect neutrality, it was visible that he leaned towards the emperor, from whom he had both more to fear and more to hope than from Francis; and it was equally manifest that if it became necessary to take a side the Venetians would, from motives of the same nature, declare for the king of France. No considerable assistance, however, was to be expected from the Italian states, who were jealous to an extreme degree of the Transalpine powers, and careful to preserve the balance even between them, unless when they were seduced to violate this favourite maxim of their policy by the certain prospect of some great advantage to themselves.

But the chief attention both of Charles and of Francis was employed in order to gain the king of England, from whom each of them expected assistance more effectual and afforded with less political caution. Henry VIII. had ascended the throne of that kingdom in the year 1509, with such circumstances of advantage as promised a reign of distinguished felicity and splendour. The union in his person of the two contending titles of York and Lancaster, the alacrity and emulation with which both factions obeyed his commands, not only enabled him to exert a degree of vigour and authority in his domestic government which none of his predecessors could have safely assumed, but permitted him to take a share in the affairs of the Continent, from which the attention of the English had long been diverted by their unhappy intestine divisions. The great sums of money which his father had amassed rendered him the most wealthy prince in Europe. The peace which had subsisted under the cautious administration of that monarch had been of sufficient length to recruit the

population of the kingdom after the desolation of the civil wars, but not so long as to enervate its spirit; and the English, ashamed of having rendered their own country so long a scene of discord and bloodshed, were eager to display their valour in some foreign war, and to revive the memory of the victories gained on the Continent by their ancestors. Henry's own temper perfectly suited the state of his kingdom and the disposition of his subjects. Ambitious, active, enterprising, and accomplished in all the martial exercises which in that age formed a chief part in the education of persons of noble birth and inspired them with an early love of war, he longed to engage in action, and to signalize the beginning of his reign by some remarkable exploit. An opportunity soon presented itself; and the victory at Guinegate, together with the successful sieges of Terouenne and Tournay, though of little utility to England, reflected great lustre on its monarch, and confirmed the idea which foreign princes entertained of his power and consequence. So many concurring causes, added to the happy situation of his own dominions, which secured them from foreign invasion, and to the fortunate circumstance of his being in possession of Calais, which served not only as a key to France, but opened an easy passage into the Netherlands, rendered the king of England the natural guardian of the liberties of Europe, and the arbiter between the emperor and French monarch. Henry himself was sensible of this singular advantage, and convinced that, in order to preserve the balance even, it was his office to prevent either of the rivals from acquiring such superiority of power as might be fatal to the other, or formidable to the rest of Christendom. But he was destitute of the penetration, and still more of the temper, which such a delicate function required. Influenced by caprice, by vanity, by resentment, by affection, he was incapable of forming any regular and

extensive system of policy or of adhering to it with steadiness. His measures seldom resulted from attention to the general welfare or from a deliberate regard to his own interest, but were dictated by passions which rendered him blind to both, and prevented his gaining that ascendant in the affairs of Europe, or from reaping such advantages to himself, as a prince of greater art, though with inferior talents, might have easily secured.

All the impolitic steps in Henry's administration must not, however, be imputed to defects in his own character; many of them were owing to the violent passions and insatiable ambition of his prime minister and favourite, Cardinal Wolsey. This man, from one of the lowest ranks in life, had risen to a height of power and dignity to which no English subject ever arrived, and governed the haughty, presumptuous, and untractable spirit of Henry with absolute authority. Great talents, and of very different kinds, fitted him for the two opposite stations of minister and of favourite. His profound judgment, his unwearied industry, his thorough acquaintance with the state of the kingdom, his extensive knowledge of the views and interest of foreign courts, qualified him for that uncontrolled direction of affairs with which he was intrusted. The elegance of his manners, the gaiety of his conversation, his insinuating address, his love of magnificence, and his proficiency in those parts of literature of which Henry was fond, gained him the affection and confidence of the young monarch. Wolsey was far from employing this vast and almost royal power to promote either the true interest of the nation or the real grandeur of his master. Rapacious at the same time, and profuse, he was insatiable in desiring wealth. Of boundless ambition, he aspired after new honours with an eagerness unabated by his former success; and being rendered presumptuous by his uncommon elevation, as well as by

the ascendant which he had gained over a prince who scarcely brooked advice from any other person, he discovered in his whole demeanour the most overbearing haughtiness and pride. To these passions he himself sacrificed every consideration; and whoever endeavoured to obtain his favour, or that of his master, found it necessary to soothe and to gratify them.

As all the states of Europe sought Henry's friendship at that time, all courted his minister with incredible attention and obsequiousness, and strove, by presents, by promises, or by flattery, to work upon his avarice, his ambition, or his pride.² Francis had, in the year 1518, employed Bonnivet, admiral of France, one of his most accomplished and artful courtiers, to gain this haughty prelate. He himself bestowed on him every mark of respect and confidence. He consulted him with regard to his most important affairs, and received his responses with implicit deference. By these arts, together with the grant of a large pension, Francis attached the cardinal to his interest, who persuaded his master to surrender Tournay to France, to conclude a treaty of marriage between his daughter, the princess Mary, and the dauphin, and to consent to a personal interview with the French king.³ From that time the most familiar intercourse subsisted between the two courts; Francis, sensible of the great value of Wolsey's friendship, laboured to secure the continuance of it by every possible expression of regard, bestowing on him, in all his letters, the honourable appellations of father, tutor, and governor.

Charles observed the progress of this union with the utmost jealousy and concern. His near affinity to the king of England gave him some title to his friendship; and soon after his accession to the throne of Castile he

² Fiddes's Life of Wolsey, 166.—Rymer's *Fœdera*, xiii. 718.

³ Herbert's History of Henry VIII., 30—Rymer, xiii. 624.

had attempted to ingratiate himself with Wolsey, by settling on him a pension of three thousand livres. His chief solicitude at present was to prevent the intended interview with Francis, the effects of which upon two young princes, whose hearts were no less susceptible of friendship than their manners were capable of inspiring it, he extremely dreaded. But after many delays, occasioned by difficulties with respect to the ceremonial, and by the anxious precautions of both courts for the safety of their respective sovereigns, the time and place of meeting were at last fixed. Messengers had been sent to different courts, inviting all comers who were gentlemen to enter the lists at tilt and tournament against the two monarchs and their knights. Both Francis and Henry loved the splendour of these spectacles too well, and were too much delighted with the graceful figure which they made on such occasions, to forego the pleasure or glory which they expected from such a singular and brilliant assembly. Nor was the cardinal less fond of displaying his own magnificence in the presence of two courts, and of discovering to the two nations the extent of his influence over both their monarchs. Charles, finding it impossible to prevent the interview, endeavoured to disappoint its effects, and to preoccupy the favour of the English monarch and his minister by an act of complaisance still more flattering and more uncommon. Having sailed from Corunna, as has already been related, he steered his course directly towards England, and, relying wholly on Henry's generosity for his own safety, landed at Dover. This unexpected visit surprised the nation. Wolsey, however, was well acquainted with the emperor's intention. A negotiation, unknown to the historians of that age, had been carried on between him and the court of Spain; this visit had been concerted; and Charles granted the cardinal, whom he calls his *most dear friend*, an additional pension of

seven thousand ducats.⁴ Henry, who was then at Canterbury, in his way to France, immediately despatched Wolsey to Dover in order to welcome the emperor, and, being highly pleased with an event so soothing to his vanity, hastened to receive with suitable respect a guest who had placed in him such unbounded confidence. Charles, to whom time was precious, stayed only four days in England; but during that short space he had the address not only to give Henry favourable impressions of his character and intentions, but to detach Wolsey entirely from the interest of the French king. All the grandeur, the wealth, and the power which the cardinal possessed did not satisfy his ambitious mind while there was one step higher to which an ecclesiastic could ascend. The papal dignity had for some time been the object of his wishes; and Francis, as the most effectual method of securing his friendship, had promised to favour his pretensions, on the first vacancy, with all his interest. But as the emperor's influence in the college of cardinals was greatly superior to that of the French king, Wolsey grasped eagerly at the offer which that artful prince had made him, of exerting it vigorously in his behalf; and, allured by this prospect, which under the pontificate of Leo, still in the prime of his life, was a very distant one, he entered with warmth into all the emperor's schemes. No treaty, however, was concluded at that time between the two monarchs; but Henry, in return for the honour which Charles had done him, promised to visit him in some place of the Low Countries immediately after taking leave of the French king.

His interview with that prince was in an open plain between Guisnes and Ardres, where the two kings and their attendants displayed their magnificence with such emulation and profuse expense as procured it the name of the *Field of the Cloth of Gold*. Feats of chivalry,

⁴ Rymer, xiii. 714.

in power as would have been fatal to the liberty and happiness of mankind.

The first act of the emperor's administration was to appoint a diet of the empire to be held at Worms on the 6th of January, 1521. In his circular letters to the different princes, he informed them that he had called this assembly in order to concert with them the most proper measures for checking the progress of those new and dangerous opinions which threatened to disturb the peace of Germany and to overturn the religion of their ancestors.

Charles had in view the opinions which had been propagated by Luther and his disciples since the year 1517. As these led to that happy reformation in religion which rescued one part of Europe from the papal yoke, mitigated its rigour in the other, and produced a revolution in the sentiments of mankind, the greatest as well as the most beneficial that has happened since the publication of Christianity, not only the events which at first gave birth to such opinions, but the causes which rendered their progress so rapid and successful, deserve to be considered with minute attention.

To overturn a system of religious belief founded on ancient and deep-rooted prejudices, supported by power, and defended with no less art than industry, to establish in its room doctrines of the most contrary genius and tendency, and to accomplish all this, not by external violence or the force of arms, are operations which historians the least prone to credulity and superstition ascribe to that Divine Providence which with infinite ease can bring about events which to human sagacity appear impossible. The interposition of heaven in favour of the Christian religion at its first publication was manifested by miracles and prophecies wrought and uttered in confirmation of it. Though none of the Reformers possessed, or pretended to pos-

cess, these supernatural gifts, yet that wonderful preparation of circumstances which disposed the minds of men for receiving their doctrines—that singular combination of causes which secured their success, and enabled men destitute of power and of policy to triumph over those who employed against them extraordinary efforts of both—may be considered as no slight proof that the same hand which planted the Christian religion protected the Reformed faith, and reared it from beginnings extremely feeble to an amazing degree of vigour and maturity.

It was from causes seemingly fortuitous, and from a source very inconsiderable, that all the mighty effects of the Reformation flowed. Leo X., when raised to the papal throne, found the revenues of the Church exhausted by the vast projects of his two ambitious predecessors, Alexander VI. and Julius II. His own temper, naturally liberal and enterprising, rendered him incapable of that severe and patient economy which the situation of his finances required. On the contrary, his schemes for aggrandizing the family of Medici, his love of splendour, his taste for pleasure, and his magnificence in rewarding men of genius, involved him daily in new expenses, in order to provide a fund for which, he tried every device that the fertile invention of priests had fallen upon to drain the credulous multitude of their wealth. Among others, he had recourse to a sale of *indulgences*. According to the doctrine of the Romish Church, all the good works of the saints over and above those which were necessary towards their own justification are deposited, together with the infinite merits of Jesus Christ, in one inexhaustible treasury. The keys of this were committed to St. Peter, and to his successors the popes, who may open it at pleasure, and, by transferring a portion of this superabundant merit to any particular person for a

sum of money, may convey to him either the pardon of his own sins, or a release for any one in whose happiness he is interested from the pains of purgatory. Such indulgences were first invented in the eleventh century by Urban II. as a recompense for those who went in person upon the meritorious enterprise of conquering the Holy Land. They were afterwards granted to those who hired a soldier for that purpose, and in process of time were bestowed on such as gave money for accomplishing any pious work enjoined by the pope.⁸ Julius II. had bestowed indulgences on all who contributed towards building the church of St. Peter at Rome; and, as Leo was carrying on that magnificent and expensive fabric, his grant was founded on the same pretence.⁹

The right of promulgating these indulgences in Germany, together with a share in the profits arising from the sale of them, was granted to Albert, elector of Mentz and archbishop of Magdeburg, who, as his chief agent for retailing them in Saxony, employed Tetzel, a Dominican friar, of licentious morals, but of an active spirit, and remarkable for his noisy and popular eloquence. He, assisted by the monks of his order, executed the commission with great zeal and success, but with little discretion or decency; and though, by magnifying excessively the benefit of their indulgences,¹⁰

⁸ History of the Council of Trent, by F. Paul, p. 4.

⁹ Pallav., Hist. Conc. Trident., p. 4.

¹⁰ As the form of these indulgences, and the benefits which they were supposed to convey, are unknown in Protestant countries, and little understood, at present, in several places where the Roman Catholic religion is established, I have, for the information of my readers, translated the form of ab-

solution used by Tetzel: " May our Lord Jesus Christ have mercy upon thee, and absolve thee by the merits of his most holy passion. And I, by his authority, that of his blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and of the most holy pope, granted and committed to me in these parts, do absolve thee, first from all ecclesiastical censures, in whatever manner they have been incurred, and then from all thy sins, transgressions, and excesses, how enormous

and by disposing of them at a very low price, they carried on for some time an extensive and lucrative traffic among the credulous and the ignorant, the extravagance of their assertions, as well as the irregularities in their conduct, came at last to give general offence. The princes and nobles were irritated at seeing their vassals drained of so much wealth in order to replenish the treasury of a profuse pontiff. Men of piety regretted the delusion of the people, who, being taught to rely for the pardon of their sins on the

soever they may be, even from such as are reserved for the cognizance of the holy see ; and as far as the keys of the Holy Church extend, I remit to you all punishment which you deserve in purgatory on their account, and I restore you to the holy sacraments of the Church, to the unity of the faithful, and to that innocence and purity which you possessed at baptism ; so that, when you die, the gates of punishment shall be shut, and the gates of the paradise of delight shall be opened ; and if you shall not die at present, this grace shall remain in full force when you are at the point of death. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Seckend., Comment., lib. i., p. 14.

The terms in which Tetzel and his associates described the benefits of indulgences, and the necessity of purchasing them, are so extravagant that they appear to be almost incredible. If any man (said they) purchase letters of indulgence, his soul may rest secure with respect to its salvation. The souls confined in purgatory, for whose redemption indulgences are purchased, as soon as the money tinkles in the chest, instantly escape from that place of torment and ascend into

heaven. That the efficacy of indulgences was so great that the most heinous sins, even if one should violate (which was impossible) the mother of God, would be remitted and expiated by them, and the person be freed both from punishment and guilt. That this was the unspeakable gift of God, in order to reconcile men to himself. That the cross erected by the preachers of indulgences was as efficacious as the cross of Christ itself. Lo ! the heavens are open ; if you enter not now, when will you enter? For twelve pence you may redeem the soul of your father out of purgatory ; and are you so ungrateful that you will not rescue your parent from torment ? If you had but one coat, you ought to strip yourself instantly, and sell it, in order to purchase such benefits, etc. These, and many such extravagant expressions, are selected out of Luther's works by Chemnitius in his Examen Concilii Tridentini, apud Herm. von der Hardt, Hist. Liter. Reform., pars iv. p. 6. The same author has published several of Tetzel's discourses, which prove that these expressions were neither singular nor exaggerated. Ibid., p. 14.

indulgences which they purchased, did not think it incumbent on them either to study the doctrines taught by genuine Christianity or to practise the duties which it enjoins. Even the most unthinking were shocked at the scandalous behaviour of Tetzel and his associates, who often squandered, in drunkenness, gaming, and low debauchery, those sums which were piously bestowed in hopes of obtaining eternal happiness; and all began to wish that some check were given to this commerce, no less detrimental to society than destructive to religion.

Such was the favourable juncture, and so disposed were the minds of his countrymen to listen to his discourses, when Martin Luther first began to call in question the efficacy of indulgences, and to declaim against the vicious lives and false doctrines of the persons employed in promulgating them. Luther was a native of Eisleben, in Saxony, and, though born of poor parents, had received a learned education, during the progress of which he gave many indications of uncommon vigour and acuteness of genius. His mind was naturally susceptible of serious sentiments, and tinctured with somewhat of that religious melancholy which delights in the solitude and devotion of a monastic life. The death of a companion, killed by lightning at his side in a violent thunder-storm, made such an impression on his mind as co-operated with his natural temper in inducing him to retire into a convent of Augustinian friars, where, without suffering the entreaties of his parents to divert him from what he thought his duty to God, he assumed the habit of that order. He soon acquired great reputation, not only for piety, but for his love of knowledge and his unwearied application to study. He had been taught the scholastic philosophy and theology, which were then in vogue, by very able masters, and wanted not penetra-

tion to comprehend all the niceties and distinctions with which they abound ; but his understanding, naturally sound, and superior to everything frivolous, soon became disgusted with those subtle and uninstructive sciences, and sought for some more solid foundation of knowledge and of piety in the Holy Scriptures. Having found a copy of the Bible, which lay neglected in the library of his monastery, he abandoned all other pursuits, and devoted himself to the study of it with such eagerness and assiduity as astonished the monks, who were little accustomed to derive their theological notions from that source. The great progress which he made in this uncommon course of study augmented so much the fame both of his sanctity and of his learning, that Frederic, elector of Saxony, having founded a university at Wittemberg on the Elbe, the place of his residence, Luther was chosen first to teach philosophy, and afterwards theology, there, and discharged both offices in such a manner that he was deemed the chief ornament of that society.

While Luther was at the height of his reputation and authority, Tetzel began to publish indulgences in the neighbourhood of Wittemberg, and to ascribe to them the same imaginary virtues which had in other places imposed on the credulity of the people. As Saxony was not more enlightened than the other provinces of Germany, Tetzel met with prodigious success there. It was with the utmost concern that Luther beheld the artifices of those who sold, and the simplicity of those who bought, indulgences. The opinions of Thomas Aquinas and the other schoolmen, on which the doctrine of indulgences was founded, had already lost much of their authority with him ; and the Scriptures, which he began to consider as the great standard of theological truth, afforded no countenance to a practice equally subversive of faith and of morals. His warm

and impetuous temper did not suffer him long to conceal such important discoveries, or to continue a silent spectator of the delusion of his countrymen. From the pulpit in the great church of Wittemberg he inveighed bitterly against the irregularities and vices of the monks who published indulgences ; he ventured to examine the doctrines which they taught, and pointed out to the people the danger of relying for salvation upon any other means than those appointed by God in his word. The boldness and novelty of these opinions drew great attention, and, being recommended by the authority of Luther's personal character and delivered with a popular and persuasive eloquence, they made a deep impression on his hearers. Encouraged by the favourable reception of his doctrines among the people, he wrote to Albert, elector of Mentz and archbishop of Magdeburg, to whose jurisdiction that part of Saxony was subject, and remonstrated warmly against the false opinions, as well as wicked lives, of the preachers of indulgences ; but he found that prelate too deeply interested in their success to correct their abuses. His next attempt was to gain the suffrage of men of learning. For this purpose he published ninety-five theses, containing his sentiments with regard to indulgences. These he proposed, not as points fully established or of undoubted certainty, but as subjects of inquiry and disputation ; he appointed a day on which the learned were invited to impugn them, either in person or by writing ; to the whole he subjoined solemn protestations of his high respect for the apostolic see, and of his implicit submission to its authority. No opponent appeared at the time prefixed ; the theses spread over Germany with astonishing rapidity ; they were read with the greatest eagerness ; and all admired the boldness of the man who had ventured not only to call in question the plenitude of papal power, but to attack the

Dominicans, armed with all the terrors of inquisitorial authority.¹¹

The friars of St. Augustine, Luther's own order, though addicted with no less obsequiousness than the other monastic fraternities to the papal see, gave no check to the publication of these uncommon opinions. Luther had, by his piety and learning, acquired extraordinary authority among his brethren; he professed the highest regard for the authority of the pope; his professions were at that time sincere; and as a secret enmity, excited by interest or emulation, subsists among all the monastic orders in the Romish Church, the Augustinians were highly pleased with his invectives against the Dominicans, and hoped to see them exposed to the hatred and scorn of the people. Nor was his sovereign, the elector of Saxony, the wisest prince at that time in Germany, dissatisfied with this obstruction which Luther threw in the way of the publication of indulgences. He secretly encouraged the attempt, and flattered himself that this dispute among the ecclesiastics themselves might give some check to the exactions of the court of Rome, which the secular princes had long, though without success, been endeavouring to oppose.

Many zealous champions immediately arose to defend opinions on which the wealth and power of the Church were founded, against Luther's attacks. In opposition to his theses, Tetzel published counter-theses at Frankfurt on the Oder; Eccius, a celebrated divine of Augsburg, endeavoured to refute Luther's notions; and Prierias, a Dominican friar, master of the sacred palace, and inquisitor-general, wrote against him with all the virulence of a scholastic disputant. But the manner in which they conducted the controversy did little service

¹¹ Lutheri Opera, Jenæ, 1612, vol. i. præfat. 3, p. 2, 66.—Hist. of Council of Trent, by F. Paul, p. 4.—Seckend, Com. Apol., p. 16.

to their cause. Luther attempted to combat indulgences by arguments founded in reason or derived from Scripture; they produced nothing in support of them but the sentiments of schoolmen, the conclusions of the canon law, and the decrees of popes.¹² The decision of judges so partial and interested did not satisfy the people, who began to call in question the authority even of these venerable guides, when they found them standing in direct opposition to the dictates of reason and the determinations of the Divine law.¹³

¹² F. Paul, p. 6.—Seckend., p. 40.
—Pallavic., p. 8.

¹³ Seckend., p. 30.—Guicciardini has asserted two things with regard to the first promulgation of indulgences:—1. That Leo bestowed a gift of the profits arising from the sale of indulgences in Saxony, and the adjacent provinces of Germany, upon his sister Magdalen, the wife of Francescetto Cibo. (Guic., lib. xiii. 168.) 2. That Arcembaldo, a Genoese ecclesiastic, who had been bred a merchant, and still retained all the activity and address of that profession, was appointed by her to collect the money which should be raised. F. Paul has followed him in both these particulars; and adds that the Augustinians in Saxony had been immemorially employed in preaching indulgences, but that Arcembaldo and his deputies, hoping to gain more by committing this trust to the Dominicans, had made their bargain with Tetzel, and that Luther was prompted at first to oppose Tetzel and his associates by a desire of taking revenge for this injury offered to his order. (F. Paul, p. 5.) Almost all historians since their time, Popish as well as Protestant, have, without examination, admitted these assertions to be true upon

their authority. But, notwithstanding the concurring testimony of two authors so eminent both for exactness and veracity, we may observe—1. That Felix Contolori, who searched the pontifical archives for the purpose, could not find this pretended grant to Leo's sister in any of those registers where it must necessarily have been recorded. (Pallav., p. 5.) 2. That the profits arising from indulgences in Saxony and the adjacent countries had been granted, not to Magdalen, but to Albert, archbishop of Mentz, who had the right of nominating those who published them. (Seck., p. 12; Luth. Oper., i., Praef. p. i.; Pallav., p. 6.) 3. That Arcembaldo never had concern in the publication of indulgences in Saxony: his district was Flanders and the Upper and Lower Rhine. (Seck., p. 14; Pallav., p. 6.) 4. That Luther and his adherents never mentioned this grant of Leo's to his sister, though a circumstance of which they could hardly have been ignorant, and which they would have been careful not to suppress. 5. The publication of indulgences in Germany was not usually committed to the Augustinians. The promulgation of them, at three different periods under Julius II., was granted

Meanwhile, these novelties in Luther's doctrines, which interested all Germany, excited little attention and no alarm in the court of Rome. Leo, fond of elegant and refined pleasures, intent upon great schemes of policy, a stranger to theological controversies, and apt to despise them, regarded with the utmost indifference the operations of an obscure friar who, in the heart of Germany, carried on a scholastic disputation in a barbarous style. Little did he apprehend, or Luther himself dream, that the effects of this quarrel would be so fatal to the papal see. Leo imputed the whole to monastic enmity and emulation, and seemed inclined not to interpose in the contest, but to allow the Augustinians and Dominicans to wrangle about the matter with their usual animosity.

The solicitations, however, of Luther's adversaries, who were exasperated to a high degree by the boldness and severity with which he animadverted on their writings, together with the surprising progress which his opinions made in different parts of Germany, roused at last the attention of the court of Rome, and obliged Leo to take measures for the security of the Church

to the Franciscans; the Dominicans had been employed in the same office a short time before the present period. (Pallav., p. 46.) 6. The promulgation of those indulgences which first excited Luther's indignation was intrusted to the archbishop of Mentz, in conjunction with the guardian of the Franciscans; but the latter having declined accepting of that trust, the sole right became vested in the archbishop. (Pallav., 6; Seck., 16, 17.) 7. Luther was not instigated by his superiors among the Augustinians to attack the Dominicans, their rivals, or to deprecate indulgences because they were promulgated by them:

his opposition to their opinions and vices proceeded from more laudable motives. (Seck., p. 15, 32; Lutheri Opera, i. p. 64, 6.) 8. A diploma of indulgences is published by Herm. von der Hardt, from which it appears that the name of the guardian of the Franciscans is retained together with that of the archbishop, although the former did not act. The limits of the country to which their commission extended, namely, the diocese of Mentz, Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and the territories of the marquis of Brandenburg, are mentioned in that diploma. Hist. Literaria Reformat., pars iv. p. 14.

against an attack that now appeared too serious to be despised. For this end, he summoned Luther to appear at Rome, within sixty days, before the auditor of the chamber and the inquisitor-general, Prierias, who had written against him, whom he empowered jointly to examine his doctrines and to decide concerning them. He wrote, at the same time, to the elector of Saxony, beseeching him not to protect a man whose heretical and profane tenets were so shocking to pious ears, and enjoined the provincial of the Augustinians to check by his authority the rashness of an arrogant monk, which brought disgrace upon the order of St. Augustine and gave offence and disturbance to the whole Church. [1518.]

From the strain of these letters, as well as from the nomination of a judge so prejudiced and partial as Prierias, Luther easily saw what sentence he might expect at Rome. He discovered, for that reason, the utmost solicitude to have his cause tried in Germany and before a less suspected tribunal. The professors in the university of Wittemberg, anxious for the safety of a man who did so much honour to their society, wrote to the pope, and, after employing several pretexts to excuse Luther from appearing at Rome, entreated Leo to commit the examination of his doctrines to some persons of learning and authority in Germany. The elector requested the same thing of the pope's legate at the diet of Augsburg; and as Luther himself, who at that time was so far from having any intention to disclaim the papal authority that he did not even entertain the smallest suspicion concerning its divine original, had written to Leo a most submissive letter, promising an unreserved compliance with his will, the pope gratified them so far as to empower his legate in Germany, Cardinal Cajetan, a Dominican, eminent for

scholastic learning, and passionately devoted to the Roman see, to hear and determine the cause.

Luther, though he had good reason to decline a judge chosen among his avowed adversaries, did not hesitate about appearing before Cajetan, and, having obtained the emperor's safe-conduct, immediately repaired to Augsburg. The cardinal received him with decent respect, and endeavoured at first to gain upon him by gentle treatment. The cardinal, relying on the superiority of his own talents as a theologian, entered into a formal dispute with Luther concerning the doctrines contained in his theses.¹⁴ But the weapons which they employed were so different, Cajetan appealing to papal decrees and the opinions of schoolmen, and Luther resting entirely on the authority of Scripture, that the contest was altogether fruitless. The cardinal relinquished the character of a disputant, and, assuming that of a judge, enjoined Luther, by virtue of the apostolic powers with which he was clothed, to retract the errors which he had uttered with regard to indulgences and the nature of faith, and to abstain for the future from the publication of new and dangerous opinions. Luther, fully persuaded of the truth of his own tenets, and confirmed in the belief of them by the approbation which they had met with among persons conspicuous both for learning and piety, was surprised at this abrupt mention of a recantation before any endeavours were used to convince him that he was mistaken. He had flattered himself that in a conference concerning the points in dispute with a prelate of such distinguished abilities he should be able to remove many of those imputations with which the ignorance or malice of his antagonists

¹⁴ In the former editions I asserted, upon the authority of Father Paul, that Cajetan thought it beneath his dignity to enter into any dispute with Luther; but M. Beau-

sobre, in his *Histoire de la Réformation*, vol. i. p. 121, etc., has satisfied me that I was mistaken. See also Seckend, lib. i. p. 46, etc.

had loaded him; but the high tone of authority that the cardinal assumed extinguished at once all hopes of this kind, and cut off every prospect of advantage from the interview. His native intrepidity of mind, however, did not desert him. He declared with the utmost firmness that he could not, with a safe conscience, renounce opinions which he believed to be true; nor should any consideration ever induce him to do what would be so base in itself and so offensive to God. At the same time, he continued to express no less reverence than formerly for the authority of the apostolic see;¹⁵ he signified his willingness to submit the whole controversy to certain universities which he named, and promised neither to write nor to preach concerning indulgences for the future, provided his adversaries were likewise enjoined to be silent with respect to them.¹⁶ All these offers Cajetan disregarded or rejected, and still insisted peremptorily on a simple recantation, threatening him with ecclesiastical censures, and forbidding him to appear again in his presence unless he resolved instantly to comply with what he had required. This haughty and violent manner of proceeding, as well as other circumstances, gave Luther's friends such strong reasons to suspect that even the imperial safe-conduct would not be able to protect him from the legate's power and resentment, that they prevailed on him to withdraw secretly from Augsburg and to return to his own country. But before his departure, according to a form of which there had been some examples, he prepared a solemn appeal from the pope, ill informed at that time concerning his cause, to the pope when he should receive more full information with respect to it.¹⁷

Cajetan, enraged at Luther's abrupt retreat and at

¹⁵ Luth., Oper., vol. i. p. 164.

—Seckend., p. 45.—Luth., Oper.,

¹⁶ Ibid., 160.

i. 163.

¹⁷ Sleid., Hist. of Reform., p. 7.

the publication of his appeal, wrote to the elector of Saxony, complaining of both, and requiring him, as he regarded the peace of the Church or the authority of its head, either to send that seditious monk a prisoner to Rome, or to banish him out of his territories. It was not from theological considerations that Frederic had hitherto countenanced Luther: he seems to have been much a stranger to controversies of that kind, and to have been little interested in them. His protection flowed almost entirely, as hath been already observed, from political motives, and was afforded with great secrecy and caution. He had neither heard any of Luther's discourses nor read any of his books; and though all Germany resounded with his fame, he had never once admitted him into his presence.¹⁸ But upon this demand which the cardinal made, it became necessary to throw off somewhat of his former reserve. He had been at great expense and had bestowed much attention on founding a new university, an object of considerable importance to every German prince; and, foreseeing how fatal a blow the removal of Luther would be to its reputation,¹⁹ he, under various pretexts and with many professions of esteem for the cardinal, as well as of reverence for the pope, not only declined complying with either of his requests, but openly discovered great concern for Luther's safety.²⁰

The inflexible rigour with which Cajetan insisted on a simple recantation gave great offence to Luther's followers in that age, and hath since been censured as imprudent by several popish writers. But it was impossible for the legate to act another part. The judges before whom Luther had been required to appear at Rome were so eager to display their zeal against his

¹⁸ Seckend., p. 27.—Sleid., Hist., p. 12.

²⁰ Sleid., Hist., p. 10.—Luth., Oper., i. 172.

¹⁹ Seckend., p. 59.

errors, that, without waiting for the expiration of sixty days allowed him in the citation, they had already condemned him as a heretic.²¹ Leo had, in several of his briefs and letters, stigmatized him as a child of iniquity and a man given up to a reprobate sense. Nothing less, therefore, than a recantation could save the honour of the Church, whose maxim it is never to abandon the smallest point that it has established, and which is even precluded, by its pretensions to infallibility, from having it in its power to do so.

Luther's situation at this time was such as would have filled any other person with the most disquieting apprehensions. He could not expect that a prince so prudent and cautious as Frederic would on his account set at defiance the thunders of the Church, and brave the papal power, which had crushed some of the most powerful of the German emperors. He knew what veneration was paid, in that age, to ecclesiastical decisions; what terrors ecclesiastical censures carried along with them, and how easily these might intimidate and shake a prince who was rather his protector from policy than his disciple from conviction. If he should be obliged to quit Saxony, he had no prospect of any other asylum, and must stand exposed to whatever punishment the rage or bigotry of his enemies could inflict. Though sensible of his danger, he discovered no symptoms of timidity or remissness, but continued to vindicate his own conduct and opinions and to inveigh against those of his adversaries with more vehemence than ever.²²

But as every step taken by the court of Rome, particularly the irregular sentence by which he had been so precipitately declared a heretic, convinced Luther that Leo would soon proceed to the most violent measures against him, he had recourse to the only expedient in

²¹ Luther.. Oper., i. 161.

²² Seckend.. p. 59.

his power in order to prevent the effect of the papal censures. He appealed to a general council, which he affirmed to be the representative of the Catholic Church and superior in power to the pope, who, being a fallible man, might err, as St. Peter, the most perfect of his predecessors, had erred.²³

It soon appeared that Luther had not formed rash conjectures concerning the intentions of the Romish Church. A bull of a date prior to his appeal was issued by the pope, in which he magnifies the virtue and efficacy of indulgences, in terms as extravagant as any of his predecessors had ventured to use in the darkest ages; and, without applying such palliatives or mentioning such concessions as a more enlightened period and the disposition in the minds of many men at that juncture seemed to call for, he required all Christians to assent to what he delivered as the doctrine of the Catholic Church, and subjected those who should hold or teach any contrary opinion to the heaviest ecclesiastical censures.

Among Luther's followers, this bull, which they considered as an unjustifiable effort of the pope in order to preserve that rich branch of his revenue which arose from indulgences, produced little effect. But among the rest of his countrymen, such a clear decision of the sovereign pontiff against him, and enforced by such dreadful penalties, must have been attended with consequences very fatal to his cause, if these had not been prevented in a great measure by the death of the emperor Maximilian, whom both his principles and his interest prompted to support the authority of the holy see. In consequence of this event, the vicariat of that part of Germany which is governed by the Saxon laws devolved to the elector of Saxony; and under the shelter of his friendly administration Luther not only

²³ Sleid., Hist., 12.—Luth., Oper., i. 179.

enjoyed tranquillity, but his opinions were suffered, during the interregnum which preceded Charles's election, to take root in different places and to grow up to some degree of strength and firmness. At the same time, as the election of an emperor was a point more interesting to Leo than a theological controversy, which he did not understand, and of which he could not foresee the consequences, he was so extremely solicitous not to irritate a prince of such considerable influence in the electoral college as Frederic, that he discovered a great unwillingness to pronounce the sentence of excommunication against Luther, which his adversaries continually demanded with the most clamorous importunity.

To these political views of the pope, as well as to his natural aversion from severe measures, was owing the suspension of any further proceedings against Luther for eighteen months. Perpetual negotiations, however, in order to bring the matter to some amicable issue, were carried on during that space. The manner in which these were conducted having given Luther many opportunities of observing the corruption of the court of Rome, its obstinacy in adhering to established errors, and its indifference about truth, however clearly proposed or strongly proved, he began to utter some doubts with regard to the divine original of the papal authority. A public disputation was held upon this important question at Leipsic, between Luther and Eccius, one of his most learned and formidable antagonists ; but it was as fruitless and indecisive as such scholastic combats usually prove. Both parties boasted of having obtained the victory ; both were confirmed in their own opinions ; and no progress was made towards deciding the point in controversy.²⁴

Nor did the spirit of opposition to the doctrines and usurpations of the Romish Church break out in Saxony

²⁴ Luth., Oper.. i. 199.

alone : an attack no less violent, and occasioned by the same causes, was made upon them about this time in Switzerland. The Franciscans, being intrusted with the promulgation of indulgences in that country, executed their commission with the same indiscretion and rapaciousness which had rendered the Dominicans so odious in Germany. They proceeded, nevertheless, with uninterrupted success, until they arrived at Zurich. There Zwinglius, a man not inferior to Luther himself in zeal and intrepidity, ventured to oppose them ; and being animated with a republican boldness, and free from those restraints which subjection to the will of a prince imposed on the German Reformer, he advanced with more daring and rapid steps to overturn the whole fabric of the established religion.²⁵ The appearance of such a vigorous auxiliary, and the progress which he made, was, at first, matter of great joy to Luther. On the other hand, the decrees of the Universities of Cologne and Louvain, which pronounced his opinions to be erroneous, afforded great cause of triumph to his adversaries.

But the undaunted spirit of Luther acquired additional fortitude from every instance of opposition ; and, pushing on his inquiries and attacks from one doctrine to another, he began to shake the firmest foundations on which the wealth or power of the Church was established. Leo came at last to be convinced that all hopes of reclaiming him by forbearance were vain ; several prelates of great wisdom exclaimed, no less than Luther's personal adversaries, against the pope's unprecedented lenity in permitting an incorrigible heretic, who during three years had been endeavouring to subvert everything sacred and venerable, still to remain within the bosom of the Church ; the dignity of the papal see rendered the most vigorous proceedings necessary ; the new emperor, it was hoped, would support its authority ; nor did it seem

* Sleid, Hist., 22.—Seckend., 59.

probable that the elector of Saxony would so far forget his usual caution as to set himself in opposition to their united power. The college of cardinals was often assembled, in order to prepare the sentence with due deliberation, and the ablest canonists were consulted how it might be expressed with unexceptionable formality. At last, on the 15th of June, 1520, the bull, so fatal to the Church of Rome, was issued. Forty-one propositions, extracted out of Luther's works, are therein condemned as heretical, scandalous, and offensive to pious ears; all persons are forbidden to read his writings upon pain of excommunication; such as had any of them in their custody were commanded to commit them to the flames; he himself, if he did not within sixty days publicly recant his errors and burn his books, is pronounced an obstinate heretic, is excommunicated, and delivered unto Satan for the destruction of his flesh; and all secular princes are required, under pain of incurring the same censure, to seize his person, that he might be punished as his crimes deserved.²⁶

The publication of this bull in Germany excited various passions in different places. Luther's adversaries exulted, as if his party and opinions had been crushed at once by such a decisive blow. His followers, whose reverence for the papal authority daily diminished, read Leo's anathemas with more indignation than terror. In some cities the people violently obstructed the promulgation of the bull; in others, the persons who attempted to publish it were insulted, and the bull itself was torn in pieces and trodden under foot.²⁷


This sentence, which he had for some time expected, did not disconcert or intimidate Luther. After renewing his appeal to the general council, he published remarks upon the bull of excommunication; and, being now

²⁶ Pallav., 27.—Luth., Oper., i. 423.

²⁷ Seckend., p. 116.

Luther burning the Pope's Bull.





persuaded that Leo had been guilty both of impiety and injustice in his proceedings against him, he boldly declared the pope to be that man of sin, or Antichrist, whose appearance is foretold in the New Testament; he declaimed against his tyranny and usurpations with greater violence than ever; he exhorted all Christian princes to shake off such an ignominious yoke, and boasted of his own happiness in being marked out as the object of ecclesiastical indignation, because he had ventured to assert the liberty of mankind. Nor did he confine his expressions of contempt for the papal power to words alone: Leo having, in execution of the bull, appointed Luther's books to be burnt at Rome, he, by way of retaliation, assembled all the professors and students in the University of Wittemberg, and with great pomp, in presence of a vast multitude of spectators, cast the volumes of the canon law, together with the bull of excommunication, into the flames; and his example was imitated in several cities of Germany. The manner in which he justified this action was still more offensive than the action itself. Having collected from the canon law some of the most extravagant propositions with regard to the plenitude and omnipotence of the papal power, as well as the subordination of all secular jurisdiction to the authority of the holy see, he published these with a commentary, pointing out the impiety of such tenets and their evident tendency to subvert all civil government.²⁸

Such was the progress which Luther had made, and such the state of his party, when Charles arrived in Germany. No secular prince had hitherto embraced Luther's opinions; no change in the established forms of worship had been introduced; and no encroachments had been made upon the possessions or jurisdiction of the clergy; neither party had yet proceeded to action;

²⁸ Luth., Oper., ii. 316.

and the controversy, though conducted with great heat and passion on both sides, was still carried on with its proper weapons,—with theses, disputations, and replies. A deep impression, however, was made upon the minds of the people; their reverence for ancient institutions and doctrines was shaken; and the materials were already scattered which kindled into the combustion that soon spread over all Germany. Students crowded from every province of the empire to Wittemberg; and under Luther himself, Melancthon, Carlostadius, and other masters then reckoned eminent, imbibed opinions which, on their return, they propagated among their countrymen, who listened to them with that fond attention which truth, when accompanied with novelty, naturally commands.²⁰

During the course of these transactions the court of Rome, though under the direction of one of its ablest pontiffs, neither formed its schemes with that profound sagacity nor executed them with that steady perseverance which had long rendered it the most perfect model of political wisdom to the rest of Europe. When Luther began to declaim against indulgences, two different methods of treating him lay before the pope, by adopting one of which the attempt, it is probable, might have been crushed, and by the other it might have been rendered innocent. If Luther's first departure from the doctrines of the Church had instantly drawn upon him the weight of its censures, the dread of these might have restrained the elector of Saxony from protecting him, might have deterred the people from listening to his discourses, or even might have overawed Luther himself; and his name, like that of many good men before his time, would now have been known to the world only for his honest but ill-timed effort to correct the corruptions of the Romish Church. On the other hand, if the

²⁰ Seckend, 59.

pope had early testified some displeasure with the vices and excesses of the friars who had been employed in publishing indulgences, if he had forbidden the mentioning of controverted points in discourses addressed to the people, if he had enjoined the disputants on both sides to be silent, if he had been careful not to risk the credit of the Church by defining articles which had hitherto been left undetermined, Luther would probably have stopped short at his first discoveries: he would not have been forced, in self-defence, to venture upon new ground, and the whole controversy might possibly have died away insensibly, or, being confined entirely to the schools, might have been carried on with as little detriment to the peace and unity of the Romish Church as that which the Franciscans maintained with the Dominicans concerning the immaculate conception, or that between the Jansenists and Jesuits concerning the operations of grace. But Leo, by fluctuating between these opposite systems, and by embracing them alternately, defeated the effects of both. By an improper exertion of authority, Luther was exasperated, but not restrained. By a mistaken exercise of lenity, time was given for his opinions to spread, but no progress was made towards reconciling him to the Church; and even the sentence of excommunication, which at another juncture might have been decisive, was delayed so long that it became at last scarcely an object of terror.

Such a series of errors in the measures of a court seldom chargeable with mistaking its own true interest is not more astonishing than the wisdom which appeared in Luther's conduct. Though a perfect stranger to the maxims of worldly wisdom, and incapable, from the impetuosity of his temper, of observing them, he was led naturally, by the method in which he made his discoveries, to carry on his operations in a manner which contributed more to their success than if every

step he took had been prescribed by the most artful policy. At the time when he set himself to oppose Tetzel, he was far from intending that reformation which he afterwards effected, and would have trembled with horror at the thoughts of what at last he gloried in accomplishing. The knowledge of truth was not poured into his mind all at once by any special revelation ; he acquired it by industry and meditation, and his progress, of consequence, was gradual. The doctrines of popery are so closely connected that the exposing of one error conducted him naturally to the detection of others ; and all the parts of that artificial fabric were so united together that the pulling down of one loosened the foundation of the rest and rendered it more easy to overturn them. In confuting the extravagant tenets concerning indulgences, he was obliged to inquire into the true cause of our justification and acceptance with God. The knowledge of that discovered to him by degrees the inutility of pilgrimages and penances ; the vanity of relying on the intercession of saints ; the impiety of worshipping them ; the abuses of auricular confession ; and the imaginary existence of purgatory. The detection of so many errors led him, of course, to consider the character of the clergy who taught them ; and their exorbitant wealth, the severe injunction of celibacy, together with the intolerable rigour of monastic vows, appeared to him the great sources of their corruption. From thence it was but one step to call in question the divine original of the papal power, which authorized and supported such a system of errors. As the unavoidable result of the whole, he disclaimed the infallibility of the pope, the decisions of schoolmen, or any other human authority, and appealed to the word of God as the only standard of theological truth. To this gradual progress Luther owed his success. His hearers were not shocked at first by any proposition too repugnant

to their ancient prejudices or too remote from established opinions. They were conducted insensibly from one doctrine to another. Their faith and conviction were able to keep pace with his discoveries. To the same cause was owing the inattention, and even indifference, with which Leo viewed Luther's first proceedings. A direct or violent attack upon the authority of the Church would at once have drawn upon Luther the whole weight of its vengeance; but as this was far from his thoughts, as he continued long to profess great respect for the pope, and made repeated offers of submission to his decisions, there seemed to be no reason for apprehending that he would prove the author of any desperate revolt; and he was suffered to proceed, step by step, in undermining the constitution of the Church, until the remedy applied at last came too late to produce any effect.

But whatever advantages Luther's cause derived, either from the mistakes of his adversaries or from his own good conduct, the sudden progress and firm establishment of his doctrines must not be ascribed to these alone. The same corruptions in the Church of Rome which he condemned had been attacked long before his time. The same opinions which he now propagated had been published in different places, and were supported by the same arguments. Waldus in the twelfth century, Wickliff in the fourteenth, and Huss in the fifteenth, had inveighed against the errors of popery with great boldness, and confuted them with more ingenuity and learning than could have been expected in those illiterate ages in which they flourished. But all these premature attempts towards a reformation proved abortive. Such feeble lights, incapable of dispelling the darkness which then covered the Church, were soon extinguished; and though the doctrines of these pious men produced some effects and left some traces in the

countries where they taught, they were neither extensive nor considerable. Many powerful causes contributed to facilitate Luther's progress, which either did not exist, or did not operate with full force, in their days; and at that critical and mature juncture when he appeared, circumstances of every kind concurred in rendering each step that he took successful.

The long and scandalous schism which divided the Church during the latter part of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries had a great effect in diminishing the veneration with which the world had been accustomed to view the papal dignity. Two or three contending pontiffs roaming about Europe at a time, fawning on the princes whom they wanted to gain, extorting large sums of money from the countries which acknowledged their authority, excommunicating their rivals, and cursing those who adhered to them, discredited their pretensions to infallibility and exposed both their persons and their office to contempt. The laity, to whom all parties appealed, came to learn that some right of private judgment belonged to them, and acquired the exercise of it so far as to choose, among these infallible guides, whom they would please to follow. The proceedings of the councils of Constance and Basil spread this disrespect for the Romish see still wider, and, by their bold exertion of authority in deposing and electing popes, taught men that there was in the Church a jurisdiction superior even to the papal power, which they had long believed to be supreme.

The wound given on that occasion to the papal authority was scarcely healed up when the pontificates of Alexander VI. and Julius II., both able princes, but detestable ecclesiastics, raised new scandal in Christendom. The profligate morals of the former in private life, the fraud, the injustice, and cruelty of his public administration, place him on a level with those tyrants

whose deeds are the greatest reproach to human nature. The latter, though a stranger to the odious passions which prompted his predecessor to commit so many unnatural crimes, was under the dominion of a restless and ungovernable ambition, that scorned all considerations of gratitude, of decency, or of justice, when they obstructed the execution of his schemes. It was hardly possible to be firmly persuaded that the infallible knowledge of a religion whose chief precepts are purity and humility was deposited in the breasts of the profligate Alexander or the overbearing Julius. The opinion of those who exalted the authority of a council above that of the pope spread wonderfully under their pontificates; and as the emperor and French kings, who were alternately engaged in hostilities with those active pontiffs, permitted and even encouraged their subjects to expose their vices with all the violence of invective and all the petulance of ridicule, men's ears being accustomed to these were not shocked with the bold or ludicrous discourses of Luther and his followers concerning the papal dignity.

Nor were such excesses confined to the head of the Church alone. Many of the dignified clergy, secular as well as regular, being the younger sons of noble families, who had assumed the ecclesiastical character for no other reason but that they found in the Church stations of great dignity and affluence, were accustomed totally to neglect the duties of their office, and indulged themselves without reserve in all the vices to which great wealth and idleness naturally give birth. Though the inferior clergy were prevented by their poverty from imitating the expensive luxury of their superiors, yet gross ignorance and low debauchery rendered them as contemptible as the others were odious.³⁰ The severe

³⁰ The corrupt state of the Church prior to the Reformation is acknowledged by an author who was both abundantly able to judge concerning

and unnatural law of celibacy, to which both were equally subject, occasioned such irregularities that in several parts of Europe the concubinage of priests was not only permitted, but enjoined. The employing of a remedy so contrary to the precepts of the Christian religion is the strongest proof that the crimes it was intended to prevent were both numerous and flagrant. Long before the sixteenth century, many authors of great name and authority give such descriptions of the dissolute morals of the clergy as seem almost incredible in the present age.³¹ The voluptuous lives of ecclesiastics occasioned great scandal, not only because their

this matter and who was not over-forward to confess it. "For some years," says Bellarmine, "before the Lutheran and Calvinistic heresies were published, there was not (as contemporary authors testify) any severity in ecclesiastical judicatories, any discipline with regard to morals, any knowledge of sacred literature, any reverence for divine things: there was not almost any religion remaining." *Bellarminus, Concio xxviii., Oper., tom. vi. col. 296, edit. Colon., 1617, apud Gerdesii Hist. Evan. Renovati, vol. i. p. 25.*

³¹ *Centum Gravamina Nation German. in Fasciculo Rer. expetend. et fugiendarum, per Ortuinum Gratium, vol. i. p. 361.* See innumerable passages to the same purpose in the Appendix, or second volume, published by Edw. Brown. See also Herm. von der Hardt, *Hist. Lit. Reform.*, pars. iii., and the vast collections of Walchius in his four volumes of *Monumenta Medii Ævi*, Gotting., 1757.—The authors I have quoted enumerate the vices of the clergy. When they ventured upon actions manifestly criminal, we may conclude that they would

be less scrupulous with respect to the decorum of behaviour. Accordingly, their neglect of the decent conduct suitable to their profession seems to have given great offence. In order to illustrate this, I shall transcribe one passage, because it is not taken from any author whose professed purpose it was to describe the improper conduct of the clergy, and who, from prejudice or artifice, may be supposed to aggravate the charge against them. The emperor Charles IV., in a letter to the archbishop of Mentz, A.D. 1359, exhorting him to reform the disorders of the clergy, thus expresses himself: "De Christi patrimonio, ludos, hastiludia et torneamenta exercent; habitum militare cum prætextis aureis et argenteis gestant, et calceos militares; comam et barbam nutriunt, et nihil quod ad vitam et ordinem ecclesiasticum spectat, ostendunt. Militaribus se duntaxat et secularibus actibus, vita et moribus, in suæ salutis dispendium, et generale populi scandulum, immiscent." *Codex Diplomaticus Anecdotorum*, per Val. Ferd. Gudenum, 4to, vol. iii. p. 438.

manners were inconsistent with their sacred character, but the laity, being accustomed to see several of them raised from the lowest stations to the greatest affluence, did not show the same indulgence to their excesses as to those of persons possessed of hereditary wealth or grandeur; and, viewing their condition with more envy, they censured their crimes with greater severity. Nothing, therefore, could be more acceptable to Luther's hearers than the violence with which he exclaimed against the immoralities of churchmen; and every person in his audience could, from his own observation, confirm the truth of his invectives.

The scandal of these crimes was greatly increased by the facility with which such as committed them obtained pardon. In all the European kingdoms, the importance of the civil magistrate, under forms of government extremely irregular and turbulent, made it necessary to relax the rigour of justice; and, upon payment of a certain fine or composition prescribed by law, judges were accustomed to remit further punishment, even of the most atrocious crimes. The court of Rome, always attentive to the means of augmenting its revenues, imitated this practice, and, by a preposterous accommodation of it to religious concerns, granted its pardons to such transgressors as gave a sum of money in order to purchase them. As the idea of a composition for crimes was then familiar, this strange traffic was so far from shocking mankind, that it soon became general; and, in order to prevent any imposition in carrying it on, the officers of the Roman chancery published a book containing the precise sum to be exacted for the pardon of every particular sin. A deacon guilty of murder was absolved for twenty crowns. A bishop, or abbot, might assassinate for three hundred livres. Any ecclesiastic might violate his vows of chastity, even with the most aggravating circumstances, for the third part of

that sum. Even such shocking crimes as occur seldom in human life, and perhaps exist only in the impure imagination of a casuist, were taxed at a very moderate rate. When a more regular and perfect mode of dispensing justice came to be introduced into civil courts, the practice of paying a composition for crimes went gradually into disuse; and, mankind having acquired more accurate notions concerning religion and morality, the conditions on which the courts of Rome bestowed its pardons appeared impious, and were considered as one great source of ecclesiastical corruption.³²

This degeneracy of manners among the clergy might have been tolerated, perhaps, with greater indulgence, if their exorbitant riches and power had not enabled them at the same time to encroach on the rights of every other order of men. It is the genius of superstition, fond of whatever is pompous or grand, to set no bounds to its liberality towards persons whom it esteems sacred, and to think its expressions of regard defective unless it hath raised them to the height of wealth and authority. Hence flowed the extensive revenues and jurisdiction possessed by the Church in every country in Europe, and which were become intolerable to the laity, from whose undiscerning bounty they were at first derived.

The burden, however, of ecclesiastical oppression had fallen with such peculiar weight on the Germans as rendered them, though naturally exempt from levity and tenacious of their ancient customs, more inclinable than any people in Europe to listen to those who called on them to assert their liberty. During the long contests between the popes and the emperors concerning

³² *Fascicul. Rer. expet. et fug.*, i. 355.—J. G. Schelhornii *Amœnit. Literar.* Francof., 1725, vol. ii. p. 369.—*Diction. de Bayle*, artic.

Banck et Tuppius.—*Texa Cancel. Romanæ*, edit. Francof., 1651, passim.

the right of investiture, and the wars which these occasioned, most of the considerable German ecclesiastics joined the papal faction ; and while engaged in rebellion against the head of the empire, they seized the imperial domains and revenues and usurped the imperial jurisdiction within their own dioceses. Upon the re-establishment of tranquillity, they still retained these usurpations ; as if by the length of an unjust possession they had acquired a legal right to them. The emperors, too feeble to wrest them out of their hands, were obliged to grant the clergy fiefs of those ample territories ; and they enjoyed all the immunities, as well as honours, which belonged to feudal barons. By means of these, many bishops and abbots in Germany were not only ecclesiastics, but princes ; and their character and manners partook more of the license too frequent among the latter, than of the sanctity which became the former.³³

The unsettled state of government in Germany, and the frequent wars to which that country was exposed, contributed in another manner towards aggrandizing ecclesiastics. The only property, during those times of anarchy, which enjoyed security from the oppression of the great, or the ravages of war, was that which belonged to the Church. This was owing not only to the great reverence for the sacred character prevalent in those ages, but to a superstitious dread of the sentence of excommunication, which the clergy were ready to denounce against all who invaded their possessions. Many, observing this, made a surrender of their lands to ecclesiastics, and, consenting to hold them in fee of the Church, obtained, as its vassals, a degree of safety which without this device they were unable to procure. By such an increase of the number of their vassals, the power of ecclesiastics received a real and permanent

* F. Paul, History of Ecclesiastical Benefices, p. 107.

augmentation; and, as lands held in fee by the limited tenures common in those ages often returned to the persons on whom the fief depended, considerable additions were made in this way to the property of the clergy.³⁴

The solicitude of the clergy in providing for the safety of their own persons was still greater than that which they displayed in securing their possessions; and their efforts to attain it were still more successful. As they were consecrated to the priestly office with much outward solemnity, were distinguished from the rest of mankind by a peculiar garb and manner of life, and arrogated to their order many privileges which do not belong to other Christians, they naturally became the objects of excessive veneration. As a superstitious spirit spread, they were regarded as beings of a superior species to the profane laity, whom it would be impious to try by the same laws or to subject to the same punishments. This exemption from civil jurisdiction, granted at first to ecclesiastics as a mark of respect, they soon claimed as a point of right. This valuable immunity of the priesthood is asserted not only in the decrees of popes and councils, but was confirmed in the most ample form by many of the greatest emperors.³⁵ As long as the clerical character remained, the person of an ecclesiastic was in some degree sacred; and unless he were degraded from his office the unhallowed hand of the civil judge durst not touch him. But, as the power of degradation was lodged in the spiritual courts, the difficulty and expense of obtaining such a sentence too often secured absolute impunity to offenders. Many assumed the clerical character for no other reason than that it might screen them from

³⁴ F. Paul, Hist. of Eccles. Benef., p. 66. — Boulainvilliers, Etat de France, tom. i. p. 169, Lond., 1737.

³⁵ Goldasti Constitut. Imperial, Francof., 1673, vol. ii pp. 92, 107.

the punishment which their actions deserved.³⁶ The German nobles complained loudly that these anointed malefactors, as they called them,³⁷ seldom suffered capitally, even for the most atrocious crimes; and their independence of the civil magistrate is often mentioned in the remonstrances of the diets, as a privilege equally pernicious to society and to the morals of the clergy.

While the clergy asserted the privileges of their own order with so much zeal, they made continual encroachments upon those of the laity. All causes relative to matrimony, to testaments, to usury, to legitimacy of birth, as well as those which concerned ecclesiastical revenues, were thought to be so connected with religion that they could be tried only in the spiritual courts. Not satisfied with this ample jurisdiction, which extended to one-half of the subjects that gave rise to litigation among men, the clergy, with wonderful industry, and by a thousand inventions, endeavoured to draw all other causes into their own courts.³⁸ As they had engrossed almost the whole learning known in the Dark Ages, the spiritual judges were commonly so far superior in knowledge and abilities to those employed in the secular courts that the people at first favoured any stretch that was made to bring their affairs under the cognizance of a judicature on the decisions of which they could rely with more perfect confidence than on those of the civil courts. Thus, the interest of the Church and the inclination of the people, concurring to elude the jurisdiction of the lay-magistrate, soon reduced it almost to nothing.³⁹ By means of this, vast power accrued to ecclesiastics, and no inconsiderable addition was made to their revenue by the sums paid in those ages to the persons who administered justice.

³⁶ Rymer's *Fœdera*, vol. xiii. p. 532.

³⁷ *Centum Gravam.*, § 31.

VOL. I.

³⁸ Giannone, *History of Naples*, book xix. § 3.

³⁹ *Centum Gravam.*, §§ 9, 56, 64.

The penalty by which the spiritual courts enforced their sentences added great weight and terror to their jurisdiction. The censure of excommunication was instituted originally for preserving the purity of the Church; that obstinate offenders, whose impious tenets or profane lives were a reproach to Christianity, might be cut off from the society of the faithful: this, ecclesiastics did not scruple to convert into an engine for promoting their own power, and they inflicted it on the most frivolous occasions. Whoever despised any of their decisions, even concerning civil matters, immediately incurred this dreadful censure, which not only excluded them from all the privileges of a Christian, but deprived them of their rights as men and citizens;⁴⁰ and the dread of this rendered even the most fierce and turbulent spirits obsequious to the authority of the Church.

Nor did the clergy neglect the proper methods of preserving the wealth and power which they had acquired with such industry and address. The possessions of the Church, being consecrated to God, were declared to be unalienable; so that the funds of a society which was daily gaining and could never lose, grew to be immense. In Germany, it was computed that the ecclesiastics had got into their hands more than one-half of the national property.⁴¹ In other countries the proportion varied; but the share belonging to the Church was everywhere prodigious. These vast possessions were not subject to the burdens imposed on the lands of the laity. The German clergy were exempted by law from all taxes;⁴² and if, on an extraordinary emergence, ecclesiastics were pleased to grant some aid towards supplying the public exigencies, this was considered as a free gift flowing from their own

⁴⁰ Centum Gravam., § 34.

⁴¹ Ibid., § 28.

⁴² Id., ibid.—Goldasti Const. Im-

per., ii. 79, 108.—Pfeffel, Hist. du Droit Publ., 350, 374.

generosity, which the civil magistrate had no title to demand, far less to exact. In consequence of this strange solecism in government, the laity in Germany had the mortification to find themselves loaded with excessive impositions, because such as possessed the greatest property were freed from any obligation to support or defend the state.

Grievous, however, as the exorbitant wealth and numerous privileges of the clerical order were to the other members of the Germanic body, they would have reckoned it some mitigation of the evil if these had been possessed only by ecclesiastics residing among themselves, who would have been less apt to make an improper use of their riches or to exercise their rights with unbecoming rigour. But the bishops of Rome having early put in a claim, the boldest that ever human ambition suggested, of being supreme and infallible heads of the Christian Church, they, by their profound policy and unwearied perseverance, by their address in availing themselves of every circumstance which occurred, by taking advantage of the superstition of some princes, of the necessities of others, and of the credulity of the people, at length established their pretensions, in opposition both to the interest and common sense of mankind. Germany was the country which these ecclesiastical sovereigns governed with most absolute authority. They excommunicated and deposed some of its most illustrious emperors, and excited their subjects, their ministers, and even their children, to take arms against them. Amidst these contests, the popes continually extended their own immunities, spoiling the secular princes gradually of their most valuable prerogatives; and the German Church felt all the rigour of that oppression which flows from subjection to foreign dominion and foreign exactions.

The right of conferring benefices, which the popes

usurped during that period of confusion, was an acquisition of great importance, and exalted the ecclesiastical power upon the ruins of the temporal. The emperors and other princes of Germany had long been in possession of this right, which served to increase both their authority and their revenue; but by wresting it out of their hands the popes were enabled to fill the empire with their own creatures; they accustomed a great body of every prince's subjects to depend, not upon him, but upon the Roman see; they bestowed upon strangers the richest benefices in every country, and drained their wealth to supply the luxury of a foreign court. Even the patience of the most superstitious ages could no longer bear such oppression; and so loud and frequent were the complaints and murmurs of the Germans that the popes, afraid of irritating them too far, consented, contrary to their usual practice, to abate somewhat of their pretensions, and to rest satisfied with the right of nomination to such benefices as happened to fall vacant during six months in the year, leaving the disposal of the remainder to the princes and other legal patrons.⁴³

But the court of Rome easily found expedients for eluding an agreement which put such restraints on its power. The practice of reserving certain benefices in every country to the pope's immediate nomination, which had been long known, and often complained of, was extended far beyond its ancient bounds. All the benefices possessed by cardinals or any of the numerous officers in the Roman court, those held by persons who happened to die at Rome, or within forty miles of that city on their journey to or from it, such as became vacant by translation, with many others, were included in the number of *reserved* benefices. Julius II. and

⁴³ F. Paul, Hist. of Eccles. Benef., 204.—Gold., Constit. Imper., i. 408.

Leo X., stretching the matter to the utmost, often collated to benefices where the right of reservation had not been declared, on pretence of having mentally reserved this privilege to themselves. The right of reservation, however, even with this extension, had certain limits, as it could be exercised only where the benefice was actually vacant; and therefore, in order to render the exertion of papal power unbounded, *expectative graces*, or mandates nominating a person to succeed to a benefice upon the first vacancy that should happen, were brought into use. By means of these, Germany was filled with persons who were servilely dependent on the court of Rome, from which they had received such reversionary grants; princes were defrauded, in a great degree, of their prerogatives; the rights of lay-patrons were preoccupied, and rendered almost entirely vain.⁴⁴

The manner in which these extraordinary powers were exercised rendered them still more odious and intolerable. The avarice and extortion of the court of Rome were become excessive, almost to a proverb. The practice of selling benefices was so notorious that no pains were taken to conceal or to disguise it. Companies of merchants openly purchased the benefices of different districts in Germany from the pope's ministers, and retailed them at an advanced price.⁴⁵ Pious men beheld with deep regret these simoniacal transactions, so unworthy the ministers of a Christian Church; while politicians complained of the loss sustained by the exportation of so much wealth in that irreligious traffic.

The sums, indeed, which the court of Rome drew by its stated and legal impositions from all the countries acknowledging its authority were so considerable

⁴⁴ Centum Gravam., § 21.—Fascic. Rer. expet., etc., 334.—Gold., Const. Imper., i. 391, 404, 405.—

F. Paul, Hist. of Eccl. Benef., 167, 199.

⁴⁵ Fascic. Rer. expet., i. 359.

that it is not strange that princes, as well as their subjects, murmured at the smallest addition made to them by unnecessary or illicit means. Every ecclesiastical person, upon his admission to his benefice, paid *annates*, or one year's produce of his living, to the pope; and, as that tax was exacted with great rigour, its amount was very great. To this must be added the frequent demands made by the popes of free gifts from the clergy, together with the extraordinary levies of tenths upon ecclesiastical benefices, on pretence of expeditions against the Turks, seldom intended or carried into execution; and, from the whole, the vast proportion of the revenues of the Church which flowed continually to Rome may be estimated.

Such were the dissolute manners, the exorbitant wealth, the enormous power and privileges, of the clergy before the Reformation; such the oppressive rigour of that dominion which the popes had established over the Christian world; and such the sentiments concerning them that prevailed in Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Nor has this sketch been copied from the controversial writers of that age, who, in the heat of disputation, may be suspected of having exaggerated the errors or of having misrepresented the conduct of that Church which they laboured to overturn: it is formed upon more authentic evidence,—upon the memorials and remonstrances of the imperial diets, enumerating the grievances under which the empire groaned, in order to obtain the redress of them. Dissatisfaction must have arisen to a great height among the people, when these grave assemblies expressed themselves with that degree of acrimony which abounds in their remonstrances; and if they demanded the abolition of these enormities with so much vehemence, the people, we may be assured, uttered their sentiments and desires in bolder and more virulent language.

To men thus prepared for shaking off the yoke, Luther addressed himself with certainty of success. As they had long felt its weight, and had borne it with impatience, they listened with joy to the first offer of procuring them deliverance. Hence proceeded the fond and eager reception that his doctrines met with, and the rapidity with which they spread over all the provinces of Germany. Even the impetuosity and fierceness of Luther's spirit, his confidence in asserting his own opinions, and the arrogance as well as contempt wherewith he treated all them who differed from him, which in ages of greater moderation and refinement have been reckoned defects in the character of that Reformer, did not appear excessive to his contemporaries, whose minds were strongly agitated by those interesting controversies which he carried on, and who had themselves endured the rigour of papal tyranny and seen the corruptions in the Church against which he exclaimed.

Nor were they offended at that gross scurrility with which his polemical writings are filled, or at the low buffoonery which he sometimes introduces into his gravest discourses. No dispute was managed in those rude times without a large portion of the former; and the latter was common, even on the most solemn occasions and in treating the most sacred subjects. So far were either of these from doing hurt to his cause that invective and ridicule had some effect, as well as more laudable arguments, in exposing the errors of popery and in determining mankind to abandon them.

Besides all these causes of Luther's rapid progress, arising from the nature of his enterprise and the juncture at which he undertook it, he reaped advantage from some foreign and adventitious circumstances, the beneficial influence of which none of his forerunners in the same course enjoyed. Among these may be reckoned

the invention of the art of printing, about half a century before his time. By this fortunate discovery, the facility of acquiring and of propagating knowledge was wonderfully increased ; and Luther's books, which must otherwise have made their way slowly and with uncertainty into distant countries, spread out at once all over Europe. Nor were they read only by the rich and the learned, who alone had access to books before that invention : they got into the hands of the people, who, upon this appeal to them as judges, ventured to examine and to reject many doctrines which they had formerly been required to believe without being taught to understand them.

The revival of learning at the same period was a circumstance extremely friendly to the Reformation. The study of the ancient Greek and Roman authors, by enlightening the human mind with liberal and sound knowledge, roused it from that profound lethargy in which it had been sunk during several centuries. Mankind seem, at that period, to have recovered the powers of inquiring and of thinking for themselves, faculties of which they had long lost the use ; and, fond of the acquisition, they exercised them with great boldness upon all subjects. They were not now afraid of entering an uncommon path or of embracing a new opinion. Novelty appears rather to have been a recommendation of a doctrine ; and, instead of being startled when the daring hand of Luther drew aside or tore the veil which covered and established errors, the genius of the age applauded and aided the attempt. Luther, though a stranger to elegance in taste or composition, zealously promoted the cultivation of ancient literature ; and, sensible of its being necessary to the right understanding of the Scriptures, he himself had acquired considerable knowledge both in the Hebrew and Greek tongues. Melancthon, and some other of his disci-

ples, were eminent proficients in the polite arts; and, as the same ignorant monks who opposed the introduction of learning into Germany set themselves with equal fierceness against Luther's opinions, and declared the good reception of the latter to be the effect of the progress which the former had made, the cause of learning and of the Reformation came to be considered as closely connected with each other, and, in every country, had the same friends and the same enemies. This enabled the Reformers to carry on the contest at first with great superiority. Erudition, industry, accuracy of sentiment, purity of composition, even wit and raillery, were almost wholly on their side, and triumphed with ease over illiterate monks, whose rude arguments, expressed in a perplexed and barbarous style, were found insufficient for the defence of a system the errors of which all the art and ingenuity of its later and more learned advocates have not been able to palliate.

That bold spirit of inquiry, which the revival of learning excited in Europe, was so favourable to the Reformation that Luther was aided in his progress, and mankind were prepared to embrace his doctrines, by persons who did not wish success to his undertaking. The greater part of the ingenious men who applied to the study of ancient literature towards the close of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth, though they had no intention, and perhaps no wish, to overturn the established system of religion, had discovered the absurdity of many tenets and practices authorized by the Church, and perceived the futility of those arguments by which illiterate monks endeavoured to defend them. Their contempt of these advocates for the received errors led them frequently to expose the opinions which they supported, and to ridicule their ignorance with great freedom and severity. By this,

men were prepared for the more serious attacks made upon them by Luther; and their reverence both for the doctrines and persons against whom he inveighed was considerably abated. This was particularly the case in Germany. When the first attempts were made to revive a taste for ancient learning in that country, the ecclesiastics there, who were still more ignorant than their brethren on the other side of the Alps, set themselves to oppose its progress with more active zeal; and the patrons of the new studies, in return, attacked them with greater violence. In the writings of Reuchlin, Hutten, and the other revivers of learning in Germany, the corruptions of the Church of Rome are censured with an acrimony of style little inferior to that of Luther himself.⁴⁴

From the same cause proceeded the frequent strictures of Erasmus upon the errors of the Church, as well as upon the ignorance and vices of the clergy. His reputation and authority were so high in Europe at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and his works were read with such universal admiration, that the effect of these deserves to be mentioned as one of the circumstances which contributed considerably towards Luther's success. Erasmus, having been destined for the Church and trained up in the knowledge of ecclesiastical literature, applied himself more to theological inquiries than any of the revivers of learning in that age. His acute judgment and extensive erudition enabled him to discover many errors both in the doctrine and worship of the Romish Church. Some of these he confuted with great solidity of reasoning and force of eloquence. Others he treated as objects of ridicule, and turned against them that irresistible

⁴⁴ Gerdesius, Hist. Evang. Re- Hardt, Hist. Literar. Reform., pars nov., vol. i. pp. 141, 157.— ii.
Seckend., lib. i. p. 103.—Von der

torrent of popular and satirical wit of which he had the command. There was hardly any opinion or practice of the Romish Church which Luther endeavoured to reform, but what had been previously animadverted upon by Erasmus and had afforded him subject either of censure or of raillery. Accordingly, when Luther first began his attack upon the Church, Erasmus seemed to applaud his conduct; he courted the friendship of several of his disciples and patrons, and condemned the behaviour and spirit of his adversaries.⁴⁷ He concurred openly with him in inveighing against the school divines, as the teachers of a system equally unedifying and obscure. He joined him in endeavouring to turn the attention of men to the study of the Holy Scriptures as the only standard of religious truth.⁴⁸

Various circumstances, however, prevented Erasmus from holding the same course with Luther. The natural timidity of his temper, his want of that strength of mind which alone can prompt a man to assume the character of a reformer,⁴⁹ his excessive deference for persons in high stations, his dread of losing the pensions and other emoluments which their liberality had conferred upon him, his extreme love of peace, and hopes of reforming abuses gradually and by gentle methods, all concurred in determining him not only to repress and to moderate the zeal with which he had once been animated against the errors of the Church,⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Seckend., lib. i. pp. 40, 96.

⁴⁸ Von der Hardt, Histor. Literar. Reform., pars i.—Gerdes, Hist. Evang. Renov., i. 147.

⁴⁹ Erasmus himself is candid enough to acknowledge this. “Luther,” says he, “has given us many a wholesome doctrine, and many a good counsel. I wish he had not defeated the effect of them by intolerable faults. But if he had

written every thing in the most unexceptionable manner, I had no inclination to die for the sake of truth. Every man hath not the courage requisite to make a martyr; and I am afraid that, if I were put to the trial, I should imitate St. Peter.”—Epist. Erasmi, in Jortin’s Life of Erasmus, vol. i. p. 273.

⁵⁰ Jortin’s Life of Erasmus, vol. i. p. 258.


but to assume the character of a mediator between Luther and his opponents. But though Erasmus soon began to censure Luther as too daring and impetuous, and was at last prevailed upon to write against him, he must nevertheless be considered as his forerunner and auxiliary in this war upon the Church. He first scattered the seeds which Luther cherished and brought to maturity. His raillery and oblique censures prepared the way for Luther's invectives and more direct attacks. In this light Erasmus appeared to the zealous defenders of the Romish Church in his own times.⁵¹ In this light he must be considered by every person conversant in the history of that period.

In this long enumeration of the circumstances which combined in favouring the progress of Luther's opinions or in weakening the resistance of his adversaries, I have avoided entering into any discussion of the theological doctrines of popery, and have not attempted to show how repugnant they are to the spirit of Christianity, and how destitute of any foundation in reason, in the word of God, or in the practice of the primitive Church; leaving those topics entirely to ecclesiastical historians, to whose province they peculiarly belong. But when we add the effect of these religious considerations to the influence of political causes, it is obvious that the united operation of both on the human mind must have been sudden and irresistible. Though, to Luther's contemporaries, who were too near, perhaps, to the scene, or too deeply interested in it, to trace causes with accuracy or to examine them with coolness, the rapidity with which his opinions spread appeared to be so unaccountable that some of them imputed it to a certain uncommon and malignant position of the stars, which scattered the spirit of giddiness and inno-

⁵¹ Von der Hardt, Hist. Literar. Reform., pars i. p. 2.

Luther before the Diet of Worms.





vation over the world,⁵² it is evident that the success of the Reformation was the natural effect of many powerful causes prepared by peculiar providence and happily conspiring to that end. This attempt to investigate these causes and to throw light on an event so singular and important will not, perhaps, be deemed an unnecessary digression. I return from it to the course of the history.

The diet of Worms conducted its deliberations with that slow formality peculiar to such assemblies. Much time was spent in establishing some regulations with regard to the internal police of the empire. The jurisdiction of the imperial chamber was confirmed, and the forms of its proceeding rendered more fixed and regular. A council of regency was appointed to assist Ferdinand in the government of the empire during any occasional absence of the emperor; which, from the extent of the emperor's dominions, as well as the multiplicity of his affairs, was an event that might be frequently expected.⁵³ The state of religion was then taken into consideration. There were not wanting some plausible reasons which might have induced Charles to have declared himself the protector of Luther's cause, or at least to have connived at its progress. If he had possessed no other dominions but those which belonged to him in Germany, and no other crown besides the imperial, he might have been disposed, perhaps, to favour a man who asserted so boldly the privileges and immunities for which the empire had struggled so long with the popes. But the vast and dangerous schemes which Francis I. was forming against Charles made it necessary for him to regulate his conduct by views more extensive than those

⁵² Jovii Historia, Lut., 1553, fol., viii. c. 11, p. 195.—Pfeffel, Abrégé Chronol., p. 598.
p. 134.

⁵³ Pont. Heuter. Rer. Austr., lib.

which would have suited a German prince; and, being of the utmost importance to secure the popular friendship, this determined him to treat Luther with great severity, as the most effectual method of soothing Leo into a concurrence with his measures. His eagerness to accomplish this rendered him not unwilling to gratify the papal legates in Germany, who insisted that without any delay or formal deliberation, the diet ought to condemn a man whom the pope had already excommunicated as an incorrigible heretic. Such an abrupt manner of proceeding, however, being deemed unprecedented and unjust by the members of the diet, they made a point of Luther's appearing in person and declaring whether he adhered or not to those opinions which had drawn upon him the censures of the Church. Not only the emperor, but all the princes through whose territories he had to pass, granted him a safe-conduct, and Charles wrote to him at the same time, requiring his immediate attendance on the diet, and renewing his promises of protection from any injury or violence. Luther did not hesitate one moment about yielding obedience, and set out for Worms, attended by the herald who had brought the emperor's letter and safe-conduct. While on his journey, many of his friends, whom the fate of Huss under similar circumstances, and notwithstanding the same security of an imperial safe-conduct, filled with solicitude, advised and entreated him not to rush wantonly into the midst of danger. But Luther, superior to such terrors, silenced them with the reply: "I am lawfully called," said he, "to appear in that city; and thither will I go in the name of the Lord, though as many devils as there are tiles on the houses were there combined against me."⁵⁵

The reception which he met with at Worms was

⁵⁴ P. Martyr. Ep., 722.

⁵⁵ Luth., Oper., ii. 411.

"Luth., Oper., ii. 412.

such as he might have reckoned a full reward of all his labours, if vanity and the love of applause had been the principle by which he was influenced. Greater crowds assembled to behold him than had appeared at the emperor's public entry; his apartments were daily filled with princes and personages of the highest rank,⁵⁷ and he was treated with all the respect paid to those who possess the power of directing the understanding and sentiments of other men,—a homage more sincere, as well as more flattering, than any which pre-eminence in birth or condition can command. At his appearance before the diet he behaved with great decency, and with equal firmness. He readily acknowledged an excess of vehemence and acrimony in his controversial writings, but refused to retract his opinions unless he were convinced of their falsehood, or to consent to their being tried by any other rule than the word of God. When neither threats nor entreaties could prevail on him to depart from this resolution, some of the ecclesiastics proposed to imitate the example of the council of Constance, and, by punishing the author of this pestilent heresy, who was now in their power, to deliver the Church at once from such an evil. But, the members of the diet refusing to expose the German integrity to fresh reproach by a second violation of public faith, and Charles being no less unwilling to bring a stain upon the beginning of his administration by such an ignominious action, Luther was permitted to depart in safety.⁵⁸ A few days after he left the city, a severe edict was published, in the emperor's name and by authority of the diet, depriving him, as an obstinate and excommunicated criminal, of all the privileges which he enjoyed as a subject of the empire, forbidding any prince to harbour or protect him, and requiring all to concur in

⁵⁷ Seckend., 156.—Luth., Oper.,
ii. 414.

⁵⁸ F. Paul, Hist. of Counc., p. 13.
—Seckend., 160.

seizing his person as soon as the term specified in his safe-conduct was expired.⁵⁰

But this rigorous decree had no considerable effect; the execution of it being prevented, partly by the multiplicity of occupations which the commotions in Spain, together with the wars in Italy and the Low Countries, created to the emperor, and partly by a prudent precaution employed by the elector of Saxony, Luther's faithful and discerning patron. As Luther, on his return from Worms, was passing near Altenstein in Thuringia, a number of horsemen in masks rushed suddenly out of a wood, where the elector had appointed them to lie in wait for him, and, surrounding his company, carried him, after dismissing all his attendants, to Wartburg, a strong castle not far distant. There the elector ordered him to be supplied with everything necessary or agreeable; but the place of his retreat was carefully concealed, until the fury of the present storm against him began to abate, upon a change in the political situation of Europe. In this solitude, where he remained nine months, and which he frequently called his Patmos, after the name of that island to which the Apostle John was banished, he exerted his usual vigour and industry in defence of his doctrines or in confutation of his adversaries, publishing several treatises, which revived the spirit of his followers, astonished to a great degree, and disheartened, at the sudden disappearance of their leader.

During his confinement his opinions continued to gain ground, acquiring the ascendant in almost every city in Saxony. At this time the Augustinians of Wittemberg, with the approbation of the university and the connivance of the elector, ventured upon the first step towards an alteration in the established forms of public worship, by abolishing the celebration of private masses, and by giving

⁵⁰ Gold., Const. Imperial., ii. 401.

the cup as well as the bread to the laity in administering the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

Whatever consolation the courage and success of his disciples, or the progress of his doctrines in his own country, afforded Luther in his retreat, he there received information of two events which considerably damped his joy, as they seemed to lay insuperable obstacles in the way of propagating his principles in the two most powerful kingdoms of Europe. One was a solemn decree, condemning his opinions, published by the University of Paris,—the most ancient, and at that time the most respectable, of the learned societies in Europe. The other was the answer written to his book concerning the Babylonish captivity by Henry VIII. of England. That monarch, having been educated under the eye of a suspicious father, who, in order to prevent his attending to business, kept him occupied in the study of literature, still retained a greater love of learning, and stronger habits of application to it, than are common among princes of so active a disposition and such violent passions. Being ambitious of acquiring glory of every kind, as well as zealously attached to the Romish Church, and highly exasperated against Luther, who had treated Thomas Aquinas, his favourite author, with great contempt, Henry did not think it enough to exert his royal authority in opposing the opinions of the Reformer, but resolved likewise to combat them with scholastic weapons. With this view he published his treatise on the seven sacraments; which, though forgotten at present, as books of controversy always are when the occasion that produced them is past, is not destitute of polemical ingenuity and acuteness, and was represented by the flattery of his courtiers to be a work of such wonderful science and learning as exalted him no less above other authors in merit than he was distinguished among them by his rank. The pope, to whom it was presented with

the greatest formality in full consistory, spoke of it in such terms as if it had been dictated by immediate inspiration, and, as a testimony of the gratitude of the Church for his extraordinary zeal, conferred on him the title of *Defender of the Faith*, an appellation which Henry soon forfeited in the opinion of those from whom he derived it, and which is still retained by his successors, though the avowed enemy of those opinions by contending for which he merited that honourable distinction. Luther, who was not overawed either by the authority of the university or the dignity of the monarch, soon published his animadversions on both, in a style no less vehement and severe than he would have used in confuting his meanest antagonist. This indecent boldness, instead of shocking his contemporaries, was considered by them as a new proof of his undaunted spirit. A controversy managed by disputants so illustrious drew universal attention ; and such was the contagion of the spirit of innovation diffused through Europe in that age, and so powerful the evidence which accompanied the doctrines of the Reformers on their first publication, that, in spite both of the civil and ecclesiastical powers combined against them, they daily gained converts both in France and in England.

How desirous soever the emperor might be to put a stop to Luther's progress, he was often obliged, during the diet at Worms, to turn his thoughts to matters still more interesting and which demanded more immediate attention. A war was ready to break out between him and the French king in Navarre, in the Low Countries, and in Italy ; and it required either great address to avert the danger, or timely and wise precautions to resist it. Every circumstance, at that juncture, inclined Charles to prefer the former measure. Spain was torn with intestine commotions. In Italy, he had not hitherto secured the assistance of any one ally. In the Low

Countries, his subjects trembled at the thoughts of a rupture with France, the fatal effects of which on their commerce they had often experienced. From these considerations, as well as from the solicitude of Chièvres, during his whole administration, to maintain peace between the two monarchs, proceeded the emperor's backwardness to commence hostilities. But Francis and his ministers did not breathe the same pacific spirit. He easily foresaw that concord could not long subsist where interest, emulation, and ambition conspired to dissolve it; and he possessed several advantages which flattered him with the hopes of surprising his rival, and of overpowering him, before he could put himself in a posture of defence. The French king's dominions, from their compact situation, from their subjection to the royal authority, from the genius of the people, fond of war, and attached to their sovereign by every tie of duty and affection, were more capable of a great or sudden effort than the larger but disunited territories of the emperor, in one part of which the people were in arms against his ministers, and in all his prerogative was more limited than that of his rival.

The only princes in whose power it was to have kept down, or to have extinguished, this flame on its first appearance, either neglected to exert themselves or were active in kindling and spreading it. Henry VIII., though he affected to assume the name of mediator, and both parties made frequent appeals to him, had laid aside the impartiality which suited that character. Wolsey, by his artifices, had estranged himself so entirely from the French king that he secretly fomented the discord which he ought to have composed, and waited only for some decent pretext to join his arms to those of the emperor.⁶⁰

Leo's endeavours to excite discord between the em-

⁶⁰ Herbert.—Fiddes's Life of Wolsey, 258.

peror and Francis were more avowed, and had greater influence. Not only his duty as the common father of Christendom, but his interest as an Italian potentate, called upon the pope to act as the guardian of the public tranquillity, and to avoid any measure that might overturn the system which, after much bloodshed and many negotiations, was now established in Italy. Accordingly Leo, who instantly discerned the propriety of this conduct, had formed a scheme, upon Charles's promotion to the imperial dignity, of rendering himself the umpire between the rivals, by soothing them alternately, while he entered into no close confederacy with either; and a pontiff less ambitious and enterprising might have saved Europe from many calamities by adhering to this plan. But this high-spirited prelate, who was still in the prime of life, longed passionately to distinguish his pontificate by some splendid action. He was impatient to wash away the infamy of having lost Parma and Placentia, the acquisition of which reflected so much lustre on the administration of his predecessor, Julius. He beheld with the indignation natural to Italians in that age the dominion which the Transalpine, or as they, in imitation of the Roman arrogance, denominated them, the barbarous nations, had attained in Italy. He flattered himself that after assisting the one monarch to strip the other of his possessions in that country he might find means of driving out the victor in his turn, and acquire the glory of restoring Italy to the liberty and happiness which it had enjoyed before the invasion of Charles VIII., when every state was governed by its native princes or its own laws, and unacquainted with a foreign yoke. Extravagant and chimerical as this project may seem, it was the favourite object of almost every Italian eminent for genius or enterprise during great part of the sixteenth century. They vainly hoped that by superior skill in the artifices and refinements of negotiation they should



Warthurg Castle.





be able to baffle the efforts of nations less polished indeed than themselves, but much more powerful and warlike. So alluring was the prospect of this to Leo that, notwithstanding the gentleness of his disposition and his fondness for the pleasures of a refined and luxurious ease, he hastened to disturb the peace of Europe, and to plunge himself into a dangerous war, with an impetuosity scarcely inferior to that of the turbulent and martial Julius.⁶¹

It was in Leo's power, however, to choose which of the monarchs he would take for his confederate against the other. Both of them courted his friendship; he wavered for some time between them, and at first concluded an alliance with Francis. The object of this treaty was the conquest of Naples, which the confederates agreed to divide between them. The pope, it is probable, flattered himself that the brisk and active spirit of Francis, seconded by the same qualities in his subjects, would get the start of the slow and wary counsels of the emperor, and that they might overrun with ease this detached portion of his dominions, ill provided for defence and always the prey of every invader. But whether the French king, by discovering too openly his suspicion of Leo's sincerity, disappointed these hopes; whether the treaty was only an artifice of the pope's to cover the more serious negotiations which he was carrying on with Charles; whether he was enticed by the prospect of reaping great advantages from a union with that prince; or whether he was soothed by the zeal which Charles had manifested for the honour of the Church in condemning Luther,—certain it is that he soon deserted his new ally, and made overtures of friendship, though with great secrecy, to the emperor.⁶² Don John Manuel, the same man who had been the

⁶¹ Guic., lib. xiv. p. 173.

⁶² Guic., lib. xiv. p. 175.—Mém. de Bellay, Par., 1573, p. 24.

favourite of Philip, and whose address had disconcerted all Ferdinand's schemes, having been delivered, upon the death of that monarch, from the prison to which he had been confined, was now the imperial ambassador at Rome, and fully capable of improving this favourable disposition in the pope to his master's advantage.* To him the conduct of this negotiation was entirely committed; and being carefully concealed from Chièvre, whose aversion to a war with France would have prompted him to retard or to defeat it, an alliance between the pope and emperor was quickly concluded. The chief articles in this treaty, which proved the foundation of Charles's grandeur in Italy, were that the pope and emperor should join their forces to expel the French out of the Milanese, the possession of which should be granted to Francis Sforza, a son of Ludovic the Moor, who had resided at Trent since the time that his brother Maximilian had been dispossessed of his dominions by the French king; that Parma and Placentia should be restored to the Church; that the emperor should assist the pope in conquering Ferrara; that the annual tribute paid by the kingdom of Naples to the holy see should be increased; that the emperor should take the family of Medici under his protection; that he should grant to the cardinal of that name a pension of ten thousand ducats upon the archbishopric of Toledo, and should settle lands in the kingdom of Naples, to the same value, upon Alexander, the natural son of Lorenzo de' Medici.

The transacting an affair of such moment without his participation appeared to Chièvres so decisive a proof of his having lost the ascendant which he had hitherto maintained over the mind of his pupil, that his chagrin on this account, added to the melancholy with which

* Jovii Vita Leonis, lib. iv. p. 89.

“ Guic., lib. xiv. 181.—Mém.

de Bellay, p. 24.—Du Mont, Cor-

Diplom., tom. iv., suppl., p. 96.

he was overwhelmed on taking a view of the many and unavoidable calamities attending a war against France, is said to have shortened his days.⁶⁶ But though this, perhaps, may be only the conjecture of historians, fond of attributing every thing that befalls illustrious personages to extraordinary causes, and of ascribing even their diseases and death to the effect of political passions, which are more apt to disturb the enjoyment than to abridge the period of life, it is certain that his death, at this critical juncture, extinguished all hopes of avoiding a rupture with France.⁶⁶ This event, too, delivered Charles from a minister to whose authority he had been accustomed from his infancy to submit with such implicit deference as checked and depressed his genius and retained him in a state of pupilage unbecoming his years as well as his rank. But this restraint being removed, the native powers of his mind were permitted to unfold themselves, and he began to display such great talents, both in council and in action, as exceeded the hopes of his contemporaries,⁶⁷ and command the admiration of posterity.

While the pope and emperor were preparing, in consequence of this secret alliance, to attack Milan, hostilities commenced in another quarter. The children of John d'Albret, king of Navarre, having often demanded the restitution of their hereditary dominions, in terms of the treaty of Noyon, and Charles having as often eluded their requests upon very frivolous pretexts, Francis thought himself authorized by that treaty to assist the exiled family. The juncture appeared extremely favourable for such an enterprise. Charles was at a distance from that part of his dominions; the troops usually stationed there had been called away to

⁶⁶ Belcarii Comment. de Reb. viii. c. 11, p. 197.
Gallic., 483.

⁶⁷ P. Heuter. Rer. Austr., lib.

⁶⁷ P. Martyr. Ep., 735.

quell the commotions in Spain ; the Spanish malecontents warmly solicited him to invade Navarre,⁶⁸ in which a considerable faction was ready to declare for the descendants of their ancient monarchs. But, in order to avoid as much as possible giving offence to the emperor, or king of England, Francis directed forces to be levied, and the war to be carried on, not in his own name, but in that of Henry d'Albret. The conduct of these troops was committed to Andrew de Foix, de l'Esparre, a young nobleman, whom his near alliance to the unfortunate king whose battles he was to fight, and, what was still more powerful, the interest of his sister, Madame de Chateaubriand, Francis's favourite mistress, recommended to that important trust, for which he had neither talents nor experience. But, as there was no army in the field to oppose him, he became master, in a few days, of the whole kingdom of Navarre, without meeting with any obstruction but from the citadel of Pampeluna. The additional works of this fortress, begun by Ximenes, were still unfinished ; nor would its slight resistance have deserved notice, if Ignatio Loyola, a Biscayan gentleman, had not been dangerously wounded in its defence. During the progress of a lingering cure, Loyola happened to have no other amusement than what he found in reading the lives of the saints : the effect of this on his mind, naturally enthusiastic, but ambitious and daring, was to inspire him with such a desire of emulating the glory of these fabulous worthies of the Roman Church as led him into the wildest and most extravagant adventures, which terminated at last in instituting the society of Jesuits, the most political and best regulated of all the monastic orders, and from which mankind have derived more advantages and received greater injury than from any other of those religious fraternities.

⁶⁸ P. Martyr, Ep., 721.

If, upon the reduction of Pampeluna, L'Esparre had been satisfied with taking proper precautions for securing his conquest, the kingdom of Navarre might still have remained annexed to the crown of France in reality as well as in title. But, pushed on by youthful ardour, and encouraged by Francis, who was too apt to be dazzled with success, he ventured to pass the confines of Navarre, and to lay siege to Logrogno, a small town in Castile. This roused the Castilians, who had hitherto beheld the rapid progress of his arms with great unconcern, and, the dissensions in that kingdom (of which a full account shall be given) being almost composed, both parties exerted themselves with emulation in defence of their country: the one, that it might efface the memory of past misconduct by its present zeal; the other, that it might add to the merit of having subdued the emperor's rebellious subjects that of repulsing his foreign enemies. The sudden advance of their troops, together with the gallant defence made by the inhabitants of Logrogno, obliged the French general to abandon his rash enterprise. The Spanish army, which increased every day, harassing him during his retreat, he, instead of taking shelter under the cannon of Pam-peluna, or waiting the arrival of some troops which were marching to join him, attacked the Spaniards, though far superior to him in number, with great impetuosity, but with so little conduct that his forces were totally routed, he himself, together with his principal officers, was taken prisoner, and Spain recovered possession of Navarre in still shorter time than the French had spent in the conquest of it.⁶⁹

While Francis endeavoured to justify his invasion of Navarre by carrying it on in the name of Henry d'Albret, he had recourse to an artifice much of the same kind in attacking another part of the emperor's

⁶⁹ Mém. de Bellay, p. 21.—P. Martyr. Ep., 726.

territories. Robert de la Mark, lord of the small but independent territory of Bouillon, situated on the frontiers of Luxembourg and Champagne, having abandoned Charles's service on account of an encroachment which the Aulic Council had made on his jurisdiction, and having thrown himself upon France for protection, was easily persuaded, in the heat of his resentment, to send a herald to Worms and to declare war against the emperor in form. Such extravagant insolence in a petty prince surprised Charles, and appeared to him a certain proof of his having received promises of powerful support from the French king. The justness of this conclusion soon became evident. Robert entered the duchy of Luxembourg with troops levied in France by the king's connivance, though seemingly in contradiction to his orders, and, after ravaging the open country, laid siege to Vireton. Of this Charles complained loudly, as a direct violation of the peace subsisting between the two crowns, and summoned Henry VIII in terms of the treaty concluded at London in the year 1518, to turn his arms against Francis as the first aggressor. Francis pretended that he was not answerable for Robert's conduct, whose army fought under his own standards and in his own quarrel, and affirmed that, contrary to an express prohibition, he had seduced some subjects of France into his service; but Henry paid so little regard to this evasion that the French king, rather than irritate a prince whom he still hoped to gain, commanded De la Mark to disband his troops.⁷⁰

The emperor, meanwhile, was assembling an army to chastise Robert's insolence. Twenty thousand men under the count of Nassau, invaded his little territories and in a few days became masters of every place in them but Sedan. After making him feel so sensibly the weight of his master's indignation, Nassau advanced

⁷⁰ Mém. de Bellay, p. 22, etc.—Mém. de Fleuranges, p. 335, etc.

towards the frontiers of France; and Charles, knowing that he might presume so far on Henry's partiality in his favour as not to be overawed by the same fears which had restrained Francis, ordered his general to besiege Mouson. The cowardice of the garrison having obliged the governor to surrender almost without resistance, Nassau invested Mézières, a place at that time of no considerable strength, but so advantageously situated that by getting possession of it the imperial army might have penetrated into the heart of Champagne, in which there was hardly any other town capable of obstructing its progress. Happily for France, its monarch, sensible of the importance of this fortress and of the danger to which it was exposed, committed the defence of it to the Chevalier Bayard, distinguished among his contemporaries by the appellation of *The knight without fear and without reproach.*⁷¹ This man, whose prowess in combat, whose punctilious honour and formal gallantry, bear a nearer resemblance than anything recorded in history to the character ascribed to the heroes of chivalry, possessed all the talents which form a great general. These he had many occasions of exerting in the defence of Mézières. Partly by his valour, partly by his conduct, he protracted the siege to a great length, and in the end obliged the imperialists to raise it, with disgrace and loss.⁷² Francis, at the head of a numerous army, soon retook Mouson, and, entering the Low Countries, made several conquests of small importance. In the neighbourhood of Valenciennes, through an excess of caution, an error with which he cannot be often charged, he lost an opportunity of cutting off the whole imperial army;⁷³ and, what was still more unfortunate, he disgusted Charles, duke of Bourbon, high constable

⁷¹ Œuvres de Brantôme, tom. vi. 114.

⁷² P. Martyr. Ep., 747.—Mém. de Bellay, 35.

⁷³ Mém. de Bellay, p. 25, etc.

of France, by giving the command of the van to the duke d'Alençon, though this post of honour belonged to Bourbon, as a prerogative of his office.

During these operations in the field, a congress was held at Calais, under the mediation of Henry VIII., in order to bring all differences to an amicable issue; and if the intention of the mediator had corresponded in any degree to his professions, it could hardly have failed of producing some good effect. But Henry committed the sole management of the negotiation, with unlimited powers, to Wolsey; and this choice alone was sufficient to have rendered it abortive. That prelate, bent on attaining the papal crown, the great object of his ambition, and ready to sacrifice every thing in order to gain the emperor's interest, was so little able to conceal his partiality that if Francis had not been well acquainted with his haughty and vindictive temper he would have declined his mediation. Much time was spent in inquiring who had begun hostilities, which Wolsey affected to represent as the principal point; and by throwing the blame of that on Francis he hoped to justify by the treaty of London any alliance into which his master should enter with Charles. The conditions on which hostilities might be terminated came next to be considered; but with regard to these the emperor's proposals were such as discovered either that he was utterly averse to peace, or that he knew Wolsey would approve of whatever terms should be offered in his name. He demanded the restitution of the duchy of Burgundy, a province the possession of which would have given him access into the heart of France, and required to be released from the homage due to the crown of France for the counties of Flanders and Artois, which none of his ancestors had ever refused, and which he had bound himself by the treaty of Noyon to renew. These terms, to which a high-spirited

prince would scarcely have listened, after the disasters of an unfortunate war, Francis rejected with great disdain; and Charles showing no inclination to comply with the more equal and moderate propositions of the French monarch, that he should restore Navarre to its lawful prince and withdraw his troops from the siege of Tournay, the congress broke up without any other effect than that which attends unsuccessful negotiations,—the exasperating of the parties whom it was intended to reconcile.⁷⁴

During the continuance of the congress, Wolsey, on pretence that the emperor himself would be more willing to make reasonable concessions than his ministers, made an excursion to Bruges to meet that monarch. He was received by Charles, who knew his vanity, with as much respect and magnificence as if he had been king of England. But, instead of advancing the treaty of peace by this interview, Wolsey, in his master's name, concluded a league with the emperor against Francis; in which it was stipulated that Charles should invade France on the side of Spain, and Henry in Picardy, each with an army of forty thousand men, and that, in order to strengthen their union, Charles should espouse the princess Mary, Henry's only child, and the apparent heir of his dominions.⁷⁵ Henry produced no better reasons for this measure, equally unjust and impolitic, than the article in the treaty of London by which he pretended that he was bound to take arms against the French king as the first aggressor, and the injury which he alleged Francis had done him in permitting the duke of Albany, the head of a faction in Scotland which opposed the interest of England, to return into that kingdom. He was influenced, however, by other considerations. The advantages which

⁷⁴ P. Martyr. Ep., 739.—Her-

⁷⁵ Rymer, Fœder., xiii.—Herbert.

accrued to his subjects from maintaining an exact neutrality, or the honour that resulted to himself from acting as the arbiter between the contending princes, appeared to his youthful imagination so inconsiderable when compared with the glory which might be reaped from leading armies or conquering provinces, that he determined to remain no longer in a state of inactivity. Having once taken this resolution, his inducements to prefer an alliance with Charles were obvious. He had no claim upon any part of that prince's dominions, most of which were so situated that he could not attack them without great difficulty and disadvantage; whereas the several maritime provinces of France had been long in the hands of the English monarchs, whose pretensions even to the crown of that kingdom were not as yet altogether forgotten; and the possession of Calais not only gave him easy access into some of those provinces, but, in case of any disaster, afforded him a secure retreat. While Charles attacked France on one frontier, Henry flattered himself that he should find little resistance on the other, and that the glory of re-annexing to the crown of England the ancient inheritance of his monarchs on the Continent was reserved for his reign. Wolsey artfully encouraged these vain hopes, which led his master into such measures as were most subservient to his own secret schemes; and the English, whose hereditary animosity against the French was apt to be rekindled on every occasion, did not disapprove of the martial spirit of their sovereign.

Meanwhile, the league between the pope and the emperor produced great effects in Italy, and rendered Lombardy the chief theatre of war. There was at that time such contrariety between the character of the French and the Italians that the latter submitted to the government of the former with greater impatience than they expressed under the dominion of other

foreigners. The phlegm of the Germans and gravity of the Spaniards suited their jealous temper and ceremonious manners better than the French gaiety, too prone to gallantry and too little attentive to decorum. Louis XII., however, by the equity and gentleness of his administration, and by granting the Milanese more extensive privileges than those they had enjoyed under their native princes, had overcome in a great measure their prejudices and reconciled them to the French government. Francis, on recovering that duchy, did not imitate the example of his predecessor. Though too generous himself to oppress his people, his boundless confidence in his favourites, and his negligence in examining into the conduct of those whom he intrusted with power, emboldened them to venture upon any acts of oppression. The government of Milan was committed by him to Odet de Foix, Maréchal de Lantrec, another brother of Madame de Chateaubriand, an officer of great experience and reputation, but haughty, imperious, and rapacious, and incapable either of listening to advice or of bearing contradiction. His insolence and exactions totally alienated the affections of the Milanese from France, drove many of the considerable citizens into banishment, and forced others to retire for their own safety. Among the last was Jerome Morone, vice-chancellor of Milan, a man whose genius for intrigue and enterprise distinguished him in an age and country where violent factions, as well as frequent revolutions, affording great scope for such talents, produced or called them forth in great abundance. He repaired to Francis Sforza, whose brother Maximilian he had betrayed; and suspecting the pope's intention of attacking the Milanese, although his treaty with the emperor was not yet made public, he proposed to Leo, in the name of Sforza, a scheme for surprising several places in that duchy by means of the exiles,

who, from hatred to the French, and from attachment to their former masters, were ready for any desperate enterprise. Leo not only encouraged the attempt, but advanced a considerable sum towards the execution of it; and when, through unforeseen accidents, it failed of success in every part, he allowed the exiles, who had assembled in a body, to retire to Reggio, which belonged at that time to the Church. The Maréchal de Foix, who commanded at Milan in the absence of his brother Lautrec, who was then in France, tempted with the hopes of catching at once, as in a snare, all the avowed enemies of his master's government in that country, ventured to march into the ecclesiastical territories and to invest Reggio. But the vigilance and good conduct of Guicciardini, the historian, governor of that place, obliged the French general to abandon the enterprise with disgrace.⁷⁶ Leo, on receiving this intelligence with which he was highly pleased, as it furnished him a decent pretence for a rupture with France, immediately assembled the consistory of cardinals. After complaining bitterly of the hostile intentions of the French king, and magnifying the emperor's zeal for the Church, of which he had given a recent proof by his proceeding against Luther, he declared that he was constrained in self-defence, and as the only expedient for the security of the ecclesiastical state, to join his arms to those of that prince. For this purpose, he now pretended to conclude a treaty with Don John Manuel, although it had really been signed some months before this time; and he publicly excommunicated De Foix, as an impious invader of St. Peter's patrimony.

Leo had already begun preparations for war by taking into pay a considerable body of Swiss; but the imperial troops advanced so slowly from Naples and Germany, that it was the middle of autumn before the army too-

* Guic., lib. xiv. 183.—Mém. de Bellay, p. 38, etc.

the field, under the command of Prosper Colonna, the most eminent of the Italian generals, whose extreme caution, the effect of long experience in the art of war, was opposed with great propriety to the impetuosity of the French. In the meantime, De Foix despatched courier after courier to inform the king of the danger which was approaching. Francis, whose forces were either employed in the Low Countries or assembling on the frontiers of Spain, and who did not expect so sudden an attack in that quarter, sent ambassadors to his allies the Swiss, to procure from them the immediate levy of an additional body of troops, and commanded Lautrec to repair forthwith to his government. That general, who was well acquainted with the great neglect of economy in the administration of the king's finances, and who knew how much the troops in the Milanese had already suffered from the want of their pay, refused to set out unless the sum of three hundred thousand crowns was immediately put into his hands. But the king, Louise of Savoy, his mother, Semblancy, the superintendent of finances, having promised, even with an oath, that on his arrival at Milan he should find remittances for the sum which he demanded, upon the faith of this he departed. Unhappily for France, Louise, a woman deceitful, vindictive, rapacious, and capable of sacrificing anything to the gratification of her passions, but who had acquired an absolute ascendant over her son by her maternal tenderness, her care of his education, and her great abilities, was resolved not to perform this promise. Lautrec having incurred her displeasure by his haughtiness in neglecting to pay court to her, and by the freedom with which he had talked concerning some of her adventures in gallantry, she, in order to deprive him of the honour which he might have gained by a successful defence of the Milanese, seized the three hundred thousand crowns

destined for that service and detained them for his own use.

Lautrec, notwithstanding this cruel disappointment, found means to assemble a considerable army, though far inferior in number to that of the confederates. He adopted the plan of defence most suitable to his situation, avoiding a pitched battle with the greatest care, while he harassed the enemy continually with his light troops, beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, and covered or relieved every place which they attempted to attack. By this prudent conduct he not only retarded their progress, but would have soon wearied out the pope, who had hitherto defrayed almost the whole expense of the war, as the emperor, whose revenues in Spain were dissipated during the commotions in that country, and who was obliged to support a numerous army in the Netherlands, could no longer make any considerable remittances into Italy. But an unforeseen accident disconcerted all his measures and occasioned a fatal reverse in the French affairs. A body of twelve thousand Swiss served in Lautrec's army under the banners of the republic, with which France was in alliance. In consequence of a law, less political than humane, established among the cantons, their troops were never hired out by public authority to both the contending parties in any war. This law, however, the love of gain had sometimes eluded, and private persons had been allowed to enlist in what service they pleased, though not under the public banners, but under those of their particular officers. The cardinal of Sion, who still preserved his interest among his countrymen and his enmity against France, having prevailed on them to connive at a levée of this kind, twelve thousand Swiss, instigated by him, joined the army of the confederates. But the leaders in the cantons, when they saw so many of their country-

men marching under the hostile standards and ready to turn their arms against each other, became so sensible of the infamy to which they would be exposed by permitting this, as well as the loss they might suffer, that they despatched couriers commanding their people to leave both armies and to return forthwith into their own country. The cardinal of Sion, however, had the address, by corrupting the messengers appointed to carry this order, to prevent it from being delivered to the Swiss in the service of the confederates ; but, being intimated in due form to those in the French army, they, fatigued with the length of the campaign, and murmuring for want of pay, instantly yielded obedience, in spite of Lautrec's remonstrances and entreaties.

After the desertion of a body which formed the strength of his army, Lautrec durst no longer face the confederates. He retired towards Milan, encamped on the banks of the Adda, and placed his chief hopes of safety in preventing the enemy from passing that river ; an expedient for defending a country so precarious that there are few instances of its being employed with success against any general of experience or abilities. Accordingly, Colonna, notwithstanding Lautrec's vigilance and activity, passed the Adda with little loss, and obliged him to shut himself up within the walls of Milan, which the confederates were preparing to besiege, when an unknown person, who never afterwards appeared either to boast of this service or to claim a reward for it, came from the city, and acquainted Morone that if the army would advance that night the Ghibelline or imperial faction would put them in possession of one of the gates. Colonna, though no friend to rash enterprises, allowed the marquis de Pescara to advance with the Spanish infantry, and he himself followed with the rest of his troops. About the beginning of night, Pescara, arriving at the Roman gate

in the suburbs, surprised the soldiers whom he found there. Those posted in the fortifications adjoining to immediately fled; the marquis, seizing the works which they abandoned, and pushing forward incessantly, though with no less caution than vigour, became master of the city with little bloodshed, and almost without resistance, the victors being as much astonished as the vanquished at the facility and success of the attempt. Lautrec retired precipitately towards the Venetian territories with the remains of his shattered army; the cities of the Milanese, following the fate of the capital surrendered to the confederates; Parma and Placentia were united to the ecclesiastical state; and, of all their conquests in Lombardy, only the town of Cremona, the castle of Milan, and a few inconsiderable forts, remained in the hands of the French.⁷⁷

Leo received the accounts of this rapid succession of prosperous events with such transports of joy as brought on (if we may believe the French historians) a slight fever, which, being neglected, occasioned his death on the 2nd of December, while he was still of a vigorous age and at the height of his glory. By this unexpected accident the spirit of the confederacy was broken and its operation suspended. The cardinals of Sion and Medici left the army, that they might be present in the conclave; the Swiss were recalled by their superiors; some other mercenaries disbanded for want of pay; and only the Spaniards, and a few Germans in the emperor's service, remained to defend the Milanese. But Lautrec, destitute both of men and of money, was unable to improve this favourable opportunity in the manner which he would have wished. The vigilance of Morone, and the good conduct of Colonna, disappointed his feeble

⁷⁷ Guic., lib. xiv. 190, etc.—
Mém. de Bellay, 42, etc.—Galeacii
Capella de Reb. gest. pro restitut.

—Fran. Sfortiæ Comment., a
Scordium, vol. ii. 180, etc.

attempts on the Milanese. Guicciardini, by his address and valour, repulsed a bolder and more dangerous attack which he made on Parma.⁷⁸

Great discord prevailed in the conclave which followed upon Leo's death, and all the arts natural to men grown old in intrigue, when contending for the highest prize an ecclesiastic can obtain, were practised. Wolsey's name, notwithstanding all the emperor's magnificent promises to favour his pretensions, of which that prelate did not fail to remind him, was hardly mentioned in the conclave. Julio, Cardinal de Medici, Leo's nephew, who was more eminent than any other member of the college for his abilities, his wealth, and his experience in transacting great affairs, had already secured fifteen voices, a number sufficient, according to the forms of the conclave, to exclude any other candidate, though not to carry his own election. As he was still in the prime of life, all the aged cardinals combined against him, without being united in favour of any other person. While these factions were endeavouring to gain, to corrupt, or to weary out each other, Medici and his adherents voted one morning at the scrutiny, which, according to the form, was made every day, for Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, who at that time governed Spain in the emperor's name. This they did merely to protract time. But, the adverse party instantly closing with them, to their amazement and that of all Europe, a stranger to Italy, unknown to the persons who gave their suffrages in his favour, and unacquainted with the manners of the people or the interest of the state the government of which they conferred upon him, was unanimously raised to the papal throne at a juncture so delicate and critical as would have demanded all the sagacity and experience of one of the most able prelates in the sacred college. The cardinals themselves, unable

⁷⁸ Guic., lib. xiv. 214.

to give a reason for this strange choice, on account which, as they marched in procession from the conclave they were loaded with insults and curses by the Roman people, ascribed it to an immediate impulse of the Holy Ghost. It may be imputed with greater certainty the influence of Don John Manuel, the imperial ambassador, who by his address and intrigues facilitated the election of a person devoted to his master's service from gratitude, from interest, and from inclination.⁷⁹

Besides the influence which Charles acquired Adrian's promotion, it threw great lustre on his administration. To bestow on his preceptor such a noble recompense, and to place on the papal throne one whom he had raised from obscurity, were acts of uncommon magnificence and power. Francis observed, with the sensibility of a rival, the pre-eminence which the emperor was gaining, and resolved to exert himself with fresh vigour, in order to wrest from him his late conquests in Italy. The Swiss, that they might make some reparation to the French king for having withdrawn their troops from his army so unseasonably as to occasion the loss of the Milanese, permitted him to levy ten thousand men in the republic. Together with this reinforcement, Lautrec received from the king a small sum of money, which enabled him once more to take the field, and, after seizing by surprise or force several places in the Milanese, to advance within a few miles of the capital. The confederate army was in no condition to obstruct his progress; for though the inhabitants of Milan, by the artifices of Morone, and by the popular declamations of a monk whom he employed, were inflamed with such enthusiastic zeal against the French government that they consented to raise extraordinary contributions, Colonna must soon have abandoned the

⁷⁹ Herm. Moringi Vita Hadriani, Hadr., p. 52.—Conclav. Hadriani, ap. Casp. Burman. in Analect. de ibid., p. 144, etc.

advantageous camp which he had chosen at Biocca, and have dismissed his troops for want of pay, if the Swiss in the French service had not once more extricated him out of his difficulties.

The insolence and caprice of those mercenaries were often no less fatal to their friends than their valour and discipline were formidable to their enemies. Having now served some months without pay, of which they complained loudly, a sum destined for their use was sent from France under a convoy of horse; but Morone, whose vigilant eye nothing escaped, posted a body of troops in their way, so that the party which escorted the money durst not advance. On receiving intelligence of this, the Swiss lost all patience, and officers, as well as soldiers, crowding around Lautrec, threatened with one voice instantly to retire, if he did not either advance the pay which was due, or promise to lead them next morning to battle. In vain did Lautrec remonstrate against these demands, representing to them the impossibility of the former and the rashness of the latter, which must be attended with certain destruction, as the enemy occupied a camp naturally of great strength, and which by art they had rendered almost inaccessible. The Swiss, deaf to reason, and persuaded that their valour was capable of surmounting every obstacle, renewed their demand with great fierceness, offering themselves to form the vanguard and to begin the attack. Lautrec, unable to overcome their obstinacy, complied with their request, hoping, perhaps, that some of those unforeseen accidents which so often determine the fate of battles might crown this rash enterprise with undeserved success, and convinced that the effects of a defeat could not be more fatal than those which would certainly follow upon the retreat of a body which composed one-half of his army. Next morning the Swiss were early in the field, and marched with the greatest

intrepidity against an enemy deeply intrenched on every side, surrounded with artillery, and prepared to receive them. As they advanced, they sustained a furious cannonade with great firmness, and without waiting for their own artillery, rushed impetuously upon the intrenchments. But, after incredible efforts of valour, which were seconded with great spirit by the French, having lost their bravest officers and best soldiers, and finding that they could make no impression on the enemy's works, they sounded a retreat; leaving the field of battle, however, like men repulsed but not vanquished, in close array, and without receiving any molestation from the enemy.

Next day, such as survived set out for their own country; and Lautrec, despairing of being able to make any further resistance, retired into France, after throwing garrisons into Cremona and a few other places; all of which, except the citadel of Cremona, Colonna soon obliged to surrender.

Genoa, however, and its territories, remaining subject to France, still gave Francis considerable footing in Italy, and made it easy for him to execute any scheme for the recovery of the Milanese. But Colonna, rendered enterprising by continual success, and excited by the solicitations of the faction of the Adorni, the hereditary enemies of the Fregosi, who, under the protection of France, possessed the chief authority in Genoa, determined to attempt the reduction of that state, and accomplished it with amazing facility. He became master of Genoa by an accident as unexpected as that which had given him possession of Milan; and, almost without opposition or bloodshed, the power of the Adorni and the authority of the Emperor were established in Genoa.⁸⁰

Such a cruel succession of misfortunes affected Francis with deep concern, which was not a little augmented

⁸⁰ Jovii Vita Ferdin. Davali, p. 344.—Guic., lib. xiv. 233.

by the unexpected arrival of an English herald, who, in the name of his sovereign, declared war in form against France. This step was taken in consequence of the treaty which Wolsey had concluded with the emperor at Bruges, and which had hitherto been kept secret. Francis, though he had reason to be surprised with this denunciation, after having been at such pains to soothe Henry and to gain his minister, received the herald with great composure and dignity,⁸¹ and, without abandoning any of the schemes which he was forming against the emperor, began vigorous preparations for resisting this new enemy. His treasury, however, being exhausted by the efforts which he had already made, as well as by the sums he expended on his pleasures, he had recourse to extraordinary expedients for supplying it. Several new offices were created and exposed to sale; the royal demesnes were alienated; unusual taxes were imposed; and the tomb of St. Martin was stripped of a rail of massive silver with which Louis XI., in one of his fits of devotion, had encircled it. By means of these expedients he was enabled to levy a considerable army, and to put the frontier towns in a good posture of defence.

The emperor, meanwhile, was no less solicitous to draw as much advantage as possible from the accession of such a powerful ally; and the prosperous situation of his affairs at this time permitting him to set out for Spain, where his presence was extremely necessary, he visited the court of England on his way to that country. He proposed by this interview not only to strengthen the bonds of friendship which united him with Henry, and to excite him to push the war against France with vigour, but hoped to remove any disgust or resentment that Wolsey might have conceived on account of the mortifying disappointment which he had met with in

⁸¹ Journal de Louise de Savoie, p. 119.

the late conclave. His success exceeded his most sanguine expectations; and by his artful address, during a residence of six weeks in England, he gained not only the king and the minister, but the nation itself. Henry, whose vanity was sensibly flattered by such a visit, as well as by the studied respect with which the emperor treated him on every occasion, entered warmly into all his schemes. The cardinal, foreseeing, from Adrian's age and infirmities, a sudden vacancy in the papal see, dissembled or forgot his resentment; and Charles, besides augmenting the pensions which he had already settled on him, renewed his promise of favouring his pretensions to the papacy with all his interest. He endeavoured to merit the former, and to secure the accomplishment of the latter, by fresh services. The nation, sharing in the glory of its monarch, and pleased with the confidence which the emperor placed in the English, by creating the earl of Surrey his high-admiral, discovered no less inclination to commence hostilities than Henry himself.

In order to give Charles, before he left England, proof of this general ardour, Surrey sailed with such forces as were ready, and ravaged the coasts of Normandy. He then made a descent on Bretagne, where he plundered and burnt Morlaix, and some other places of less consequence. After these slight excursions attended with greater dishonour than damage to France, he repaired to Calais, and took the command of the principal army, consisting of sixteen thousand men, with which, having joined the Flemish troops under the Count de Buren, he advanced into Picardy. The army which Francis had assembled was far inferior in numbers to these united bodies; but during the long wars between the two nations the French had discovered the proper method of defending their country against the English. They had been taught by their misfortunes

to avoid a pitched battle with the utmost care, and to endeavour, by throwing garrisons into every place capable of resistance, by watching all the enemy's motions, by intercepting their convoys, attacking their advanced posts, and harassing them continually with their numerous cavalry, to ruin them with the length of war, or to beat them by piecemeal. This plan the duke of Vendôme, the French general in Picardy, pursued with no less prudence than success, and not only prevented Surrey from taking any town of importance, but obliged him to retire with his army, greatly reduced by fatigue, by want of provisions, and by the loss which it had sustained in several unsuccessful skirmishes.

Thus ended the second campaign, in a war the most general that had hitherto been kindled in Europe; and though Francis, by his mother's ill-timed resentment, by the disgusting insolence of his general, and the caprice of the mercenary troops which he employed, had lost his conquests in Italy, yet all the powers combined against him had not been able to make any impression on his hereditary dominions; and wherever they either intended or attempted an attack, he was well prepared to receive them.

While the Christian princes were thus wasting each other's strength, Solyman the Magnificent entered Hungary with a numerous army, and, investing Belgrade, which was deemed the chief barrier of that kingdom against the Turkish arms, soon forced it to surrender. Encouraged by this success, he turned his victorious arms against the island of Rhodes, the seat, at that time, of the knights of St. John of Jerusalem. This small state he attacked with such a numerous army as the lords of Asia have been accustomed, in every age, to bring into the field. Two hundred thousand men, and a fleet of four hundred sail, appeared against a

town defended by a garrison consisting of five thousand soldiers and six hundred knights, under the command of Villiers de L'Isle Adam, the grand master, whose wisdom and valour rendered him worthy of that station at such a dangerous juncture. No sooner did he begin to suspect the destination of Solyman's vast armament than he despatched messengers to all the Christian courts, imploring their aid against the common enemy. But though every prince in that age acknowledged Rhodes to be the great bulwark of Christendom in the East, and trusted to the gallantry of its knights as the best security against the progress of the Ottoman army,—though Adrian, with a zeal which became the head and father of the Church, exhorted the contending powers to forget their private quarrels, and, by uniting their arms, to prevent the infidels from destroying the society which did honour to the Christian name,—so violent and implacable was the animosity of both parties that, regardless of the danger to which they exposed all Europe, and unmoved by the entreaties of the grand master or the admonitions of the pope, they suffered Solyman to carry on his operations against Rhodes without disturbance. The grand master, after incredible efforts of courage, of patience, and of military conduct, during a siege of six months,—after sustaining many assaults, and disputing every post with amazing obstinacy,—was obliged at last to yield in numbers; and, having obtained an honourable capitulation from the sultan, who admired and respected his virtue, he surrendered the town, which was reduced to a heap of rubbish and destitute of every resource. Charles and Francis, ashamed of having occasioned such a loss to Christendom by their ambitious contest, endeavoured to throw the blame of it on each other.

^{**} Fontanus de Bello Rhodio, ap. p. 88.—P. Barre, Hist. d'Allemagne, Seard. Script. Rer. German., vol. ii. tom. viii. 57.

while all Europe, with greater justice, imputed it equally to both. The emperor, by way of reparation, granted the knights of St. John the small island of Malta, in which they fixed their residence, retaining, though with less power and splendour, their ancient spirit, and implacable enmity to the infidels.

BOOK III.

Insurrections.—Attempts of the Regent, Adrian, to suppress them.—federacy in Castile against him.—Measures taken by the Emperor.—Remonstrance of the Junta.—They take up Arms.—Their Negotiations with the Nobles.—The Junta under Padilla defeated in Battle.—Defence of Toledo by his Widow.—The War in Valencia and Majorca.—Generosity of the Emperor.—Reception of Adrian at Rome.—His pacific Policy.—A new League against France.—Treachery of the Duke of Bourbon.—Francis attacks Milan.—Death of Adrian, and Election of Clement VII.—Disappointment of Wolsey.—Progress of the War with France.—Pope Clement unwilling to bring about Peace.—The French abandon the Milanese.—Death of Bayard.—The Reformation in Germany.—Luther translates the Bible.—The Diet at Nuremberg proposes a General Council.—Diet presents a List of Grievances to the Pope.—Opinion at Rome concerning the Policy of Adrian.—Clement's Measures against Luther.

CHARLES, having had the satisfaction of seeing hostilities begun between France and England, took leave of Henry, and arrived in Spain on the 17th of July 1522. He found that country just beginning to recover order and strength after the miseries of a civil war in which it had been exposed during his absence; an account of the rise and progress of which, as it was little connected with the other events which happened in Europe, hath been reserved to this place.

No sooner was it known that the cortes assembled in Galicia had voted the Emperor a *free gift*, without obtaining the redress of any one grievance, than it excited universal indignation. The citizens of Toledo, who considered themselves, on account of the great privileges which they enjoyed, as guardians of the liberties of the Castilian commons, finding that no regard

paid to the remonstrances of their deputies against that unconstitutional grant, took arms with tumultuary violence, and, seizing the gates of the city, which were fortified, attacked the alcazar or castle, which they soon obliged the governor to surrender. Emboldened by this success, they deprived of all authority every person whom they suspected of any attachment to the court, established a popular form of government, composed of deputies from the several parishes in the city, and levied troops in their own defence. The chief leader of the people in these insurrections was Don John de Padilla, the eldest son of the commendator of Castile, a young nobleman of a generous temper, of undaunted courage, and possessed of the talents, as well as of the ambition, which, in times of civil discord, raise men to power and eminence.¹ [1520.]

The resentment of the citizens of Segovia produced effects still more fatal. Tordesillas, one of their representatives in the late cortes, had voted for the donative, and, being a bold and haughty man, ventured, upon his return, to call together his fellow-citizens in the great church, that he might give them, according to custom, an account of his conduct in the assembly. But the multitude, unable to bear his insolence in attempting to justify what they thought inexcusable, burst open the gates of the church with the utmost fury, and, seizing the unhappy Tordesillas, dragged him through the streets, with a thousand curses and insults, towards the place of public execution. In vain did the dean and canons come forth in procession with the holy sacrament in order to appease their rage. In vain did the monks of those monasteries by which they passed conjure them on their knees to spare his life, or at least to allow him time to confess, and to receive absolution of his sins. Without listening to the dictates either of humanity or

¹ Sandoval, p. 77.

religion, they cried out, “That the hangman alone can absolve such a traitor to his country;” they then hurried him along with greater violence; and, perceiving that he had expired under their hands, they hung him with his head downwards on the common gibbet.² The same spirit seized the inhabitants of Burgos, Zamora, and several other cities; and though their representatives, taking warning from the fate of Tordesillas, had been so wise as to save themselves by a timely flight, they were burnt in effigy, their houses razed to the ground, and their effects consumed with fire; and still it was the horror which the people had conceived against them, as betrayers of the public liberty, that not one of those licentious multitudes would touch anything, however valuable, which had belonged to them.³

Adrian, at that time regent of Spain, had scarcely fixed the seat of his government at Valladolid when he was alarmed with an account of these insurrections. He immediately assembled the privy council to deliberate concerning the proper method of suppressing them. The councillors differed in opinion, some insisting that it was necessary to check this audacious spirit in its infancy by a severe execution of justice, others advising to treat with lenity a people who had some reason to be incensed, and not to drive them beyond all the bounds of duty by an ill-timed rigour. The sentiments of the former, being warmly supported by the archbishop of Granada, president of the council, a person of great authority, choleric and impetuous, were approved by Adrian, whose zeal to support his master's authority hurried him into a measure to which, from his natural caution and timidity, he would otherwise have been averse. He commanded Ronquillo, one of the king's judges, to repair instantaneously to Segovia, which had set the first example of mutiny, and to proceed against the delinquents according to law.

² P. Martyr. Ep., 671.

³ Sandoval, 103.—P. Martyr. Ep., 671.

and, lest the people should be so outrageous as to resist his authority, a considerable body of troops was appointed to attend him. The Segovians, foreseeing what they might expect from a judge so well known for his austere and unforgiving temper, took arms with one consent, and, having mustered twelve thousand men, shut their gates against him. Ronquillo, enraged at this insult, denounced them rebels and outlaws, and, his troops seizing all the avenues to the town, hoped that it would soon be obliged to surrender for want of provisions. The inhabitants, however, defended themselves with vigour, and, having received a considerable reinforcement from Toledo, under the command of Padilla, attacked Ronquillo, and forced him to retire with the loss of his baggage and military chest.⁴ [1522.]

Upon this, Adrian ordered Antonio de Fonseca, whom the emperor had appointed commander-in-chief of the forces in Castile, to assemble an army and to besiege Segovia in form. But the inhabitants of Medina del Campo, where Cardinal Ximenes had established a vast magazine of military stores, would not suffer him to draw from it a train of battering cannon, or to destroy their countrymen with those arms which had been prepared against the enemies of the kingdom. Fonseca, who could not execute his orders without artillery, determined to seize the magazine by force; and, the citizens standing on their defence, he assaulted the town with great briskness; but his troops were so warmly received that, despairing of carrying the place, he set fire to some of the houses, in hopes that the citizens would abandon the walls in order to save their families and effects. Instead of that, the expedient to which he had recourse served only to increase their fury, and he was repulsed with great disgrace; while the flames, spreading from street to street, reduced to ashes almost

⁴ Sandoval, 112.—P. Martyr. Ep., 679.—Miniana, Contin., p. 15.

the whole town, one of the most considerable at that time in Spain, and the great mart for the manufacture of Segovia and several other cities. As the warehouses were then filled with goods for the approaching fair, the loss was immense, and was felt universally. This, added to the impression which such a cruel action made on a people long unaccustomed to the horrors of civil war, enraged the Castilians almost to madness. Fonseca became the object of general hatred, and was branded with the name of incendiary, and enemy to his country. Even the citizens of Valladolid, whom the presence of the cardinal had hitherto restrained, declared that they could no longer remain inactive spectators of the sufferings of their countrymen. Taking arms with no less fury than the other cities, they burnt Fonseca's house to the ground, elected new magistrates, raised soldiers, appointed officers to command them, and guarded their walls with as much diligence as if an enemy had been ready to attack them.

The cardinal, though virtuous and disinterested, and capable of governing the kingdom with honour in times of tranquillity, possessed neither the courage nor the sagacity necessary at such a dangerous juncture. Finding himself unable to check these outrages committed under his own eye, he attempted to appease the people by protesting that Fonseca had exceeded his orders and had by his rash conduct offended him as much as he had injured them. This condescension, the effect of irresolution and timidity, rendered the malcontents bolder and more insolent; and the cardinal having soon after recalled Fonseca, and dismissed his troops, which he could no longer afford to pay, as the treasury, drained by the rapaciousness of the Flemish ministers, had received no supply from the great cities, which were all in arms, the people were left at full liberty to act without control and scarcely any shadow of power remained in his hands.

Nor were the proceedings of the commons the effect merely of popular and tumultuary rage: they aimed at obtaining redress of their political grievances, and an establishment of public liberty on a secure basis, objects worthy of all the zeal which they discovered in contending for them. The feudal government in Spain was at that time in a state more favourable to liberty than in any other of the great European kingdoms. This was owing chiefly to the number of great cities in that country, a circumstance I have already taken notice of, and which contributes more than any other to mitigate the rigour of the feudal institutions and to introduce a more liberal and equal form of government. The inhabitants of every city formed a great corporation, with valuable immunities and privileges; they were delivered from a state of subjection and vassalage; they were admitted to a considerable share in the legislature; they had acquired the arts of industry, without which cities cannot subsist; they had accumulated wealth by engaging in commerce; and, being free and independent themselves, were ever ready to act as the guardians of the public freedom and independence. The genius of the internal government established among the inhabitants of cities, which, even in countries where despotic power prevails most, is democratical and republican, rendered the idea of liberty familiar and dear to them. Their representatives in the cortes were accustomed, with equal spirit, to check the encroachments of the king and the oppression of the nobles. They endeavoured to extend the privileges of their own order; they laboured to shake off the remaining encumbrances with which the spirit of feudal policy, favourable only to the nobles, had burdened them; and, conscious of being one of the most considerable orders in the state, were ambitious of becoming the most powerful.

The present juncture appeared favourable for pushing

any new claim. Their sovereign was absent from dominions; by the ill-conduct of his ministers he lost the esteem and affection of his subjects; the people exasperated by many injuries, had taken arms, tho' without concert, almost by general consent; they were animated with rage capable of carrying them to the most violent extremes; the royal treasury was exhausted, the kingdom destitute of troops, and the government committed to a stranger, of great virtue, indeed, but of abilities unequal to such a trust. The first care of Padilla and the other popular leaders, who observed and determined to improve these circumstances, was to establish some form of union or association among the malcontents, that they might act with greater regularity and pursue one common end; and as the different cities had been prompted to take arms by the same motives, were accustomed to consider themselves as a distinct body from the rest of the subjects, they did not find it difficult. A general convention was appointed to be held at Avila. Deputies appeared there in the names of almost all the cities entitled to have representatives in the cortes. They all bound themselves, by solemn oaths, to live and die in the service of the king and in defense of the privileges of their order, and, assuming the name of the "holy junta," or association, proceeded to deliberate concerning the state of the nation and the proper method of redressing its grievances. The first that naturally presented itself was the nomination of a foreigner to be regent: this they declared with one voice to be a violation of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and resolved to send a deputation of their members to Adrian, requiring him in their name to lay aside all the ensigns of his office, and to abstain for the future from the exercise of a jurisdiction which they had pronounced illegal.⁵

* P. Martyr. Ep., 691.

While they were preparing to execute this bold resolution, Padilla accomplished an enterprise of the greatest advantage to the cause. After relieving Segovia, he marched suddenly to Tordesillas, the place where the unhappy Queen Joanna had resided since the death of her husband, and, being favoured by the inhabitants, was admitted into the town, and became master of her person, for the security of which Adrian had neglected to take proper precautions.⁶ Padilla waited immediately upon the queen, and, accosting her with that profound respect which she exacted from the few persons whom she deigned to admit into her presence, acquainted her at large with the miserable condition of her Castilian subjects under the government of her son, who, being destitute of experience himself, permitted his foreign ministers to treat them with such rigour as had obliged them to take arms in defence of the liberties of their country. The queen, as if she had been awakened out of a lethargy, expressed great astonishment at what he said, and told him that, as she had never heard, until that moment, of the death of her father, or known the sufferings of her people, no blame could be imputed to her, but that now she would take care to provide a sufficient remedy. "And in the meantime," added she, "let it be your concern to do what is necessary for the public welfare." Padilla, too eager in forming a conclusion agreeable to his wishes, mistook this lucid interval of reason for a perfect return of that faculty, and, acquainting the junta with what had happened, advised them to remove to Tordesillas, and to hold their meetings in that place. This was instantly done; but though Joanna received very graciously an address of the junta beseeching her to take upon herself the government of the kingdom, and,

⁶ Vita dell' Imper. Carl. V. dell' Miniana, Contin., p. 17.
Alf. Ulloa, Ven., 1509, p. 67.—

in token of her compliance, admitted all the deputies to kiss her hand,—though she was present at a tournament held on that occasion, and seemed highly satisfied with both these ceremonies, which were conducted with great magnificence in order to please her,—she soon relapsed into her former melancholy and sullenness, and could never be brought, by any arguments or entreaties, to sign any one paper necessary for the despatch of business.

The junta, concealing as much as possible this lamentable circumstance, carried on all their deliberations in the name of Joanna; and as the Castilians, who idolized the memory of Isabella, retained a wonderful attachment to her daughter, no sooner was it known that she had consented to assume the reins of government than the people expressed the most universal and immoderate joy, and, believing her recovery to be complete, ascribed it to a miraculous interposition of Heaven in order to rescue their country from the oppression of foreigners. The junta, conscious of the reputation and power which they had acquired by seeming to act under the royal authority, were no longer satisfied with requiring Adriano to resign the office of regent: they detached Padilla from Valladolid with a considerable body of troops, ordering him to seize such members of the council as were still in that city, to conduct them to Tordesillas, and to bring away the seals of the kingdom, the public archives, and the treasury books. Padilla, who was received by the citizens as the deliverer of his country, executed this commission with great exactness; permitting Adriano, however, still to reside in Valladolid, though only as a private person and without any shadow of power.⁸

The emperor, to whom frequent accounts of these transactions were transmitted while he was still in Flanders, was sensible of his own imprudence and the

⁷ Sandoval, 164.—P. Martyr,
Ep., 685, 686.

⁸ Sandoval, 174.—P. Mart.
Ep., 791.

of his ministers in having despised too long the murmurs and remonstrances of the Castilians. He beheld with deep concern a kingdom the most valuable of any he possessed, and in which lay the strength and sinews of his power, just ready to disown his authority and on the point of being plunged in all the miseries of civil war. But, though his presence might have averted this calamity, he could not, at that time, visit Spain without endangering the imperial crown and allowing the French king full leisure to execute his ambitious schemes. The only point now to be deliberated upon was, whether he should attempt to gain the malcontents by indulgence and concessions, or prepare directly to suppress them by force; and he resolved to make trial of the former, while at the same time, if that should fail of success, he prepared for the latter. For this purpose he issued circular letters to all the cities of Castile, exhorting them in most gentle terms, and with assurances of full pardon, to lay down their arms; he promised such cities as had continued faithful not to exact from them the subsidy granted in the late cortes, and offered the same favour to such as returned to their duty; he engaged that no office should be conferred for the future upon any but native Castilians. On the other hand, he wrote to the nobles, exciting them to appear with vigour in defence of their own rights, and those of the crown, against the exorbitant claims of the commons; he appointed the high admiral, Don Fadrique Enriques, and the high constable of Castile, Don Iñigo de Valasco, two noblemen of great abilities as well as influence, regents of the kingdom in conjunction with Adrian; and he gave them full power and instructions, if the obstinacy of the malcontents should render it necessary, to vindicate the royal authority by force of arms.⁹

⁹ P. Heuter. Rer. Austr., lib. viii. c. 6, p. 188.

These concessions, which at the time of his leaving Spain would have fully satisfied the people, came now too late to produce any effect. The junta, relying on the unanimity with which the nation submitted to their authority, elated with the success which hitherto had accompanied all their undertakings, and seeing no military force collected to defeat or obstruct their designs, aimed at a more thorough reformation of political abuses. They had been employed for some time in preparing a remonstrance, containing a large enumeration, not only of the grievances of which they craved redress, but of such new regulations as they thought necessary for the security of their liberties. This remonstrance, which is divided into many articles, relating to all the different members of which the constitution was composed, as well as the various departments in the administration of government, furnishes us with more authentic evidence concerning the intentions of the junta than can be drawn from the testimony of the later Spanish historians, who lived in times when it became fashionable, and even necessary, to represent the conduct of the malcontents in the worst light and as flowing from the worst motives. After a long preamble concerning the various calamities under which the nation groaned, and the errors and corruption in government to which these were to be imputed, they take notice of the exemplary patience wherewith the people had endured them, until self-preservation, and the duty which they owed to their country, had obliged them to assemble, in order to provide in a legal manner for their own safety and that of the constitution. For this purpose they demanded that the king would be pleased to return to his Spanish dominions and reside there, as all their former monarchs had done; that he would not marry but with consent of the cortes; that if he should be obliged at any time to leave the kingdom, it shall not

be lawful to appoint any foreigner to be regent; that the present nomination of Cardinal Adrian to that office shall instantly be declared void; that he would not, at his return, bring along with him any Flemings or other strangers; that no foreign troops shall, on any pretence whatever, be introduced into the kingdom; that none but natives shall be capable of holding any office or benefice either in church or state; that no foreigner shall be naturalized; that free quarters shall not be granted to soldiers, nor to the members of the king's household, for any longer time than six days, and that only when the court is in a progress; that all the taxes shall be reduced to the same state they were in at the death of Queen Isabella; that all alienations of the royal demesnes or revenues since the queen's death shall be resumed; that all new offices created since that period shall be abolished; that the subsidy granted by the late cortes in Galicia shall not be exacted; that in all future cortes each city shall send one representative of the clergy, one of the gentry, and one of the commons, each to be elected by his own order; that the crown shall not influence or direct any city with regard to the choice of its representatives; that no member of the cortes shall receive an office or pension from the king, either for himself or for any of his family, under pain of death and confiscation of his goods; that each city or community shall pay a competent salary to its representative for his maintenance during his attendance on the cortes; that the cortes shall assemble once in three years at least, whether summoned by the king or not, and shall then inquire into the observation of the articles now agreed upon, and deliberate concerning public affairs; that the rewards which have been given or promised to any of the members of the cortes held in Galicia shall be revoked; that it shall be declared a capital crime to send gold, silver, or jewels

out of the kingdom; that judges shall have fixed salaries assigned them, and shall not receive any share the fines and forfeitures of persons condemned by them; that no grant of the goods of persons accused shall be valid if given before sentence was pronounced against them; that all privileges which the nobles have at any time obtained, to the prejudice of the commonalty, shall be revoked; that the government of cities and towns shall not be put into the hands of noblemen; that the possessions of the nobility shall be subject to all public taxes, in the same manner as those of the commons; that an inquiry be made into the conduct of such as have been intrusted with the management of the royal patrimony since the accession of Ferdinand, and if the king do not within thirty days appoint persons properly qualified for that service, it shall be lawful for the cortes to nominate them; that indulgences shall not be preached or dispersed in the kingdom until the cause of publishing them be examined and approved by the cortes; that all the money arising from the sale of indulgences shall be faithfully employed in carrying on war against the infidels; that such prelates as do not reside in their dioceses six months in the year shall forfeit their revenues during the time they are absent; that the ecclesiastical judges and their officers shall not exact greater fees than those which are paid in the secular courts; that the present archbishop of Toledo, being a foreigner, be compelled to resign that dignity which shall be conferred upon a Castilian; that the king shall ratify and hold, as good service done to him and the kingdom, all the proceedings of the junta, and pardon any irregularities which the cities may have committed from an excess of zeal in a good cause; that he shall promise and swear in the most solemn manner to observe all these articles, and on no occasion attempt either to elude or to repeal them; and that

he shall never solicit the pope or any other prelate to grant him a dispensation or absolution from this oath and promise.¹⁰

Such were the chief articles presented by the junta to their sovereign. As the feudal institutions in the several kingdoms of Europe were originally the same, the genius of those governments which arose from them bore a strong resemblance to each other, and the regulations which the Castilians attempted to establish on this occasion differ little from those which other nations have laboured to procure in their struggles with their monarchs for liberty. The grievances complained of and the remedies proposed by the English commons in their contests with the princes of the house of Stuart particularly resemble those upon which the junta now insisted. But the principles of liberty seem to have been better understood at this period by the Castilians than by any other people in Europe; they had acquired more liberal ideas with respect to their own rights and privileges; they had formed more bold and generous sentiments concerning government, and discovered an extent of political knowledge to which the English themselves did not attain until more than a century afterwards.

It is not improbable, however, that the spirit of reformation among the Castilians, hitherto unrestrained by authority and emboldened by success, became too impetuous, and prompted the junta to propose innovations which, by alarming the other members of the constitution, proved fatal to their cause. The nobles, who, instead of obstructing, had favoured or connived at their proceedings, while they confined their demands of redress to such grievances as had been occasioned by the king's want of experience and by the imprudence and rapaciousness of his foreign ministers, were

¹⁰ Sandoval, 208.—P. Martyr. Ep., 686.

filled with indignation when the junta began to touch the privileges of their order, and plainly saw that the measures of the commons tended no less to break the power of the aristocracy than to limit the prerogative of the crown. The resentment which they had conceived on account of Adrian's promotion to the regency abated considerably upon the emperor's raising the constable and admiral to joint power with him in that office; and, as their pride and dignity were less hurt by suffering the prince to possess an extensive prerogative than by admitting the high pretensions of the people, they determined to give their sovereign the assistance which he had demanded of them, and began to assemble their vassals for that purpose.

The junta, meanwhile, expected with impatience the emperor's answer to their remonstrance, which they had appointed some of their number to present. The members intrusted with this commission set out immediately for Germany; but, having received at different places certain intelligence from court that they could not venture to appear there without endangering their lives, they stopped short in their journey, and acquainted the junta of the information which had been given them.¹¹ This excited such violent passions as transported the whole party beyond all bounds of prudence or of moderation. That a king of Castile should deny his subjects access into his presence, or refuse to listen to their humble petitions, was represented as an act of tyranny so unprecedented and intolerable that nothing now remained but with arms in their hands to drive away that ravenous band of foreigners which encompassed the throne, who, after having devoured the wealth of the kingdom, found it necessary to prevent the cries of an injured people from reaching the ear of their sovereign. Many insisted warmly on approv-

¹¹ Sandoval, 143.

ing a motion which had formerly been made, for depriving Charles, during the life of his mother, of the regal titles and authority which had been too rashly conferred upon him, from a false supposition of her total inability for government. Some proposed to provide a proper person to assist her in the administration of public affairs, by marrying the queen to the prince of Calabria, the heir of the Aragonese kings of Naples, who had been detained in prison since the time that Ferdinand had dispossessed his ancestors of their crown. All agreed that, as the hopes of obtaining redress and security merely by presenting their requests to their sovereign had kept them too long in a state of inaction and prevented them from taking advantage of the unanimity with which the nation declared in their favour, it was now necessary to collect their whole force, and to exert themselves with vigour, in opposing this fatal combination of the king and the nobility against their liberties.¹²

They soon took the field with twenty thousand men. Violent disputes arose concerning the command of this army. Padilla, the darling of the people and soldiers, was the only person whom they thought worthy of this honour. But Don Pedro de Giron, the eldest son of the Conde de Uruena, a young nobleman of the first order, having lately joined the commons out of private resentment against the emperor, the respect due to his birth, together with a secret desire of disappointing Padilla, of whose popularity many members of the junta had become jealous, procured him the office of general; though he soon gave them a fatal proof that he possessed neither the experience, the abilities, nor the steadiness which that important station required.

The regents, meanwhile, appointed Rioseco as the place of rendezvous for their troops, which, though far

¹² P. Martyr. Ep., 688.

inferior to those of the commons in number, exceeded them greatly in discipline and in valour. They had drawn a considerable body of regular and veteran infantry out of Navarre. Their cavalry, which formed the chief strength of their army, consisted mostly of gentlemen accustomed to the military life and accustomed with the martial spirit peculiar to their order at that age. The infantry of the junta was formed entirely of citizens and mechanics, little acquainted with the use of arms. The small body of cavalry which they had been able to raise was composed of persons of ignoble birth, and perfect strangers to the service in which they entered. The character of the general differed no less than that of their troops. The royalists were commanded by the Conde de Haro, the constable's eldest son, an officer of great experience and of distinguished abilities.

Giron marched with his army directly to Rioseco, and, seizing the villages and passes around it, hoped that the royalists would be obliged either to surrender for want of provisions, or to fight with disadvantage before all their troops were assembled. But he had neither the abilities, nor his troops the patience and discipline necessary for the execution of such a scheme. The Conde de Haro found little difficulty in conducting a considerable reinforcement through all his posts into the town; and Giron, despairing of being able to reduce it, advanced suddenly to Villapanda, a place belonging to the constable, in which the enemy had the chief magazine of provisions. By this ill-judged motion he left Tordesillas open to the royalists, whom the Conde de Haro led thither in the night with the utmost secrecy and despatch; and attacking the town, in which Giron had left no other garrison than a regiment of priests raised by the bishop of Zamora, he, by breaking of day, forced his way into it, after a desperate re-

ance, became master of the queen's person, took prisoners many members of the junta, and recovered the great seal, with the other ensigns of government.

By this fatal blow the junta lost all the reputation and authority which they had derived from seeming to act by the queen's commands; such of the nobles as had hitherto been wavering or undetermined in their choice now joined the regents, with all their forces; and an universal consternation seized the partizans of the commons. This was much increased by the suspicions they began to entertain of Giron, whom they loudly accused of having betrayed Tordesillas to the enemy; and, though that charge seems to have been destitute of foundation, the success of the royalists being owing to Giron's ill-conduct rather than to his treachery, he so entirely lost credit with his party that he resigned his commission and retired to one of his castles.¹³

Such members of the junta as had escaped the enemy's hands at Tordesillas fled to Valladolid; and, as it would have required long time to supply the places of those who were prisoners by a new election, they made choice among themselves of a small number of persons, to whom they committed the supreme direction of affairs. Their army, which grew stronger every day by the arrival of troops from different parts of the kingdom, marched likewise to Valladolid; and, Padilla being appointed commander-in-chief, the spirits of the soldiery revived, and the whole party, forgetting the late misfortune, continued to express the same ardent zeal for the liberties of their country, and the same implacable animosity against their oppressors.

What they stood most in need of was money to pay their troops. A great part of the current coin had been carried out of the kingdom by the Flemings; the

¹³ *Miscellaneous Tracts*, by Dr. Mich. Geddes, vol. i. p. 278.

stated taxes levied in times of peace were inconsiderable; commerce of every kind being interrupted by the war, the sum which it yielded decreased daily; and the junta were afraid of disgusting the people by burdening them with new impositions, to which, in that age, they were little accustomed. But from this difficulty they were extricated by Donna Maria Pacheco, Padilla's wife, a woman of noble birth, of great abilities, boundless ambition, and animated with the most ardent zeal in support of the cause of the junta. She, with boldness superior to those superstitious fears which often influence her sex, proposed to seize all the rich and magnificent ornaments in the cathedral of Toledo; but lest that action, by its appearance of impiety, might offend the people, she and her retinue marched to the church in solemn procession, in mourning habits, with tears in their eyes, beating their breasts, and, falling on their knees, implored the pardon of the saints whose shrines she was about to violate. By this artifice, which screened her from the imputation of sacrilege, and persuaded the people that necessity and zeal for a good cause had constrained her, though with reluctance, to venture upon this action, she stripped the cathedral of whatever was valuable, and procured a considerable sum of money for the junta.¹⁴ The regents, no less at a loss how to maintain their troops, the revenues of the crown having either been dissipated by the Flemings or seized by the commons, were obliged to take the queen's jewels, together with the plate belonging to the nobility, and apply them to that purpose; and when those failed, they obtained a small sum by way of loan from the king of Portugal.¹⁵

The nobility discovered great unwillingness to proceed to extremities with the junta. They were al-

¹⁴ Sandoval, 308. — Dict. de Bayle, art. Padilla.

¹⁵ P. Martyr. Ep., 718.

mated with no less hatred than the commons against the Flemings; they approved much of several articles in the remonstrance; they thought the juncture favourable not only for redressing past grievances, but for rendering the constitution more perfect and secure by new regulations; they were afraid that, while the two orders of which the legislature was composed wasted each other's strength by mutual hostilities, the crown would rise to power on the ruin or weakness of both, and encroach no less on the independence of the nobles than on the privileges of the commons. To this disposition were owing the frequent overtures of peace which the regents made to the junta, and the continual negotiations they carried on during the progress of their military operations. Nor were the terms which they offered unreasonable; for, on condition that the junta would pass from a few articles most subversive of the royal authority or inconsistent with the rights of the nobility, they engaged to procure the emperor's consent to their other demands, which if he, through the influence of evil counsellors, should refuse, several of the nobles promised to join with the commons in their endeavours to extort it.¹⁶ Such divisions, however, prevailed among the members of the junta as prevented their deliberating calmly or judging with prudence. Some of the cities which had entered into the confederacy were filled with that mean jealousy and distrust of each other which rivalry in commerce or in grandeur is apt to inspire; the constable, by his influence and promises, had prevailed on the inhabitants of Burgos to abandon the junta, and other noblemen had shaken the fidelity of some of the lesser cities; no person had arisen among the commons of such superior abilities or elevation of mind as to acquire the direction of their affairs; Padilla, their general, was a

¹⁶ P. Martyr. Ep., 695, 713.—Geddes's Tracts, i. 261.

man of popular qualities, but distrusted for that reason by those of highest rank who adhered to the junta; the conduct of Giron led the people to view with suspicion every person of noble birth who joined their party; and that the strongest marks of irresolution, mutual distrust, and mediocrity of genius appeared in all the proceedings at this time. After many consultations held concerning the terms proposed by the regent, they suffered themselves to be so carried away by resentment against the nobility that, rejecting all thoughts of accommodation, they threatened to deprive them of the crown lands, which they or their ancestors had usurped, and to re-annex these to the royal domain. Upon this preposterous scheme, which would at once have annihilated all the liberties for which the people had been struggling, by rendering the kings of Castile absolute and independent of their subjects, they were intent that they now exclaimed with less vehemence against the exactions of the foreign ministers than against the exorbitant power and wealth of the nobility; and seemed to hope that they might make peace with Charles by offering to enrich him with their spoils.

The success which Padilla had met with in several small encounters, and in reducing some inconsiderable towns, helped to precipitate the members of the junta into this measure, filling them with such confidence in the valour of their troops that they hoped for an easy victory over the royalists. Padilla, that his army might not remain inactive while flushed with good fortune, resolved to besiege Torrelobaton, a place of greater strength and importance than any that he had hitherto ventured to attack, and which was defended by a sufficient garrison; and though the besieged made a desperate resistance, and the admiral attempted to relieve them, he took the town by storm, and gave it up to be plundered by his soldiers. If he had marched instantly with his

torious army to Tordesillas, the head-quarters of the royalists, he could hardly have failed of making an effectual impression on their troops, whom he would have found in astonishment at the briskness of his operations and far from being of sufficient strength to give him battle. But the fickleness and imprudence of the junta prevented his taking this step. Incapable, like all popular associations, either of carrying on war or of making peace, they listened again to overtures of accommodation, and even agreed to a short suspension of arms. This negotiation terminated in nothing ; but, while it was carrying on, many of Padilla's soldiers, unacquainted with the restraints of discipline, went off with the booty which they had got at Torrelobaton, and others, wearied out by the unusual length of the campaign, deserted.¹⁷ The constable, too, had leisure to assemble his forces at Burgos, and to prepare everything for taking the field ; and as soon as the truce expired he effected a junction with the Conde de Haro, in spite of all Padilla's efforts to prevent it. They advanced immediately towards Torrelobaton ; and Padilla, finding the number of his troops so diminished that he durst not risk a battle, attempted to retreat to Toro, which if he could have accomplished, the invasion of Navarre at that juncture by the French, and the necessity which the regents must have been under of detaching men to that kingdom, might have saved him from danger. But Haro, sensible how fatal the consequences would be of suffering him to escape, marched with such rapidity at the head of his cavalry that he came up with him near Villalar, and, without waiting for his infantry, advanced to the attack. Padilla's army, fatigued and disheartened by their precipitate retreat, which they could not distinguish from a flight, happened at that time to be passing over a ploughed field,

¹⁷ Sandoval, 336.

on which such a violent rain had fallen that the soldiers sunk almost to the knees at every step, and remained exposed to the fire of some field-pieces which royalists had brought along with them. All these circumstances so disconcerted and intimidated raw soldiers that, without facing the enemy or making any resistance, they fled in the utmost confusion. Padilla exerted himself with extraordinary courage and activity in order to rally them, though in vain; fear rendering them deaf both to his threats and entreaties. Upon which, finding matters irretrievable, and resolving not to survive the disgrace of that day and the ruin of his party, he rushed into the thickest of the enemy; but, being wounded and dismounted, he was taken prisoner. His principal officers shared the same fate; the common soldiers were not allowed to depart unhurt, the nobles being too generous to kill men who threw down their arms.¹⁸

The resentment of his enemies did not suffer Padilla to linger long in expectation of what should befall him. Next day he was condemned to lose his head, though without any regular trial, the notoriety of the crime being supposed sufficient to supersede the formality of a legal process. He was led instantly to execution together with Don John Bravo and Don Francis McDonada, the former commander of the Segovians, and the latter of the troops of Salamanca. Padilla viewed the approach of death with calm but undaunted fortitude; and when Bravo, his fellow-sufferer, expressed some indignation at hearing himself proclaimed a traitor, he checked him by observing, "That yesterday was the time to have displayed the spirit of gentlemen; this day to die with the meekness of Christians." Being permitted to write to his wife and to the community

¹⁸ Sandoval, 345, etc.—P. Martyr. Ep., 720.—Miniana, Contin., p. 26.—Epitome de la Vida y Hechos del

Emperador Carlos V., por D. J. Anton. de Vera y Zuñiga, Madrid, 1627, p. 19.

filled with indignation when the junta began to touch the privileges of their order, and plainly saw that the measures of the commons tended no less to break the power of the aristocracy than to limit the prerogatives of the crown. The resentment which they had conceived on account of Adrian's promotion to the regency abated considerably upon the emperor's raising the constable and admiral to joint power with him in that office; and, as their pride and dignity were less hurt by suffering the prince to possess an extensive prerogative than by admitting the high pretensions of the people, they determined to give their sovereign the assistance which he had demanded of them, and began to assemble their vassals for that purpose.

The junta, meanwhile, expected with impatience the emperor's answer to their remonstrance, which they had appointed some of their number to present. The members intrusted with this commission set out immediately for Germany; but, having received at different places certain intelligence from court that they could not venture to appear there without endangering their lives, they stopped short in their journey, and acquainted the junta of the information which had been given them.¹¹ This excited such violent passions as transported the whole party beyond all bounds of prudence or of moderation. That a king of Castile should deny his subjects access into his presence, or refuse to listen to their humble petitions, was represented as an act of tyranny so unprecedented and intolerable that nothing now remained but with arms in their hands to drive away that ravenous band of foreigners which encompassed the throne, who, after having devoured the wealth of the kingdom, found it necessary to prevent the cries of an injured people from reaching the ears of their sovereign. Many insisted warmly on appro-

¹¹ Sandoval, 143.

ing a motion which had formerly been made, for depriving Charles, during the life of his mother, of the regal titles and authority which had been too rashly conferred upon him, from a false supposition of her total inability for government. Some proposed to provide a proper person to assist her in the administration of public affairs, by marrying the queen to the prince of Calabria, the heir of the Aragonese kings of Naples, who had been detained in prison since the time that Ferdinand had dispossessed his ancestors of their crown. All agreed that, as the hopes of obtaining redress and security merely by presenting their requests to their sovereign had kept them too long in a state of inaction and prevented them from taking advantage of the unanimity with which the nation declared in their favour, it was now necessary to collect their whole force, and to exert themselves with vigour, in opposing this fatal combination of the king and the nobility against their liberties.¹²

They soon took the field with twenty thousand men. Violent disputes arose concerning the command of this army. Padilla, the darling of the people and soldiers, was the only person whom they thought worthy of this honour. But Don Pedro de Giron, the eldest son of the Conde de Uruena, a young nobleman of the first order, having lately joined the commons out of private resentment against the emperor, the respect due to his birth, together with a secret desire of disappointing Padilla, of whose popularity many members of the junta had become jealous, procured him the office of general; though he soon gave them a fatal proof that he possessed neither the experience, the abilities, nor the steadiness which that important station required.

The regents, meanwhile, appointed Rioseco as the place of rendezvous for their troops, which, though far

¹² P. Martyr. Ep., 688.

After this, he submitted quietly to his fate. Most of the Spanish historians, accustomed to ideas of government and of regal power very different from those which he acted, have been so eager to testify their approbation of the cause in which he was engaged that they have neglected or have been afraid to do justice to his virtues, and, by blackening his memory, have endeavoured to deprive him of that pity which is seldom denied to illustrious sufferers.

The victory at Villalar proved as decisive as it was complete. Valladolid, the most zealous of all the associated cities, opened its gates immediately to the conquerors, and, being treated with great clemency by the regents, Medina del Campo, Segovia, and many other towns followed its example. This sudden dissolution of a confederacy, formed not upon slight disgusts or untrifling motives, into which the whole body of the people had entered, and which had been allowed time to acquire a considerable degree of order and consistence by establishing a regular plan of government, is the strongest proof either of the inability of its leaders or of the secret discord reigning among its members. Those who part of that army by which they had been subdued were obliged, a few days after the battle, to march toward Navarre, in order to check the progress of the French into that kingdom, nothing could prevail on the dejected commons of Castile to take arms again, and to embolden such a favourable opportunity of acquiring those rights and privileges for which they had appeared so zealous. The city of Toledo alone, animated by Donna María Pacheco, Padilla's widow, who, instead of bewailing her husband with a womanish sorrow, prepared to

I say nothing, for it is not mine.
I can write nothing more, for at
this very moment I feel the knife
at my throat, with greater dread of

thy displeasure than apprehension of my own pain."—Sandoval, vol. i. p. 478.

venge his death and to prosecute that cause in defence of which he had suffered, must be excepted. Respect for her sex, or admiration for her courage and abilities, as well as sympathy with her misfortunes and veneration for the memory of her husband, secured her the same ascendant over the people which he had possessed. The prudence and vigour with which she acted justified that confidence they placed in her. She wrote to the French general in Navarre, encouraging him to invade Castile by the offer of powerful assistance. She endeavoured, by her letters and emissaries, to revive the spirit and hopes of the other cities. She raised soldiers, and exacted a great sum from the clergy belonging to the cathedral, in order to defray the expense of keeping them on foot.²⁰ She employed every artifice that could interest or inflame the populace. For this purpose she ordered crucifixes to be used by her troops instead of colours, as if they had been at war with the infidels and enemies of religion; she marched through the streets of Toledo with her son, a young child, clad in deep mourning, seated on a mule, having a standard carried before him representing the manuer of his father's execution.²¹ By all these means she kept the minds of the people in such perpetual agitation as prevented their passions from subsiding, and rendered them insensible of the dangers to which they were exposed by standing alone in opposition to the royal authority. While the army was employed in Navarre, the regents were unable to attempt the reduction of Toledo by force; and all their endeavours, either to diminish Donna Maria's credit with the people, or to gain her by large promises and the solicitations of her brother, the Marquis de Mondejar, proved ineffectual. Upon the expulsion of the French out of Navarre, part of the army returned into Castile and invested Toledo. Even this made no impression

²⁰ P. Martyr. Ep., 727.

²¹ Sandoval, 375.

on the intrepid and obstinate courage of Donna Maria. She defended the town with vigour, her troops, in several sallies, beat the royalists, and no progress was made towards reducing the place until the clergy, whom she had highly offended by invading their property, ceased to support her. As soon as they received information of the death of William de Croy, archbishop of Toledo, whose possession of that see was their chief grievance, and that the emperor had named a Castilian to succeed him, they openly turned against her, and persuaded the people that she had acquired such influence over them by the force of enchantments; that she was assisted by a familiar demon, which attended her in the form of a negro maid; and that by its suggestions she regulated every part of her conduct.²² The credulous multitude, whom their impatience of a long blockade and despair of obtaining succours, either from the cities formerly in confederacy with them or from the French, rendered desirous of peace, took arms against her, and driving her out of the city, surrendered it to the royalists. She retired to the citadel, which she defended with amazing fortitude four months longer; and when reduced to the last extremities, she made her escape in disguise, and fled to Portugal, where she had many relations.²³

Upon her flight, the citadel surrendered. Tranquillity was re-established in Castile; and this bold attempt of the commons, like all unsuccessful insurrections, contributed to confirm and extend the power of the crown, which it was intended to moderate and abridge. The cortes still continued to make a part of the Castilian constitution, and was summoned to meet whenever the king stood in need of money; but instead of adhering to their ancient and cautious form, of examining and re-

²² P. Martyr. Ep., 727.

²³ Sandoval, 375.—P. Martyr. Ep., 754.—Ferreras, viii. 563.

dressing public grievances before they proceeded to grant any supply, the more courtly custom of voting a donative in the first place was introduced, and the sovereign, having obtained all that he wanted, never allowed them to enter into any inquiry or to attempt any reformation injurious to his authority. The privileges which the cities had enjoyed were gradually circumscribed or abolished; their commerce began from this period to decline; and, becoming less wealthy and less populous, they lost that power and influence which they had acquired in the cortes.

While Castile was exposed to the calamities of civil war, the kingdom of Valencia was torn by intestine commotions still more violent. The association which had been formed in the city of Valencia in the year 1520, and which was distinguished by the name of the Germanada, continued to subsist after the emperor's departure from Spain. The members of it, upon pretext of defending the coasts against the descents of the corsairs of Barbary, and under sanction of that permission which Charles had rashly granted them, refused to lay down their arms. But as the grievances which the Valencians aimed at redressing proceeded from the arrogance and exactions of the nobility, rather than from any unwarrantable exercise of the royal prerogative, their resentment turned chiefly against the former. As soon as they were allowed the use of arms, and became conscious of their own strength, they grew impatient to take vengeance on their oppressors. They drove the nobles out of most of the cities, plundered their houses, wasted their lands, and assaulted their castles. They then proceeded to elect thirteen persons, one from each company of tradesmen established at Valencia, and committed the administration of government to them, under pretext that they would reform the laws, establish one uniform mode of dispensing justice, without partiality

or regard to the distinction of ranks, and thus restored men to some degree of their original equality.

The nobles were obliged to take arms in self-defence. Hostilities began, and were carried on with all the rage and cour with which resentment at oppression inspired the one party and the idea of insulted dignity animated the other. As no person of honourable birth or of liberal education joined the Germanada, the councils as well as troops of the confederacy were conducted by low mechanics, who acquired the confidence of an enraged multitude chiefly by the fierceness of their zeal and the extravagance of their proceedings. Among such men the laws introduced in civilized nations in order to restrain or moderate the violence of war were unknown or despised; and they ran into the wildest excesses of cruelty and outrage.

The emperor, occupied with suppressing the insurrection in Castile, which more immediately threatened the subversion of his power and prerogative, was unable to give much attention to the tumults in Valencia, and left the nobility of that kingdom to fight their own battles. His viceroy, the Conde de Melito, had the supreme command of the forces which the nobles raised among the vassals. The Germanada carried on the war during the years 1520 and 1521 with a more persevering courage than could have been expected from a body so tumultuary, under the conduct of such leaders. They defeated the nobility in several actions, which, though not considerable, were extremely sharp. They repulsed them in their attempts to reduce different towns. But the nobles, by their superior skill in war, and at the head of troops more accustomed to service, gained the advantage in most of the encounters. At length they were joined by a body of Castilian cavalry, which the regents despatched towards Valencia soon after their victory over Padilla at Villalar, and by their assistance

the Valencian nobles acquired such superiority that they entirely broke and ruined the Germanada. The leaders of the party were put to death, almost without any formality of legal trial, and suffered such cruel punishments as the sense of recent injuries prompted their adversaries to inflict. The government of Valencia was re-established in its ancient form.²⁴

In Aragon, violent symptoms of the same spirit of disaffection and sedition which reigned in the other kingdoms of Spain began to appear; but by the prudent conduct of the viceroy, Don John de Lanusa, they were so far composed as to prevent their breaking out into any open insurrection. But in the island of Majorca, annexed to the crown of Aragon, the same causes which had excited the commotions in Valencia produced effects no less violent. The people, impatient of the hardships which they had endured under the rigid jurisdiction of the nobility, took arms in a tumultuary manner, deposed their viceroy, drove him out of the island, and massacred every gentleman who was so unfortunate as to fall into their hands. The obstinacy with which the people of Majorca persisted in their rebellion was equal to the rage with which they began it. Many and vigorous efforts were requisite in order to reduce them to obedience; and tranquillity was re-established in every part of Spain before the Majorcans could be brought to submit to their sovereign.²⁵

While the spirit of disaffection was so general among the Spaniards, and so many causes concurred in precipitating them into such violent measures in order to obtain the redress of their grievances, it may appear strange

²⁴ Argensola, *Anales de Aragon*, cap. 75, 90, 99, 118. — Sayas, *Anales de Aragon*, cap. 5, 12, etc. — P. Martyr. Ep., lib. xxxiii. et xxxiv., *paasim*. — Ferreras, *Hist. d'Espagne*, viii. 542, 564, etc.

²⁵ Argensola, *Anales de Aragon*, c. 113. — Ferreras, *Hist.*, viii. 542. — Sayas, *Anales de Aragon*, cap. 7, 11, 14, 76, 81. — Ferreras, *Hist. d'Espagne*, viii. 579, etc., 609.

that the malcontents in the different kingdoms should have carried on their operations without any mutual concert, or even any intercourse with each other. By uniting their councils and arms, they might have acted both with greater force and with more effect. The appearance of a national confederacy would have rendered it no less respectable among the people than formidable to the crown ; and the emperor, unable to resist such a combination, must have complied with any terms which the members of it should have thought fit to prescribe. Many things, however, prevented the Spaniards from forming themselves into one body and pursuing common measures. The people of the different kingdoms in Spain, though they were become the subjects of the same sovereign, retained in full force their national antipathy to each other. The remembrance of their ancient rivalship and hostilities was still lively, and the sense of reciprocal injuries so strong as to prevent them from acting with confidence and concert. Each nation chose rather to depend on its own efforts, and to maintain the struggle alone, than to implore the aid of neighbours whom they distrusted and hated. At the same time, the forms of government in the several kingdoms of Spain were so different, and the grievances of which they complained, as well as the alterations and amendments in policy which they attempted to introduce, so various, that it was not easy to bring them to unite in any common plan. To this disunion Charles was indebted for the preservation of the Spanish crowns and while each of the kingdoms followed separate measures, they were all obliged at last to conform to the will of their sovereign.

The arrival of the emperor in Spain filled his subjects who had been in arms against him with deep apprehensions, from which he soon delivered them by an act of clemency no less prudent than generous. After a rebel-

lion so general, scarcely twenty persons, among so many criminals obnoxious to the law, had been punished capitally in Castile. Though strongly solicited by his council, Charles refused to shed any more blood by the hands of the executioner, and published a general pardon, extending to all crimes committed since the commencement of the insurrections, from which only fourscore persons were excepted. Even these he seems to have named rather with an intention to intimidate others than from any inclination to seize them; for when an officious courtier offered to inform him where one of the most considerable among them was concealed, he avoided it by a good-natured pleasantry. “Go,” says he, “I have now no reason to be afraid of that man, but he has some cause to keep at a distance from me; and you would be better employed in telling him that I am here, than in acquainting me with the place of his retreat.”²⁶ By this appearance of magnanimity, as well as by his care to avoid everything which had disgusted the Castilians during his former residence among them,—by his address in assuming their manners, in speaking their language, and in complying with all their humours and customs,—he acquired an ascendant over them which hardly any of their native monarchs had ever attained, and brought them to support him in all his enterprises with a zeal and valour to which he owed much of his success and grandeur.²⁷

About the time that Charles landed in Spain, Adrian set out for Italy to take possession of his new dignity. But though the Roman people longed extremely for his arrival, they could not on his first appearance conceal their surprise and disappointment. After being accustomed to the princely magnificence of Julius and the elegant splendour of Leo, they beheld with contempt

²⁶ Sandoval, 377, etc.—*Vida del Emperador Carlos*, por Don Juan Antonio de Vera y Zuñiga, p. 30.

²⁷ Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, p. 85.

an old man of an humble deportment, of austere manners, an enemy to pomp, destitute of taste in the and unadorned with any of the external accom- ments which the vulgar expect in those raised to emi- stations.²⁸ Nor did his political views and maxims less strange and astonishing to the pontifical minis- He acknowledged and bewailed the corruptions w abounded in the Church, as well as in the cour- Rome, and prepared to reform both; he discov- no intention of aggrandizing his family; he e scrupled at retaining such territories as some of predecessors had acquired by violence or fraud ra than by any legal title, and for that reason he inve Francesco Maria de Rovere anew in the duchy of Urb of which Leo had stripped him, and surrendered to duke of Ferrara several places wrested from him by Church.²⁹ To men little habituated to see princes re late their conduct by the maxims of morality and principles of justice, these actions of the new p appeared incontestible proofs of his weakness or in perience. Adrian, who was a perfect stranger to complex and intricate system of Italian politics, and could place no confidence in persons whose subtle re ments in business suited so ill with the natural simpli and candour of his own character, being often em rassed and irresolute in his deliberations, the opinio his incapacity daily increased, until both his person government became objects of ridicule among subjects.³⁰

Adrian, though devoted to the emperor, endeavou to assume the impartiality which became the com father of Christendom, and laboured to reconcile

²⁸ Guic., lib. xv. 238.—Jovii Vita Adriani, 117. — Bellefor. Epietr. des Princ., 8.

²⁹ Guic., lib. xv. 240.

³⁰ Jovii Vita Adriani, 118. Martyr. Ep., 774.—Ruscelli, L de' Princ., vol. i 87, 96, 101

contending princes, in order that they might unite in a league against Soliman, whose conquest of Rhodes rendered him more formidable than ever to Europe.³¹ But this was an undertaking far beyond his abilities. To examine such a variety of pretensions, to adjust such a number of interfering interests, to extinguish the passions which ambition, emulation, and mutual injuries had kindled, to bring so many hostile powers to pursue the same scheme with unanimity and vigour, required not only uprightness of intention, but great superiority both of understanding and address.

The Italian states were no less desirous of peace than the pope. The imperial army under Colonna was still kept on foot; but as the emperor's revenues in Spain, in Naples, and in the Low Countries were either exhausted or applied to some other purpose, it depended entirely for pay and subsistence on the Italians. A great part of it was quartered in the ecclesiastical state, and monthly contributions were levied upon the Florentines, the Milanese, the Genoese, and Lucchese, by the viceroy of Naples; and, though all exclaimed against such oppression, and were impatient to be delivered from it, the dread of worse consequences from the rage of the army or the resentment of the emperor obliged them to submit.³²

So much regard, however, was paid to the pope's exhortations, and to a bull which he issued, requiring all Christian princes to consent to a truce for three years, that the imperial, the French, and English ambassadors at Rome were empowered by their respective courts to treat of that matter; but, while they wasted their time in fruitless negotiations, their masters continued their preparations for war. The Venetians, who had hitherto adhered with great firmness to their alliance with Francis, being now convinced that his affairs in Italy

³¹ Bellefor. Epistr., p. 86.

³² Guic., lib. xv. 238.

were in a desperate situation, entered into a league against him with the emperor; to which Adrian, at the instigation of his countryman and friend, Charles de Lannoy, viceroy of Naples, who persuaded him that the only obstacles to peace arose from the ambition of the French king, soon after acceded. The other Italian states followed their example; and Francis was left without a single ally to resist the efforts of so many enemies, whose armies threatened and whose territories encompassed his dominions on every side.³³

The dread of this powerful confederacy, it was thought, would have obliged Francis to keep wholly on the defensive, or at least have prevented his entertaining any thoughts of marching into Italy. But it was the character of that prince, too apt to become remiss and even negligent on ordinary occasions, to rouse at the approach of danger, and not only to encounter it with spirit and intrepidity, qualities which never forsook him, but to provide against it with diligence and industry. Before his enemies were ready to execute any of their schemes, Francis had assembled a numerous army. His authority over his own subjects was far greater than that which Charles or Henry possessed over theirs. They depended on their diets, their cortes, and their parliaments for money, which was usually granted them in small sums, very slowly, and with much reluctance. The taxes he could impose were more considerable, and levied with greater despatch; so that on this as well as on other occasions he brought his armies into the field while they were only devising ways and means for raising theirs. Sensible of this advantage, Francis hoped to disconcert all the emperor's schemes by marching in person into the Milanese; and this bold measure, the more formidable because unexpected, could scarcely have failed of producing that effect. But when the vanguard of his

³³ Guic., lib. xv. 241, 246.

army had already reached Lyons, and he himself was hastening after it with a second division of his troops, the discovery of a domestic conspiracy, which threatened the ruin of the kingdom, obliged him to stop short and to alter his measures.

The author of this dangerous plot was Charles, duke of Bourbon, lord high constable, whose noble birth, vast fortune, and high office raised him to be the most powerful subject in France, as his great talents, equally suited to the field or the council, and his signal services to the crown, rendered him the most illustrious and deserving. The near resemblance between the king and him in many of their qualities, both being fond of war and ambitious to excel in manly exercises, as well as their equality in age and their proximity of blood, ought naturally to have secured to him a considerable share in that monarch's favour. But unhappily Louise, the king's mother, had contracted a violent aversion to the house of Bourbon, for no better reason than because Anne of Bretagne, the queen of Louis XII., with whom she lived in perpetual enmity, had discovered a peculiar attachment to that branch of the royal family, and had taught her son, who was too susceptible of any impression which his mother gave him, to view all the constable's actions with a mean and unbecoming jealousy. His distinguished merit at the battle of Marignano had not been sufficiently rewarded; he had been recalled from the government of Milan upon very frivolous pretences, and had met with a cold reception, which his prudent conduct in that difficult station did not deserve; the payment of his pensions had been suspended without any good cause; and during the campaign of 1521 the king, as has already been related, had affronted him in presence of the whole army, by giving the command of the van to the duke of Alençon. The constable, at first, bore these indignities

with greater moderation than could have been expected from a high-spirited prince, conscious of what was due to his rank and to his services. Such a multiplicity of injuries, however, exhausted his patience; and, inspiring him with thoughts of revenge, he retired from court, and began to hold a secret correspondence with some of the emperor's ministers.

About that time the duchess of Bourbon happened to die without leaving any children. Louise, of a disposition no less amorous than vindictive, and still susceptible of the tender passions at the age of forty-six, began to view the constable, a prince as amiable as he was accomplished, with other eyes; and, notwithstanding the great disparity of their years, she formed the scheme of marrying him. Bourbon, who might have expected every thing to which an ambitious mind can aspire from the doting fondness of a woman who governed her son and the kingdom, being incapable either of imitating the queen in her sudden transition from hatred to love, or of dissembling so meanly as to pretend affection for one who had persecuted him so long with unprovoked malice, not only rejected the match, but embittered his refusal by some severe raillery on Louise's person and character. She finding herself not only contemned but insulted, her disappointed love turned into hatred, and, since she could not marry, she resolved to ruin Bourbon.

For this purpose, she consulted with the chancellor, Du Prat, a man who by a base prostitution of great talents and of superior skill in his profession had risen to that high office. By his advice a lawsuit was commenced against the constable for the whole estate belonging to the house of Bourbon. Part of it was claimed in the king's name, as having fallen to the crown; part in that of Louise, as the nearest heir in blood of the deceased duchess. Both of these claims were equally

destitute of any foundation in justice; but Louise, by her solicitations and authority, and Du Prat, by employing all the artifices and chicanery of law, prevailed on the judges to order the estate to be sequestered. This unjust decision drove the constable to despair, and to measures which despair alone could have dictated. He renewed his intrigues in the imperial court, and, flattering himself that the injuries which he had suffered would justify his having recourse to any means in order to obtain revenge, he offered to transfer his allegiance from his natural sovereign to the emperor, and to assist him in the conquest of France. Charles, as well as the king of England, to whom the secret was communicated,³⁴ expecting prodigious advantages from his revolt, were ready to receive him with open arms, and spared neither promises nor allurements which might help to confirm him in his resolution. The emperor offered him in marriage his sister Eleanor, the widow of the king of Portugal, with an ample portion. He was included as a principal in the treaty between Charles and Henry. The counties of Provence and Dauphiné were to be settled on him, with the title of king. The emperor engaged to enter France by the Pyrenees, and Henry, supported by the Flemings, to invade Picardy; while twelve thousand Germans, levied at their common charge, were to penetrate into Burgundy and to act in concert with Bourbon, who undertook to raise six thousand men among his friends and vassals in the heart of the kingdom. The execution of this deep-laid and dangerous plot was suspended until the king should cross the Alps with the only army capable of defending his dominions; and, as he was far advanced in his march for that purpose, France was on the brink of destruction.³⁵

³⁴ Rymer's *Fœdera*, xiii. 794. ³⁵ *Heuter. Rer. Austr.*, lib. viii. c. 18,
Thuani *Hist.*, lib. i. c. 10.— p. 207:

Happily for that kingdom, a negotiation which had now been carrying on for several months, though conducted with the most profound secrecy, and communicated only to a few chosen confidants, could not altogether escape the observation of the rest of the constable's numerous retainers, rendered more inquisitive by finding that they were distrusted. Two of these gave the king some intimation of a mysterious correspondence between their master and the Count de Rœux, a Flemish nobleman of great confidence with the emperor. Francis, who could not bring himself to suspect that the first prince of the blood would be so base as to betray the kingdom to its enemies, immediately repaired to Moulins, where the constable was in bed, feigning indisposition, that he might not be obliged to accompany the king into Italy, and acquainted him of the intelligence which he had received. Bourbon, with great solemnity, and the most imposing affectation of ingenuity and candour, asserted his own innocence; and as his health, he said, was now more confirmed, he promised to join the army within a few days. Francis, open and candid himself, and too apt to be deceived by the appearance of those virtues in others, gave such credit to what he said that he refused to arrest him, although advised to take that precaution by his wisest counsellors; and, as if the danger had been over, he continued his march towards Lyons. The constable set out soon after, seemingly with an intention to follow him; but, turning suddenly to the left, he crossed the Rhone, and, after infinite fatigue and peril, escaped all the parties which the king, who became sensible too late of his own credulity, sent out to intercept him, and reached Italy in safety.³⁶

Francis took every possible precaution to prevent the

³⁶ Mém. de Bellay, p. 64, etc.—Pasquier, Recherches de la France, p. 481

bad effects of the irreparable error which he had committed. He put garrisons in all the places of strength in the constable's territories. He seized all the gentlemen whom he could suspect of being his associates ; and as he had not hitherto discovered the whole extent of the conspirators' schemes, nor knew how far the infection had spread among his subjects, he was afraid that his absence might encourage them to make some desperate attempt, and for that reason relinquished his intention of leading his army in person into Italy.

He did not, however, abandon his design on the Milanese, but appointed Admiral Bonnivet to take the supreme command in his stead, and to march into that country with an army thirty thousand strong. Bonnivet did not owe this preferment to his abilities as a general ; for, of all the talents requisite to form a great commander, he possessed only personal courage, the lowest and the most common. But he was the most accomplished gentleman in the French court, of agreeable manners and insinuating address and a sprightly conversation ; and Francis, who lived in great familiarity with his courtiers, was so charmed with these qualities that he honoured him on all occasions with the most partial and distinguished marks of his favour. He was, besides, the implacable enemy of Bourbon ; and, as the king hardly knew whom to trust at that juncture, he thought the chief command could be lodged nowhere so safely as in his hands.

Colonna, who was intrusted with the defence of the Milanese, his own conquest, was in no condition to resist such a formidable army. He was destitute of money sufficient to pay his troops, which were reduced to a small number by sickness or desertion, and had, for that reason, been obliged to neglect every precaution necessary for the security of the country. The only plan which he formed was, to defend the passage

of the river Tessino against the French ; and, as if he had forgotten how easily he himself had disconcerted a similar scheme formed by Lautrec, he promised with great confidence on its being effectual. But, in spite of all his caution, it succeeded no better with him than with Lautrec. Bonnivet passed the river without loss, at a ford which had been neglected, and the imperialists retired to Milan, preparing to abandon the town as soon as the French should appear before it. By an unaccountable negligence, which Guicciardini imputes to infatuation,³⁷ Bonnivet did not advance for three or four days, and lost the opportunity with which his good fortune presented him. The citizens recovered from their consternation ; Colonna, still active at the age of fourscore, and Morone, whose enmity to France rendered him indefatigable, were employed night and day in repairing the fortifications, in amassing provisions, in collecting troops from every quarter, and, by the time the French approached, had put the city in a condition to stand a siege. Bonnivet, after some fruitless attempts on the town, which harassed his own troops more than the enemy, was obliged, by the inclemency of the season, to retire into winter quarters.

During these transactions, Pope Adrian died,—an event so much to the satisfaction of the Roman people, whose hatred or contempt of him augmented every day, that the night after his decease they adorned the door of his chief physician's house with garlands, adding this inscription, To THE DELIVERER OF HIS COUNTRY.³⁸ The Cardinal de' Medici instantly renewed his pretensions to the papal dignity, and entered the conclave with high expectations on his own part, and a general opinion of the people, that they would be successful. But, though supported by the imperial faction, possessed of great personal interest, and capable

³⁷ Guic., lib. xv. 254.

³⁸ Jovii Vit. Adr., 127.

of all the artifices, refinements, and corruption which reign in those assemblies, the obstinacy and intrigues of his rivals protracted the conclave to the unusual length of fifty days. The address and perseverance of the cardinal at last surmounted every obstacle. He was raised to the head of the Church, and assumed the government of it by the name of Clement VII. The choice was universally approved of. High expectations were conceived of a pope whose great talents and long experience in business seemed to qualify him no less for defending the spiritual interests of the Church, exposed to imminent danger by the progress of Luther's opinions, than for conducting its political operations with the prudence requisite at such a difficult juncture, and who, besides these advantages, rendered the ecclesiastical state more respectable by having in his hands the government of Florence, together with the wealth of the family of Medici.³⁹

Cardinal Wolsey, not disheartened by the disappointment of his ambitious views at the former election, had entertained more sanguine hopes of success on this occasion. Henry wrote to the emperor, reminding him of his engagements to second the pretensions of his minister. Wolsey bestirred himself with activity suitable to the importance of the prize for which he contended, and instructed his agents at Rome to spare neither promises nor bribes in order to gain his end. But Charles had either amused him with vain hopes which he never intended to gratify, or he judged it impolitic to oppose a candidate who had such a prospect of succeeding as Medici; or perhaps the cardinals durst not venture to provoke the people of Rome, while their indignation against Adrian's memory was still fresh, by placing another *Ultramontane* on the papal throne. Wolsey, after all his

³⁹ Guic., lib. xv. 263.

expectations and endeavours, had the mortification to see a pope elected of such an age and of so vigorous a constitution that he could not derive much comfort to himself from the chance of surviving him. This second proof fully convinced Wolsey of the emperor's insincerity, and it excited in him all the resentment which a haughty mind feels on being at once disappointed and deceived; and though Clement endeavoured to soothe his vindictive nature by granting him a commission to be legate in England during life, with such ample powers as vested in him almost the whole judicial jurisdiction in that kingdom, the injury he had now received made such an impression as entirely dissolved the tie which had united him to Charles, and from that moment he meditated revenge. It was necessary, however, to conceal his intention from his master, and to suspend the execution of it until, by a dexterous improvement of the incidents which might occur, he should be able gradually to alienate the king's affection from the emperor. For this reason, he was so far from expressing any uneasiness on account of the republique which he had met with, that he abounded on every occasion, private as well as public, in declarations of his high satisfaction with Clement's promotion.⁴⁰

Henry had, during the campaign, fulfilled with great sincerity whatever he was bound to perform by the league against France, though more slowly than he could have wished. His thoughtless profusion and total neglect of economy reduced him often to great straits for money. The operations of war were now carried on in Europe in a manner very different from that which had long prevailed. Instead of armies suddenly assembled, which under distinct chieftains followed their prince into the field for a short space and served at their own cost, troops were now levied

⁴⁰ Fiddes's Life of Wolsey, 294, etc.—Herbert.

great charge and received regularly considerable pay. Instead of impatience on both sides to bring every quarrel to the issue of a battle, which commonly decided the fate of open countries, and allowed the barons, together with their vassals, to return to their ordinary occupations, towns were fortified with great art and defended with much obstinacy ; war, from a very simple, became a very intricate science ; and campaigns grew, of course, to be more tedious and less decisive. The expense which these alterations in the military system necessarily created appeared intolerable to nations hitherto unaccustomed to the burden of heavy taxes. Hence proceeded the frugal and even parsimonious spirit of the English parliaments in that age, which Henry, with all his authority, was seldom able to overcome. The commons having refused at this time to grant him the supplies which he demanded, he had recourse to the ample and almost unlimited prerogative which the kings of England then possessed, and, by a violent and unusual exertion of it, raised the money he wanted. This, however, wasted so much time that it was late in the season before his army, under the duke of Suffolk, could take the field. Being joined by a considerable body of Flemings, Suffolk marched into Picardy, and Francis, from his extravagant eagerness to recover the Milanese, having left that frontier almost unguarded, he penetrated as far as the banks of the river Oyse, within eleven leagues of Paris, filling that capital with consternation. But the arrival of some troops detached by the king, who was still at Lyons, the active gallantry of the French officers, who allowed the allies no respite night or day, the rigour of a most unnatural season, together with scarcity of provisions, compelled Suffolk to retire ; and La Tramouille, who commanded in those parts, had the glory not only of having checked the progress of a formidable army

with a handful of men, but of driving them with ignominy out of the French territories.⁴¹

The emperor's attempts upon Burgundy and Guienne were not more fortunate, though in both these provinces Francis was equally ill prepared to resist them. The conduct and valour of his generals supplied his want of foresight; the Germans, who made an irruption into one of these provinces, and the Spaniards, who attacked the other, were repulsed with great disgrace.

Thus ended the year 1523, during which Francis' good fortune and success had been such as gave Europe a high idea of his power and resources. He had discovered and disconcerted a dangerous conspiracy, the author of which he had driven into exile almost without an attendant; he had rendered abortive all the schemes of the powerful confederacy formed against him; he had protected his dominions when attacked on three different sides; and, though his army in the Milanese had not made such progress as might have been expected from its superiority to the enemy in number, he had recovered, and still kept possession of, one-half of that duchy.

The ensuing year opened with events more disastrous to France. Fontarabia was lost by the cowardice or treachery of its governor. In Italy, the allies resolved on an early and vigorous effort, in order to dispossess Bonnivet of that part of the Milanese which lies beyond the Tessino. Clement, who, under the pontificates of Leo and Adrian, had discovered implacable enmity to France, began now to view the power which the emperor was daily acquiring in Italy with so much jealousy that he refused to accede, as his predecessors had done, to the league against Francis, and, forgetting private passions and animosities, laboured with the zeal which became his character.

⁴¹ Herbert, Mémo. de Bellay, 73, etc.

to bring about a reconciliation among the contending parties. But all his endeavours were ineffectual: a numerous army, to which each of the allies furnished their contingent of troops, was assembled at Milan by the beginning of March. Lannoy, viceroy of Naples, took the command of it upon Colonna's death, though the chief direction of military operations was committed to Bourbon and the marquis de Pescara, the latter the ablest and most enterprising of the imperial generals; the former inspired by his resentment with new activity and invention, and acquainted so thoroughly with the characters of the French commanders, the genius of their troops, and the strength as well as weakness of their armies, as to be of infinite service to the party which he had joined. But all these advantages were nearly lost through the emperor's inability to raise money sufficient for executing the various and extensive plans which he had formed. When his troops were commanded to march, they mutinied against their leaders, demanding the pay which was due to them for some months, and, disregarding both the menaces and entreaties of their officers, threatened to pillage the city of Milan if they did not instantly receive satisfaction. Out of this difficulty the generals of the allies were extricated by Morone, who, prevailing on his countrymen, over whom his influence was prodigious, to advance the sum that was requisite, the army took the field.⁴²

Bonnivet was destitute of troops to oppose this army, and still more of the talents which could render him an equal match for its leaders. After various movements and encounters, described with great accuracy by the contemporary historians, a detail of which would now be equally uninteresting and uninstructive, he was forced to abandon the strong camp in which

⁴² Guic., lib. xv. 267.—Capella, 190.

he had intrenched himself at Biagrassa. Soon a partly by his own misconduct, partly by the act of the enemy, who harassed and ruined his army continual skirmishes, while they carefully decline battle, which he often offered them, and partly by caprice of six thousand Swiss, who refused to join army, though within a day's march of it, he wasduced to the necessity of attempting a retreat France through the valley of Aost. Just as he arrived on the banks of the Sessia, and began to pass the river, Bourbon and Pescara appeared with the vanguard of the allies, and attacked his rear with great fury. At the beginning of the charge, Bonnivet, who exerting himself with much valour, was wounded dangerously that he was obliged to quit the field ; the conduct of the rear was committed to the Chevalier Bayard, who, though so much a stranger to the art of war, and to a court that he never rose to the chief command, was always called, in times of real danger, to the post of greatest difficulty and importance. He put himself at the head of the men-at-arms, and, animating them by his presence and example to sustain the whole shock of the enemy's troops, he gained time for the rest of his countrymen to make good their retreat. But in performing this service he received a wound which he immediately perceived to be mortal, and, being unable to continue any longer on horseback, he ordered one of his attendants to place him under a tree, with his face towards the enemy ; then, fixing his eyes on the guard of his sword, which he held up instead of a cross, addressed his prayers to God, and in this posture, which became his character both as a soldier and a Christian, he calmly awaited the approach of death. Bourbon, who led the foremost of the enemy's troops, found him in this situation, and expressed regret and pity at the sight. "Pity not me," cried the high

spirited chevalier. “I die as a man of honour ought, in the discharge of my duty: they indeed are objects of pity who fight against their king, their country, and their oath.” The marquis de Pescara, passing soon after, manifested his admiration of Bayard’s virtues, as well as his sorrow for his fate, with the generosity of a gallant enemy, and, finding that he could not be removed with safety from that spot, ordered a tent to be pitched there, and appointed proper persons to attend him. He died, notwithstanding their care, as his ancestors for several generations had done, in the field of battle. Pescara ordered his body to be embalmed and sent to his relations; and such was the respect paid to military merit in that age that the duke of Savoy commanded it to be received with royal honours in all the cities of his dominions: in Dauphiné, Bayard’s native country, the people of all ranks came out in a solemn procession to meet it.⁴³

Bonnivet led back the shattered remains of his army into France; and in one short campaign Francis was stripped of all he had possessed in Italy, and left without one ally in that country.

While the war kindled by the emulation of Charles and Francis spread over so many countries of Europe, Germany enjoyed a profound tranquillity, extremely favourable to the Reformation, which continued to make progress daily. During Luther’s confinement in his retreat at Wartburg, Carlostadius, one of his disciples, animated with the same zeal, but possessed of less prudence and moderation than his master, began to propagate wild and dangerous opinions, chiefly among the lower people. Encouraged by his exhortations, they rose in several villages of Saxony, broke into the churches with tumultuary violence, and threw down

⁴³ Bellefor. Epistr., p. 73.—Brant., tom. vi. p. 108, etc.—Pas-Mém. de Bellay, 75.—(Œuv. de quier, Recherches, p. 526.


and destroyed the images with which they were adorned. Those irregular and outrageous proceedings were so repugnant to all the elector's cautious maxims, that if they had not received a timely check they could hardly have failed of alienating from the formers a prince no less jealous of his own authority than afraid of giving offence to the emperor and other patrons of the ancient opinions. Luther, sensible of the danger, immediately quitted his retreat, without waiting for Frederic's permission, and returned to Wittenberg. Happily for the Reformation, the veneration for his person and authority was still so great that his appearance alone suppressed that spirit of extravagance which began to seize his party. Carlostadius and his fanatical followers, struck dumb by his rebukes, submitted at once, and declared that they heard the voice of an angel, not of a man.⁴⁴ [1522.]

Before Luther left his retreat, he had begun to translate the Bible into the German tongue, an undertaking of no less difficulty than importance, of which he was extremely fond, and for which he was well qualified. He had a competent knowledge of the original languages ; a thorough acquaintance with the style and sentiments of the inspired writers ; and, though his compositions in Latin were rude and barbarous, he was reckoned a great master of the purity of his mother-tongue, and could express himself with all the elegance of which it is capable. By his own assiduous application, together with the assistance of Melancthon and several other of his disciples, he finished part of the New Testament in the year 1522 ; and the publication of it proved more fatal to the Church of Rome than that of all his own works. It was read with wonderful avidity and attention by persons of every rank. They were astonished at discovering how contrary the

⁴⁴ Sleid., Hist., 51.—Seckend., 195.

Luther preaching in the Chapel of Wurtburg Castle





cepts of the Author of our religion are to the inventions of those priests who pretended to be his vice-gerents ; and, having now in their hand the rule of faith, they thought themselves qualified, by applying it, to judge of the established opinions, and to pronounce when they were conformable to the standard or when they departed from it. The great advantages arising from Luther's translation of the Bible encouraged the advocates for reformation in the other countries of Europe to imitate his example, and to publish versions of the Scriptures in their respective languages.

About this time, Nuremberg, Frankfort, Hamburg, and several other free cities in Germany, of the first rank, openly embraced the Reformed religion, and by the authority of their magistrates abolished the mass and the other superstitious rites of popery.⁴⁵ The elector of Brandenburg, the dukes of Brunswick and Lunenburg, and prince of Anhalt, became avowed patrons of Luther's opinions and countenanced the preaching of them among their subjects.

The court of Rome beheld this growing defection with great concern ; and Adrian's first care, after his arrival in Italy, had been to deliberate with the cardinals concerning the proper means of putting a stop to it. He was profoundly skilled in scholastic theology, and, having been early celebrated on that account, he still retained such an excessive admiration of the science to which he was first indebted for his reputation and success in life that he considered Luther's invectives against the schoolmen, particularly Thomas Aquinas, as little less than blasphemy. All the tenets of that doctor appeared to him so clear and irrefragable that he supposed every person who called in question or contradicted them to be either blinded by ignorance or to be acting in opposition to the conviction of his

⁴⁵ Seckend, 241.—Chytrai Contin. Krantzii, 203.

own mind. Of course, no pope was ever more bigoted or inflexible with regard to points of doctrine than Adrian : he not only maintained them, as Leo had done, because they were ancient, or because it was dangerous for the Church to allow of innovations, he adhered to them with the zeal of a theologian and with the tenaciousness of a disputant. At the same time, his own manners being extremely simple, uninfectcd with any of the vices which reigned in the court of Rome, he was as sensible of its corruption as the Reformers themselves, and viewed them with less indignation. The brief which he addressed to the diet of the empire assembled at Nuremberg, and the instructions which he gave Cheregato, the nuncio whom he sent thither, were framed agreeably to these views. On the one hand, he condemned Luther's opinions with more asperity and rancour of expression than Leo ever used ; he severely censured the princes of Germany for suffering him to spread his pernicious tenets by their neglecting to execute the edict of the diet of Worms, and required them, if Luther did not instantly retract his errors, to destroy him with fire as a hardened and incurable member, in like manner as Dathan and Abiram had been cut off by Moses, Ananias and Sapphira by the apostles, and John Huss and Jerome of Prague by their ancestors.⁴⁶ On the other hand, he, with great candour and in the most explicit terms, acknowledged the corruptions of the Roman court to be the source from which had flowed most of the evils that the Church now felt or dreaded ; he promised to exert all his authority towards reforming these abuses with as much despatch as the nature and inveteracy of the disorders would admit ; and he requested of the Reformation states to give him their advice with regard to the most effi-

* *Fascic. Rer. expet. et fugicnd.*, p. 342.

tual means of suppressing that new heresy which had sprung up among them.⁴⁷

The members of the diet, after praising the pope's pious and laudable intentions, excused themselves for not executing the edict of Worms, by alleging that the prodigious increase of Luther's followers, as well as the aversion to the court of Rome among their other subjects on account of its innumerable exactions, rendered such an attempt not only dangerous, but impossible. They affirmed that the grievances of Germany, which did not arise from imaginary injuries, but from impositions no less real than intolerable, as his holiness would learn from a catalogue of them which they intended to lay before him, called now for some new and efficacious remedy; and, in their opinion, the only remedy adequate to the disease, or which afforded them any hopes of seeing the Church restored to soundness and vigour, was a general council. Such a council, therefore, they advised him, after obtaining the emperor's consent, to assemble, without delay, in one of the great cities of Germany, that all who had right to be present might deliberate with freedom, and propose their opinions with such boldness as the dangerous situation of religion at this juncture required.⁴⁸

The nuncio, more artful than his master, and better acquainted with the political views and interests of the Roman court, was startled at the proposition of a council, and easily foresaw how dangerous such an assembly might prove at a time when many openly denied the papal authority, and the reverence and submission yielded to it visibly declined among all. For that reason, he employed his utmost address in order to prevail on the members of the diet to proceed themselves with greater severity against the Lutheran heresy, and to relinquish their proposal concerning a general

⁴⁷ *Fascic. Rer. expet. et fugiend.*, p. 345. ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

council to be held in Germany. They, perceiving nuncio to be more solicitous about the interests the Roman court than the tranquillity of the empire or purity of the Church, remained inflexible, and continued to prepare the catalogue of their grievances to be presented to the pope.⁴⁹ The nuncio, that he might not be the bearer of a remonstrance so disagreeable to his court, left Nuremberg abruptly, without taking leave of the diet.⁵⁰

The secular princes accordingly, for the ecclesiastical although they gave no opposition, did not think decent to join with them, drew up the list (so famous in the German annals) of a hundred grievances which the empire imputed to the iniquitous dominion of the papal see. This list contained grievances much of the same nature with that prepared under the reign of Maximilian. It would be tedious to enumerate even a few of them: they complained of the sums exacted for dispensations, absolutions, and indulgences; of the expenses arising from the lawsuits carried by appeal to Rome; of the innumerable abuses occasioned by reservations, commendams, and annates; of the exemption from civil jurisdiction which the clergy had obtained; of the laws by which they brought all secular causes under the cognizance of the ecclesiastical judges; of the indecent and profligate lives which not a few of the clergy led; and of various other particulars, many of which have already been mentioned among the circumstances that contributed to the favourable reception or to the quick progress of Luther's doctrines. In the end they concluded that, if the holy see did not speedily deliver them from those intolerable burdens, they had determined to endure them no longer, and would employ

⁴⁹ *Fascic. Rer. expet. et fugiend.*, p. 349.
⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

power and authority with which God had intrusted them in order to procure relief.⁵¹

Instead of such severities against Luther and his followers as the nuncio had recommended, the *recess* or edict of the diet contained only a general injunction to all ranks of men to wait with patience for the determinations of the council which was to be assembled, and in the mean time not to publish any new opinions contrary to the established doctrines of the Church; together with an admonition to all preachers to abstain from matters of controversy in their discourses to the people, and to confine themselves to the plain and instructive truths of religion.⁵² [1523.]

The Reformers derived great advantage from the transactions of this diet, as they afforded them the fullest and most authentic evidence that gross corruptions prevailed in the court of Rome, and that the empire was loaded by the clergy with insupportable burdens. With regard to the former, they had now the testimony of the pope himself, that their invectives and accusations were not malicious or ill-founded. As to the latter, the representatives of the Germanic body, in an assembly where the patrons of the new opinions were far from being the most numerous or powerful, had pointed out as the chief grievances of the empire those very practices of the Romish Church against which Luther and his disciples were accustomed to declaim. Accordingly, in all their controversial writings after this period, they often appealed to Adrian's declaration, and to the hundred grievances, in confirmation of whatever they advanced concerning the dissolute manners, or insatiable ambition and rapaciousness, of the papal court.

At Rome, Adrian's conduct was considered as a proof of the most childish simplicity and imprudence. Men

⁵¹ *Fascic. Rer. expet. et fugiend.*, p. 354.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 348.

trained up amidst the artifices and corruptions of papal court, and accustomed to judge of actions not what was just, but by what was useful, were astonished at a pontiff who, departing from the wise maxim of his predecessors, acknowledged disorders which ought to have concealed, and, forgetting his dignity, asked advice of those to whom he was entitled to prescribe. By such an excess of impolitic sincerity they were afraid that, instead of reclaiming the enemies of the Church, he would render them more presumptuous, and, instead of extinguishing heresy, would weaken the foundations of the papal power, or expose the chief sources from which wealth flowed into the Church.⁵³ For this reason, the cardinals, and other ecclesiastics of greatest eminence in the papal court industriously opposed all his schemes of reformation, and, by throwing objections and difficulties in his way endeavoured to retard or to defeat the execution of them. Adrian, amazed, on the one hand, at the obstinacy of the Lutherans, disgusted, on the other, with the manners and maxims of the Italians, and finding himself unable to correct either the one or the other, often lamented his own situation, and often looked back with pleasure on that period of his life when he was only dean of Louvain, a more humble but happier station, in which little was expected from him, and there was nothing to frustrate his good intentions.⁵⁴

Clement VII., his successor, excelled Adrian as much in the arts of government as he was inferior to him in purity of life or uprightness of intention. He was animated not only with the aversion which all popes naturally bear to a council, but, having gained his election by means very uncanonical, he was afraid of an assembly that might subject it to a scrutiny which

⁵³ F. Paul, Hist. of Counc., p. 28.—Pallavic., Hist., 58.

⁵⁴ Jovii Vit. Adr., p. 118.

could not stand. He determined, therefore, by every possible means to elude the demands of the Germans, both with respect to the calling of a council, and reforming abuses in the papal court, which the rashness and incapacity of his predecessor had brought upon him. For this purpose he made choice of Cardinal Campeggio, an artful man, often intrusted by his predecessors with negotiations of importance, as his nuncio to the diet of the empire, assembled again at Nuremberg.

Campeggio, without taking any notice of what had passed in the last meeting, exhorted the diet, in a long discourse, to execute the edict of Worms with vigour, as the only effectual means of suppressing Luther's doctrines. The diet, in return, desired to know the pope's intentions concerning the council and the redress of the hundred grievances. The former the nuncio endeavoured to elude by general and unmeaning declarations of the pope's resolution to pursue such measures as would be for the greatest good of the Church. With regard to the latter, as Adrian was dead before the catalogue of grievances reached Rome, and, of consequence, it had not been regularly laid before the present pope, Campeggio took advantage of this circumstance to decline making any definitive answer to them in Clement's name; though, at the same time, he observed that their catalogue of grievances contained many particulars extremely indecent and undutiful, and that the publishing it by their own authority was highly disrespectful to the Roman see. In the end, he renewed his demand of their proceeding with vigour against Luther and his adherents. But though an ambassador from the emperor, who was at that time very solicitous to gain the pope, warmly seconded the nuncio, with many professions of his master's zeal for the honour and dignity of the papal see, the *recess* of the diet was conceived in

terms of almost the same import with the former, without enjoining any additional severity against Luther and his party.⁵⁵

Before he left Germany, Campeggio, in order to amuse and soothe the people, published certain cles for the amendment of some disorders and abuses which prevailed among the inferior clergy; but the partial reformation, which fell so far short of the expectations of the Lutherans and of the demands of the diet, gave no satisfaction, and produced little effect. The nuncio, with a cautious hand, tenderly lopped off a few branches; the Germans aimed a deeper blow, and, by striking at the root, wished to exterminate the evil.⁵⁶

" Seckend., 286.—Sleid., Hist., 66.

" Seckend., 292.

BOOK IV.

Views of the Italian States respecting Charles and Francis.—Charles invades France without Success.—Francis invades the Milanese.—He besieges Pavia.—Neutrality of the Pope.—Francis attacks Naples.—Movements of the Imperial Generals.—Battle of Pavia.—Francis taken Prisoner.—Schemes of the Emperor.—Prudence of Louise the Regent.—Conduct of Henry VIII. and of the Italian Powers.—The Emperor's rigorous Terms to Francis.—Francis carried to Spain.—Henry makes a Treaty with the Regent Louise.—Intrigues of Morone in Milan.—He is betrayed by Pescara.—Treatment of Francis.—Bourbon made General and Duke of Milan.—Treaty of Madrid.—Liberation of Francis.—Charles marries Isabella of Portugal.—Affairs in Germany.—Insurrections.—Conduct of Luther.—Prussia wrested from the Teutonic Knights.—Measures of Francis upon reaching his Kingdom.—A League against the Emperor.—Preparations for War.—The Colonnas Masters of Rome.—The Pope detached from the Holy League.—Position of the Emperor.—Bourbon marches towards the Pope's Territories.—Negotiations.—Assault of Rome.—Bourbon slain.—The City taken and plundered.—The Pope a Prisoner.—Hypocrisy of the Emperor.—Soliman invades Hungary.—Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, becomes King of Hungary.—Progress of the Reformation.

THE expulsion of the French both out of the Milanese and the republic of Genoa was considered by the Italians as the termination of the war between Charles and Francis; and as they began immediately to be apprehensive of the emperor, when they saw no power remaining in Italy capable either to control or oppose him, they longed ardently for the re-establishment of peace. Having procured the restoration of Sforza to his paternal dominions, which had been their chief motive for entering into confederacy with Charles, they plainly discovered their intention to contribute no longer towards increasing the emperor's superiority over his rival, which

was already become the object of their jealousy. The pope especially, whose natural timidity increased his suspicions of Charles's designs, endeavoured by his remonstrances to inspire him with moderation and incline him to peace.

But the emperor, intoxicated with success, and urged on by his own ambition, no less than by Bourbon's desire of revenge, contemned Clement's admonitions, and declared his resolution of ordering his army to pass the Alps and to invade Provence, a part of his rival's dominions where, as he least dreaded an attack, he was least prepared to resist it. His most experienced ministers dissuaded him from undertaking such an enterprise with a feeble army and an exhausted treasury ; but he relied so much on having obtained the concurrence of the king of England, and on the hopes which Bourbon, with the confidence and credulity natural to exiles, entertained of being joined by a numerous body of his partisans as soon as the imperial troops should enter France, that he persisted obstinately in the measure. Henry undertook to furnish a hundred thousand ducats towards defraying the expense of the expedition during the first month, and had it in his choice either to continue the payment of that sum monthly, or to invade Picardy before the end of July with an army capable of acting with vigour. The emperor engaged to attack Guienne at the same time with a considerable body of men ; and if these enterprises proved successful, they agreed that Bourbon, besides the territories which he had lost, should be put in possession of Provence, with the title of king, and should do homage to Henry, as the lawful king of France, for his new dominions. Of all the parts of this extensive but extravagant project the invasion of Provence was the only one which was executed. For although Bourbon, with a scrupulous delicacy, altogether unexpected after the part which he

had acted, positively refused to acknowledge Henry's title to the crown of France, and thereby absolved him from any obligation to promote the enterprise, Charles's eagerness to carry his own plan into execution did not in any degree abate. The army which he employed for that purpose amounted only to eighteen thousand men, the command of which was given to the marquis de Pescara, with instructions to pay the greatest deference to Bourbon's advice in all his operations. Pescara passed the Alps without opposition, and, entering Provence, laid siege to Marseilles. Bourbon had advised him rather to march towards Lyons, in the neighbourhood of which city his territories were situated, and where of course his influence was most extensive ; but the emperor was so desirous to get possession of a port which would at all times secure him an easy entrance into France that by his authority he overruled the constable's opinion, and directed Pescara to make the reduction of Marseilles his chief object.¹

Francis, who foresaw, but was unable to prevent, this attempt, took the most proper precautions to defeat it. He laid waste the adjacent country, in order to render it more difficult for the enemy to subsist their army ; he razed the suburbs of the city, strengthened its fortifications, and threw into it a numerous garrison, under the command of brave and experienced officers. To these, nine thousand of the citizens, whom their dread of the Spanish yoke inspired with contempt of danger, joined themselves ; by their united courage and industry, all the efforts of Pescara's military skill and of Bourbon's activity and revenge were rendered abortive. Francis, meanwhile, had leisure to assemble a powerful army under the walls of Avignon, and no sooner began to advance towards Marseilles than the imperial troops, exhausted by the fatigues of a siege which had lasted

¹ Guic. lib. xv. 273, etc.—Mém. de Bellay, p. 80.

forty days, weakened by diseases, and almost destitute of provisions, retired with precipitation towards Italy.

If, during these operations of the army in Provence, either Charles or Henry had attacked France in the manner which they had projected, that kingdom must have been exposed to the most imminent danger.

on this, as well as on many other occasions, the emperor found that the extent of his revenues was not adequate to the greatness of his schemes or the ardour of his ambition, and the want of money obliged him, though with much reluctance, to circumscribe his plan and leave part of it unexecuted. Henry, disgusted at the Bourbon's refusing to recognise his right to the crown of France, alarmed at the motions of the Scots, who under the solicitations of the French king had persuaded him to march towards the borders of England, and no longer cited by his minister, who was become extremely cool with regard to all the emperor's interests, took no measures to support an enterprise of which, as of all new undertakings, he had been at first excessively fond.³

If the king of France had been satisfied with having delivered his subjects from this formidable invasion, he had thought it enough to show all Europe the facilities with which the internal strength of his dominions enabled him to resist the invasions of a foreign enemy; even when seconded by the abilities and powerful efforts of a rebellious subject, the campaign, notwithstanding the loss of the Milanese, would have been far from ending ingloriously. But Francis, animated with courage more becoming a soldier than a general, pushed on with ambition, enterprising rather than considerate, and too apt to be elated with success, was fond of every undertaking that seemed bold and adventurous. Such was the undertaking the situation of his affairs at that juncture.

² Guic., lib. xv. 277.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., p. 93.

³ Fiddes's Life of Wolsey, pend. Nos. 70, 71, 72.

naturally presented to his view. He had under his command one of the most powerful and best-appointed armies France had ever brought into the field, which he could not think of disbanding without having employed it in any active service. The imperial troops had been obliged to retire, almost ruined by hard duty, and disheartened with ill success ; the Milanese had been left altogether without defence ; it was not impossible to reach that country before Pescara, with his shattered forces, could arrive there ; or, if fear should add speed to their retreat, they were in no condition to make head against his fresh and numerous troops, and Milan would now, as in former instances, submit without resistance to a bold invader. These considerations, which were not destitute of plausibility, appeared to his sanguine temper to be of the utmost weight. In vain did his wisest ministers and generals represent to him the danger of taking the field at a season so far advanced, with an army composed chiefly of Swiss and Germans, to whose caprices he would be subject in all his operations and on whose fidelity his safety must absolutely depend. In vain did Louise of Savoy advance by hasty journeys towards Provence, that she might exert all her authority in dissuading her son from such a rash enterprise. Francis disregarded the remonstrances of his subjects ; and, that he might save himself the pain of an interview with his mother, whose counsels he had determined to reject, he began his march before her arrival, appointing her, however, by way of atonement for that neglect, to be regent of the kingdom during his absence. Bonnivet, by his persuasions, contributed not a little to confirm Francis in this resolution. That favourite, who strongly resembled his master in all the defective parts of his character, was led, by his natural impetuosity, warmly to approve of such an enterprise ; and being prompted besides by his impatience to visit

a Milanese lady of whom he had been deeply enamoured during his late expedition, he is said, by his florid descriptions of her beauty and accomplishments, to have inspired Francis, who was extremely susceptible of strong passions, with an equal desire of seeing her.*

The French passed the Alps at Mount Cenis as their success depended on despatch, they advanced with the greatest diligence. Pescara, who had been obliged to take a longer and more difficult route through Monaco and Final, was soon informed of their intentions, and, being sensible that nothing but the presence of a large body of troops could save the Milanese, marched with such rapidity that he reached Alva on the same day that the French army arrived at Vercelli. Francis, instructed by Bonnivet's error in the former campaign, advanced directly towards Milan, where the unexpected appearance of an enemy so powerful occasioned such consternation and disorder that, although Pescara entered the city with some of his best troops, he found that the defence of it could not be undertaken with any probability of success, and, having thrown a garrison into the citadel, retired through one gate, while the French were admitted at another.†

These brisk motions of the French monarch disconcerted all the schemes of defence which the imperious Charles had formed. Never, indeed, did generals attempt to oppose a formidable invasion under such circumstances of disadvantage. Though Charles possessed dominions more extensive than any other prince in Europe, he had at this time no other army but that which he had employed in Lombardy, which did not amount to six thousand men, his prerogative in all his different states was so limited, and his subjects, without whose consent he could raise no taxes, discovered such unwillingness

* Œuv. de Brant., tom. vi. 253.

† Mém. de Bellay, p. 81.—Guic., lib. xv. 278.

to burden themselves with new or extraordinary impositions, that even this small body of troops was in want of pay, of ammunition, of provisions, and of clothing. In such a situation, it required all the wisdom of Lannoy, the intrepidity of Pescara, and the implacable resentment of Bourbon to preserve them from sinking under despair, and to inspire them with resolution to attempt, or sagacity to discover, what was essential to their safety. To the efforts of their genius and the activity of their zeal the emperor was more indebted for the preservation of his Italian dominions than to his own power. Lannoy, by mortgaging the revenues of Naples, procured some money, which was immediately applied towards providing the army with whatever was most necessary.⁶ Pescara, who was beloved and almost adored by the Spanish troops, exhorted them to show the world, by their engaging to serve the emperor in that dangerous exigency without making any immediate demand of pay, that they were animated with sentiments of honour very different from those of mercenary soldiers; to which proposition that gallant body of men, with an unexampled generosity, gave their consent.⁷ Bourbon, having raised a considerable sum by pawning his jewels, set out for Germany, where his influence was great, that by his presence he might hasten the levying of troops for the imperial service.⁸

Francis, by a fatal error, allowed the emperor's generals time to derive advantage from all these operations. Instead of pursuing the enemy, who retired to Lodi on the Adda, an untenable post, which Pescara had resolved to abandon on the approach of the French, he, in compliance with the opinion of Bonnivet, though contrary

⁶ Guic., lib. xv. 280.

⁷ Jovii Vit. Davali, lib. xv. p. 386.—Sandoval, vol. i. 621.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., p. 94, etc.

—Vida del Emperador Carlos V., por Vera y Zuñiga, p. 36.

⁸ Mém. de Bellay, p. 83.

to that of his other generals, laid siege to Pavia, the Tessino,—a town, indeed, of great importance, possession of which would have opened to him all the fertile country lying on the banks of that river. The fortifications of the place were strong; it was dangerous to undertake a difficult siege at so late a season; and the imperial generals, sensible of its consequences, had thrown into the town a garrison composed of thousand veterans under the command of Antonio Leyva, an officer of high rank, of great experience, a patient but enterprising courage, fertile in resources, ambitious of distinguishing himself, and capable, for reason, as well as from his having been long accustomed both to obey and to command, of suffering or performing anything in order to procure success.

Francis prosecuted the siege with obstinacy equal to the rashness with which he had undertaken it. During three months, everything known to the engineers of that age, or that could be effected by the valour of troops, was attempted in order to reduce the place; while Lannoy and Pescara, unable to obstruct his operations, were obliged to remain in such an ignominious state of inaction that a pasquinade was published at Rome, offering a reward to any person who could find the imperial army, lost in the month of October in the mountains between France and Lombardy, and which had not been heard of since that time.⁹

Leyva, well acquainted with the difficulties under which his countrymen laboured, and the impossibility of their facing in the field such a powerful army, formed the siege of Pavia, placed his only hopes of safety in his own vigilance and valour. The efforts of both were extraordinary, and in proportion to the importance of the place with the defence of which he intrusted. He interrupted the approaches of the French

⁹ Sandoval, i. 608.

by frequent and furious sallies. Behind the breaches made by their artillery he erected new works, which appeared to be scarcely inferior in strength to the original fortifications. He repulsed the besiegers in all their assaults, and, by his own example, brought not only the garrison, but the inhabitants, to bear the most severe fatigues and to encounter the greatest dangers without murmuring. The rigour of the season conspired with his endeavours in retarding the progress of the French. Francis attempting to become master of the town by diverting the course of the Tessino, which is its chief defence on one side, a sudden inundation of the river destroyed in one day the labour of many weeks, and swept away all the mounds which his army had raised with infinite toil as well as at great expense.¹⁰

Notwithstanding the slow progress of the besiegers, and the glory which Leyva acquired by his gallant defence, it was not doubted but that the town would at last be obliged to surrender. The pope, who already considered the French arms as superior in Italy, became impatient to disengage himself from his connections with the emperor, of whose designs he was extremely jealous, and to enter into terms of friendship with Francis. As Clement's timid and cautious temper rendered him incapable of following the bold plan which Leo had formed, of delivering Italy from the yoke of both the rivals, he returned to the more obvious and practicable scheme of employing the power of the one to balance and to restrain that of the other. For this reason, he did not dissemble his satisfaction at seeing the French king recover Milan, as he hoped that the dread of such a neighbour would be some check upon the emperor's ambition, which no power in Italy was now able to control. He laboured hard to bring about a peace that would secure Francis in the possession of

¹⁰ Guic., lib. xv. 280.—Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, p. 95.

his new conquests; and as Charles, who was always inflexible in the prosecution of his schemes, rejected the proposition with disdain, and with bitter exclamation against the pope, by whose persuasions, while Cardinal de' Medici, he had been induced to invade the Milanese, Clement immediately concluded a treaty of neutrality with the king of France, in which the republic of Florence was included.¹¹

Francis, having by this transaction, deprived the emperor of his two most powerful allies, and at the same time having secured a passage for his own troops through their territories, formed a scheme of attacking the kingdom of Naples, hoping either to overrun the country, which was left altogether without defence, or that at least such an unexpected invasion would oblige the viceroy to recall part of the imperial army out of the Milanese. For this purpose he ordered six thousand men to march under the command of John Stuart, earl of Albany. But Pescara, foreseeing that the effect of this diversion would depend entirely upon the operations of the armies in the Milanese, persuaded Lannoy to regard Albany's motions¹² and to bend his whole force against the king himself; so that Francis not only weakened his army very unseasonably by this great attachment, but incurred the reproach of engaging rashly in chimerical and extravagant projects.

By this time the garrison of Pavia was reduced to extremity; their ammunition and provisions began to fail; the Germans, of whom it was chiefly composed, having received no pay for seven months,¹³ threatened to deliver the town into the enemy's hands, and could hardly be restrained from mutiny by all Leyva's address and authority. The imperial generals, who were strangers to his situation, saw the necessity of marching

¹¹ Guic., lib. xv. 282, 285.

¹² Ibid., p. 285.

¹³ Gold., Polit. Imperial., 8

without loss of time to his relief. This they had now in their power : twelve thousand Germans, whom the zeal and activity of Bourbon taught to move with unusual rapidity, had entered Lombardy under his command, and rendered the imperial army nearly equal to that of the French, greatly diminished by the absence of the body under Albany, as well as by the fatigues of the siege and the rigour of the season. But the more their troops increased in number, the more sensibly did the imperialists feel the distress arising from want of money. Far from having funds for paying a powerful army, they had scarcely what was sufficient for defraying the charges of conducting their artillery and of carrying their ammunition and provisions. The abilities of the generals, however, supplied every defect. By their own example, as well as by magnificent promises in the name of the emperor, they prevailed on the troops of all the different nations which composed their army to take the field without pay ; they engaged to lead them directly towards the enemy, and flattered them with the certain prospect of victory, which would at once enrich them with such royal spoils as would be an ample reward for all their services. The soldiers, sensible that by quitting the army they would forfeit the great arrears due to them, and eager to get possession of the promised treasures, demanded a battle with all the impatience of adventurers who fight only for plunder.¹⁴

The imperial generals, without suffering the ardour of their troops to cool, advanced immediately towards the French camp. On the first intelligence of their approach, Francis called a council of war, to deliberate what course he ought to take. All his officers of greatest experience were unanimous in advising him to retire, and to decline a battle with an enemy who courted it

¹⁴ Eryci Peuteani Hist. Cisalpina, ap. Grævii Thea. Antiquit. Ital., iii. 1170, 1179.

from despair. The imperialists, they observed, either be obliged in a few weeks to disband an army which they were unable to pay, and which they could not support together only by the hope of plunder, or the soldiers, enraged at the non-performance of the promises which they had trusted, would rise in some mutiny, which would allow their generals to throw nothing but their own safety; that, meanwhile, he might encamp in some strong post, and, waiting in safety for the arrival of fresh troops from France and Switzerland, might, before the end of spring, take possession of the Milanese without danger or bloodshed. But the position to them, Bonnivet, whose destiny it was to represent counsels fatal to France during the whole campaign, represented the ignominy that it would reflect on his sovereign if he should abandon a siege which he had prosecuted so long, or turn his back before an enemy whom he was still superior in number, and insisted on the necessity of fighting the imperialists rather than relinquish an undertaking on the success of which the king's future fame depended. Unfortunately, French notions of honour were delicate to an excess that bordered on what was romantic. Having often said that he would take Pavia or perish in the attempt, he thought himself bound not to depart from that resolution, and, rather than expose himself to the slightest imputation, he resolved to forego all the advantages which were the certain sequences of a retreat, and determined to wait for the imperialists before the walls of Pavia.¹⁵

The imperial generals found the French so strongly intrenched that, notwithstanding the powerful motives which urged them on, they hesitated long before they ventured to attack them; but at last the necessities of the besieged, and the murmurs of their own soldi-

¹⁵ Guic., lib. xv. 291.

obliged them to put every thing to hazard. Never did armies engage with greater ardour, or with a higher opinion of the importance of the battle which they were going to fight; never were troops more strongly animated with emulation, national antipathy, mutual resentment, and all the passions which inspire obstinate bravery. On the one hand, a gallant young monarch, seconded by a generous nobility, and followed by subjects to whose natural impetuosity indignation at the opposition which they had encountered added new force, contended for victory and honour. On the other side, troops more completely disciplined, and conducted by generals of greater abilities, fought from necessity, with courage heightened by despair. The imperialists, however, were unable to resist the first efforts of the French valour, and their firmest battalions began to give way. But the fortune of the day was quickly changed. The Swiss in the service of France, unmindful of the reputation of their country for fidelity and martial glory, abandoned their post in a cowardly manner. Leyva, with his garrison, sallied out and attacked the rear of the French, during the heat of the action, with such fury as threw it into confusion; and Pescara, falling on their cavalry with the imperial horse, among whom he had prudently intermingled a considerable number of Spanish foot, armed with the heavy muskets then in use, broke this formidable body, by an unusual method of attack, against which they were wholly unprovided. The rout became universal; and resistance ceased in almost every part but where the king was in person, who fought now not for fame or victory, but for safety. Though wounded in several places, and thrown from his horse, which was killed under him, Francis defended himself on foot with an heroic courage. Many of his bravest officers, gathering round him, and endeavouring to save his life at the expense of their own, fell at his feet.

Among these was Bonnivet, the author of this calamity, who alone died unlamented. The king exhausted with fatigue, and scarcely capable of further resistance, was left almost alone, exposed to the fury of some Spanish soldiers, strangers to his rank and era, at his obstinacy. At that moment came up Pompey, a French gentleman who had entered together with Bourbon into the emperor's service, and, placing himself by the side of the monarch against whom he had rebelled, assisted in protecting him from the violence of the soldiers, at the same time beseeching him to render to Bourbon, who was not far distant. Immediately as the danger was which now surrounded France, he rejected with indignation the thoughts of an alliance which would have afforded such matter of triumph to his traitorous subject, and, calling for Lannoy, who happened likewise to be near at hand, gave up his sword to him; which he, kneeling to kiss the king's hand, received with profound respect, and, taking his sword from his side, presented it to him, saying “that it did not become so great a monarch to remain disarmed in the presence of one of the emperor's subjects.” [February 24, 1525.]



Ten thousand men fell on this day, one of the most fatal France had ever seen. Among these were many noblemen of the highest distinction, who chose rather to perish than to turn their backs with dishonour. A few were taken prisoners, of whom the most illustrious was Henry d'Albret, the unfortunate king of Navarre. A small body of the rear-guard made their escape, under the command of the duke of Alençon, the feeble garrison of Milan, on the first news of the defeat, retired, without being pursued, by another route.

¹⁶ Guic., lib. xv. 292.—Œuv. de Brant., vi. 355.—Mém. de Bellay, p. 90.—Sandoval, Hist., i. 638,

etc.—P. Mart. Ep. 805, 806.—Ruscelli, Lettere de' Principi, 70.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V.,

Sword and Buckler of Francis I., taken at Pa





and in two weeks after the battle not a Frenchman remained in Italy.

Lannoy, though he treated Francis with all the outward marks of honour due to his rank and character, guarded him with the utmost attention. He was solicitous not only to prevent any possibility of his escaping, but afraid that his own troops might seize his person and detain it as the best security for the payment of their arrears. In order to provide against both these dangers, he conducted Francis, the day after the battle, to the strong castle of Pizzichitone, near Cremona, committing him to the custody of Don Ferdinand Alarcon, general of the Spanish infantry, an officer of great bravery and of strict honour, but remarkable for that severe and scrupulous vigilance which such a trust required.

Francis, who formed a judgment of the emperor's dispositions by his own, was extremely desirous that Charles should be informed of his situation, fondly hoping that from his generosity or sympathy he should obtain speedy relief. The imperial generals were no less impatient to give their sovereign an early account of the decisive victory which they had gained, and to receive his instructions with regard to their future conduct. As the most certain and expeditious method of conveying intelligence to Spain, at that season of the year, was by land, Francis gave the Commandador Pennalosa, who was charged with Lannoy's despatches, a passport to travel through France.

Charles received the account of this signal and unexpected success that had crowned his arms with a moderation which, if it had been real, would have done him more honour than the greatest victory. Without uttering one word expressive of exultation or of intemperate joy, he retired immediately into his chapel, and, having spent an hour in offering up his thanksgivings to Heaven, returned to the presence-chamber, which by

that time was filled with grandees and foreign ambassadors, assembled in order to congratulate him. He accepted of their compliments with a modest demeanour; he lamented the misfortune of the captive as a striking example of the sad reverse of fortune which the most powerful monarchs are subject to; he bade any public rejoicings, as indecent in a war carried on among Christians, reserving them until he should obtain a victory equally illustrious over the infidels. He seemed to take pleasure in the advantage which he gained only as it would prove the occasion of restoring peace to Christendom.¹⁷

Charles, however, had already begun to form schemes in his own mind which little suited such external appearances. Ambition, not generosity, was the ruling principle in his mind; and the victory at Pavia opened such wide and unbounded prospects of gratifying it as allured him with irresistible force; but, it being no easy matter to execute the vast designs which he meditated, he thought it necessary, while proper measures were taken for the purpose, to affect the greatest moderation, hoping by this veil to conceal his real intentions from the princes of Europe.

Meanwhile, France was filled with consternation. The king himself had early transmitted an account of the defeat at Pavia, in a letter to his mother, delivered by Pennetier, which contained only these words: "Madam, all is lost except our honour." The officers who made their escape when they arrived from Italy, brought such a melancholy detail of particulars as made all ranks of men seriously feel the greatness and extent of the calamity. France, without its sovereign, without money in her treasury, without an army, without generals to command it, encompassed on all sides by a victorious and implacable enemy, seemed to be on the very brink of destruction.

¹⁷ Sandoval, Hist., i. 611.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., p. 110.

But on that occasion the great abilities of Louise the regent saved the kingdom which the violence of her passions had more than once exposed to the greatest danger. Instead of giving herself up to such lamentations as were natural to a woman so remarkable for her maternal tenderness, she discovered all the foresight and exerted all the activity of a consummate politician. She assembled the nobles at Lyons, and animated them by her example, no less than by her words, with such zeal in defence of their country as its present situation required. She collected the remains of the army which had served in Italy, ransomed the prisoners, paid the arrears, and put them in a condition to take the field. She levied new troops, provided for the security of the frontiers, and raised sums sufficient for defraying these extraordinary expenses. Her chief care, however, was to appease the resentment or to gain the friendship of the king of England; and from that quarter the first ray of comfort broke in upon the French.

Though Henry, in entering into alliances with Charles or Francis, seldom followed any regular or concerted plan of policy, but was influenced chiefly by the caprice of temporary passions, such occurrences often happened as recalled his attention towards that equal balance of power which it was necessary to keep between the two contending potentates, the preservation of which he always boasted to be his peculiar office. He had expected that his union with the emperor might afford him an opportunity of recovering some part of those territories in France which had belonged to his ancestors, and for the sake of such an acquisition he did not scruple to give his assistance towards raising Charles to a considerable pre-eminence above Francis. He had never dreamt, however, of any event so decisive and so fatal as the victory at Pavia, which seemed not only to have broken, but to have annihilated, the power of one of the rivals; so that

the prospect of the sudden and entire revolution which this would occasion in the political system filled him with the most disquieting apprehensions. He saw all Europe in danger of being overrun by an ambitious prince, to whose power there now remained no counterpoise; and, though he himself might at first be admitted, in quality of an ally, to some share in the spoils of the captive monarch, it was easy to discern that with regard to the manner of making the partition, as well as his security for keeping possession of what should be allotted him, he must absolutely depend upon the will of a confederate, to whose forces his own bore no proportion. He was sensible that if Charles were permitted to add any considerable part of France to the vast dominions of which he was already master, his neighbourhood would be much more formidable to England than that of the ancient French kings; while at the same time the proper balance on the Continent, to which England owed both its safety and importance, would be entirely lost. Concern for the situation of the unhappy monarch co-operated with these political considerations; his gallant behaviour in the battle of Pavia had excited a high degree of admiration, which never fails of augmenting sympathy; and Henry, naturally susceptible of generous sentiments, was fond of appearing as the deliverer of a vanquished enemy from a state of captivity. The passions of the English minister seconded the inclinations of the monarch. Wolsey, who had not forgotten the disappointment of his hopes in two successive conclaves, which he imputed chiefly to the emperor, thought this a proper opportunity of taking revenge; and Louise courting the friendship of England with such flattering submissions as were no less agreeable to the king than to the cardinal, Henry gave her secret assurances that he would not lend his aid towards oppressing France in its present helpless state. and obliged her to promise that

she would not consent to dismember the kingdom, even in order to procure her son's liberty.¹⁸

But, as Henry's connections with the emperor made it necessary to act in such a manner as to save appearances, he ordered public rejoicings to be made in his dominions for the success of the imperial arms; and, as if he had been eager to seize the present opportunity of ruining the French monarchy, he sent ambassadors to Madrid to congratulate with Charles upon his victory, to put him in mind that he, as his ally, engaged in one common cause, was entitled to partake in the fruits of it, and to require that, in compliance with the terms of their confederacy, he would invade Guienne with a powerful army, in order to give him possession of that province. At the same time, he offered to send the princess Mary into Spain or the Low Countries, that she might be educated under the emperor's direction until the conclusion of the marriage agreed on between them; and in return for that mark of his confidence he insisted that Francis should be delivered to him, in consequence of that article in the treaty of Bruges whereby each of the contracting parties was bound to surrender all usurpers to him whose rights they had invaded. It was impossible that Henry could expect that the emperor would listen to these extravagant demands, which it was neither his interest nor in his power to grant. They appear evidently to have been made with no other intention than to furnish him with a decent pretext for entering into such engagements with France as the juncture required.¹⁹

It was among the Italian states, however, that the victory at Pavia occasioned the greatest alarm and terror. That balance of power on which they relied for their security, and which it had been the constant

¹⁸ Mem. de Bellay, 94.—Guic., lib. xvi. 318.—Herbert.

¹⁹ Herbert, p. 64.

object of all their negotiations and refinements maintain, was destroyed in a moment. They were posed, by their situation, to feel the first effects of the uncontrolled authority which Charles had acquired. They observed many symptoms of a boundless ambition in that young prince, and were sensible that, as emperor, or king of Naples, he might not only foist dangerous pretensions upon each of their territories, but might invade them with great advantage. They deliberated, therefore, with much solicitude concerning the means of raising such a force as might obstruct his progress;²⁰ but their consultations, conducted with little union and executed with less vigour, had no effect. Clement, instead of pursuing the measures which he had concerted with the Venetians for securing the liberty of Italy, was so intimidated by Lannoy's threats, or overcome by his promises, that he entered into a separate treaty, binding himself to advance a considerable sum to the emperor, in return for certain emoluments which he was to receive from him. The money was instantly paid; but Charles afterwards refused to ratify the treaty, and the pope remained exposed once to infamy and to ridicule: to the former, because he had deserted the public cause for his private interest; to the latter, because he had been a loser by that unworthy action.²¹

How dishonourable soever the artifice might be which was employed in order to defraud the pope of this sum, it came very seasonably into the viceroy's hands, and put it in his power to extricate himself out of an imminent danger. Soon after the defeat of the French army, the German troops, which had defended Pavia with singularly meritorious courage and perseverance, growing insolent

²⁰ Guic., lib. xvi. 300.—Ruscelli, Lettere de' Princ., ii. 74, 76, etc.—Thuani Hist., lib. i. c. 11.

²¹ Guic., lib. xvi. 305.—Macri, ceni Histor. Venet., ap. Istoria delle Cose Venez., v. 131, 136.

upon the fame that they had acquired, and impatient of relying any longer on fruitless promises, with which they had been so often amused, rendered themselves masters of the town, with a resolution to keep possession of it as a security for the payment of their arrears; and the rest of the army discovered a much stronger inclination to assist than to punish the mutineers. By dividing among them the money exacted from the pope, Lannoy quieted the tumultuous Germans; but, though this satisfied their present demands, he had so little prospect of being able to pay them or his other forces regularly for the future, and was under such continual apprehensions of their seizing the person of the captive king, that not long after he was obliged to dismiss all the Germans and Italians in the imperial service.²³ Thus, from a circumstance that now appears very singular, but arising naturally from the constitution of most European governments in the sixteenth century, while Charles was suspected by all his neighbours of aiming at universal monarchy, and while he was really forming vast projects of this kind, his revenues were so limited that he could not keep on foot his victorious army, though it did not exceed twenty-four thousand men.

During these transactions, Charles, whose pretensions to moderation and disinterestedness were soon forgotten, deliberated with the utmost solicitude how he might derive the greatest advantages from the misfortunes of his adversary. Some of his councillors advised him to treat Francis with the magnanimity that became a victorious prince, and, instead of taking advantage of his situation to impose rigorous conditions, to dismiss him on such equal terms as would bind him for ever to his interest by the ties of gratitude and affection, more forcible as well as more permanent than any which

²³ Guic., lib. xvi. p. 302.

could be formed by extorted oaths and involuntary stipulations. Such an exertion of generosity is not, perhaps, to be expected in the conduct of political affairs, and it was far too refined for that prince to whom it was proposed. The more obvious but less splendid scheme, of endeavouring to make the utmost of Francis's calamity, had a greater number in the council to recommend it, and suited better with the emperor's genius. But, though Charles adopted this plan, he seems not to have executed it in the most proper manner. Instead of making one great effort to penetrate into France with all the forces of Spain and the Low Countries, instead of crushing the Italian states before they recovered from the consternation which the success of his arms had occasioned, he had recourse to the artifices of intrigue and negotiation. This proceeded partly from necessity, partly from the natural disposition of his mind. The situation of his finances at that time rendered it extremely difficult to carry on any extraordinary armament; and he himself, having never appeared at the head of his armies, the command of which he had hitherto committed to his generals, was averse to bold and martial councils, and trusted more to the arts with which he was acquainted. He laid, besides, too much stress upon the victory of Pavia, as if by that event the strength of France had been annihilated, its resources exhausted, and the kingdom itself, no less than the person of its monarch, had been subjected to his power.

Full of this opinion, he determined to set the highest price upon Francis's freedom, and, having ordered the Count de Rœux to visit the captive king in his name, he instructed him to propose the following articles as the conditions on which he would grant him his liberty: that he should restore Burgundy to the emperor, from whose ancestors it had been unjustly wrested; that he

should surrender Provence and Dauphiné, that they might be erected into an independent kingdom for the Constable Bourbon; that he should make full satisfaction to the king of England for all his claims, and finally renounce the pretensions of France to Naples, Milan, or any other territory in Italy. When Francis, who had hitherto flattered himself that he should be treated by the emperor with the generosity becoming one great prince towards another, heard these rigorous conditions, he was so transported with indignation that, drawing his dagger hastily, he cried out, “ ‘Twere better that a king should die thus.” Alarcon, alarmed at his vehemence, laid hold on his hand; but, though he soon recovered greater composure, he still declared, in the most solemn manner, that he would rather remain a prisoner during life than purchase liberty by such ignominious concessions.²³

This mortifying discovery of the emperor’s intentions greatly augmented Francis’s chagrin and impatience under his confinement, and must have driven him to absolute despair, if he had not laid hold of the only thing which could still administer any comfort to him. He persuaded himself that the conditions which Rœux had proposed did not flow originally from Charles himself, but were dictated by the rigorous policy of his Spanish council, and that therefore he might hope in one personal interview with him to do more towards hastening his own deliverance than could be effected by long negotiations passing through the subordinate hands of his ministers. Relying on this supposition, which proceeded from too favourable an opinion of the emperor’s character, he offered to visit him in Spain, and was willing to be carried thither as a spectacle to that haughty nation. Lannoy employed all his address to confirm him in these sentiments, and concerted with

²³ Mém. de Bellay, 94.—Ferreras, Hist., ix. 43.

him in secret the manner of executing this resolution. Francis was so eager on a scheme which seemed to open some prospect of liberty, that he furnished the galleys necessary for conveying him to Spain, Charles being at this time unable to fit out a squadron for that purpose. The viceroy, without communicating his intentions either to Bourbon or Pescara, conducted his prisoner towards Genoa, under pretence of transporting him by sea to Naples; though soon after they set sail he ordered the pilots to steer directly for Spain; but, the wind happening to carry them near the French coast, the unfortunate monarch had a full prospect of his own dominions, towards which he cast many a sorrowful and desiring look. They landed, however, in a few days at Barcelona, and soon after Francis was lodged, by the emperor's command, in the alcazar of Madrid, under the care of the vigilant Alarcon, who guarded him with as much circumspection as ever.²⁴

A few days after Francis's arrival at Madrid, and when he began to be sensible of his having relied without foundation on the emperor's generosity, Henry VIII. concluded a treaty with the regent of France, which afforded him some hope of liberty from another quarter. Henry's extravagant demands had been received at Madrid with that neglect which they deserved and which he probably expected. Charles, intoxicated with prosperity, no longer courted him in that respectful and submissive manner which pleased his haughty temper. Wolsey, no less haughty than his master, was highly irritated at the emperor's discontinuing his wonted caresses and professions of friendship to himself. These slight offences, added to the weighty considerations formerly mentioned, induced Henry to enter into a defensive alliance with Louise, in which all the differences between him and her son were adjusted; at the same

²⁴ Mém. de Bellay, 95.—P. Martyr. Ep. ult.—Guic., lib. xvi. 322.

time he engaged that he would employ his best offices in order to procure the deliverance of his new ally from a state of captivity.²⁵

While the open defection of such a powerful confederate affected Charles with deep concern, a secret conspiracy was carrying on in Italy, which threatened him with consequences still more fatal. The restless and intriguing genius of Morone, chancellor of Milan, gave rise to this. His revenge had been amply gratified by the expulsion of the French out of Italy, and his vanity no less soothed by the re-establishment of Sforza, to whose interest he had attached himself, in the duchy of Milan. The delays, however, and evasions of the imperial court in granting Sforza the investiture of his new-acquired territories had long alarmed Morone; these were repeated so often, and with such apparent artifice, as became a full proof to his suspicious mind that the emperor intended to strip his master of that rich country which he had conquered in his name. Though Charles, in order to quiet the pope and Venetians, no less jealous of his designs than Morone, gave Sforza at last the investiture which had been so long desired, the charter was clogged with so many reservations and subjected him to such grievous burdens as rendered the duke of Milan a dependant on the emperor, rather than a vassal of the empire, and afforded him hardly any other security for his possessions than the good pleasure of an ambitious superior. Such an accession of power as would have accrued from the addition of the Milanese to the kingdom of Naples was considered by Morone as fatal to the liberties of Italy, no less than to his own importance. Full of this idea, he began to revolve in his mind the possibility of rescuing Italy from the yoke of foreigners,—the darling scheme, as has been already observed, of the Italian politicians in that age, and

²⁵ Herbert.—Fiddes's Life of Wolsey, 337.

which it was the great object of their ambition to accomplish. If to the glory of having been the chief instrument of driving the French out of Milan he could add that of delivering Naples from the dominion of the Spaniards, he thought that nothing would be wanting to complete his fame. His fertile genius soon suggested to him a project for that purpose,—a difficult, indeed, and daring one, but for that very reason more agreeable to his bold and enterprising temper.

Bourbon and Pescara were equally enraged at Lannoy's carrying the French king into Spain without their knowledge. The former, being afraid that the two monarchs might, in his absence, conclude some treaty in which his interests would be entirely sacrificed, hastened to Madrid, in order to guard against that danger. The latter, on whom the command of the army now devolved, was obliged to remain in Italy; but in every company he gave vent to his indignation against the viceroy, in expressions full of rancour and contempt; he accused him, in a letter to the emperor, of cowardice in the time of danger, and of insolence after a victory, towards the obtaining of which he had contributed nothing either by his valour or his conduct; nor did he abstain from bitter complaints against the emperor himself, who had not discovered, as he imagined, a sufficient sense of his merit nor bestowed any adequate reward on his services. It was on this disgust of Pescara that Morone founded his whole system. He knew the boundless ambition of his nature, the great extent of his abilities in peace as well as war, and the intrepidity of his mind, capable alike of undertaking and of executing the most desperate designs. The cantonment of the Spanish troops on the frontier of the Milanese gave occasion to many interviews between him and Morone, in which the latter took care frequently to turn the conversation to the transactions

subsequent to the battle of Pavia, a subject upon which the marquis always entered willingly and with passion; and Morone, observing his resentment to be uniformly violent, artfully pointed out and aggravated every circumstance that could increase its fury. He painted in the strongest colours the emperor's want of discernment, as well as of gratitude, in preferring Lannoy to him, and in allowing that presumptuous Fleming to dispose of the captive king without consulting the man to whose bravery and wisdom Charles was indebted for the glory of having a formidable rival in his power. Having warmed him by such discourses, he then began to insinuate that now was the time to be avenged for these insults, and to acquire immortal renown as the deliverer of his country from the oppression of strangers; that the states of Italy, weary of the ignominious and intolerable dominion of barbarians, were at last ready to combine in order to vindicate their own independence; that their eyes were fixed on him as the only leader whose genius and good fortune could insure the happy success of that noble enterprise; that the attempt was no less practicable than glorious, it being in his power so to disperse the Spanish infantry, the only body of the emperor's troops that remained in Italy, through the villages of the Milanese, that in one night they might be destroyed by the people, who, having suffered much from their exactions and insolence, would gladly undertake this service; that he might then without opposition take possession of the throne of Naples, the station destined for him, and a reward not unworthy the restorer of liberty to Italy; that the pope, of whom that kingdom held, and whose predecessors had disposed of it on many former occasions, would willingly grant him the right of investiture; that the Venetians, the Florentines, the duke of Milan, to whom he had communicated the scheme, together with the

French, would be the guarantees of his right; that Neapolitans would naturally prefer the government of one of their countrymen, whom they loved and admired, to that odious dominion of strangers, to which they had been so long subjected; and that the emperor, astonished at a blow so unexpected, would find that he had neither troops nor money to resist such a powerful confederacy.²⁶

Pescara, amazed at the boldness and extent of the scheme, listened attentively to Morone, but with the countenance of a man lost in profound and anxious thought. On the one hand, the infamy of betraying his sovereign, under whom he bore such high command, deterred him from the attempt; on the other, the prospect of obtaining a crown allured him to venture upon it. After continuing a short space in suspense, the least commendable motives, as is usual after such deliberations, prevailed, and ambition triumphed over honour. In order, however, to throw a colour of decency on his conduct, he insisted that some learned casuists should give their opinion, “Whether it was lawful for a subject to take arms against his immediate sovereign, in obedience to the lord paramount of whom the kingdom itself was held?” Such a resolution being obtained, the case as he expected was soon obtained from the divines and civilians both of Rome and Milan: the negotiation went forward; and measures seemed to be taken with great spirit for the speedy execution of his design.

During this interval, Pescara, either shocked at the treachery of the action that he was going to commit, or despairing of its success, began to entertain thoughts of abandoning the engagements which he had contracted.

²⁶ Guic., lib. xvi. 325.—Jovii Vita Davali, p. 417.—Œuv. de Brantôme, iv. 171.—Ruscelli, Let-

tere de' Princ., ii. 91.—T. Hist. lib. i. c. 11.—P. Her. Rer. Austr., lib. ix. c. 3, p. 2

under. The indisposition of Sforza, who happened at that time to be taken ill of a distemper which was thought mortal, confirmed his resolution, and determined him to make known the whole conspiracy to the emperor, deeming it more prudent to expect the duchy of Milan from him as the reward of this discovery than to aim at a kingdom to be purchased by a series of crimes. This resolution, however, proved the source of actions hardly less criminal and ignominious. The emperor, who had already received full information concerning the conspiracy from other hands, seemed to be highly pleased with Pescara's fidelity, and commanded him to continue his intrigues for some time with the pope and Sforza, both that he might discover their intentions more fully and that he might be able to convict them of the crime with greater certainty. Pescara, conscious of guilt, as well as sensible how suspicious his long silence must have appeared at Madrid, durst not decline that dishonourable office, and was obliged to act the meanest and most disgraceful of all parts, that of seducing with a purpose to betray. Considering the abilities of the persons with whom he had to deal, the part was scarcely less difficult than base; but he acted it with such address as to deceive even the penetrating eye of Morone, who, relying with full confidence on his sincerity, visited him at Novara in order to put the last hand to their machinations. Pescara received him in an apartment where Antonio de Leyva was placed behind the tapestry, that he might overhear and bear witness to their conversation. As Morone was about to take leave, that officer suddenly appeared, and to his astonishment arrested him prisoner in the emperor's name. He was conducted to the castle of Pavia; and Pescara, who had so lately been his accomplice, had now the assurance to interrogate him as his judge. At the same time, the emperor declared Sforza to have forfeited

all right to the duchy of Milan by his engaging in a conspiracy against the sovereign of whom he held ; Pescara, by his command, seized on every place in the Milanese, except the castles of Cremona and Milan, which, the unfortunate duke attempting to defend, were closely blockaded by the imperial troops.²⁷

But though this unsuccessful conspiracy, instead of stripping the emperor of what he already possessed in Italy, contributed to extend his dominions in that country, it showed him the necessity of coming to some agreement with the French king, unless he chose to draw on himself a confederacy of all Europe, which the progress of his arms and his ambition, now as undisguised as it was boundless, filled with general alarm. He had not hitherto treated Francis with the generosity which that monarch expected, and hardly with the decency due to his station. Instead of displaying the sentiments becoming a great prince, Charles, by his mode of treating Francis, seems to have acted with the mercenary heart of a corsair, who by the rigorous usage of his prisoners endeavours to draw from them a higher price for their ransom. The captive king was confined to an old castle, under a keeper whose formal austerity of manners rendered his vigilance still more disgusting. He was allowed no exercise but that of riding on a mule, surrounded with armed guards on horseback. Charles, on pretence of its being necessary to attend the cortes assembled in Toledo, had gone to reside in that city, and suffered several weeks to elapse without visiting Francis, though he solicited an interview with the most pressing and submissive importunity. So many indignities made a deep impression on a high-spirited prince ; he began to lose all relish for his usual amusements ; his natural gaiety of temper forsook him ; and, after languishing for some time, he was seized

²⁷ Guic., lib. xvi. 329.—Jovii Hist., 319.—Capella, lib. v. p. 200.

with a dangerous fever, during the violence of which he complained constantly of the unexpected and unprincely rigour with which he had been treated, often exclaiming that now the emperor would have the satisfaction of his dying a prisoner in his hands, without having once deigned to see his face. The physicians at last despaired of his life, and informed the emperor that they saw no hope of his recovery unless he were gratified with regard to that point on which he seemed to be so strongly bent. Charles, solicitous to preserve a life with which all his prospects of further advantage from the victory of Pavia must have terminated, immediately consulted his ministers concerning the course to be taken. In vain did the Chancellor Gattinara, the most able among them, represent to him the indecency of his visiting Francis if he did not intend to set him at liberty immediately upon equal terms; in vain did he point out the infamy to which he would be exposed if avarice or ambition should prevail on him to give the captive monarch this mark of attention and sympathy, for which humanity and generosity had pleaded so long without effect. The emperor, less delicate or less solicitous about reputation than his minister, set out for Madrid to visit his prisoner. The interview was short; Francis being too weak to bear a long conversation, Charles accosted him in terms full of affection and respect, and gave him such promises of speedy deliverance and princely treatment as would have reflected the greatest honour upon him if they had flowed from another source. Francis grasped at them with the eagerness natural in his situation, and, cheered with this gleam of hope, began to revive from that moment, recovering rapidly his wonted health.²⁸

He had soon the mortification to find that his confidence in the emperor was not better founded than

²⁸ Guic., lib. xvi. 339.—Sandoval, Hist., i. 665.


formerly. Charles returned instantly to Toledo; all negotiations were carried on by his ministers; and Francis was kept in as strict custody as ever. A new indignity, and that very galling, was added to all those he had already suffered. Bourbon arrived in Spain about this time. Charles, who had so long refused to visit the king of France, received his rebellious subject with the most studied respect. He met him without the gates of Toledo, embracing him with the greatest affection, and, placing him on his left hand, conducted him to his apartment. These marks of honour to him were so many insults to the unfortunate monarch, which he felt in a very sensible manner. It afforded him some consolation, however, to observe that the sentiments of the Spaniards differed widely from those of their sovereign. That generous people detested Bourbon's crime. Notwithstanding his great talents and important services, they shunned all intercourse with him to such a degree that, Charles having desired the marquis de Villena to permit Bourbon to reside in his palace while the court remained in Toledo, he politely replied, "That he could not refuse gratifying his sovereign in that request," but added, with a Castilian dignity of mind, that the emperor must not be surprised if, the moment the constable departed, he should burn to the ground a house which, having been polluted by the presence of a traitor, became an unfit habitation for a man of honour.²⁹

Charles himself, nevertheless, seemed to have it much at heart to reward Bourbon's services in a signal manner. But as he insisted, in the first place, on the accomplishment of the emperor's promise of giving him in marriage his sister Eleanora, queen-dowager of Portugal, the honour of which alliance had been one of his chief inducements to rebel against his lawful sovereign, as

Guic., lib. xvi. 335.

Francis I. refusing the Demands of the Emp





Francis, in order to prevent such a dangerous union, had offered before he left Italy to marry that princess, and as Eleanora herself discovered an inclination rather to match with a powerful monarch than with his exiled subject, all these interfering circumstances created great embarrassment to Charles and left him hardly any hope of extricating himself with decency. But the death of Pescara, who, at the age of thirty-six, left behind him the reputation of being one of the greatest generals and ablest politicians of that century, happened opportunely at this juncture for his relief. By that event the command of the army in Italy became vacant, and Charles, always fertile in resources, persuaded Bourbon, who was in no condition to dispute his will, to accept the office of general-in-chief there, together with a grant of the duchy of Milan forfeited by Sforza, and in return for these to relinquish all hopes of marrying the queen of Portugal.³⁰

The chief obstacle that stood in the way of Francis's liberty was the emperor's continuing to insist so peremptorily on the restitution of Burgundy as a preliminary to that event. Francis often declared that he would never consent to dismember his kingdom, and that, even if he should so far forget the duties of a monarch as to come to such a resolution, the fundamental laws of the nation would prevent its taking effect. On his part, he was willing to make an absolute cession to the emperor of all his pretensions in Italy and the Low Countries; he promised to restore to Bourbon all his lands which had been confiscated; he renewed his proposal of marrying the emperor's sister, the queen-dowager of Portugal, and engaged to pay a great sum by way of ransom for his own person. But all mutual esteem and confidence between the two monarchs were now entirely lost: there appeared on the one

³⁰ Sandoval, Hist. i. 676.—Œuv. de Brant, iv. 249.

hand a rapacious ambition, labouring to avail itself every favourable circumstance; on the other, suspicion and resentment standing perpetually on their guard so that the prospect of bringing their negotiations to an issue seemed to be far distant. The duchess of Alençon, the French king's sister, whom Charles had permitted to visit her brother in his confinement, employed all her address in order to procure his liberty on more reasonable terms. Henry of England interposed his good offices to the same purpose, but both with so little success that Francis, in despair, took suddenly the resolution of resigning his crown, with all its rights and prerogatives, to his son, the dauphin, determining rather to end his days in prison than to purchase his freedom by concessions unworthy of a king. The deed for this purpose he signed with legal formality in Madrid, empowering his sister to carry it into France, that it might be registered in all the parliaments of the kingdom; and at the same time intimating his intention to the emperor that he desired him to name the place of his confinement, and to assign him a proper number of attendants during the remainder of his days.³¹

This resolution of the French king had great effect. Charles began to be sensible that by pushing rigour to excess he might defeat his own measures, and, instead of the vast advantages which he hoped to draw from ransoming a powerful monarch, he might at last find in his hands a prince without dominions or revenue. About the same time, one of the king of Navarre's domestics happened, by an extraordinary exertion of fidelity, courage, and address, to procure his master an opportunity of escaping from the prison in which he had been confined ever since the battle of Pavia. This event convinced the emperor that the most vigilant attention

³¹ This paper is published in Mémoires historiques, etc., par M. l'Abbé Raynal, tom. ii. p. 151.

of his officers might be eluded by the ingenuity or boldness of Francis or his attendants, and one unlucky hour might deprive him of all the advantages which he had been so solicitous to obtain. By these considerations he was induced to abate somewhat of his former demands. On the other hand, Francis's impatience under confinement daily increased; and, having received certain intelligence of a powerful league forming against his rival in Italy, he grew more compliant with regard to his concessions, trusting that if he could once obtain his liberty he would soon be in a condition to resume whatever he had yielded.

Such being the views and sentiments of the two monarchs, the treaty which procured Francis his liberty was signed at Madrid on the 14th of January, 1526. The article with regard to Burgundy, which had hitherto created the greatest difficulty, was compromised, Francis engaging to restore that duchy with all its dependencies in full sovereignty to the emperor, and Charles consenting that this restitution should not be made until the king was set at liberty. In order to secure the performance of this as well as the other conditions in the treaty, Francis agreed that at the same instant when he himself should be released he would deliver as hostages to the emperor his eldest son, the dauphin, and his second son, the duke of Orleans, or, in lieu of the latter, twelve of his principal nobility, to be named by Charles. The other articles swelled to a great number, and, though not of such importance, were extremely rigorous. Among these the most remarkable were, that Francis should renounce all his pretensions in Italy; that he should disclaim any title which he had to the sovereignty of Flanders and Artois; that within six weeks after his release he should restore to Bourbon and his adherents all their goods, moveable and immoveable, and make

them full reparation for the damages which they sustained by the confiscation of them; that he should use his interest with Henry d'Albret to relinquish his pretensions to the crown of Navarre, and should for the future assist him in any attempt to recover it; that there should be established between the emperor and Francis a league of perpetual friendship and federacy, with a promise of mutual assistance in case of necessity; that, in corroboration of this alliance, Francis should marry the emperor's sister, the queen dowager of Portugal; that Francis should cause the articles of this treaty to be ratified by the emperor and registered in the parliaments of his kingdom; that upon the emperor's receiving this ratification, the hostages should be set at liberty, but in their place the duke of Angoulême, the king's third son, should be delivered to Charles; that, in order to manifest as far as possible the sincerity of the emperor, he might be educated at the imperial court; and if Francis did not, within the time limited, fulfil all the stipulations in the treaty, he should promise, upon honour and oath, to return to Spain, and to surrender himself again a prisoner to the emperor.³²

By this treaty, Charles flattered himself that he had not only effectually humbled his rival, but that he had taken such precautions as would for ever prevent Francis from re-attaining any formidable degree of power. The opinion which the wisest politicians formed concerning it was very different; they could not persuade themselves that Francis, after obtaining his liberty, would execute articles against which he had struggled so long, and to which, notwithstanding all that he had suffered during a long and rigorous confinement, he had consented with the utmost reluctance. Ambition and resentment, they knew, would conspire in prompting

³² Recueil des Trait., tom. ii. 112.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., p. 102.

him to violate the hard conditions to which he had been constrained to submit; nor would arguments and casuistry be wanting to represent that which was so manifestly advantageous to be necessary and just. If one part of Francis's conduct had been known at that time, this opinion might have been founded, not in conjecture, but in certainty. A few hours before he signed the treaty, he assembled such of his counsellors as were then at Madrid, and, having exacted from them a solemn oath of secrecy, he made a long enumeration in their presence of the dishonourable arts as well as unprincely rigour which the emperor had employed in order to ensnare or intimidate him. For that reason, he took a formal protest in the hands of notaries that his consent to the treaty should be considered as an involuntary deed and be deemed null and void.³³ By this disingenuous artifice, for which even the treatment that he had met with was no apology, Francis endeavoured to satisfy his honour and conscience in signing the treaty, and to provide at the same time a pretext on which to break it.

Great, meanwhile, were the outward demonstrations of love and confidence between the two monarchs: they appeared often together in public; they frequently had long conferences in private; they travelled in the same litter, and joined in the same amusements. But, amidst these signs of peace and friendship, the emperor still harboured suspicion in his mind. Though the ceremonies of the marriage between Francis and the queen of Portugal were performed soon after the conclusion of the treaty, Charles would not permit him to consummate it until the return of the ratification from France. Even then Francis was not allowed to be at full liberty; his guards were still continued; though caressed as a brother-in-law, he was still watched

³³ Recueil des Trait., tom. ii. p. 107.

like a prisoner; and it was obvious to attentive observation that an union in the very beginning of which might be discerned such symptoms of jealousy and distrust could not be cordial or of long continuance.

About a month after the signing of the treaty, the regent's ratification of it was brought from France, and that wise princess, preferring on this occasion public good to domestic affection, informed her husband that, instead of the twelve noblemen named in the treaty, she had sent the duke of Orleans along with his brother the dauphin to the frontier, as the king could suffer nothing by the absence of a child who must be left almost incapable of defence if deprived of its ablest statesmen and most experienced general, whom Charles had artfully included in his nomination. At last Francis took leave of the emperor, whose suspicion of the king's sincerity increasing as the time for putting it to the proof approached, he endeavoured to bind him still faster by exacting new promises, which, after those he had already made, the French monarch was not slow to grant. He set out from Madrid, a place which the remembrance of many afflictive circumstances rendered peculiarly odious to him, without the joy natural on such an occasion, and began his long-wished-for journey towards his own dominions. He was escorted by a body of horse under the command of Alarcon, who, as the king drew near the frontiers of France, guarded him with more scrupulous exactness than ever. When he arrived at the river Andaye, which separates the two kingdoms, La Valette appeared on the opposite bank with a guard of men equal in number to Alarcon's. An empty bark was moored in the middle of the stream; the attendants drew up in order on the opposite banks; at the

instant, Lannoy, with eight gentlemen, put off from the Spanish, and Lautrec with the same number from the French side of the river; the former had the king in his boat, the latter the dauphin and duke of Orleans; they met in the empty vessel; the exchange was made in a moment; Francis, after a short embrace of his children, leaped into Lautrec's boat, and reached the French shore. He mounted at that instant a Turkish horse, waved his hand over his head, and, with a joyful voice crying aloud several times, "I am yet a king!" galloped full speed to St. John de Luz, and from thence to Bayonne. This event, no less impatiently desired by the French nation than by their monarch, happened on the 18th of March, a year and twenty-two days after the fatal battle of Pavia.³⁵

Soon after the emperor had taken leave of Francis and permitted him to begin his journey towards his own dominions, he set out for Seville, in order to solemnize his marriage with Isabella, the daughter of Emanuel, the late king of Portugal, and the sister of John III., who had succeeded him in the throne of that kingdom. Isabella was a princess of uncommon beauty and accomplishments; and as the cortes, both in Castile and Aragon, had warmly solicited their sovereign to marry, the choice of a wife so nearly allied to the royal blood of both kingdoms was extremely acceptable to his subjects. The Portuguese, fond of this new connection with the first monarch in Christendom, granted him an extraordinary dowry with Isabella, amounting to nine hundred thousand crowns, a sum which, from the situation of his affairs at that juncture, was of no small consequence to the emperor. The marriage was celebrated with that splendour and gaiety which became a great and youthful prince. Charles

³⁵ Sandoval, Hist., i. 735.—Guic., lib. xvi. 355.

lived with Isabella in perfect harmony, and treated her on all occasions with much distinction and regard.²⁶

During these transactions, Charles could hardly give any attention to the affairs of Germany, though it was torn in pieces by commotions which threatened the most dangerous consequences. By the feudal institutions, which still subsisted almost unimpaired in the empire, the property of lands was vested in the princes and free barons. Their vassals held of them by the strictest and most limited tenures; while the great body of the people was kept in a state but little removed from absolute servitude. In some places of Germany, people of the lowest class were so entirely in the power of their masters as to be subject to personal and domestic slavery, the most rigorous form of that wretched state. In other provinces, particularly in Bohemia and Lusatia, the peasants were bound to remain on the lands to which they belonged, and, making part of the estate, were transferred, like any other property, from one hand to another. Even in Suabia and the countries on the banks of the Rhine, where their condition was most tolerable, the peasants not only paid the full rent of their farms to the landlord, but, if they chose either to change the place of their abode, or to follow a new profession, before they could accomplish what they desired they were obliged to purchase this privilege at a certain price. Besides this, all grants of lands to peasants expired at their death, without descending to their posterity. Upon that event the landlord had a right to the best of their cattle, as well as of their furniture; and their heirs, in order to obtain a renewal of the grant, were obliged to pay large sums by way of fine. These exactions, though grievous, were borne with patience, because they were customary and ancient;

²⁶ Ulloa, *Vita di Carlo V.*, p. 106. — Belcarius, *Com. Rer. Gallic.* p. 565.—Spalatinus, ap. Struv., *Corp. Hist. Germ.*, ii. 1081.

but when the progress of elegance and luxury, as well as the changes introduced into the art of war, came to increase the expense of government, and made it necessary for princes to levy occasional or stated taxes on their subjects, such impositions, being new, appeared intolerable; and in Germany these duties, being laid chiefly upon beer, wine, and other necessaries of life, affected the common people in the most sensible manner. The addition of such a load to their former burdens drove them to despair. It was to the valour inspired by resentment against impositions of this kind that the Swiss owed the acquisition of their liberty in the fourteenth century. The same cause had excited the peasants in several other provinces of Germany to rebel against their superiors towards the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries; and, though these insurrections were not attended with like success, they could not, however, be quelled without much difficulty and bloodshed.³⁷

By these checks the spirit of the peasants was overawed rather than subdued; and, their grievances multiplying continually, they ran to arms, in the year 1526, with the most frantic rage. Their first appearance was near Ulm, in Suabia. The peasants in the adjacent country flocked to their standard with the ardour and impatience natural to men who, having groaned long under oppression, beheld at last some prospect of deliverance; and the contagion, spreading from province to province, reached almost every part of Germany. Wherever they came, they plundered the monasteries, wasted the lands of their superiors, razed their castles, and massacred without mercy all persons of noble birth who were so unhappy as to fall into their hands.³⁸ Having intimidated their oppressors, as they imagined,

³⁷ Seckend., lib. ii. pp. 2, 6.

cano, ap. Freher. Script. Rer. Germ.,

³⁸ Petr. Crinitus de Bello Rusti-

Argent., 1717, vol. iii. p. 243.

by the violence of these proceedings, they began to consider what would be the most proper and effectual method of securing themselves for the future from their tyrannical exactions. With this view, they drew up and published a memorial containing all their demands, and declared that, while arms were in their hands, they would either persuade or oblige the nobles to give them full satisfaction with regard to these. The chief articles were, that they might have liberty to choose their own pastors; that they might be freed from the payment of all tithes except those of corn; that they might no longer be considered as the slaves or bondmen of their superiors; that the liberty of hunting and fishing might be common; that the great forests might not be regarded as private property, but be open for the use of all; that they might be delivered from the unusual burden of taxes under which they laboured; that the administration of justice might be rendered less rigorous and more impartial; that the encroachments of the nobles upon meadows and commons might be restrained.³⁹

Many of these demands were extremely reasonable, and, being urged by such formidable numbers, should have met with some redress. But those unwieldy bodies, assembled in different places, had neither union, nor conduct, nor vigour. Being led by persons of the lowest rank, without skill in war or knowledge of what was necessary for accomplishing their designs, all their exploits were distinguished only by a brutal and unmeaning fury. To oppose this, the princes and nobles of Suabia and the Lower Rhine raised such of their vassals as still continued faithful, and, attacking some of the mutineers with open force and others by surprise, cut to pieces or dispersed all who infested those provinces; so that the peasants, after ruining the

³⁹ Sleid., Hist., p. 90.

open country, and losing upwards of twenty thousand of their associates in the field, were obliged to return to their habitations with less hope than ever of relief from their grievances.⁴⁰

These commotions happened at first in provinces of Germany where Luther's opinions had made little progress, and, being excited wholly by political causes, had no connection with the disputed points in religion. But the frenzy, reaching at last those countries in which the Reformation was established, derived new strength from circumstances peculiar to them, and rose to a still greater pitch of extravagance. The Reformation, wherever it was received, increased that bold and innovating spirit to which it owed its birth. Men who had the courage to overturn a system supported by every thing which can command respect or reverence were not to be overawed by any authority, how great or venerable soever. After having been accustomed to consider themselves as judges of the most important doctrines in religion, to examine these freely, and to reject without scruple what appeared to them erroneous, it was natural for them to turn the same daring and inquisitive eye towards government, and to think of rectifying whatever disorders or imperfections were discovered there. As religious abuses had been reformed in several places without the permission of the magistrate, it was an easy transition to attempt the redress of political grievances in the same manner.

No sooner, then, did the spirit of revolt break out in Thuringia, a province subject to the elector of Saxony, the inhabitants of which were mostly converts to Lutheranism, than it assumed a new and more dangerous form. Thomas Muncer, one of Luther's

⁴⁰ Seckend., lib. ii. p. 10.—Petr. multu in Germania, ap. Scard. Gnodalius de Rusticanorum Tu- Script., vol. ii. p. 131, etc.

disciples, having established himself in that country, had acquired a wonderful ascendant over the minds of the people. He propagated among them the wildest and most enthusiastic notions, but such as tended manifestly to inspire them with boldness, and lead them to sedition. “Luther,” he told them, “had done more hurt than service to religion. He had, indeed, rescued the Church from the yoke of popery, but his doctrines encouraged, and his life set an example of the utmost licentiousness of manners. In order to avoid vice,” says he, “men must practise perpetual mortification. They must put on a grave countenance, speak little, wear a plain garb, and be serious in their whole deportment. Such as prepare their hearts in this manner may expect that the Supreme Being will direct all their steps, and by some visible sign discover his will to them; if that illumination be at any time withheld, we may expostulate with the Almighty, who deals with us so harshly, and remind him of his promises. This expostulation and anger will be highly acceptable to God, and will at last prevail on him to guide us with the same unerring hand which conducted the patriarchs of old. Let us beware, however, of offending him by our arrogance; but, as all men are equal in his eye, let them return to that condition of equality in which he formed them, and, having all things in common, let them live together like brethren, without any marks of subordination or pre-eminence.”⁴¹

Extravagant as these tenets were, they flattered so many passions in the human heart as to make a deep impression. To aim at nothing more than abridging the power of the nobility was now considered as a trifling and partial reformation, not worth the contending for; it was proposed to level every distinction

⁴¹ Seckend., lib. ii. p. 13.— Sleid., Hist., p. 83.

among mankind, and, by abolishing property, to reduce them to their natural state of equality, in which all should receive their subsistence from one common stock. Muncer assured them that the design was approved of by Heaven, and that the Almighty had in a dream ascertained him of its success. The peasants set about the execution of it, not only with the rage which animated those of their order in other parts of Germany, but with the ardour which enthusiasm inspires. They deposed the magistrates in all the cities of which they were masters; seized the lands of the nobles, and obliged such of them as they got into their hands to put on the dress commonly worn by peasants, and, instead of their former titles, to be satisfied with the appellation given to people in the lowest class of life. Great numbers engaged in this wild undertaking; but Muncer, their leader and their prophet, was destitute of the abilities necessary for conducting it. He had all the extravagance, but not the courage, which enthusiasts usually possess. It was with difficulty he could be persuaded to take the field; and, though he soon drew together eight thousand men, he suffered himself to be surrounded by a body of cavalry under the command of the elector of Saxony, the landgrave of Hesse, and the duke of Brunswick. These princes, unwilling to shed the blood of their deluded subjects, sent a young nobleman to their camp, with the offer of a general pardon if they would immediately lay down their arms and deliver up the authors of the sedition. Muncer, alarmed at this, began to harangue his followers with his usual vehemence, exhorting them not to trust these deceitful promises of their oppressors, nor to desert the cause of God and of Christian liberty.

But, the sense of present danger making a deeper impression on the peasants than his eloquence, confusion and terror were visible on every face, when a rainbow,

which was the emblem that the mutineers had painted on their colours, happening to appear in the clouds, Muncer, with admirable presence of mind, laid hold of that incident, and, suddenly raising his eyes and hands towards heaven, “Behold,” cries he, with an elevated voice, “the sign which God has given. There is the pledge of your safety, and a token that the wicked shall be destroyed.” The fanatical multitude set up instantly a great shout, as if victory had been certain, and, passing in a moment from one extreme to another, massacred the unfortunate nobleman who had come with the offer of pardon, and demanded to be led towards the enemy. The princes, enraged at this shocking violation of the laws of war, advanced with no less impetuosity, and began the attack. But the behaviour of the peasants in the combat was not such as might have been expected either from their ferocity or confidence of success; an undisciplined rabble was no equal match for well-trained troops; above five thousand were slain in the field, almost without making resistance: the rest fled, and among the foremost Muncer their general. He was taken next day, and, being condemned to such punishments as his crimes had deserved, he suffered them with a poor and dastardly spirit. His death put an end to the insurrections of the peasants, which had filled Germany with such terror;⁴² but the enthusiastic notions which he had scattered were not extirpated, and produced, not long after, effects more memorable, as well as more extravagant.

During these commotions, Luther acted with exemplary prudence and moderation; like a common parent, solicitous about the welfare of both parties, without sparing the faults or errors of either. On the one hand, he addressed a monitory discourse to the nobles, exhort-

⁴² Sleid., Hist., p. 84.—Seckend., lib. ii. p. 12.—Gnodalius, Tumult Rustican., 155.

ing them to treat their dependants with greater humanity and indulgence. On the other, he severely censured the seditious spirit of the peasants, advising them not to murmur at hardships inseparable from their condition, nor to seek for redress by any but legal means.⁴³

Luther's famous marriage with Catherine à Boria, a nun of a noble family, who, having thrown off the veil, had fled from the cloister, happened this year, and was far from meeting with the same approbation. Even his most devoted followers thought this step indecent at a time when his country was involved in so many calamities; while his enemies never mentioned it with any softer appellation than that of incestuous or profane. Luther himself was sensible of the impression which it had made to his disadvantage; but, being satisfied with his own conduct, he bore the censure of his friends and the reproaches of his adversaries with his usual fortitude.⁴⁴

This year the Reformation lost its first protector, Frederic, elector of Saxony; but the blow was the less sensibly felt as he was succeeded by his brother John, a more avowed and zealous, though less able, patron of Luther and his doctrines.

Another event happened about the same time, which, as it occasioned a considerable change in the state of Germany, must be traced back to its source. While the frenzy of the crusades possessed all Europe during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, several orders of religious knighthood were founded in defence of the Christian faith against heathens and infidels. Among these, the Teutonic order in Germany was one of the most illustrious, the knights of which distinguished themselves greatly in all the enterprises carried on in the Holy Land. Being driven at last from their settle-

⁴³ Sleid., Hist., p. 87.

⁴⁴ Seckend., lib. ii. p. 15.

ments in the East, they were obliged to return to their native country. Their zeal and valour were too impetuous to remain long inactive ; they invaded, on very slight pretences, the provinces of Prussia, the inhabitants of which were still idolaters, and, having completed the conquest of it about the middle of the thirteenth century, held it many years as a fief depending on the crown of Poland. Fierce contests arose, during this period, between the grand masters of the order and the kings of Poland, the former struggling for independence, while the latter asserted their right of sovereignty with great firmness. Albert, a prince of the house of Brandenburg, who was elected grand master in the year 1511, engaging keenly in this quarrel, maintained a long war with Sigismund, king of Poland ; but, having become an early convert to Luther's doctrines, this gradually lessened his zeal for the interests of his fraternity, so that he took the opportunity of the confusions in the empire, and the absence of the emperor, to conclude a treaty with Sigismund, greatly to his own private emolument. By it, that part of Prussia which belonged to the Teutonic order was erected into a secular and hereditary duchy, and the investiture of it granted to Albert, who, in return, bound himself to do homage for it to the kings of Poland as their vassal. Immediately after this he made public profession of the reformed religion and married a princess of Denmark. The Teutonic knights exclaimed so loudly against the treachery of their grand master that he was put under the ban of the empire ; but he still kept possession of the province which he had usurped, and transmitted it to his posterity. In process of time this rich inheritance fell to the electoral branch of the family, all dependence on the crown of Poland was shaken off, and the margraves of Brandenburg, having assumed the title of kings of Prussia, have not only risen to an equality with the first

princes in Germany, but take their rank among the great monarchs of Europe.⁴⁵

Upon the return of the French king to his dominions, the eyes of all the powers in Europe were fixed upon him, that by observing his first motions they might form a judgment concerning his subsequent conduct. They were not held long in suspense. Francis, as soon as he arrived at Bayonne, wrote to the king of England, thanking him for the zeal and affection wherewith he had interposed in his favour, to which he acknowledged that he owed the recovery of his liberty. Next day the emperor's ambassadors demanded audience, and, in their master's name, required him to issue such orders as were necessary for carrying the treaty of Madrid into immediate and full execution. He coldly answered that, though for his own part he determined religiously to perform all that he had promised, the treaty contained so many articles relative not to himself alone, but affecting the interests of the French monarchy, that he could not take any farther step without consulting the states of his kingdom, and that some time would be necessary in order to reconcile their minds to the hard conditions which he had consented to ratify.⁴⁶ This reply was considered as no obscure discovery of his being resolved to elude the treaty; and the compliment paid to Henry appeared a very proper step towards securing the assistance of that monarch in the war with the emperor, to which such a resolution would certainly give rise. These circumstances, added to the explicit declarations which Francis made in secret to the ambassadors from several of the Italian powers, fully satisfied them that their conjectures with regard to his conduct had been just, and that, instead of intending to execute an unreasonable treaty, he was eager to seize the first opportunity

⁴⁵ Sleid., Hist., p. 98.—Pfeffel, lique, p. 605, etc.
Abrégé de l'Histoire du Droit pub- ⁴⁶ Mém. de Bellay, p. 97.

of revenging those injuries which had compelled him to feign an approbation of it. Even the doubts, fears and scruples which used, on other occasions, to hold Clement in a state of uncertainty, were dissipated by Francis's seeming impatience to break through all engagements with the emperor. The situation, indeed, of affairs in Italy at that time did not allow the pope to hesitate long. Sforza was still besieged by the imperialists in the castle of Milan. That feeble prince, deprived now of Morone's advice, and unprovided with every thing necessary for defence, found means to inform Clement and the Venetians that he must soon surrender if he did not come to his relief. The imperial troops, as he had received no pay since the battle of Pavia, lived at discretion in the Milanese, levying such exorbitant contributions in that duchy as amounted, if we may believe on Guicciardini's calculation, to no less a sum than one thousand ducats a day;⁴⁷ nor was it to be doubted that the soldiers, as soon as the castle should succumb, would choose to leave a ruined country, which had afforded them subsistence, that they might take possession of more comfortable quarters in the fertile and untouched territories of the pope and Venetians. The assistance of the French king was the only thing which could either save Sforza or enable them to protect their own dominions from the insults of the imperial troops.

For these reasons, the pope, the Venetians, and the duke of Milan were equally impatient to come to an agreement with Francis, who, on his part, was no less desirous of acquiring such a considerable accession of strength and reputation as such a confederacy would bring along with it. The chief objects of this alliance, which was concluded at Cognac on the 22nd of July, though kept secret for some time, were to oblige the emperor to set at liberty the French king's sons.

⁴⁷ Guic., lib. xvii. 360.

payment of a reasonable ransom, and to re-establish Sforza in the quiet possession of the Milanese. If Charles should refuse either of these, the contracting parties bound themselves to bring into the field an army of thirty-five thousand men, with which, after driving the Spaniards out of the Milanese, they would attack the kingdom of Naples. The king of England was declared protector of this league, which they dignified with the name of *holy*, because the pope was at the head of it; and, in order to allure Henry more effectually, a principality in the kingdom of Naples, of thirty thousand ducats' yearly revenue, was to be settled on him, and lands to the value of ten thousand ducats on Wolsey, his favourite.⁴⁸

No sooner was this league concluded than Clement, by the plenitude of his papal power, absolved Francis from the oath which he had taken to observe the treaty of Madrid.⁴⁹ This right, how pernicious soever in its effects, and destructive of that integrity which is the basis of all transactions among men, was the natural consequence of the powers which the popes arrogated as the infallible vicegerents of Christ upon earth. But as, in virtue of this pretended prerogative, they had often dispensed with obligations which were held sacred, the interest of some men, and the credulity of others, led them to imagine that the decisions of a sovereign pontiff authorised or justified actions which would otherwise have been criminal and impious.

The discovery of Francis's intention to elude the treaty of Madrid filled the emperor with a variety of disquieting thoughts. He had treated an unfortunate prince in the most ungenerous manner; he had displayed an insatiable ambition in all his negotiations with

⁴⁸ P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. ix. a. 3, p. 217.—Recueil des Trait. ii. 124. ⁴⁹ Goldast., Polit. Imperial, p. 1002.—Pallav., Hist., p. 70.

his prisoner; he knew what censures the former had drawn upon him, and what apprehensions the latter had excited in every court of Europe; nor had he reaped from the measures which he pursued any of those advantages which politicians are apt to consider as an excuse for the most criminal conduct and a compensation for the severest reproaches. Francis was now out of his hands, and not one of all the mighty consequences which he had expected from the treaty that set him at liberty was likely to take place. His rashness in relying so far on his own judgment as to trust to the sincerity of the French king, in opposition to the sentiments of his wisest ministers, was now apparent; and he easily conjectured that the same confederacy the dread of which had induced him to set Francis at liberty would now be formed against him, with that gallant and incensed monarch at its head. Self-condemnation and shame on account of what was past, with anxious apprehensions concerning what might happen, were the necessary result of these reflections on his own conduct and situation. Charles, however, was naturally firm and inflexible in all his measures. To have receded suddenly from any article in the treaty of Madrid would have been a plain confession of imprudence and a palpable symptom of fear: he determined, therefore, that it was most suitable to his dignity to insist, whatever might be the consequences, on the strict execution of the treaty, and particularly not to accept of anything which might be offered as an equivalent for the restitution of Burgundy.⁵⁰

In consequence of this resolution, he appointed Lannoy and Alarcon to repair, as his ambassadors, to the court of France, and formally to summon the king either to execute the treaty with the sincerity that became him, or to return, according to his oath, a prisoner to Madrid. Instead of giving them an immediate answer, Francis

⁵⁰ Guic., lib. xvii. 366.

admitted the deputies of the states of Burgundy to an audience in their presence. They humbly represented to him that he had exceeded the powers vested in a king of France when he consented to alienate their country from the crown, the domains of which he was bound by his coronation oath to preserve entire and unimpaired. Francis, in return, thanked them for their attachment to his crown, and entreated them, though very faintly, to remember the obligations which he lay under to fulfil his engagements with the emperor. The deputies, assuming a higher tone, declared that they would not obey commands which they considered as illegal; and if he should abandon them to the enemies of France they had resolved to defend themselves to the best of their power, with a firm purpose rather to perish than submit to a foreign dominion. Upon which Francis, turning towards the imperial ambassadors, represented to them the impossibility of performing what he had undertaken, and offered, in lieu of Burgundy, to pay the emperor two millions of crowns. The viceroy and Alarcon, who easily perceived that the scene to which they had been witnesses was concerted between the king and his subjects in order to impose upon them, signified to him their master's fixed resolution not to depart in the smallest point from the terms of the treaty, and withdrew.⁶¹ Before they left the kingdom, they had the mortification to hear the holy league against the emperor published with great solemnity.

Charles no sooner received an account of this confederacy than he exclaimed, in the most public manner and in the harshest terms, against Francis, as a prince void of faith and of honour. He complained no less of Clement, whom he solicited in vain to abandon his new allies; he accused him of ingratitude; he taxed him with an ambition unbecoming his character; he

⁶¹ Balcar., *Comment. de Reb. Gal.*, 573.—*Mém. de Bellay*, p. 97.

threatened him not only with all the vengeance which the power of an emperor can inflict ; but, by appeal to a general council, called up before his eyes all terrors arising from the authority of those assemblies so formidable to the papal see. It was necessary, however, to oppose something else than reproaches and threats to the powerful combination formed against him ; and the emperor, prompted by so many passions, did not fail to exert himself with unusual vigour, in order to send supplies, not only of men, but of money, which was still more needed, into Italy.

On the other hand, the efforts of the confederates bore no proportion to that animosity against the emperor with which they seemed to enter into the Holy League. Francis, it was thought, would have infused spirit and vigour into the whole body. He had his honour to repair, many injuries to revenge, and his station among the princes of Europe, from which he had fallen, to recover. From all these powerful incitements added to the natural impetuosity of his temper, a violence more fierce and bloody than any that he had hitherto made upon his rival was expected. But Francis had gone through such a scene of distress, and the impression he had made was still so fresh in his memory, that he had become diffident himself, distrustful of fortune, and desirous of tranquillity. To procure the release of his son, and to avoid the restitution of Burgundy by paying some reasonable equivalent, were his chief objects ; and in the sake of these he would willingly have sacrificed Sforza, and the liberties of Italy, to the emperor. He flattered himself that the dread of the confederacy which he had formed would of itself induce Charles to listen to what was equitable, and was afraid of employing any considerable force for the relief of the Milanese, lest his allies, whom he had often found to be more attentive to their own interest than punctual in fulfilling

their engagements, should abandon him as soon as the imperialists were driven out of that country, and deprive his negotiations with the emperor of that weight which they derived from his being at the head of a powerful league. In the meantime, the castle of Milan was pressed more closely than ever, and Sforza was now reduced to the last extremity. The pope and Venetians, trusting to Francis's concurrence, commanded their troops to take the field in order to relieve him; and an army more than sufficient for that service was soon formed. The Milanese, passionately attached to their unfortunate duke, and no less exasperated against the imperialists, who had oppressed them so cruelly, were ready to aid the confederates in all their enterprises. But the duke d'Urbino, their general, naturally slow and indecisive, and restrained, besides, by his ancient enmity to the family of Medici from taking any step that might aggrandize or add reputation to the pope,⁵² lost some opportunities of attacking the imperialists and raising the siege, and refused to improve others. These delays gave Bourbon time to bring up a reinforcement of fresh troops and a supply of money. He immediately took the command of the army, and pushed on the siege with such vigour as quickly obliged Sforza to surrender, who, retiring to Lodi, which the confederates had surprised, left Bourbon in full possession of the rest of the duchy, the investiture of which the emperor had promised to grant him.⁵³

The Italians began now to perceive the game which Francis had played, and to be sensible that, notwithstanding all their address and refinements in negotiation, which they boasted of as talents peculiarly their own, they had for once been overreached in those very arts by a *tramontane* prince. He had hitherto thrown almost the whole burden of the war upon them, taking

⁵² Guic., lib. xvii. 382.

⁵³ Ibid., 376 etc.

advantage of their efforts in order to enforce the proposals which he often renewed at the court of Macerata for obtaining the liberty of his sons. The pope and the Venetians ex postulated and complained;⁵⁴ but, as they were not able to rouse Francis from his inactivity, their own zeal and vigour gradually abated, and Clement, having already gone farther than his timidity usually permitted him, began to accuse himself of rashness, and to relapse into his natural state of doubt and uncertainty.

All the emperor's motions, depending on himself alone, were more brisk and better concerted. The narrowness of his revenues, indeed, did not allow him to make any sudden or great effort in the field, but abundantly supplied that defect by his intrigues and negotiations. The family of Colonna, the most powerful of all the Roman barons, had adhered uniformly to the Ghibelline or imperial faction during those fierce contentions between the popes and emperors which several ages filled Italy and Germany with discord and bloodshed. Though the causes which at first gave birth to these destructive factions existed no longer, and the rage with which they had been animated was in a great measure spent, the Colonnas still retained their attachment to the imperial interest, and, by placing themselves under the protection of the emperors, secured the quiet possession of their own territories and privileges. The Cardinal Pompeo Colonna, a man of turbulent and ambitious temper, at that time the head of the family, had long been Clement's rival, to whom influence in the last conclave he imputed the appointment of all his schemes for attaining the papal dignity, of which, from his known connection with the emperor, he thought himself secure. To an aspiring mind, this was an injury too great to be forgiven; and

"Ruscelli, *Lettere de' Principi*, ii. 157, etc., 159, 160-168.

though he had dissembled his resentment so far as to vote for Clement at his election, and to accept of great offices in his court, he waited with the utmost impatience for an opportunity of being revenged. Don Hugo de Moncada, the imperial ambassador at Rome, who was no stranger to these sentiments, easily persuaded him that now was the time, while all the papal troops were employed in Lombardy, to attempt something which would at once avenge his own wrongs and be of essential service to the emperor his patron. The pope, however, whose timidity rendered him quick-sighted, was so attentive to their operations, and began to be alarmed so early, that he might have drawn together troops sufficient to have disconcerted all Colonna's measures. But Moncada amused him so artfully with negotiations, promises, and false intelligence that he lulled asleep all his suspicions, and prevented his taking any of the precautions necessary for his safety; and, to the disgrace of a prince, possessed of great power as well as renowned for political wisdom, Colonna, at the head of three thousand men, seized one of the gates of his capital while he, imagining himself to be in perfect security, was altogether unprepared for resisting such a feeble enemy. The inhabitants of Rome permitted Colonna's troops, from whom they apprehended no injury, to advance without opposition; the pope's guards were dispersed in a moment; and Clement himself, terrified at the danger, ashamed of his own credulity, and deserted by almost every person, fled with precipitation into the castle of St. Angelo, which was immediately invested. The palace of the Vatican, the church of St. Peter, and the houses of the pope's ministers and servants were plundered in the most licentious manner. The rest of the city was left unmolested. Clement, destitute of every thing necessary either for subsistence or

defence, was soon obliged to demand a capitulation, and Moncada, being admitted into the castle, scribed to him, with all the haughtiness of a conqueror, conditions which it was not in his power to refuse. The chief of these was that Clement should not grant a full pardon to the Colonnas, but receive them into favour, and immediately withdraw all the troops in his pay from the army of the confederates in Lombardy.⁵⁵

The Colonnas, who talked of nothing less than deposing Clement and of placing Pompeo, their kinsman, in the vacant chair of St. Peter, exclaimed loudly against a treaty which left them at the mercy of the pontiff justly incensed against them. But Moncada, attentive only to his master's interest, paid little regard to their complaints, and by this fortunate measure broke entirely the power of the confederates.

While the army of the confederates suffered such a considerable diminution, the imperialists received two great reinforcements; one from Spain, under the command of Lannoy and Alarcon, which amounted to six thousand men; the other was raised in the empire by General Fronsperg, a German nobleman, who, having served Italy with great reputation, had acquired such influence and popularity that multitudes of his countrymen, impatient on every occasion of engaging in military enterprises, and impatient at that juncture to escape from the opposition which they felt in religious as well as civil matters, crowded to his standard; so that, without any other inducement than the payment of a crown to each man, four thousand enlisted in his service. To these the Archduke Ferdinand added two thousand horse, levied in the Austrian dominions. But although the emperor had raised troops, he could not remit the sums necessary

⁵⁵ Jovii Vita Pomp. Colon.—Guic., lib. xvii. 407.—Ruscelli, Lib. de' Principi, i. p. 104.

their support. His ordinary revenues were exhausted; the credit of princes, during the infancy of commerce, was not extensive; and the cortes of Castile, though every art had been tried to gain them, and some innovations had been made in the constitution in order to secure their concurrence, peremptorily refused to grant Charles any extraordinary supply;⁵⁶ so that the more his army increased in number the more were his generals embarrassed and distressed. Bourbon, in particular, was involved in such difficulties that he stood in need of all his address and courage in order to extricate himself. Large sums were due to the Spanish troops already in the Milanese, when Fronsperg arrived with sixteen thousand hungry Germans, destitute of every thing. Both made their demands with equal fierceness, the former claiming their arrears, and the latter the pay which had been promised them on their entering Lombardy. Bourbon was altogether incapable of giving satisfaction to either. In this situation he was constrained to commit acts of violence extremely shocking to his own nature, which was generous and humane. He seized the principal citizens of Milan, and by threats, and even by torture, forced from them a considerable sum; he rifled the churches of all their plate and ornaments; the inadequate supply which these afforded he distributed among the soldiers, with so many soothing expressions of his sympathy and affection that, though it fell far short of the sums due to them, it appeased their present murmurs.⁵⁷

Among other expedients for raising money, Bourbon granted his life and liberty to Morone, who, having been kept in prison since his intrigue with Pescara, had been condemned to die by the Spanish judges empowered to try him. For this remission he paid twenty thousand ducats; and such were his singular

⁵⁶ Sandoval, i. 814.

⁵⁷ Ripamond. Hist. Mediol., lib. ix. p. 717.

talents, and the wonderful ascendant which he always acquired over the minds of those to whom he had access, that in a few days, from being Bourbon's prisoner, he became his prime confidant, with whom he consulted in all affairs of importance. To his insinuations must be imputed the suspicions which Bourbon began to entertain that the emperor had never intended to grant him the investiture of Milan, but had appointed Leyva and the other Spanish generals rather to be spies on his conduct than to co-operate heartily towards the execution of his schemes. To him likewise, as he still retained, at the age of fourscore, all the enterprising spirit of youth, may be attributed the bold and unexpected measure on which Bourbon soon after ventured.⁵⁸

Such, indeed, were the exigencies of the imperial troops in the Milanese that it became indispensably necessary to take some immediate step for their relief. The arrears of the soldiers increased daily; the emperor made no remittances to his generals; and the utmost rigour of military extortion could draw nothing more from a country entirely drained and ruined. In this situation there was no choice left but either to disband the army or to march for subsistence into the enemy's country. The territories of the Venetians lay nearest at hand; but they, with their usual foresight and prudence, had taken such precautions as secured them from any insult. Nothing, therefore, remained but to invade the dominions of the Church, or of the Florentines; and Clement had of late acted such a part as merited the severest vengeance from the emperor. No sooner did the papal troops return to Rome after the insurrection of the Colonnas, than, without paying any regard to the treaty with Moncada, he degraded the Cardinal Colonna, excommunicated the

⁵⁸ Guia, lib. xvii. 419.

rest of the family, seized their places of strength, and wasted their lands with all the cruelty which the smart of a recent injury naturally excites. After this he turned his arms against Naples, and, as his operations were seconded by the French fleet, he made some progress towards the conquest of that kingdom ; the viceroy being no less destitute than the other imperial generals of the money requisite for a vigorous defence.⁵⁹

These proceedings of the pope justified, in appearance, the measures which Bourbon's situation rendered necessary ; and he set about executing them under such disadvantages as furnish the strongest proof both of the despair to which he was reduced, and of the greatness of his abilities, which were able to surmount so many obstacles. Having committed the government of Milan to Leyva, whom he was not unwilling to leave behind, he began his march in the depth of winter, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, composed of nations differing from each other in language and manners, without money, without magazines, without artillery, without carriages,—in short, without any of those things which are necessary to the smallest party, and which seem essential to the existence and motions of a great army. His route lay through a country cut by rivers and mountains, in which the roads were almost impracticable : as an addition to his difficulties, the enemy's army, superior to his own in number, was at hand to watch all his motions and to improve every advantage. But his troops, impatient of their present hardships, and allured by the hopes of immense booty, without considering how ill provided they were for a march, followed him with great cheerfulness. His first scheme was to have made himself master of Placentia, and to have gratified his soldiers by the plunder of that

⁵⁹ Jovii Vita Pomp. Colon.—Guic., lib. xviii. 424.

city; but the vigilance of the confederate generals rendered the design abortive. Nor had he better success in his project for the reduction of Bologna, which was seasonably supplied with as many troops as secured it from the insults of an army which had neither artillery nor ammunition. Having failed in both these attempts to become master of some great city, he was under a necessity of advancing. But he had now been two months in the field; his troops had suffered every calamity that a long march, together with the uncommon rigour of the season, could bring upon men destitute of all necessary accommodations in an enemy's country; the magnificent promises to which they trusted had hitherto proved altogether vain; they saw no prospect of relief; their patience, tried to the utmost, failed at last, and they broke out into open mutiny. Some officers, who rashly attempted to restrain them, fell victims to their fury: Bourbon himself, not daring to appear during the first transports of their rage, was obliged to fly secretly from his quarters.^{**} But this sudden ebullition of wrath began at last to subside, when Bourbon, who possessed in a wonderful degree the art of governing the minds of soldiers, renewed his promises with more confidence than formerly, and assured them that they would be soon accomplished. He endeavoured to render their hardships more tolerable by partaking of them himself; he fared no better than the meanest sentinel; he marched along with them on foot; he joined them in singing their camp ballads, in which, with high praises of his valour, they mingled many strokes of military raillery on his poverty; and wherever they came, he allowed them, as a foretaste of what he had promised, to plunder the adjacent villages at discretion. Encouraged by all these soothing arts, they entirely for-

^{**} Guia, lib. xviii. 434.—Jovii Vit. Colon., 162.

got their sufferings and complaints, and followed him with the same implicit confidence as formerly.⁶¹

Bourbon, meanwhile, carefully concealed his intentions. Rome and Florence, not knowing on which the blow would fall, were held in the most disquieting state of suspense. Clement, equally solicitous for the safety of both, fluctuated in more than his usual uncertainty ; and while the rapid approach of danger called for prompt and decisive measures, he spent the time in deliberations which came to no issue, or in taking resolutions which next day his restless mind, more sagacious in discerning than in obviating difficulties, overturned, without being able to fix on what should be substituted in their place. At one time he determined to unite himself more closely than ever with his allies, and to push on the war with vigour ; at another, he inclined to bring all differences to a final accommodation by a treaty with Lannoy, who, knowing his passion for negotiation, solicited him incessantly with proposals for that purpose. His timidity at length prevailed, and led him to conclude an agreement with Lannoy, of which the following were the chief articles : That a suspension of arms should take place between the pontifical and imperial troops for eight months ; that Clement should advance sixty thousand crowns towards satisfying the demands of the imperial army ; that the Colonnas should be absolved from censure, and their former dignities and possessions be restored to them ; that the viceroy should come to Rome, and prevent Bourbon from approaching nearer to that city or to Florence.⁶² On this hasty treaty, which deprived him of all hopes of assistance from his allies, without affording him any solid foundation of security, Clement relied so firmly that, like a man extricated at once out of all difficulties, he was at perfect ease, and, in the

^a Œuvres de Brant, vol. iv. p. 246, etc.

^b Guic., lib. xviii. 436.

fulness of his confidence, disbanded all his troops, except as many as were sufficient to guard his own person. This amazing confidence of Clement, who on every other occasion was fearful and suspicious to excess, appeared so unaccountable to Giocardi, who, being at that time the pontifical commissary-general and resident in the confederate army, had great opportunities, as well as great abilities, for observing how chimerical all his hopes were, that he imputes the pope's conduct at this juncture wholly to infatuation, which those who are doomed to ruin cannot avoid.⁶³

Lannoy, it would seem, intended to have executed the treaty with great sincerity, and, having detached Clement from the confederacy, wished to turn Bourbon's army against the Venetians, who, of all the powers at war with the emperor, had exerted the greatest vigour. With this view, he despatched a courier to Bourbon, informing him of the suspension of arms which, in the name of their common master, he had concluded with the pope. Bourbon had other schemes, and he had prosecuted them now too far to think of retreating. To have mentioned a retreat to his soldiers would have been dangerous; his command was independent of Lannoy; he was fond of mortifying a man whom he had many reasons to hate: for these reasons, without paying the least regard to the message, he continued to ravage the ecclesiastical territories and to advance towards Florence. Upon this, all Clement's terror and anxiety returning with new force, he had recourse to Lannoy, and entreated and conjured him to put a stop to Bourbon's progress. Lannoy accordingly set out for his camp, but durst not approach it; Bourbon's soldiers, having got notice of the truce, raged and threatened, demanding the accomplishment of the promises to which they had trusted; their general himself could hardly restrain them; every

⁶³ Guic., lib. xviii. 446.

person in Rome perceived that nothing remained but to prepare for resisting a storm which it was now impossible to dispel. Clement alone, relying on some ambiguous and deceitful professions which Bourbon made of his inclination towards peace, sunk back into his former security.⁶⁴

Bourbon, on his part, was far from being free from solicitude. All his attempts on any place of importance had hitherto miscarried; and Florence, towards which he had been approaching for some time, was, by the arrival of the duke d'Urbino's army, put in a condition to set his power at defiance. As it now became necessary to change his route, and to take instantly some new resolution, he fixed without hesitation on one which was no less daring in itself than it was impious, according to the opinion of that age. This was to assault and plunder Rome. Many reasons, however, prompted him to it. He was fond of thwarting Lannoy, who had undertaken for the safety of that city; he imagined that the emperor would be highly pleased to see Clement, the chief author of the league against him, humbled; he flattered himself that by gratifying the rapacity of his soldiers with such immense booty he would attach them forever to his interest; or (which is still more probable than any of these) he hoped that by means of the power and fame which he would acquire from the conquest of the first city in Christendom he might lay the foundation of an independent power, and that, after shaking off all connection with the emperor, he might take possession of Naples, or of some of the Italian states, in his own name.⁶⁵

Whatever his motives were, he executed his resolution with a rapidity equal to the boldness with which he had formed it. His soldiers, now that they had

⁶⁴ Guic., lib. xviii. 437, etc.—
Mém. de Bellay, p. 100.

⁶⁵ Brant., iv. 271, vi. 189.—
Belcarii Comment., 594.

their prey full in view, complained neither of fatigue, nor famine, nor want of pay. No sooner did they begin to move from Tuscany towards Rome than the pope, sensible at last how fallacious the hopes had been on which he reposed, started from his security. But no time now remained, even for a bold and decisive pontiff, to have taken proper measures or to have formed any effectual plan of defence. Under Clement's feeble conduct, all was consternation, disorder, and irresolution. He collected, however, such of his disbanded soldiers as still remained in the city; he armed the artificers of Rome, and the footmen and train-bearers of the cardinals; he repaired the breaches in the walls; he began to erect new works; he excommunicated Bourbon and all his troops, branding the Germans with the name of Lutherans, and the Spaniards with that of Moors.⁶⁶ Trusting to these ineffectual military preparations, or to his spiritual arms, which were still more despised by rapacious soldiers, he seems to have laid aside his natural timidity, and, contrary to the advice of all his counsellors, determined to wait the approach of an enemy whom he might easily have avoided by a timely retreat.

Bourbon, who saw the necessity of despatch, now that his intentions were known, advanced with such speed that he gained several marches on the duke d'Urbino's army, and encamped in the plains of Rome on the evening of the 5th of May. From thence he showed his soldiers the palaces and churches of that city, into which, as the capital of the Christian commonwealth, the riches of all Europe had flowed during many centuries, without having been once violated by any hostile hand, and, commanding them to refresh themselves that night, as a preparation for the assault next day, pro-

⁶⁶ Seckend., lib. ii. 68.

mised them, in reward of their toils and valour, the possession of all the treasures accumulated there.

Early in the morning, Bourbon, who had determined to distinguish that day either by his death or the success of his enterprise, appeared at the head of his troops clad in complete armour, above which he wore a vest of white tissue, that he might be more conspicuous both to his friends and to his enemies; and, as all depended on one bold impression, he led them instantly to scale the walls. Three distinct bodies, one of Germans, another of Spaniards, and the last of Italians, the three different nations of whom the army was composed, were appointed to this service; a separate attack was assigned to each; and the whole army advanced to support them, as occasion should require. A thick mist concealed their approach until they reached almost the brink of the ditch which surrounded the suburbs; having planted their ladders in a moment, each brigade rushed on the assault with an impetuosity heightened by national emulation. They were received at first with fortitude equal to their own: the Swiss in the pope's guards, and the veteran soldiers who had been assembled, fought with a courage becoming men to whom the defence of the noblest city in the world was intrusted. Bourbon's troops, notwithstanding all their valour, gained no ground, and even began to give way; when their leader, perceiving that on this critical moment the fate of the day depended, leaped from his horse, crossed to the front, snatched a scaling-ladder from a soldier, planted it against the wall, and began to mount it, encouraging his men with his voice and hand to follow him. But at that very instant a musket-bullet from the ramparts pierced his groin with a wound which he immediately felt to be mortal; but he retained so much presence of mind as to desire those who were near him to cover his body with a cloak, that his death might

not dishearten his troops ; and soon after he expired, with a courage worthy of a better cause, and which would have entitled him to the highest praise if he had thus fallen in defence of his country, not at the head of its enemies.⁶⁷

This fatal event could not be concealed from the army ; the soldiers soon missed their general, whom they were accustomed to see in every time of danger ; but, instead of being disheartened by their loss, it animated them with new valour ; the name of Bourbon resounded along the line, accompanied with the cry of *blood* and *revenge*. The veterans who defended the walls were soon overpowered by numbers ; the untrained body of city recruits fled at the sight of danger, and the enemy, with irresistible violence, rushed into the town.

During the combat, Clement was employed at the high altar of St. Peter's church in offering up to Heaven unavailing prayers for victory. No sooner was he informed that his troops began to give way than he fled with precipitation ; and, with an infatuation still more amazing than any thing already mentioned, instead of making his escape by the opposite gate, where there was no enemy to oppose it, he shut himself up, together with thirteen cardinals, the foreign ambassadors, and many persons of distinction, in the castle of St. Angelo, which, from his late misfortune, he might have known to be an insecure retreat. In his way from the Vatican to that fortress he saw his troops flying before an enemy who pursued without giving quarter ; he heard the cries and lamentations of the Roman citizens, and beheld the beginning of those calamities which his own credulity and ill conduct had brought upon his subjects.⁶⁸

It is impossible to describe, or even to imagine, the

⁶⁷ Mém. de Bellay, 101.—Guic., Brant., iv. 257, etc.
lib. xviii. p. 445, etc.—Œuvres de ⁶⁸ Jov. Vit. Colon., 165.

misery and horror of that scene which followed. Whatever a city taken by storm can dread from military rage unrestrained by discipline, whatever excesses the ferocity of the Germans, the avarice of the Spaniards, or the licentiousness of the Italians could commit, these wretched inhabitants were obliged to suffer. Churches, palaces, and the houses of private persons were plundered without distinction. No age, or character, or sex, was exempt from injury. Cardinals, nobles, priests, matrons, virgins, were all the prey of soldiers, and at the mercy of men deaf to the voice of humanity. Nor did these outrages cease, as is usual in towns which are carried by assault, when the first fury of the storm was over: the Imperialists kept possession of Rome several months; and during all that time the insolence and brutality of the soldiers hardly abated. Their booty in ready money alone amounted to a million of ducats; what they raised by ransoms and exactions far exceeded that sum. Rome, though taken several different times by the Northern nations, who overran the empire in the fifth and sixth centuries, was never treated with so much cruelty by the barbarous and heathen Huns, Vandals, or Goths, as now by the bigoted subjects of a Catholic monarch.⁶⁹

After Bourbon's death, the command of the imperial army devolved on Philibert de Châlons, prince of Orange, who with difficulty prevailed on as many of his soldiers to desist from the pillage as were necessary to invest the castle of St. Angelo. Clement was immediately sensible of his error in having retired into that ill-provided and untenable fort. But as the imperialists, scorning discipline, and intent only on plunder, pushed the siege with little vigour, he did not despair

* Jov. Vit. Colon, 166.—Guic., lib. xviii. 440, etc.—Comment de Capta Urbe Romæ, ap. Scardium,

ii. 230.—Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., p. 110, etc.—Giannone, Hist. of Nap., b. xxxi. c. 3, p. 507.

of holding out until the duke d'Urbino could come to his relief. That general advanced at the head of an army composed of Venetians, Florentines, and Swiss, in the pay of France, of sufficient strength to have delivered Clement from the present danger. But D'Urbino, preferring the indulgence of his hatred against the family of Medici to the glory of delivering the capital of Christendom and the head of the Church, pronounced the enterprise to be too hazardous, and, from an exquisite refinement in revenge, having marched forward so far that his army, being seen from the ramparts of St. Angelo, flattered the pope with the prospect of certain relief, he immediately wheeled about, and retired.⁷⁰ Clement, deprived of every resource, and reduced to such extremity of famine as to feed on asses' flesh,⁷¹ was obliged to capitulate on such conditions as the conquerors were pleased to prescribe. He agreed to pay four hundred thousand ducats to the army, to surrender to the emperor all the places of strength belonging to the Church, and, besides giving hostages, to remain a prisoner himself until the chief articles were performed. He was committed to the care of Alarcon, who by his severe vigilance in guarding Francis had given full proof of his being qualified for that office; and thus, by a singular accident, the same man had the custody of the two most illustrious personages who had been made prisoners in Europe during several ages.

The account of this extraordinary and unexpected event was no less surprising than agreeable to the emperor. But in order to conceal his joy from his subjects, who were filled with horror at the success and crimes of their countrymen, and to lessen the indignation of the rest of Europe, he declared that Rome had been assaulted without any order from him. He wrote

⁷⁰ Guic., lib. xviii. 450.

⁷¹ Jov. Vit. Colon., 167.

to all the princes with whom he was in alliance, disclaiming his having had any knowledge of Bourbon's intention.⁷² He put himself and court into mourning; commanded the rejoicings which had been ordered for the birth of his son Philip to be stopped; and, employing an artifice no less hypocritical than gross, he appointed prayers and processions throughout all Spain for the recovery of the pope's liberty, which, by an order to his generals, he could have immediately granted him.⁷³

The good fortune of the house of Austria was no less conspicuous in another part of Europe. Solyman having invaded Hungary with an army of three hundred thousand men, Lewis II., king of that country and of Bohemia, a weak and unexperienced prince, advanced rashly to meet him with a body of men which did not amount to thirty thousand. With an imprudence still more unpardonable, he gave the command of these troops to Paul Tomorri, a Franciscan monk, archbishop of Golocza. This awkward general, in the dress of his order, girt with its cord, marched at the head of the troops; and, hurried on by his own presumption, as well as by the impetuosity of nobles who despised danger but were impatient of long service, he fought the fatal battle of Mohacz, in which the king, the flower of the Hungarian nobility, and upwards of twenty thousand men, fell, the victims of his folly and ill conduct. Solyman, after his victory, seized and kept possession of several towns of the greatest strength in the southern provinces of Hungary, and, overrunning the rest of the country, carried near two hundred thousand persons into captivity. As Lewis was the last male of the royal family of Jagellon, the Archduke Ferdinand claimed both his crowns. This claim was

⁷² Ruscelli, *Lettere de' Principi*, ii. 234.

⁷³ Sleid., 109.—Sandoval, i. 822.—Mauroe. *Hist. Veneta*, lib. iii. 220.

founded on a double title; the one derived from ancient pretensions of the house of Austria to kingdoms, the other from the right of his wife, only sister of the deceased monarch. The feudal institutions, however, subsisted both in Hungary and Ferdinand's rights, if they had not been powerfully supported, would have met with little respect. But his own personal merit, the respect due to his brother of the greatest monarch in Christendom, the necessity of choosing a prince able to afford his subjects some additional protection against the Turkish arms, which, as they had recently felt their power, they greatly dreaded, together with the intrigues of his sister, who had been married to the late King of Poland, overcame the prejudices which the Hungarians conceived against the archduke as a foreigner, though a considerable party voted for the Vaywod of Transylvania, at length secured Ferdinand the throne of that kingdom. The states of Bohemia imitated the example of their neighbour kingdom; but, in order to ascertain and secure their own privileges, they obliged Ferdinand, before his coronation, to subscribe a charter which they term a *reverse*, declaring that he held the crown not by any previous right, but by their gratuitous and voluntary election. By such a vast accession of territories, the hereditary possession of which was secured in process of time to their family, the power of the house of Austria attained that pre-eminent and despotic power which hath rendered them so formidable to the rest of Germany.⁷⁴

The dissensions between the pope and emperors

⁷⁴ Steph. Broderick Pro cancellarii Hungar.—Clades in Campo Mohacz, ap. Scardium, ii. 218.—P. Barre,

Hist. d' Allemagne, tom. vi. i. p. 198.

proved extremely favourable to the progress of Lutheranism. Charles, exasperated by Clement's conduct, and fully employed in opposing the league which he had formed against him, had little inclination, and less leisure, to take any measures for suppressing the new opinions in Germany. In a diet of the empire held at Spires, the state of religion came to be considered, and all that the emperor required of the princes was that they would wait patiently, and without encouraging innovations, for the meeting of a general council, which he had demanded of the pope. They, in return, acknowledged the convocation of a council to be the proper and regular step towards reforming abuses in the Church, but contended that a national council held in Germany would be more effectual for that purpose than what he had proposed. To his advice concerning the discouragement of innovations they paid so little regard that, even during the meeting of the diet at Spires, the divines who attended the elector of Saxony and landgrave of Hesse-Cassel thither preached publicly, and administered the sacraments, according to the rites of the Reformed Church.⁷⁵ The emperor's own example emboldened the Germans to treat the papal authority with little reverence. During the heat of his resentment against Clement, he had published a long reply to an angry brief which the pope had intended as an apology for his own conduct. In this manifesto, the emperor, after having enumerated many instances of that pontiff's ingratitude, deceit, and ambition, all which he painted in the strongest and most aggravated colours, appealed from him to a general council. At the same time he wrote to the college of cardinals, complaining of Clement's partiality and injustice, and requiring them, if he refused or delayed to call a council, to show their concern for the peace

⁷⁵ Sleid., 103.

of the Christian Church, so shamefully neglected by its chief pastor, by summoning that assembly in their own name.⁷⁶ This manifesto, little inferior in virulence to the invectives of Luther himself, was dispersed over Germany with great industry, and, being eagerly read by persons of every rank, did much more than counterbalance the effect of all Charles's declarations against the new opinions.

* Goldast, *Polit. Imper.*, p. 984.

BOOK V.

General Indignation and Confederacy against the Emperor.—The Florentines.—The French Army in Italy.—The Emperor sets the Pope at Liberty, and makes Pacific Overtures.—A Royal Challenge.—Retreat of the Imperial Army from Rome.—The French besiege Naples.—Revolt of Andrew Doria.—Freedom of Genoa.—Operations in the Milanese.—Treaty between the Pope and the Emperor, and between Charles and Francis.—Henry VIII. seeks a Divorce from his Queen, Catharine of Aragon.—Charles visits Italy and re-establishes the Power of the Medici.—Returns to Germany.—The Diet of Spires.—The Protest.—The Diet of Augsburg.—Decree against the Protestants.—Charles makes his Brother Ferdinand King of the Romans.—Negotiations of the Protestants.—The Campaign in Hungary.—Conference between the Emperor and the Pope.—Movements of the French King.—Henry divorced from Queen Catharine by the Archbishop, and excommunicated by the Pope.—Papal Authority abolished in England.—Death of Clement VII.—Pope Paul III.—Insurrection of the Anabaptists in Germany.—They become Masters of Munster.—John of Leyden crowned King.—Confederacy against him.—Munster besieged and taken.—The League of Smalkalde.—Expedition of the Emperor to Africa.—The Barbary States.—The Barbarossas.—Conquest of Tunis.—The Emperor besieges Goletta, defeats Barbarossa, and restores the King of Tunis.

THE account of the cruel manner in which the pope had been treated filled all Europe with astonishment or horror. To see a Christian emperor, who, by possessing that dignity, ought to have been the protector and advocate of the holy see, lay violent hands on him who represented Christ on earth, and detain his sacred person in a rigorous captivity, was considered as an impiety that merited the severest vengeance and which called for the immediate interposition of every dutiful son of the Church. Francis and Henry, alarmed at the progress of the imperial arms in Italy, had, even

before the taking of Rome, entered into a closer alliance, and, in order to give some check to the emperor's ambition, had agreed to make a vigorous diversion in the Low Countries. The force of every motive which had influenced them at that time was now increased; and to these was added the desire of rescuing the pope out of the emperor's hands, a measure no less politic than it appeared to be pious. This, however, rendered it necessary to abandon their hostile intentions against the Low Countries, and to make Italy the seat of war, as it was by vigorous operations there they might contribute most effectually towards delivering Rome and setting Clement at liberty. Francis, being now sensible that in his system with regard to the affairs of Italy the spirit of refinement had carried him too far, and that by an excess of remissness he had allowed Charles to attain advantages which he might easily have prevented, was eager to make reparation for an error of which he was not often guilty, by an activity more suitable to his temper. Henry thought his interposition necessary in order to hinder the emperor from becoming master of all Italy, and acquiring by that means such superiority of power as would enable him for the future to dictate without control to the other princes of Europe. Wolsey, whom Francis had taken care to secure by flattery and presents, the certain methods of gaining his favour, neglected nothing that could incense his master against the emperor. Besides all these public considerations, Henry was influenced by one of a more private nature: having begun about this time to form his great scheme of divorcing Catharine of Aragon, towards the execution of which he knew that the sanction of papal authority would be necessary, he was desirous to acquire as much merit as possible with Clement, by appearing to be the chief instrument of his deliverance.

The negotiation, between princes thus disposed, was

not tedious. Wolsey himself conducted it, on the part of his sovereign, with unbounded powers. Francis treated with him in person at Amiens, where the cardinal appeared, and was received with royal magnificence. A marriage between the duke of Orleans and the princess Mary was agreed to as the basis of the confederacy; it was resolved that Italy should be the theatre of war; the strength of the army which should take the field, as well as the contingent of troops or of money which each prince should furnish, were settled; and if the emperor did not accept of the proposals which they were jointly to make him, they bound themselves immediately to declare war, and to begin hostilities. Henry, who took every resolution with impetuosity, entered so eagerly into this new alliance that, in order to give Francis the strongest proof of his friendship and respect, he formally renounced the ancient claim of the English monarchs to the crown of France, which had long been the pride and ruin of the nation; as a full compensation for which, he accepted a pension of fifty thousand crowns, to be paid annually to himself and his successors.¹

The pope, being unable to fulfil the conditions of his capitulation, still remained a prisoner, under the severe custody of Alarcon. The Florentines no sooner heard of what had happened at Rome than they ran to arms in a tumultuous manner, expelled the cardinal di Cortona, who governed their city in the pope's name, defaced the arms of the Medici, broke in pieces the statues of Leo and Clement, and, declaring themselves a free state, re-established their ancient popular government. The Venetians, taking advantage of the calamity of their ally the pope, seized Ravenna, and other places belonging to the Church, under pretext of keeping them in deposit. The dukes of Urbino and

¹ Herbert, 83, etc.—Rym. Fœd., xiv. 203.

Ferrara laid hold likewise on part of the spoils of the unfortunate pontiff, whom they considered as irreparably ruined.²

Lannoy, on the other hand, laboured to derive solid benefit from that unforeseen event which gave such splendour and superiority to his master's army. For this purpose he marched to Rome, together with Moncada and the marquis del Guasto, at the head of the troops which they could assemble in the kingdom of Naples. The arrival of this reinforcement brought new calamities on the unhappy citizens of Rome. The soldiers, envying the wealth of their companions, imitated their license, and with the utmost rapidity gathered the gleanings which had escaped the avarice of the Spaniards and Germans. There was not any army in Italy capable of making head against these imperialists; and nothing more was requisite to render Bologna and the other towns in the ecclesiastical states than to have appeared before them. But the soldiery, having been so long accustomed, under Bourbon, to an entire relaxation of discipline, and having tasted the sweets of living at discretion in a great city, and without the control of a superior, were become so discontented of military subordination, and so averse to service, that they refused to leave Rome unless all their arrears were paid,—a condition which they knew to be impossible. At the same time they declared that they would not obey any other person than the prince of Orange, whom the army had chosen general. Lannoy, finding that it was no longer safe for him to remain among such treacherous troops who despised his dignity and hated his person, returned to Naples; soon after, the marquis del Guasto and Moncada thought it prudent to quit Italy for the same reason. The prince of Orange, a general only in name, and by the most precarious of all tem-

the good will of soldiers whom success and license had rendered capricious, was obliged to pay more attention to their humours than they did to his commands. Thus the emperor, instead of reaping any of the advantages which he might have expected from the reduction of Rome, had the mortification to see the most formidable body of troops that he had ever brought into the field continue in a state of inactivity from which it was impossible to rouse them.*

This gave the king of France and the Venetians leisure to form new schemes and to enter into new engagements for delivering the pope and preserving the liberties of Italy. The newly-restored republic of Florence very imprudently joined with them, and Lautrec, of whose abilities the Italians entertained a much more favourable opinion than his own master, was, in order to gratify them, appointed generalissimo of the league. It was with the utmost reluctance he undertook the office, being unwilling to expose himself a second time to the difficulties and disgraces which the negligence of the king or the malice of his favourites might bring upon him. The best troops in France marched under his command, and the king of England, though he had not yet declared war against the emperor, advanced a considerable sum towards carrying on the expedition. Lautrec's first operations were prudent, vigorous, and successful. By the assistance of Andrew Doria, the ablest sea-officer of that age, he rendered himself master of Genoa, and re-established in that republic the faction of the Fregosi, together with the dominion of France. He obliged Alexander to surrender after a short siege, and reduced all the country on that side of the Tessino. He took Pavia, which had so long resisted the arms of his sovereign, by assault, and plundered it with that cruelty which the memory of the fatal disaster that had befallen

* Guic., lib. xviii. 454.

the French nation before its walls naturally ins
All the Milanese, which Antonio de Leyva def
with a small body of troops kept together and
ported by his own address and industry, must
soon submitted to his power if he had continued to
the force of his arms against that country. But La
durst not complete a conquest which would have been
honourable to himself and of such advantage to
league. Francis knew his confederates to be more
sirous of circumscribing the imperial power in
than of acquiring new territories for him, and was
that if Sforza were once re-established in Milan
would second but coldly the attack which he intended
to make on the kingdom of Naples. For this reason
instructed Lautrec not to push his operations with
much vigour in Lombardy; and happily the impo
ties of the pope and the solicitations of the Florentines,
the one for relief and the other for protection, were
urgent as to furnish him with a decent pretext for
marching forward without yielding to the entreaties
the Venetians and Sforza, who insisted on his laying
siege to Milan.⁴

While Lautrec advanced slowly towards Rome, the emperor had time to deliberate concerning the disposal of the pope's person, who still remained a prisoner in the castle of St. Angelo. Notwithstanding the spiritual veil of religion with which he usually endeavoured to cover his actions, Charles in many instances appears to have been but little under the influence of religious considerations, and had frequently, on this occasion, expressed an inclination to transport the pope to Spain, that he might indulge his ambition without the spectacle of the two most illustrious personages in Europe successively prisoners in his court. But

⁴ Guicciardini, lib. xviii. 461.—Bellay, 107, etc.—Mauroc., Hist. lib. iii. 238.

fear of giving new offence to all Christendom, and of filling his own subjects with horror, obliged him to forego that satisfaction.⁵ The progress of the confederates made it now necessary either to set the pope at liberty or to remove him to some place of confinement more secure than the castle of St. Angelo. Many considerations induced him to prefer the former, particularly his want of the money requisite as well for recruiting his army as for paying off the vast arrears due to it. In order to obtain this, he had assembled the cortes of Castile at Valladolid about the beginning of the year, and, having laid before them the state of his affairs and represented the necessity of making great preparations to resist the enemies whom envy at the success which had crowned his arms would unite against him, he demanded a large supply in the most pressing terms; but the cortes, as the nation was already exhausted by extraordinary donatives, refused to load it with any new burden, and, in spite of all his endeavours to gain or to intimidate the members, persisted in this resolution.⁶ No resource, therefore, remained but the extorting from Clement, by way of ransom, a sum sufficient for discharging what was due to his troops, without which it was vain to mention to them their leaving Rome.

Nor was the pope inactive on his part, or his intrigues unsuccessful towards hastening such a treaty. By flattery, and the appearance of unbounded confidence, he disarmed the resentment of cardinal Colonna, and wrought upon his vanity, which made him desirous of showing the world that, as his power had at first depressed the pope, it could now raise him to his former dignity. By favours and promises he gained Morone, who, by one of those whimsical revolutions which occur so often in his life, and which so strongly display his

⁵ Guic., lib. xviii. 457.

⁶ Sandoval, i. 814.

character, had now recovered his credit and authority with the imperialists. The address and influence of such men easily removed all the obstacles which retarded an accommodation, and brought the treaty of Clement's liberty to a conclusion, upon conditions indeed, but not more severe than a prince in his situation had reason to expect. He was obliged to advance, ready money, a hundred thousand crowns for the use of the army, to pay the same sum at the distance of a fortnight, and, at the end of three months, a hundred and fifty thousand more. He engaged not to take part in the war against Charles, either in Lombardy or Naples; he granted him a bull of cruzado, and the tenth of ecclesiastical revenues in Spain; and he not only gave hostages, but put the emperor in possession of several towns, as a security for the performance of the articles.⁷ Having raised the first moiety by a sale of ecclesiastical dignities and benefices, and other expedients equally uncanonical, a day was fixed for delivering him from imprisonment. But Clement, impatient to be free, after a tedious confinement of six months, well as full of the suspicion and distrust natural to the unfortunate, was so much afraid that the imperialists might still throw in obstacles to put off his deliverance, that he disguised himself, on the night preceding the day when he was to be set free, in the habit of a merchant, and, Alarcon having remitted somewhat of his vigilance upon the conclusion of the treaty, he made his escape undiscovered. He arrived before next morning at Ortego, without any attendants but a single officer, and from thence wrote a letter of thanks to Lautrec, as the chief instrument of procuring him liberty.⁸

During these transactions, the ambassadors of France and England repaired to Spain, in consequence of the

⁷ Guic., lib. xviii. 467, etc.

Jov., Vit. Colon., 169.—Maur.

⁸ Guic., lib. xviii. 467, etc.—

Hist. Venet., lib. iii. 252.

treaty which Wolsey had concluded with the French king. The emperor, unwilling to draw on himself the united forces of the two monarchs, discovered an inclination to relax somewhat the rigour of the treaty of Madrid, to which hitherto he had adhered inflexibly. He offered to accept of the two millions of crowns which Francis had proposed to pay as an equivalent for the duchy of Burgundy, and to set his sons at liberty, on condition that he would recall his army out of Italy, and restore Genoa, together with the other conquests which he had made in that country. With regard to Sforza, he insisted that his fate should be determined by the judges appointed to inquire into his crimes. These propositions being made to Henry, he transmitted them to his ally, the French king, whom it more nearly concerned to examine and to answer them; and if Francis had been sincerely solicitous either to conclude peace or to preserve consistency in his own conduct, he ought instantly to have closed with overtures which differed but little from the propositions which he himself had formerly made.⁹ But his views were now much changed: his alliance with Henry, Lautrec's progress in Italy, and the superiority of his army there above that of the emperor, hardly left him room to doubt of the success of his enterprise against Naples. Full of these sanguine hopes, he was at no loss to find pretexts for rejecting or evading what the emperor had proposed. Under the appearance of sympathy with Sforza, for whose interests he had not hitherto discovered much solicitude, he again demanded the full and unconditional re-establishment of that unfortunate prince in his dominions. Under colour of its being imprudent to rely on the emperor's sincerity, he insisted that his sons should be set at liberty before the French troops left Italy or surrendered Genoa. The unreasonable-

⁹ Recueil des Traites, ii. 249.

ness of these demands, as well as the reproachful insinuations with which they were accompanied, irritated Charles to such a degree that he could hardly listen to them with patience, and, repenting of his moderation, which had made so little impression on his enemies, declared that he would not depart in the smallest article from the conditions which he had now offered. Upon this, the French and English ambassadors (for Henry had been drawn unaccountably to concur with Francis in these strange propositions) demanded and obtained their audience of leave.¹⁰

Next day, two heralds, who had accompanied the ambassadors on purpose, though they had hitherto concealed their character, having assumed the ensigns of their office, appeared in the emperor's court, and, being admitted into his presence, they, in the name of their respective masters, and with all the solemnities customary on such occasions, denounced war against him. Charles received both with a dignity suitable to his own rank, but spoke to each in a tone adapted to the sentiments which he entertained of the sovereigns. He accepted the defiance of the English monarch with a firmness tempered by some degree of decency and respect. His reply to the French king abounded with that acrimony of expression which personal rivalship, exasperated by the memory of many injuries inflicted as well as suffered, naturally suggests. He desired the French herald to acquaint his sovereign that he would henceforth consider him not only as a base violater of public faith, but as a stranger to the honour and integrity becoming a gentleman. Francis, too high-spirited to bear such an imputation, had recourse to an uncommon expedient in order to vindicate his character. He instantly sent back the herald with a *cartel* of defiance, in which he gave the emperor the lie in form, challenged

¹⁰ Rym., xiv. 200.—Herbert, 85.—Guic., lib. xviii. 471.

him to single combat, requiring him to name the time and place for the encounter, and the weapons with which he chose to fight. Charles, as he was not inferior to his rival in spirit or bravery, readily accepted the challenge; but, after several messages concerning the arrangement of all the circumstances relative to the combat, accompanied with mutual reproaches, bordering on the most indecent scurrility, all thoughts of this duel, more becoming the heroes of romance than the two greatest monarchs of their age, were entirely laid aside.¹¹

The example of two personages so illustrious drew such general attention, and carried with it so much authority, that it had considerable influence in producing an important change in manners all over Europe. Duels, as has already been observed, had long been permitted by the laws of all the European nations, and, forming a part of their jurisprudence, were authorized by the magistrate, on many occasions, as the most proper method of terminating questions with regard to property, or of deciding those which respected crimes. But single combats being considered as solemn appeals to the omniscience and justice of the Supreme Being, they were allowed only in public causes, according to the prescription of law, and carried on in a judicial form. Men accustomed to this manner of decisions in courts of justice were naturally led to apply it to personal and private quarrels. Duels, which at first could be appointed by the civil judge alone, were fought without the interposition of his authority, and in cases to which the laws did not extend. The transaction between Charles and Francis strongly countenanced this practice. Upon every affront or injury which seemed to touch his honour, a gentleman thought himself entitled to draw his sword, and to

¹¹ Recueil des Traitées, 2.—Mém. de Bellay, 103, etc.—Sandoval. Hist., i. 837.

call on his adversary to give him satisfaction. An opinion becoming prevalent among men of courage, of high spirit, and of rude manners, that offence was often given, and revenge was always produced most fatal consequences. Much of the blood in Christendom was shed; many useful lives sacrificed; and, at some periods, war itself hath been more destructive than these private contests of honour. So powerful, however, is the dominion of fashion, that neither the terror of penal laws, nor the reverence for religion, have been able entirely to abolish a practice unknown among the ancients, and not justifiable by any principle of reason; though, at the same time, it must be admitted that to this absurd custom must ascribe in some degree the extraordinary gentleness and complaisance of modern manners, and that respectful attention of one man to another, which at present renders the social intercourses of life far more agreeable and decent than among the most civilized nations of antiquity.

While the two monarchs seemed so eager to terminate their quarrel by a personal combat, Lautrec continued his operations, which promised to be more decisive. His army, which was now increased to thirty-five thousand men, advanced by great marches towards Naples. The terror of their approach, as well as the representations and the entreaties of the prince of Orange, prevailed at last on the imperial troops, though with difficulty, to quit Rome, of which they had kept session during ten months. But of that flourishing army which had entered the city, scarcely one thousand remained: the rest, cut off by the plague, or wasted by disease, the effects of their inactivity, intemperance, and debauchery, fell victims to their own crimes. Lautrec made the greatest efforts to attack them in their retreat towards the Neapolitan territories, w

¹² Guic., lib. xviii. 478.

would have finished the war at one blow. But the prudence of their leaders disappointed all his measures, and conducted them with little loss to Naples. The people of that kingdom, extremely impatient to shake off the Spanish yoke, received the French with open arms wherever they appeared to take possession; and, Gaeta and Naples excepted, hardly any place of importance remained in the hands of the imperialists. The preservation of the former was owing to the strength of its fortifications, that of the latter to the presence of the imperial army. Lautrec, however, sat down before Naples; but, finding it vain to think of reducing a city by force while defended by a whole army, he was obliged to employ the slower but less dangerous method of blockade; and, having taken measures which appeared to him effectual, he confidently assured his master that famine would soon compel the besieged to capitulate. These hopes were strongly confirmed by the defeat of a vigorous attempt made by the enemy in order to recover the command of the sea. The galleys of Andrew Doria, under the command of his nephew Philippino, guarded the mouth of the harbour. Moncada, who had succeeded Lannoy in the viceroyalty, rigged out a number of galleys superior to Doria's, manned them with a chosen body of Spanish veterans, and, going on board himself, together with the marquis del Guasto, attacked Philippino before the arrival of the Venetian and French fleets. But the Genoese admiral, by his superior skill in naval operations, easily triumphed over the valour and number of the Spaniards. The viceroy was killed, most of his fleet destroyed, and Guasto, with many officers of distinction, being taken prisoners, were put on board the captive galleys and sent by Philippino as trophies of his victory to his uncle.¹³

¹³ Guic., lib. xix. 487.—P. Heuter., lib. x. c. 2, p. 231.

Notwithstanding this flattering prospect of success many circumstances concurred to frustrate Lautrec's expectations. Clement, though he always acknowledged his being indebted to Francis for the recovery of his liberty, and often complained of the cruel treatment which he had met with from the emperor, was not influenced at this juncture by principles of gratitude; nor, which is more extraordinary, was he swayed by the desire of revenge. His past misfortunes rendered him more cautious than ever, and his recollection of the errors which he had committed increased the natural irresolution of his mind. While he amused Francis with promises, he secretly negotiated with Charles and, being solicitous above all things to re-establish his family in Florence with their ancient authority which he could not expect from Francis, who had entered into strict alliance with the new republic, leaned rather to the side of his enemy than to that of his benefactor, and gave Lautrec no assistance towards carrying on his operations. The Venetians, viewing with jealousy the progress of the French arms, were intent only upon recovering such maritime towns as the Neapolitan dominions as were to be possessed by their republic, while they were altogether careless about the reduction of Naples, on which the success of the common cause depended.¹⁴ The king of England instead of being able, as had been projected, to embarrass the emperor by attacking his territories in the Low Countries, found his subjects so averse to an unnecessary war, which would have ruined the trade of the nation, that, in order to silence their clamours and put a stop to the insurrections ready to break out among them, he was compelled to conclude a truce for eight months with the governess of the Netherlands. Francis himself, with the same unpardonable inattention

¹⁴ Guic., lib. xix. 491

¹⁵ Herbert, 90.—Rymer, xiv. 258

tion of which he had formerly been guilty and for which he had suffered so severely, neglected to make proper remittances to Lautrec for the support of his army.¹⁶

These unexpected events retarded the progress of the French, discouraging both the general and his troops; but the revolt of Andrew Doria proved a fatal blow to all their measures. That gallant officer, the citizen of a republic, and trained up from his infancy in the sea-service, retained the spirit of independence natural to the former, together with the plain, liberal manners peculiar to the latter. A stranger to the arts of submission or flattery necessary in courts, but conscious, at the same time, of his own merit and importance, he always offered his advice with freedom, and often preferred his complaints and remonstrances with boldness. The French ministers, unaccustomed to such liberties, determined to ruin a man who treated them with so little deference; and though Francis himself had a just sense of Doria's services, as well as a high esteem for his character, the courtiers, by continually representing him as a man haughty, intractable, and more solicitous to aggrandise himself than to promote the interests of France, gradually undermined the foundations of his credit, and filled the king's mind with suspicion and distrust. From thence proceeded several affronts and indignities put upon Doria. His appointments were not regularly paid; his advice, even in naval affairs, was often slighted; an attempt was made to seize the prisoners taken by his nephew in the sea-fight off Naples; all which he bore with abundance of ill-humour. But an injury offered to his country transported him beyond all bounds of patience. The French began to fortify Savona, to clear its harbour, and, removing thither some branches of trade carried

¹⁶ Guic., lib. xviii. 478.

on at Genoa, plainly showed that they intended render that town, which had been long the object jealousy and hatred to the Genoese, their rival wealth and commerce. Doria, animated with a patriotic zeal for the honour and interest of his country, remonstrated against this in the highest tone, not without threats if the measure were not instantly abandoned. This bold action, aggravated by the malice of the courtiers, and placed in the most odious light, irritated Francis to such a degree, that he commanded Barbier sieux, whom he appointed admiral of the Levant, to sail directly to Genoa with the French fleet, to arrest Doria, and to seize his galleys. This rash order, the execution of which could have been secured only by the most profound secrecy, was concealed with little care, that Doria got timely intelligence of it, and retired with all his galleys to a place of safety. Guasto, his prisoner, who had long observed and fomented his growing discontent, and had often allure him by magnificent promises to enter into the emperor's service, laid hold on this favourable opportunity. While his indignation and resentment were at the height, he prevailed on him to despatch one of his officers to the imperial court with his overtures and demands. The negotiation was not long: Charles, fully sensible of the importance of such an acquisition, granted him whatever terms he required. Doria sent back his commission, together with the collar of St Michael, to Francis, and, hoisting the imperial colours, sailed with all his galleys towards Naples, not to block up the harbour of that unhappy city, as he had formerly engaged, but to bring them protection and deliverance.

His arrival opened the communication with the seaport, and restored plenty in Naples, which was now reduced to the last extremity; and the French, having lost the

superiority at sea, were soon reduced to great straits for want of provisions. The prince of Orange, who succeeded the viceroy in the command of the imperial army, showed himself by his prudent conduct worthy of that honour which his good fortune and the death of his generals had twice acquired him. Beloved by the troops, who, remembering the prosperity which they had enjoyed under his command, served him with the utmost alacrity, he let slip no opportunity of harassing the enemy, and by continual alarms or sallies fatigued and weakened them.¹⁷ As an addition to all these misfortunes, the diseases common in that country during the sultry months began to break out among the French troops. The prisoners communicated to them the pestilence which the imperial army had brought to Naples from Rome, and it raged with such violence that few, either officers or soldiers, escaped the infection. Of the whole army, not four thousand men, a number hardly sufficient to defend the camp, were capable of doing duty;¹⁸ and, being now besieged in their turn, they suffered all the miseries from which the imperialists were delivered. Lautrec, after struggling long with so many disappointments and calamities, which preyed on his mind at the same time that the pestilence wasted his body, died, lamenting the negligence of his sovereign and the infidelity of his allies, to which so many brave men had fallen victims.¹⁹ By his death, and the indisposition of the other generals, the command devolved on the marquis de Saluces, an officer altogether unequal to such a trust. He, with troops no less dispirited than reduced, retreated in disorder to Aversa; which town being invested by the prince of Orange, Saluces was under the necessity of con-

¹⁷ Jovii Hist., lib. xxxvi. p. 31,
etc.—Siganii Vita Doriae, p. 1139.
—Bellay, 114, etc.

¹⁸ Bellay, 117, etc.
¹⁹ P. Heuter., Rerum Austr., lib.
x. c. 2, p. 231.

senting that he himself should remain a prisoner of war, that his troops should lay down their arms and colours, give up their baggage, and march under a guard through the frontiers of France. By this ignominious capitulation the wretched remains of the French army were saved; and the emperor, by his own perseverance and the good conduct of his generals, acquired once more the superiority in Italy.²⁰

The loss of Genoa followed immediately upon the ruin of the army in Naples. To deliver his country from the dominion of foreigners was Doria's high ambition, and had been his principal inducement to quit the service of France and enter into that of the emperor. A most favourable opportunity for executing this honourable enterprise now presented itself. The city of Genoa, afflicted by the pestilence, was almost deserted by its inhabitants; the French garrison, being neither regularly paid nor recruited, was reduced to an incalculable number; Doria's emissaries found that such of the citizens as remained, being weary alike of the French and imperial yoke, the rigour of which they had alternately felt, were ready to welcome him as their deliverer and to second all his measures. Things were in this promising aspect, he sailed towards the coast of Genoa; on his approach the French galleys retired, a small body of men which he landed surprised one of the gates of Genoa in the night-time; Trivulci, the French governor, with his feeble garrison, shut himself up in the citadel, and Doria took possession of the town without bloodshed or resistance. Want of provisions quickly obliged Trivulci to capitulate; the people, eager to abolish such an odious monument of their servitude, ran together with a tumultuous violence and levelled the citadel with the ground.

It was now in Doria's power to have rendered his

²⁰ Bellay, 117, etc.—Jovii Hist., lib. xxv., xxvi.

self the sovereign of his country, which he had so happily delivered from oppression. The fame of his former actions, the success of his present attempt, the attachment of his friends, the gratitude of his countrymen, together with the support of the emperor, all conspired to facilitate his attaining the supreme authority and invited him to lay hold of it. But, with a magnanimity of which there are few examples, he sacrificed all thoughts of aggrandizing himself to the virtuous satisfaction of establishing liberty in his country, the highest object at which ambition can aim. Having assembled the whole body of the people in the court before his palace, he assured them that the happiness of seeing them once more in possession of freedom was to him a full reward for all his services ; that, more delighted with the name of citizen than of sovereign, he claimed no pre-eminence or power above his equals, but remitted entirely to them the right of settling what form of government they would now choose to be established among them. The people listened to him with tears of admiration and of joy. Twelve persons were elected to new-model the constitution of the republic. The influence of Doria's virtue and example communicated itself to his countrymen : the factions which had long torn and ruined the state seemed to be forgotten ; prudent precautions were taken to prevent their reviving ; and the same form of government which hath subsisted with little variation since that time in Genoa was established with universal applause. Doria lived to a great age, beloved, respected, and honoured by his countrymen ; and, adhering uniformly to his professions of moderation, without arrogating any thing unbecoming a private citizen, he preserved a great ascendant over the councils of the republic, which owed its being to his generosity. The authority which he possessed was more flattering, as well as more satisfactory, than that derived from

sovereignty,—a dominion founded in love and in gratitude, and upheld by veneration for his virtues, not by the dread of his power. His memory is still reverenced by the Genoese; and he is distinguished in their public monuments, and celebrated in the works of their historians, by the most honourable of all appellations, THE FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY, AND THE RESTORER OF ITS LIBERTY.²¹

François, in order to recover the reputation of his arms, discredited by so many losses, made new efforts in the Milanese. But the count of St. Pol, a rash and unexperienced officer, to whom he gave the command, was no match for Antonio de Leyva, the ablest of the imperial generals. He, by his superior skill in war, checked, with a handful of men, the brisk but ill-concerted motions of the French; and, though so infirm himself that he was carried constantly in a litter, he surpassed them, when occasion required, no less in activity than in prudence. By an unexpected march, he surprised, defeated, and took prisoner the count of St. Pol, ruining the French army in the Milanese as entirely as the prince of Orange had ruined that which besieged Naples.²²

Amidst these vigorous operations in the field, each party discovered an impatient desire of peace, and continual negotiations were carried on for that purpose. The French king, discouraged and almost exhausted by so many unsuccessful enterprises, was reduced now to think of obtaining the release of his sons by concessions, not by the terror of his arms. The pope hoped to recover by a treaty whatever he had lost in the war. The emperor, notwithstanding the advantages which he had gained, had many reasons to make him wish for an

²¹ Guic., lib. xix. 498.—Sigonii Vita Doris, p. 1146.—Jovii Hist., lib. xxvi. p. 36, etc.

²² Guic., lib. xix. 520.—P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. x. c. 3, p. 233.—Mém. de Bellay, p. 121.

accommodation. Solyman, having overrun Hungary, was ready to break in upon the Austrian territories with the whole force of the East. The Reformation gaining ground daily in Germany, the princes who favoured it had entered into a confederacy which Charles thought dangerous to the tranquillity of the empire. The Spaniards murmured at a war of such unusual length, the weight of which rested chiefly on them. The variety and extent of the emperor's operations far exceeded what his revenues could support: his success hitherto had been owing chiefly to his own good fortune and to the abilities of his generals; nor could he flatter himself that they, with troops destitute of every thing necessary, would always triumph over enemies still in a condition to renew their attacks. All parties, however, were at equal pains to conceal or to dissemble their real sentiments. The emperor, that his inability to carry on the war might not be suspected, insisted on high terms in the tone of a conqueror. The pope, solicitous not to lose his present allies before he came to any agreement with Charles, continued to make a thousand protestations of fidelity to the former, while he privately negotiated with the latter. Francis, afraid that his confederates might prevent him by treating for themselves with the emperor, had recourse to many dishonourable artifices in order to turn their attention from the measures which he was taking to adjust all differences with his rival.

In this situation of affairs, when all the contending powers wished for peace but durst not venture too hastily on the steps necessary for attaining it, two ladies undertook to procure this blessing so much desired by all Europe. These were Margaret of Austria, duchess dowager of Savoy, the emperor's aunt, and Louise, Francis's mother. They agreed on an interview at Cambray, and, being lodged in two adjoining houses,

between which a communication was opened, met together without ceremony or observation, and held daily conferences, to which no person whatever was admitted. As both were profoundly skilled in business, thoroughly acquainted with the secrets of their respective courts, and possessed with perfect confidence in each other, they soon made great progress towards a final accommodation; and the ambassadors of all the confederates waited in anxious suspense to know the fate, the determination of which was entirely in the hands of those illustrious negotiators.²³

But, whatever diligence they used to hasten forward a general peace, the pope had the address and industry to get the start of his allies, by concluding at Barcelona a particular treaty for himself. The emperor, impatient to visit Italy in his way to Germany, and desirous of re-establishing tranquillity in the one country before he attempted to compose the disorders which abounded in the other, found it necessary to secure at least an alliance among the Italian states on which he might depend. That with Clement, who courted it with unabated importunity, seemed more proper than with any other. Charles, being extremely solicitous to make some reparation for the insults which he had offered to the sacred character of the pope, and to redeem past offences by new merit, granted Clement, notwithstanding all his misfortunes, terms more favourable than could have expected after a continued series of successes. Among other articles, he engaged to restore the territories belonging to the ecclesiastical state, to re-establish the dominion of the Medici in Florence, to give his natural daughter in marriage to Alexander, the head of that family, and to put it in the pope's power to decide concerning the fate of Sforza and

²³ P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. x. c. 3, p. 133.—Mém. de Bellay, 122.

possession of the Milanese. In return for these ample concessions, Clement gave the emperor the investiture of Naples without the reserve of any tribute but the present of a white steed in acknowledgment of his sovereignty, absolved all who had been concerned in assaulting and plundering Rome, and permitted Charles and his brother Ferdinand to levy the fourth of the ecclesiastical revenues throughout their dominions.²⁴

The account of this transaction quickened the negotiations at Cambray, and brought Margaret and Louise to an immediate agreement. The treaty of Madrid served as the basis of that which they concluded; the latter being intended to mitigate the rigour of the former. The chief articles were, that the emperor should not for the present demand the restitution of Burgundy, reserving, however, in full force his rights and pretensions to that duchy; that Francis should pay two millions of crowns as the ransom of his sons, and, before they were set at liberty, should restore such towns as he still held in the Milanese; that he should resign his pretensions to the sovereignty of Flanders and of Artois; that he should renounce all his pretensions to Naples, Milan, Genoa, and every other place beyond the Alps; that he should immediately consummate the marriage concluded between him and the emperor's sister Eleanora.²⁵

Thus Francis, chiefly from his impatience to procure liberty to his sons, sacrificed every thing which had at first prompted him to take arms, or which had induced him, by continuing hostilities during nine successive campaigns, to protract the war to a length hardly known in Europe before the establishment of standing armies and the imposition of exorbitant taxes became universal. The emperor, by this treaty, was rendered sole arbiter

²⁴ Guic., lib. xix. 522.

c. 3, p. 234.—Sandoval, Hist. del

²⁵ P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. x.

Emper. Car. V., ii. 28.

of the fate of Italy ; he delivered his territories in the Netherlands from an unpleasant badge of subjection ; and, after having baffled his rival in the field, he prescribed to him the conditions of peace. The different conduct and spirit with which the two monarchs carried on the operations of war led naturally to such an issue of it. Charles, inclined by temper as well as obliged by his situation, concerted all his schemes with caution, pursued them with perseverance, and, observing circumstances and events with attention, let none escape that could be improved to advantage. Francis, more enterprising than steady, undertook great designs with warmth, but often executed them with remissness, and, diverted by his pleasures or deceived by his favourites, he lost on several occasions the most promising opportunities of success. Nor had the character of the two rivals themselves greater influence on the operations of war than the opposite qualities of the generals whom they employed. Among the imperialists, valour tempered with prudence, fertility of invention, aided by experience, discernment to penetrate the designs of their enemies, a provident sagacity in conducting their own measures,—in a word, all the talents which form great commanders and insure victory,—were conspicuous. Among the French these qualities were either wanting, or the very reverse of them abounded ; nor could they boast of one man (unless we except Lautrec, who was always unfortunate) that equalled the merit of Pescara, Leyva, Guasto, the prince of Orange, and other leaders, whom Charles had set in opposition to them. Bourbon, Morone, Doria, who by their abilities and conduct might have been capable of balancing the superiority which the imperialists had acquired, were induced to abandon the service of France, by the carelessness of the king and the malice or injustice of his counsellors ; and the most fatal blows given to France during the

progress of the war proceeded from the despair and resentment of these three persons.

The hard conditions to which Francis was obliged to submit were not the most afflicting circumstances to him in the treaty of Cambray. He lost his reputation, and the confidence of all Europe, by abandoning his allies to his rival. Unwilling to enter into the details necessary for adjusting their interests, or afraid that whatever he claimed for them must have been purchased by farther concessions on his own part, he gave them up in a body, and, without the least provision in their behalf, left the Venetians, the Florentines, the duke of Ferrara, together with such of the Neapolitan barons as had joined his army, to the mercy of the emperor. They exclaimed loudly against this base and perfidious action, of which Francis himself was so much ashamed that, in order to avoid the pain of hearing from their ambassadors the reproaches which he justly merited, it was some time before he would consent to allow them an audience. Charles, on the other hand, was attentive to the interest of every person who had adhered to him: the rights of some of his Flemish subjects who had estates or pretensions in France were secured; one article was inserted, obliging Francis to restore the blood and memory of the Constable Bourbon, and to grant his heirs the possession of his lands which had been forfeited; another, by which the indemnification was stipulated for those French gentlemen who had accompanied Bourbon in his exile.²⁶ This conduct, laudable in itself, and placed in the most striking light by a comparison with that of Francis, gained Charles as much esteem as the success of his arms had acquired him glory.

Francis did not treat the king of England with the same neglect as his other allies. He communicated to

* Guic. lib. xix. p. 525.—P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. x. c. 4, p. 235.

him all the steps of his negotiation at Cambray, luckily found that monarch in a situation which him no choice but to approve implicitly of his measure and to concur with them. Henry had been soliciting the pope for some time in order to obtain a divorce from Catharine of Aragon, his queen. Several motives combined in prompting the king to urge his suit. He was powerfully influenced at some seasons by religious considerations, he entertained many scruples concerning the legitimacy of his marriage with his brother's widow. His affections had long been estranged from the queen, who was older than himself, and had lost all the charms which she possessed in the earlier part of her life; she was passionately desirous of having male issue; Wolsey artfully fortified his scruples, and encouraged his hopes that he might widen the breach between him and the emperor, Catharine's nephew; and, what was more forcible, perhaps, in its operation than all theseuni- the king had conceived a violent love for the celebrated Anne Boleyn, a young lady of great beauty, and of greater accomplishments, whom, as he found it possible to gain her on other terms, he determined to raise to the throne. The papal authority had often been interposed to grant divorces for reasons less specious than those which Henry produced. When the matter was first proposed to Clement, during his imprisonment in the castle of St. Angelo, as his hopes of recovering his liberty depended entirely on the king of England and his ally of France, he expressed the warmest inclination to gratify him. But no sooner was he set free than he discovered other sentiments. Charles, who espoused the protection of his aunt with zeal inflamed by resentment, alarmed the pope, on the one hand, with threats which made a deep impression on his timid mind, and allured him, on the other, with those promises in favor of his family which he afterwards accomplished. Under

Henry VIII. and Anne Boleyn.



the prospect of these, Clement not only forgot all his obligations to Henry, but ventured to endanger the interests of the Romish religion in England, and to run the risk of alienating that kingdom for ever from the obedience of the papal see. After amusing Henry during two years with all the subtleties and chicane which the court of Rome can so dexterously employ to protract or defeat any cause,—after displaying the whole extent of his ambiguous and deceitful policy, the intricacies of which the English historians, to whom it properly belongs, have found it no easy matter to trace and unravel,—he at last recalled the powers of the delegates whom he had appointed to judge in the point, avocated the cause to Rome, leaving the king no other hope of obtaining a divorce but from the personal decision of the pope himself. As Clement was now in strict alliance with the emperor, who had purchased his friendship by the exorbitant concessions which have been mentioned, Henry despaired of procuring any sentence from the former but what was dictated by the latter. His honour, however, and passions concurred in preventing him from relinquishing his scheme of a divorce, which he determined to accomplish by other means, and at any rate; and the continuance of Francis's friendship being necessary to counterbalance the emperor's power, he, in order to secure that, not only offered no remonstrances against the total neglect of their allies in the treaty of Cambray, but made Francis the present of a large sum as a brotherly contribution towards the payment of the ransom for his sons.²⁷

Soon after the treaty of peace was concluded, the emperor landed in Italy with a numerous train of the Spanish nobility and a considerable body of troops. He left the government of Spain, during his absence,

²⁷ Herbert, *Mém. de Bellay*, 122.

to the empress Isabella. By his long residence in that country he had acquired such thorough knowledge of the character of the people that he could perfectly accommodate the maxims of his government to their genius. He could even assume, upon some occasions, such popular manners as gained wonderfully upon the Spaniards. A striking instance of his disposition to gratify them had occurred a few days before he embarked for Italy. He was to make his public entry into the city of Barcelona; and some doubts having arisen among the inhabitants whether they should receive him as emperor or as count of Barcelona, Charles instantly decided in favour of the latter, declaring that he was more proud of that ancient title than of his imperial crown. Soothed with this flattering expression of his regard, the citizens welcomed him with acclamations of joy; and the states of the province swore allegiance to his son Philip, as heir of the county of Barcelona. A similar oath had been taken in all the kingdoms of Spain, with equal satisfaction.²⁸

The emperor appeared in Italy with the pomp and power of a conqueror. Ambassadors from all the princes and states of that country attended his court, waiting to receive his decision with regard to their fate. At Genoa, where he first landed, he was received with the acclamations due to the protector of their liberties. Having honoured Doria with many marks of distinction, and bestowed on the republic several new privileges, he proceeded to Bologna, the place fixed upon for his interview with the pope. He affected to unite in his public entry into that city the state and majesty that suited an emperor with the humility becoming an obedient son of the Church; and while at the head of twenty thousand veteran soldiers, able to give law to all Italy, he kneeled down to kiss the feet of that very

²⁸ Sandoval, ii. p. 50.—Ferreras, ix. 116.

pope whom he had so lately detained a prisoner. The Italians, after suffering so much from the ferocity and licentiousness of his armies, and after having been long accustomed to form in their imagination a picture of Charles which bore some resemblance to that of the barbarous monarchs of the Goths or Huns, who had formerly afflicted their country with like calamities, were surprised to see a prince of a graceful appearance, affable and courteous in his deportment, of regular manners, and of exemplary attention to all the offices of religion.²⁹ They were still more astonished when he settled all the concerns of the princes and states which now depended on him with a degree of moderation and equity much beyond what they had expected.

Charles himself, when he set out from Spain, far from intending to give any such extraordinary proof of his self-denial, seems to have been resolved to avail himself to the utmost of the superiority which he had acquired in Italy. But various circumstances concurred in pointing out the necessity of pursuing a very different course. The progress of the Turkish sultan, who, after overrunning Hungary, had penetrated into Austria and laid siege to Vienna with an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, loudly called upon him to collect his whole force to oppose that torrent; and though the valour of the Germans, the prudent conduct of Ferdinand, together with the treachery of the vizier, soon obliged Solyman to abandon that enterprise with disgrace and loss, the religious disorders still growing in Germany rendered the presence of the emperor highly necessary there.³⁰ The Florentines, instead of giving their consent to the re-establishment of the Medici, which by the treaty of Barcelona the emperor had bound himself to procure, were preparing to defend their liberty by force

²⁹ Sandoval, *Hist. del. Emp. Carl.*
V., ii. 50, 53, etc.

³⁰ Sleidan, 121.—*Guic.*, lib. xx.
550.

of arms; the preparations for his journey had involved him in unusual expenses; and on this, as well as many other occasions, the multiplicity of his affairs, together with the narrowness of his revenues, obliged him to contract the schemes which his boundless ambition was apt to form, and to forego present and certain advantages that he might guard against more remote but unavoidable dangers. Charles, from all these considerations, finding it necessary to assume an air of moderation, acted his part with a good grace. He admitted Sforza into his presence, and not only gave him a full pardon of all past offences, but granted him the investiture of the duchy, together with his niece, the king of Denmark's daughter, in marriage. He allowed the duke of Ferrara to keep possession of all his dominions, adjusting the points in dispute between him and the pope with an impartiality not very agreeable to the latter. He came to a final accommodation with the Venetians, upon the reasonable condition of their restoring whatever they had usurped during the late war, either in the Neapolitan or papal territories. In return for so many concessions, he exacted considerable sums from each of the powers with whom he treated, which they paid without reluctance, and which afforded him the means of proceeding on his journey towards Germany with a magnificence suitable to his dignity.³¹

These treaties, which restored tranquillity to Italy after a tedious war, the calamities of which had chiefly affected that country, were published at Bologna with great solemnity on the first day of the year 1530, amidst the universal acclamations of the people; applauding the emperor, to whose moderation and generosity they ascribed the blessings of peace which they had so long desired. The Florentines alone did not partake of this general joy. Animated with a zeal for liberty more

³¹ Sandoval, ii. 55, etc.

laudable than prudent, they determined to oppose the restoration of the Medici. The imperial army had already entered their territories and formed the siege of their capital. But though deserted by all their allies, and left without any hope of succour, they defended themselves many months with an obstinate valour worthy of better success; and even when they surrendered they obtained a capitulation which gave them hopes of securing some remains of their liberty. But the emperor, from his desire to gratify the pope, frustrated all their expectations, and, abolishing their ancient form of government, raised Alexander de' Medici to the same absolute dominion over that state which his family have retained to the present times. Philibert de Châlons, prince of Orange, the imperial general, was killed during this siege. His estate and titles descended to his sister, Claude de Châlons, who was married to René, count of Nassau; and she transmitted to her posterity of the house of Nassau the title of princes of Orange, which by their superior talents and valour they have rendered so illustrious.³²

After the publication of the peace at Bologna, and the ceremony of his coronation as king of Lombardy and emperor of the Romans, which the pope performed with the accustomed formalities, nothing detained Charles in Italy;³³ and he began to prepare for his journey to Germany. His presence became every day more necessary in that country, and was solicited with equal importunity by the Catholics and by the favourers of the new doctrines. During that long interval of tranquillity which the absence of the emperor, the contests between him and the pope, and his attention to the war with France afforded them, the latter gained much

³² Guic., lib. xx., p. 341, etc.—
P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. ii. c. 4,
p. 236.

³³ H. Cornel. Agrippa de duplice
coronatione Car. V., ap. Scard., ii.
226.

ground. Most of the princes who had embraced Luther's opinions had not only established in their territories that form of worship which he approved, but had entirely suppressed the rites of the Romish Church. Many of the free cities had imitated their conduct. Almost one-half of the Germanic body had revolted from the papal see; and its authority, even in those provinces which had not hitherto shaken off the yoke, was considerably weakened, partly by the example of revolt in the neighbouring states, partly by the secret progress of the Reformed doctrine, even in those countries where it was not openly embraced. Whatever satisfaction the emperor, while he was at open enmity with the see of Rome, might have felt in those events which tended to mortify and embarrass the pope, he could not help perceiving now that the religious divisions in Germany would, in the end, prove extremely hurtful to the imperial authority. The weakness of former emperors had suffered the great vassals of the empire to make such successful encroachments upon their power and prerogative that during the whole course of the war, which had often required the exertion of his utmost strength, Charles hardly drew any effectual aid from Germany, and found that magnificent titles or obsolete pretensions were almost the only advantages which he had gained by swaying the imperial sceptre. He became fully sensible that if he did not recover in some degree the prerogatives which his predecessors had lost, and acquire the authority as well as possess the name of head of the empire, his high dignity would contribute more to obstruct than to promote his ambitious schemes. Nothing, he saw, was more essential towards attaining this than to suppress opinions which might form new bonds of confederacy among the princes of the empire and unite them by ties stronger and more sacred than any political connection. Nothing seemed to lead more

certainly to the accomplishment of his design than to employ zeal for the established religion, of which he was the natural protector, as the instrument of extending his civil authority.

Accordingly, a prospect no sooner opened of coming to an accommodation with the pope than, by the emperor's appointment, a diet of the empire was held at Spires, in order to take into consideration the state of religion. The decree of the diet assembled there in the year 1526, which was almost equivalent to a toleration of Luther's opinions, had given great offence to the rest of Christendom. The greatest delicacy of address, however, was requisite in proceeding to any decision more rigorous. The minds of men, kept in perpetual agitation by a controversy carried on during twelve years without intermission of debate or abatement of zeal, were now inflamed to a high degree. They were accustomed to innovations, and saw the boldest of them successful. Having not only abolished old rites, but substituted new forms in their place, they were influenced as much by attachment to the system which they had embraced as by aversion to that which they had abandoned. Luther himself, of a spirit not to be worn out by the length and obstinacy of the combat or to become remiss upon success, continued the attack with as much vigour as he had begun it. His disciples, of whom many equalled him in zeal and some surpassed him in learning, were no less capable than their master to conduct the controversy in the properest manner. Many of the laity, some even of the princes, trained up amidst these incessant disputations, and in the habit of listening to the arguments of the contending parties, who alternately appealed to them as judges, came to be profoundly skilled in all the questions which were agitated, and, upon occasion, could show themselves not inexpert in any of the arts with which these theological encounters

were managed. It was obvious from all these circumstances that any violent decision of the diet must have immediately precipitated matters into confusion and have kindled in Germany the flames of a religious war. All, therefore, that the archduke, and the other commissioners appointed by the emperor, demanded of the diet, was to enjoin those states of the empire which had hitherto obeyed the decree issued against Luther at Worms, in the year 1524, to persevere in the observation of it, and to prohibit the other states from attempting any further innovation in religion, particularly from abolishing the mass, before the meeting of a general council. After much dispute, a decree to that effect was approved of by a majority of voices.³⁴ [1529.]

The elector of Saxony, the marquis of Brandenburg, the landgrave of Hesse, the dukes of Lunenburg, the prince of Anhalt, together with the deputies of fourteen imperial or free cities,³⁵ entered a solemn protest against this decree, as unjust and impious. On that account they were distinguished by the name of PROTESTANTS,³⁶ an appellation which hath since become better known and more honourable by its being applied indiscriminately to all the sects, of whatever denomination, which have revolted from the Roman see. Not satisfied with this declaration of their dissent from the decree of the diet, the Protestants sent ambassadors into Italy to lay their grievances before the emperor; from whom they met with the most discouraging reception. Charles was at that time in close union with the pope, and solicitous to attach him inviolably to his interests. During their long residence at Bologna they held many consultations concerning the most effectual means of

³⁴ Sleid., Hist., 117.

³⁵ The fourteen cities were Strasburg, Nuremberg, Ulm, Constance, Reutlingen, Windsheim, Meiningen, Lindau, Kempten, Heilbronn, Isna,

Weissemburg, Nordlingen, and St. Gall.

³⁶ Sleid., Hist., 119.—F. Paul, Hist., p. 45. —Seckend., ii. 127.

extirpating the heresies which had sprung up in Germany. Clement, whose cautious and timid mind the proposal of a general council filled with horror even beyond what popes, the constant enemies of such assemblies, usually feel, employed every argument to dissuade the emperor from consenting to that measure. He represented general councils as factious, ungovernable, presumptuous, formidable to civil authority, and too slow in their operations to remedy disorders which required an immediate cure. Experience, he said, had now taught both the emperor and himself that forbearance and lenity, instead of soothing the spirit of innovation, had rendered it more enterprising and presumptuous : it was necessary, therefore, to have recourse to the rigorous methods which such a desperate case required ; Leo's sentence of excommunication, together with the decree of the diet at Worms, should be carried into execution ; and it was incumbent on the emperor to employ his whole power in order to overawe those on whom the reverence due either to ecclesiastical or civil authority had no longer any influence. Charles, whose views were very different from the pope's, and who became daily more sensible how obstinate and deep-rooted the evil was, thought of reconciling the Protestants by means less violent, and considered the convocation of a council as no improper expedient for that purpose, but promised, if gentler arts failed of success, that then he would exert himself with rigour to reduce to the obedience of the holy see those stubborn enemies of the Catholic faith.³⁷

Such were the sentiments with which the emperor set out for Germany, having already appointed a diet of the empire to be held at Augsburg. In his journey

³⁷ F. Paul, xlviij.—Seck., lib. ii. 142.—Hist. de la Confess. d'Augs- burg, par. D. Chytraeus, 4to, Antw. 1572, p. 6.

towards that city he had many opportunities of observing the disposition of the Germans with regard to the points in controversy, and found their minds everywhere so much irritated and inflamed as convinced him that nothing tending to severity or rigour ought to be attempted until all other measures proved ineffectual. He made his public entry into Augsburg with extraordinary pomp, and found there such a full assembly of the members of the diet as was suitable both to the importance of the affairs which were to come under their consideration, and to the honour of an emperor who, after a long absence, returned to them crowned with reputation and success. His presence seems to have communicated to all parties an unusual spirit of moderation and desire of peace. The elector of Saxony would not permit Luther to accompany him to the diet, lest he should offend the emperor by bringing into his presence a person excommunicated by the pope, and who had been the author of all those dissensions which it now appeared so difficult to compose. At the emperor's desire, all the Protestant princes forbade the divines who accompanied them to preach in public during their residence at Augsburg. For the same reason, they employed Melancthon, the man of the greatest learning as well as of the most pacific and gentle spirit among the Reformers, to draw up a confession of their faith, expressed in terms as little offensive to the Roman Catholics as a regard for truth would permit. Melancthon, who seldom suffered the rancour of controversy to envenom his style, even in writings purely polemical, executed a task so agreeable to his natural disposition with great moderation and address. The creed which he composed, known by the name of the *Confession of Augsburg*, from the place where it was presented, was read publicly in the diet. Some popish divines were appointed to examine it; they brought in

their animadversions; a dispute ensued between them and Melancthon, seconded by some of his brethren; but though Melancthon softened some articles, made concessions with regard to others, and put the least exceptionable sense upon all,—though the emperor himself laboured with great earnestness to reconcile the contending parties,—so many marks of distinction were now established, and such insuperable barriers placed between the two churches, that all hopes of bringing about a coalition seemed utterly desperate.³⁸

From the divines, among whom his endeavours had been so unsuccessful, Charles turned to the princes their patrons. Nor did he find them, how desirous soever of accommodation, or willing to oblige the emperor, more disposed than the former to renounce their opinions. At that time, zeal for religion took possession of the minds of men to a degree which can scarcely be conceived by those who live in an age when the passions excited by the first manifestation of truth and the first recovery of liberty have in a great measure ceased to operate. This zeal was then of such strength as to overcome attachment to their political interests, which is commonly the predominant motive among princes. The elector of Saxony, the landgrave of Hesse, and other chiefs of the Protestants, though solicited separately by the emperor, and allured by the promise or prospect of those advantages which it was known they were more solicitous to attain, refused, with a fortitude highly worthy of imitation, to abandon what they deemed the cause of God, for the sake of any earthly acquisition.³⁹

Every scheme in order to gain or disunite the Pro-

³⁸ Seckend., lib. ii. 159. etc.—
Abr. Sculteti *Annales Evangelici*,
ap. Herm. Von der Hard., *Hist.
Liter. Reform.*, Lips., 1717, fol., p.

159.

" Sleid., 132.—Scultet. *Annal.*,
158.

testant party proving abortive, nothing now remained for the emperor but to take some vigorous measures towards asserting the doctrines and authority of the established Church. These, Campeggio, the papal nuncio, had always recommended as the only proper and effectual course of dealing with such obstinate heretics. In compliance with his opinions and remonstrances, the diet issued a decree condemning most of the peculiar tenets held by the Protestants, forbidding any person to protect or tolerate such as taught them, enjoining a strict observance of the established rites, and prohibiting any further innovation, under severe penalties. All orders of men were required to assist with their persons and fortunes in carrying this decree into execution; and such as refused to obey it were declared incapable of acting as judges, or of appearing as parties in the imperial chamber, the supreme court of judicature in the empire. To all which was subjoined a promise that an application should be made to the pope requiring him to call a general council within six months, in order to terminate all controversies by its sovereign decisions.⁴⁰

The severity of this decree, which was considered as a prelude to the most violent persecution, alarmed the Protestants and convinced them that the emperor was resolved on their destruction. The dread of those calamities which were ready to fall on the Church oppressed the feeble spirit of Melancthon, and, as if the cause had already been desperate, he gave himself up to melancholy and lamentation. But Luther, who during the meeting of the diet had endeavoured to confirm and animate his party by several treatises which he addressed to them, was not disconcerted or dismayed at the prospect of this new danger. He comforted Melancthon and his other desponding disciples,

⁴⁰ Sleid, 139.

and exhorted the princes not to abandon those truths which they had lately asserted with such laudable boldness.⁴¹ His exhortations made the deeper impression upon them as they were greatly alarmed at that time by the account of a combination among the popish princes of the empire for the maintenance of the established religion, to which Charles himself had acceded.⁴² This convinced them that it was necessary to stand on their guard, and that their own safety, as well as the success of their cause, depended on union. Filled with this dread of the adverse party, and with these sentiments concerning the conduct proper for themselves, they assembled at Smalkalde. There they concluded a league of mutual defence against all aggressors,⁴³ by which they formed the Protestant states of the empire into one regular body, and, beginning already to consider themselves as such, they resolved to apply to the kings of France and England and to implore them to patronize and assist their new confederacy.

An affair not connected with religion furnished them with a pretence for courting the aid of foreign princes. Charles, whose ambitious views enlarged in proportion to the increase of his power and grandeur, had formed a scheme of continuing the imperial crown in his family, by procuring his brother Ferdinand to be elected king of the Romans. The present juncture was favourable for the execution of that design. The emperor's arms had been everywhere victorious; he had given law to all Europe at the late peace; no rival now remained in a condition to balance or to control him; and the electors, dazzled with the splendour of his success, or overawed by the greatness of his power, durst scarcely dispute the will of a prince whose solici-

⁴¹ Seck., ii. 180.—Sleid. 140.

⁴² Seck., ii. 200; iii. 11.

⁴³ Sleid., 142.

tations carried with them the authority of commands. Nor did he want plausible reasons to enforce the measure. The affairs of his other kingdoms, he said, obliged him to be often absent from Germany; the growing disorders occasioned by the controversies about religion, as well as the formidable neighbourhood of the Turks, who continually threatened to break in with their desolating armies into the heart of the empire, required the constant presence of a prince endowed with prudence capable of composing the former, and with power as well as valour sufficient to repel the latter. His brother Ferdinand possessed these qualities in an eminent degree; by residing long in Germany, he had acquired a thorough knowledge of its constitution and manners; having been present almost from the first rise of the religious dissensions, he knew what remedies were most proper, what the Germans could bear, and how to apply them; as his own dominions lay on the Turkish frontier, he was the natural defender of Germany against the invasions of the infidels, being prompted by interest no less than he would be bound in duty to oppose them.

These arguments made little impression on the Protestants. Experience taught them that nothing had contributed more to the undisturbed progress of their opinions than the interregnum after Maximilian's death, the long absence of Charles, and the slackness of the reins of government which these occasioned. Conscious of the advantages which their cause had derived from this relaxation of government, they were unwilling to render it more vigorous by giving themselves a new and a fixed master. They perceived clearly the extent of Charles's ambition, that he aimed at rendering the imperial crown hereditary in his family, and would of course establish in the empire an absolute dominion, to which elective princes could not have aspired with equal

facility. They determined, therefore, to oppose the election of Ferdinand with the utmost vigour, and to rouse their countrymen, by their example and exhortations, to withstand this encroachment on their liberties. The elector of Saxony, accordingly, not only refused to be present at the electoral college which the emperor summoned to meet at Cologne, but instructed his eldest son to appear there and to protest against the election as informal, illegal, contrary to the articles of the golden bull, and subversive of the liberties of the empire. But the other electors, whom Charles had been at great pains to gain, without regarding either his absence or protest, chose Ferdinand king of the Romans, who, a few days after, was crowned at Aix-la-Chapelle.⁴⁴

When the Protestants, who were assembled a second time at Smalkalde, received an account of this transaction, and heard at the same time that prosecutions were commenced in the imperial chamber against some of their number on account of their religious principles, they thought it necessary not only to renew their former confederacy, but immediately to despatch their ambassadors into France and England. Francis had observed with all the jealousy of a rival the reputation which the emperor had acquired by his seeming disinterestedness and moderation in settling the affairs in Italy, and beheld with great concern the successful step which he had taken towards perpetuating and extending his authority in Germany by the election of a king of the Romans. Nothing, however, would have been more impolitic than to precipitate his kingdom into a new war, when exhausted by extraordinary efforts and discouraged by ill success, before it had got time to recruit its strength or to forget past misfortunes. As no provocation had been given by the emperor, and hardly a pre-

⁴⁴ Sleid., 142.—Seck., iii. 1.—P. Heuter., Rer. Austr., lib. x. c. 6, p. 240.

text for a rupture had been afforded him, he could not violate a treaty of peace which he himself had so lately solicited, without forfeiting the esteem of all Europe and being detested as a prince void of probity and honour. He observed with great joy powerful factions beginning to form in the empire ; he listened with the utmost eagerness to the complaints of the Protestant princes, and, without seeming to countenance their religious opinions, determined secretly to cherish those sparks of political discord which might be afterwards kindled into a flame. For this purpose he sent William de Bellay, one of the ablest negotiators in France, into Germany, who, visiting the courts of the malcontent princes, and heightening their ill humour by various arts, concluded an alliance between them and his master,⁴⁵ which, though concealed at that time, and productive of no immediate effects, laid the foundation of a union fatal on many occasions to Charles's ambitious projects, and showed the discontented princes of Germany where, for the future, they might find a protector no less able than willing to undertake their defence against the encroachments of the emperor.

The king of England, highly incensed against Charles, in complaisance to whom the pope had long retarded and now openly opposed his divorce, was no less disposed than Francis to strengthen a league which might be rendered so formidable to the emperor. But his favourite project of the divorce led him into such a labyrinth of schemes and negotiations, and he was at the same time so intent on abolishing the papal jurisdiction in England, that he had no leisure for foreign affairs. This obliged him to rest satisfied with giving general promises, together with a small supply in money, to the confederates of Smalkalde.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, many circumstances convinced Charles

⁴⁵ Mém. de Bellay, 129 a, 130 b.—Seck., iii. 14.

⁴⁶ Herbert, 152, 154.

that this was not a juncture when the extirpation of heresy was to be attempted by violence and rigour; that, in compliance with the pope's inclinations, he had already proceeded with imprudent precipitation; and that it was more his interest to consolidate Germany into one united and vigorous body than to divide and enfeeble it by a civil war. The Protestants, who were considerable as well by their numbers as by their zeal, had acquired additional weight and importance by their joining in that confederacy into which the rash steps taken at Augsburg had forced them. Having now discovered their own strength, they despised the decisions of the imperial chamber, and, being secure of foreign protection, were ready to set the head of the empire at defiance. At the same time, the peace with France was precarious, the friendship of an irresolute and interested pontiff was not to be relied on, and Solyman, in order to repair the discredit and loss which his arms had sustained in the former campaign, was preparing to enter Austria with more numerous forces. On all these accounts, especially the last, a speedy accommodation with the malcontent princes became necessary, not only for the accomplishment of his future schemes, but for insuring his present safety. Negotiations were accordingly carried on by his direction with the elector of Saxony and his associates. After many delays, occasioned by their jealousy of the emperor and of each other,—after innumerable difficulties arising from the inflexible nature of religious tenets, which cannot admit of being altered, modified, or relinquished in the same manner as points of political interest,—terms of pacification were agreed upon at Nuremberg and ratified solemnly in the diet at Ratisbon. In this treaty it was stipulated that universal peace be established in Germany until the meeting of a general council, the convocation of which within six months the emperor shall endeavour to procure; that no person shall be molested on account of

religion ; that a stop shall be put to all processes begun by the imperial chamber against Protestants, and the sentences already passed to their detriment shall be declared void. On their part, the Protestants engaged to assist the emperor with all their forces in resisting the invasion of the Turks.⁴⁷ Thus, by their firmness in adhering to their principles, by the unanimity with which they urged all their claims, and by their dexterity in availing themselves of the emperor's situation ; the Protestants obtained terms which amounted almost to a toleration of their religion ; all the concessions were made by Charles, none by them ; even the favourite point of their approving his brother's election was not mentioned ; and the Protestants of Germany, who had hitherto been viewed only as a religious sect, came henceforth to be considered as a political body of no small consequence.⁴⁸

The intelligence which Charles received of Solyman's having entered Hungary at the head of three hundred thousand men brought the deliberations of the diet at Ratisbon to a period, the contingent both of troops and money which each prince was to furnish towards the defence of the empire having been already settled. The Protestants, as a testimony of their gratitude to the emperor, exerted themselves with extraordinary zeal, and brought into the field forces which exceeded in number the quota imposed on them ; and, the Catholics imitating their example, one of the greatest and best-appointed armies that had ever been levied in Germany assembled near Vienna. Being joined by a body of Spanish and Italian veterans under the marquis del Guasto, by some heavy armed cavalry from the Low Countries, and by the troops which Ferdinand had raised in Bohemia, Austria, and his other territories, it amounted in all to

⁴⁷ Du Mont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. part ii. 87, 89.

⁴⁸ Sleid., 149, etc.—Seck., iii. 19.

ninety thousand disciplined foot and thirty thousand horse, besides a prodigious swarm of irregulars. Of this vast army, worthy the first prince in Christendom, the emperor took the command in person, and mankind waited in suspense the issue of a decisive battle between the two greatest monarchs in the world. But, each of them dreading the other's power and good fortune, they both conducted their operations with such excessive caution that a campaign for which such immense preparations had been made ended without any memorable event. Solyman, finding it impossible to gain ground upon an enemy always attentive and on his guard, marched back to Constantinople towards the end of autumn.⁴⁹ It is remarkable that, in such a martial age, when every gentleman was a soldier and every prince a general, this was the first time that Charles, who had already carried on such extensive wars and gained so many victories, appeared at the head of his troops. In this first essay of his arms, to have opposed such a leader as Solyman was no small honour; to have obliged him to retreat, merited very considerable praise.

About the beginning of this campaign, the elector of Saxony died, and was succeeded by his son, John Frederick. The Reformation rather gained than lost by that event: the new elector, no less attached than his predecessors to the opinions of Luther, occupied the station which they had held at the head of the Protestant party, and defended with the boldness and zeal of youth that cause which they had fostered and reared with the caution of more advanced age.

Immediately after the retreat of the Turks, Charles, impatient to revisit Spain, set out on his way thither, for Italy. As he was extremely desirous of an interview with the pope, they met a second time at Bologna, with the same external demonstrations of respect and

⁴⁹ Jovii Hist., lib. xxx. p. 100, etc.—Barre, Hist. de l'Empire, i. 8, 647.

friendship, but with little of that confidence which had subsisted between them during their late negotiations there. Clement was much dissatisfied with the emperor's proceedings at Augsburg, his concessions with regard to the speedy convocation of a council having more than cancelled all the merit of the severe decree against the doctrines of the Reformers. The toleration granted to the Protestants at Ratisbon, and the more explicit promise concerning a council with which it was accompanied, had irritated him still farther. Charles, however, partly from conviction that the meeting of a council would be attended with salutary effects, and partly from his desire to please the Germans, having solicited the pope by his ambassadors to call that assembly without delay, and now urging the same thing in person, Clement was greatly embarrassed what reply he should make to a request which it was indecent to refuse and dangerous to grant. He endeavoured at first to divert Charles from the measure; but, finding him inflexible, he had recourse to artifices which he knew would delay, if not entirely defeat, the calling of that assembly. Under the plausible pretext of its being previously necessary to settle, with all parties concerned, the place of the council's meeting, the manner of its proceedings, the right of the persons who should be admitted to vote, and the authority of their decisions, he despatched a nuncio, accompanied by an ambassador from the emperor, to the elector of Saxony, as head of the Protestants. With regard to each of these articles, inextricable difficulties and contests arose. The Protestants demanded a council to be held in Germany; the pope insisted that it should meet in Italy: they contended that all points in dispute should be determined by the words of Holy Scripture alone; he considered not only the decrees of the Church, but the opinions of fathers and doctors, as of equal authority:

they required a free council, in which the divines, commissioned by different churches, should be allowed a voice; he aimed at modelling the council in such a manner as would render it entirely dependent on his pleasure. Above all, the Protestants thought it unreasonable that they should bind themselves to submit to the decrees of a council before they knew on what principles these decrees were to be founded, by what persons they were to be pronounced, and what forms of proceeding they would observe. The pope maintained it to be altogether unnecessary to call a council if those who demanded it did not previously declare their resolution to acquiesce in its decrees. In order to adjust such a variety of points, many expedients were proposed, and the negotiations spun out to such a length as effectually answered Clement's purpose of putting off the meeting of a council, without drawing on himself the whole infamy of obstructing a measure which all Europe deemed so essential to the good of the Church.⁵⁰

Together with this negotiation about calling a council, the emperor carried on another, which he had still more at heart, for securing the peace established in Italy. As Francis had renounced his pretensions in that country with great reluctance, Charles made no doubt but that he would lay hold on the first pretext afforded him, or embrace the first opportunity which presented itself, of recovering what he had lost. It became necessary, on this account, to take measures for assembling an army able to oppose him. As his treasury, drained by a long war, could not supply the sums requisite for keeping such a body constantly on foot, he attempted to throw that burden on his allies, and to provide for the safety of his own dominions at their expense, by proposing that the Italian states

⁵⁰ F. Paul, Hist., 62.—Seckend., iii. 73.

should enter into a league of defence against all invaders; that on the first appearance of danger an army should be raised and maintained at the common charge; and that Antonio de Leyva should be appointed the generalissimo. Nor was the proposal unacceptable to Clement, though for a reason very different from that which induced the emperor to make it. He hoped by this expedient to deliver Italy from the German and Spanish veterans, which had so long filled all the powers in that country with terror, and still kept them in subjection to the imperial yoke. A league was accordingly concluded; all the Italian states, the Venetians excepted, acceded to it; the sum which each of the contracting partners should furnish towards maintaining the army was fixed; the emperor agreed to withdraw the troops which gave so much umbrage to his allies, and which he was unable any longer to support. Having disbanded part of them, and removed the rest to Sicily and Spain, he embarked on board Doria's galleys and arrived at Barcelona.⁵¹

Notwithstanding all his precautions for securing the peace of Germany and maintaining that system which he had established in Italy, the emperor became every day more and more apprehensive that both would be soon disturbed by the intrigues or arms of the French king. His apprehensions were well founded, as nothing but the desperate situation of his affairs could have brought Francis to give his consent to a treaty so dishonourable and disadvantageous as that of Cambray. He, at the very time of ratifying it, had formed a resolution to observe it no longer than necessity compelled him, and took a solemn protest, though with the most profound secrecy, against several articles in the treaty, particularly that whereby he renounced all pretensions to the duchy of Milan, as unjust, injurious to

⁵¹ Guic., lib. xx. 551.—Ferreras, ix. 149.

his heirs, and invalid. One of the crown lawyers, by his command, entered a protest to the same purpose, and with the like secrecy, when the ratification of the treaty was registered in the parliament of Paris.⁵² Francis seems to have thought that by employing an artifice unworthy of a king, destructive of public faith, and of the mutual confidence on which all transactions between nations are founded, he was released from any obligation to perform the most solemn promises or to adhere to the most sacred engagements. From the moment he concluded the peace of Cambray, he wished and watched for an opportunity of violating it with safety. He endeavoured for that reason to strengthen his alliance with the king of England, whose friendship he cultivated with the greatest assiduity. He put the military force of his own kingdom on a better and more respectable footing than ever. He artfully fomented the jealousy and discontent of the German princes.⁵³

But above all Francis laboured to break the strict confederacy which subsisted between Charles and Clement; and he had soon the satisfaction to observe appearances of disgust and alienation arising in the mind of that suspicious and interested pontiff, which gave him hopes that their union would not be lasting. As the emperor's decision in favour of the duke of Ferrara had greatly irritated the pope, Francis aggravated the injustice of that proceeding, and flattered Clement that the papal see would find in him a more impartial and no less powerful protector. As the importunity with which Charles demanded a council was extremely offensive to the pope, Francis artfully created obstacles to prevent it, and attempted to divert the German princes, his allies, from insisting so obstinately on that point.⁵³ As the emperor had gained such an ascendant over Clement

⁵² Du Mont, *Corps Diplom.*, tom. iv. part ii. p. 52.

⁵³ *Mém. de Bellay*, 141, etc.—*Seck.*, iii. 48.—F Paul, 63.

by contributing to aggrandize his family, Francis endeavoured to allure him by the same irresistible bait, proposing a marriage between his second son, Henry, duke of Orleans, and Catharine, the daughter of the pope's cousin, Laurence de' Medici. On the first overture of this match, the emperor could not persuade himself that Francis really intended to debase the royal blood of France by an alliance with Catharine, whose ancestors had been so lately private citizens and merchants in Florence, and believed that he meant only to flatter or amuse the ambitious pontiff. He thought it necessary, however, to efface the impression which such a dazzling offer might have made, by promising to break off the marriage which had been agreed on between his own niece, the king of Denmark's daughter, and the duke of Milan, and to substitute Catharine in her place. But, the French ambassador producing unexpectedly full powers to conclude the marriage-treaty with the duke of Orleans, this expedient had no effect. Clement was so highly pleased with an honour which added such lustre and dignity to the house of Medici that he offered to grant Catharine the investiture of considerable territories in Italy, by way of portion; he seemed ready to support Francis in prosecuting his ancient claims in that country, and consented to a personal interview with that monarch ⁵⁴

Charles was at the utmost pains to prevent a meeting in which nothing was likely to pass but what would be of detriment to him; nor could he bear, after he had twice condescended to visit the pope in his own territories, that Clement should bestow such a mark of distinction on his rival as to venture on a voyage by sea, at an unfavourable season, in order to pay court to Francis in the French dominions. But the pope's eagerness to accomplish the match overcame all the

⁵⁴ Guic., lib. xx. 551, 553.—Mém. de Bellay, 138.

scruples of pride, or fear, or jealousy, which would have probably influenced him on any other occasion. The interview, notwithstanding several artifices of the emperor to prevent it, took place at Marseilles, with extraordinary pomp, and demonstrations of confidence on both sides; and the marriage, which the ambition and abilities of Catharine rendered in the sequel as pernicious to France as it was then thought dishonourable, was consummated. But whatever schemes may have been secretly concerted by the pope and Francis in favour of the duke of Orleans, to whom his father proposed to make over all his rights in Italy, so careful were they to avoid giving any cause of offence to the emperor that no treaty was concluded between them;⁵⁵ and even in the marriage-articles Catherine renounced all claims and pretensions in Italy, except to the duchy of Urbino.⁵⁶

But at the very time when he was carrying on these negotiations, and forming this connection with Francis, which gave so great umbrage to the emperor, such was the artifice and duplicity of Clement's character that he suffered the latter to direct all his proceedings with regard to the king of England, and was no less attentive to gratify him in that particular than if the most cordial union had subsisted between them. Henry's suit for a divorce had now continued near six years; during all which period the pope negotiated, promised, retracted, and concluded nothing. After bearing repeated delays and disappointments longer than could have been expected from a prince of such a choleric and impetuous temper, the patience of Henry was at last so much exhausted that he applied to another tribunal for that decree which he had solicited in vain at Rome. Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury, by a sentence founded on the authority of universities,

⁵⁵ Guic., lib. xx. 555. ⁵⁶ Du Mont, Corps Diplom., iv. part ii. 101.

doctors, and rabbis, who had been consulted with respect to the point, annulled the king's marriage with Catharine; her daughter was declared illegitimate, and Anne Boleyn acknowledged as queen of England. At the same time, Henry began not only to neglect and to threaten the pope, whom he had hitherto courted, but to make innovations in the Church of which he had formerly been such a zealous defender. Clement, who had already seen so many provinces and kingdoms revolt from the Holy See, became apprehensive at last that England might imitate their example, and, partly from his solicitude to prevent that fatal blow, partly in compliance with the French king's solicitations, determined to give Henry such satisfaction as might retain him within the bosom of the Church. But the violence of the cardinals, devoted to the emperor, did not allow the pope leisure for executing this prudent resolution, and hurried him, with a precipitation fatal to the Roman see, to issue a bull rescinding Cranmer's sentence, confirming Henry's marriage with Catharine, and declaring him excommunicated if within a time specified he did not abandon the wife he had taken and return to her whom he had deserted. Enraged at this unexpected decree, Henry kept no longer any measures with the court of Rome; his subjects seconded his resentment and indignation; an act of parliament was passed abolishing the papal power and jurisdiction in England; by another, the king was declared supreme head of the Church, and all the authority of which the popes were deprived was vested in him. That vast fabric of ecclesiastical dominion which had been raised with such art, and of which the foundations seemed to have been laid so deep, being no longer supported by the veneration of the people, was overturned in a moment. Henry himself, with the caprice peculiar to his character, continued to defend the doctrines of the Romish Church as fiercely

as he attacked its jurisdiction. He alternately persecuted the Protestants for rejecting the former, and the Catholics for acknowledging the latter. But his subjects, being once permitted to enter into new paths, did not choose to stop short at the precise point prescribed by him. Having been encouraged by his example to break some of their fetters, they were so impatient to shake off what still remained⁵⁷ that in the following reign, with the applause of the greater part of the nation, a total separation was made from the Church of Rome in articles of doctrine, as well as in matters of discipline and jurisdiction.

A short delay might have saved the see of Rome from all the unhappy consequences of Clement's rashness. Soon after his sentence against Henry, he fell into a languishing distemper, which, gradually wasting his constitution, put an end to his pontificate, the most unfortunate, both during its continuance and by its effects, that the Church had known for many ages. The very day on which the cardinals entered the conclave, they raised to the papal throne Alexander Farnese, dean of the sacred college, and the oldest member of that body, who assumed the name of Paul III. The account of his promotion was received with extraordinary acclamations of joy by the people of Rome, highly pleased, after an interval of more than a hundred years, to see the crown of St. Peter placed on the head of a Roman citizen. Persons more capable of judging formed a favourable presage of his administration, from the experience which he had acquired under four pontificates, as well as the character of prudence and moderation which he had uniformly maintained in a station of great eminence, and during an active period, that required both talents and address.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Herbert.—Burnet, Hist. of Re-

⁵⁸ Guic., lib. xx. 556.—F. Paul,
64.

Europe, it is probable, owed the continuance of its peace to the death of Clement; for, although no traces remain in history of any league concluded between him and Francis, it is scarcely to be doubted but that he would have seconded the operations of the French arms in Italy, that he might have gratified his ambition by seeing one of his family possessed of the supreme power in Florence, and another in Milan. But upon the election of Paul III., who had hitherto adhered uniformly to the imperial interest, Francis found it necessary to suspend his operations for some time, and to put off the commencement of hostilities against the emperor, on which, before the death of Clement, he had been fully determined.

While Francis waited for an opportunity to renew a war which had hitherto proved so fatal to himself and his subjects, a transaction of a very singular nature was carried on in Germany. Among many beneficial and salutary effects of which the Reformation was the immediate cause, it was attended, as must be the case in all actions and events wherein men are concerned, with some consequences of an opposite nature. When the human mind is roused by grand objects and agitated by strong passions, its operations acquire such force that they are apt to become irregular and extravagant. Upon any great revolution in religion, such irregularities abound most at that particular period when men, having thrown off the authority of their ancient principles, do not yet fully comprehend the nature or feel the obligation of those new tenets which they have embraced. The mind, in that situation, pushing forward with the boldness which prompted it to reject established opinions, and not guided by a clear knowledge of the system substituted in their place, disdains all restraint, and runs into wild notions, which often lead to scandalous or immoral conduct. Thus, in the first ages of the Christian

Church, many of the new converts, having renounced their ancient systems of religious faith, and being but imperfectly acquainted with the doctrines and precepts of Christianity, broached the most extravagant opinions, equally subversive of piety and virtue; all which errors disappeared or were exploded when the knowledge of religion increased and came to be more generally diffused. In like manner, soon after Luther's appearance, the rashness or ignorance of some of his disciples led them to publish tenets no less absurd than pernicious, which, being proposed to men extremely illiterate but fond of novelty, and at a time when their minds were occupied chiefly with religious speculations, gained too easy credit and authority among them. To these causes must be imputed the extravagances of Muncer, in the year 1525, as well as the rapid progress which his opinions made among the peasants; but, though the insurrection excited by that fanatic was soon suppressed, several of his followers lurked in different places, and endeavoured privately to propagate his opinions.

In those provinces of Upper Germany which had already been so cruelly wasted by their enthusiastic rage, the magistrates watched their motions with such severe attention that many of them found it necessary to retire into other countries; some were punished, others driven into exile, and their errors were entirely rooted out. But in the Netherlands and Westphalia, where the pernicious tendency of their opinions was more unknown and guarded against with less care, they got admittance into several towns, and spread the infection of their principles. The most remarkable of their religious tenets related to the sacrament of baptism, which, as they contended, ought to be administered only to persons grown up to years of understanding, and should be performed, not by sprinkling them with water, but by dipping them in it: for this reason they

condemned the baptism of infants, and, rebaptizing all whom they admitted into their society, the sect came to be distinguished by the name of Anabaptists. To this peculiar notion concerning baptism, which has the appearance of being founded on the practice of the Church in the apostolic age, and contains nothing inconsistent with the peace and order of human society, they added other principles of a most enthusiastic as well as dangerous nature. They maintained that among Christians, who had the precepts of the gospel to direct and the Spirit of God to guide them, the office of magistracy was not only unnecessary, but an unlawful encroachment on their spiritual liberty; that the distinctions occasioned by birth or rank or wealth, being contrary to the spirit of the gospel, which considers all men as equals, should be entirely abolished; that all Christians, throwing their possessions into one common stock, should live together in that state of equality which becomes members of the same family; that as neither the laws of nature nor the precepts of the New Testament had imposed any restraints upon men with regard to the number of wives which they might marry, they should use that liberty which God himself had granted to the patriarchs.

Such opinions, propagated and maintained with enthusiastic zeal and boldness, were not long without producing the violent effects natural to them. Two Anabaptist prophets, John Matthias, a baker of Haerlem, and John Boccold, or Beükels, a journeyman tailor of Leyden, possessed with the rage of making proselytes, fixed their residence at Munster, an imperial city in Westphalia, of the first rank, under the sovereignty of its bishop, but governed by its own senate and consuls. As neither of these fanatics wanted the talents requisite in desperate enterprises, great resolution, the appearance of sanctity, bold pretensions to

inspiration, and a confident and plausible manner of discoursing, they soon gained many converts. Among these were Rothman, who had first preached the Protestant doctrine in Munster, and Cnipperdoling, a citizen of good birth and considerable eminence. Emboldened by the countenance of such disciples, they openly taught their opinions; and, not satisfied with that liberty, they made several attempts, though without success, to become masters of the town, in order to get their tenets established by public authority. At last, having secretly called in their associates from the neighbouring country, they suddenly took possession of the arsenal and senate-house in the night-time, and, running through the streets with drawn swords and horrible howlings, cried out alternately, “Repent, and be baptized,” and, “Depart, ye ungodly.” The senators, the canons, the nobility, together with the more sober citizens, whether Papists or Protestants, terrified at their threats and outcries, fled in confusion, and left the city under the dominion of a frantic multitude consisting chiefly of strangers. Nothing now remaining to overawe or control them, they set about modelling the government according to their own wild ideas; and though at first they showed so much reverence for the ancient constitution as to select senators of their own, and to appoint Cnipperdoling and another proselyte consuls, this was nothing more than form; for all their proceedings were directed by Matthias, who, in the style and with the authority of a prophet, uttered his commands, which it was instant death to disobey. Having begun with encouraging the multitude to pillage the churches and deface their ornaments, he enjoined them to destroy all books except the Bible, as useless or impious; he ordered the estates of such as fled to be confiscated and sold to the inhabitants of the adjacent country; he commanded every man to bring forth his gold, silver, and

other precious effects, and to lay them at his feet; the wealth amassed by these means he deposited in a public treasury, and named deacons to dispense it for the common use of all. The members of his commonwealth being thus brought to a perfect equality, he commanded all of them to eat at tables prepared in public, and even prescribed the dishes which were to be served up each day. Having finished his plan of reformation, his next care was to provide for the defence of the city; and he took measures for that purpose with a prudence which savoured nothing of fanaticism. He collected large magazines of every kind; he repaired and extended the fortifications, obliging every person without distinction to work in his turn; he formed such as were capable of bearing arms into regular bodies, and endeavoured to add the stability of discipline to the impetuosity of enthusiasm. He sent emissaries to the Anabaptists in the Low Countries, inviting them to assemble at Munster, which he dignified with the name of Mount Sion, that from thence they might set out to reduce all the nations of the earth under their dominion. He himself was unwearied in attending to everything necessary for the security or increase of the sect; animating his disciples by his own example to decline no labour, as well as to submit to every hardship; and, their enthusiastic passions being kept from subsiding by a perpetual succession of exhortations, revelations, and prophecies, they seemed ready to undertake or to suffer anything in maintenance of their opinions.

While they were thus employed, the bishop of Munster, having assembled a considerable army, advanced to besiege the town. On his approach, Matthias sallied out at the head of some chosen troops, attacked one quarter of his camp, forced it, and, after great slaughter, returned to the city loaded with glory and spoil. Intoxicated with this success, he appeared next

day brandishing a spear, and declared that, in imitation of Gideon, he would go forth with a handful of men and smite the host of the ungodly. Thirty persons, whom he named, followed him without hesitation in this wild enterprise, and, rushing on the enemy with a frantic courage, were cut off to a man. The death of their prophet occasioned at first great consternation among his disciples; but Boccold, by the same gifts and pretensions which had gained Matthias credit, soon revived their spirits and hopes to such a degree that he succeeded the deceased prophet in the same absolute direction of all their affairs. As he did not possess that enterprising courage which distinguished his predecessor, he satisfied himself with carrying on a defensive war; and, without attempting to annoy the enemy by sallies, he waited for the succours he expected from the Low Countries, the arrival of which was often foretold and promised by their prophets. But, though less daring in action than Matthias, he was a wilder enthusiast, and of more unbounded ambition. Soon after the death of his predecessor, having by obscure visions and prophecies prepared the multitude for some extraordinary event, he stripped himself naked, and, marching through the streets, proclaimed with a loud voice, "That the kingdom of Sion was at hand; that whatever was highest on earth should be brought low, and whatever was lowest should be exalted." In order to fulfil this, he commanded the churches, as the most lofty buildings in the city, to be levelled with the ground; he degraded the senators chosen by Matthias, and, depriving Cnipperdoling of the consulship, the highest office in the commonwealth, appointed him to execute the lowest and most infamous, that of common hangman, to which strange transition the other agreed, not only without murmuring, but with the utmost joy; and such was the despotic rigour of Boccold's adminis-

tration, that he was called almost every day to perform some duty or other of his wretched function. In place of the deposed senators, he named twelve judges, according to the number of tribes in Israel, to preside in all affairs, retaining to himself the same authority which Moses anciently possessed as legislator of that people.

Not satisfied, however, with power or titles which were not supreme, a prophet, whom he had gained and tutored, having called the multitude together, declared it to be the will of God that John Boccold should be king of Sion, and sit on the throne of David. John, kneeling down, accepted of the heavenly call, which he solemnly protested had been revealed likewise to himself, and was immediately acknowledged as monarch by the deluded multitude. From that moment he assumed all the state and pomp of royalty. He wore a crown of gold, and was clad in the richest and most sumptuous garments. A Bible was carried on his one hand, a naked sword on the other. A great body of guards accompanied him when he appeared in public. He coined money stamped with his own image, and appointed the great officers of his household, and kingdom, among whom Cnipperdoling was nominated governor of the city, as a reward for his former submission.

Having now attained the height of power, Boccold began to discover passions which he had hitherto restrained, or indulged only in secret. As the excesses of enthusiasm have been observed in every age to lead to sensual gratifications, the same constitution that is susceptible of the former being remarkably prone to the latter, he instructed the prophets and teachers to harangue the people for several days concerning the lawfulness, and even necessity, of taking more wives than one, which they asserted to be one of the privileges granted by God to the saints. When their ears were

once accustomed to this licentious doctrine, and their passions inflamed with the prospect of such unbounded indulgence, he himself set them an example of using what he called their Christian liberty, by marrying at once three wives, among which the widow of Matthias, a woman of singular beauty, was one. As he was allured by beauty, or the love of variety, he gradually added to the number of his wives until they amounted to fourteen, though the widow of Matthias was the only one dignified with the title of queen or who shared with him the splendour and ornaments of royalty. After the example of their prophet, the multitude gave themselves up to the most licentious and uncontrolled gratification of their desires. No man remained satisfied with a single wife. Not to use their Christian liberty was deemed a crime. Persons were appointed to search the houses for young women grown up to maturity, whom they instantly compelled to marry. Together with polygamy, freedom of divorce, its inseparable attendant, was introduced, and became a new source of corruption. Every excess was committed of which the passions of men are capable when restrained neither by the authority of laws nor the sense of decency;⁵⁹ and, by a monstrous and almost incredible conjunction, voluptuousness was engrafted on

⁵⁹ “Prophetæ et concionatorum autoritate juxta et exemplo, tota urbe ad rapiendas pulcherrimas quasque foeminas discursum est. Nec intra paucos dies, in tanta hominum turbâ, fere ulla reperta est supra annum decimum quartum, quæ stuprum passa non fuerit.” (Lamb. Hortens., p. 303.) “Vulgo viris quinas esse uxores, pluribus senas, nonnullis septenas et octonas. Puellas supra duodecimum etatis annum statim amare.” (Id., 305.)

“Nemo una contentus fuit, neque cuiquam extra effectas et viris immaturas continentis esse licuit.” (Id., 307.) “Tacebo hic, ut sit suns honor auribus, quanta barbaria et militia usi sunt in puellis vitiandis nondum aptis matrimonio, id quod mihi neque ex vano, neque ex vulgi sermonibus haustum est, sed ex eâ vetula, cui cura sic vitiatarum demandata fuit, auditum.” Joh. Corvinus, 316.

religion, and dissolute riot accompanied the austerities of fanatical devotion.

Meanwhile, the German princes were highly offended at the insult offered to their dignity by Boccold's presumptuous usurpation of royal honours; and the profligate manners of his followers, which were a reproach to the Christian name, filled men of all professions with horror. Luther, who had testified against this fanatical spirit on its first appearance, now deeply lamented its progress, and, having exposed the delusion with great strength of argument as well as acrimony of style, called loudly on all the states of Germany to put a stop to frenzy no less pernicious to society than fatal to religion. The emperor, occupied with other cares and projects, had not leisure to attend to such a distant object; but the princes of the empire, assembled by the king of the Romans, voted a supply of men and money to the bishop of Munster, who, being unable to keep a sufficient army on foot, had converted the siege of the town into a blockade. The forces raised in consequence of this resolution were put under the command of an officer of experience, who, approaching the town towards the end of spring in the year 1535, pressed it more closely than formerly, but found the fortifications so strong and so diligently guarded that he durst not attempt an assault. It was now about fifteen months since the Anabaptists had established their dominion in Munster; they had during that time undergone prodigious fatigue in working on the fortifications and performing military duty. Notwithstanding the prudent attention of their king to provide for their subsistence, and his frugal as well as regular economy in their public meals, they began to feel the approach of famine. Several small bodies of their brethren, who were advancing to their assistance from the Low Countries, had been intercepted and cut

to pieces ; and while all Germany was ready to combine against them, they had no prospect of succour. But such was the ascendant which Boccold had acquired over the multitude, and so powerful the fascination of enthusiasm, that their hopes were as sanguine as ever, and they hearkened with implicit credulity to the visions and predictions of their prophets, who assured them that the Almighty would speedily interpose in order to deliver the city. The faith, however, of some few, shaken by the violence and length of their sufferings, began to fail ; but, being suspected of an inclination to surrender to the enemy, they were punished with immediate death, as guilty of impiety in distrusting the power of God. One of the king's wives having uttered certain words which implied some doubt concerning his divine mission, he instantly called the whole number together, and, commanding the blasphemer, as he called her, to kneel down, cut off her head with his own hands ; and so far were the rest from expressing any horror at this cruel deed, that they joined him in dancing with a frantic joy around the bleeding body of their companion.

By this time the besieged endured the utmost rigour of famine ; but they chose rather to suffer hardships the recital of which is shocking to humanity than to listen to the terms of capitulation offered them by the bishop. At last a deserter, whom they had taken into their service, being either less intoxicated with the fumes of enthusiasm, or unable any longer to bear such distress, made his escape to the enemy. He informed their general of a weak part in the fortifications which he had observed, and, assuring him that the besieged, exhausted with hunger and fatigue, kept watch there with little care, he offered to lead a party thither in the night. The proposal was accepted, and a chosen body of troops appointed for the service, who, scaling

the walls unperceived, seized one of the gates, and admitted the rest of the army. The Anabaptists, though surprised, defended themselves in the market-place with valour heightened by despair; but, being overpowered by numbers, and surrounded on every hand, most of them were slain, and the remainder were taken prisoners. Among the last were the king and Cnipperdoling. The king, loaded with chains, was carried from city to city as a spectacle to gratify the curiosity of the people, and was exposed to all their insults. His spirit, however, was not broken or humbled by this sad reverse of his condition; and he adhered with unshaken firmness to the distinguishing tenets of his sect. After this, he was brought back to Munster, the scene of his royalty and crimes, and put to death with the most exquisite as well as lingering tortures, all which he bore with astonishing fortitude. This extraordinary man, who had been able to acquire such amazing dominion over the minds of his followers and to excite commotions so dangerous to society, was only twenty-six years of age.⁶⁰

Together with its monarch, the kingdom of the Anabaptists came to an end. Their principles having taken deep root in the Low Countries, the party still subsists there, under the name of Mennonites; but, by a very singular revolution, this sect, so mutinous and sanguinary at its first origin, hath become altogether innocent and pacific. Holding it unlawful to wage war, or to accept of civil offices, they devote themselves entirely to the duties of private citizens, and by their industry and charity endeavour to make reparation to human society for the violence committed by their

⁶⁰ Sleid., 190, etc.—*Tumultuum Anabaptistarum, liber unus, Ant. Lamberto Hortensio Auctore, ap. Scardium, vol. ii. p. 298, etc.*—*De Miserabili Monasteriensium Obsidi-*

one, etc., libellus Antonii Corvini, ap. Scar. 313.—Annales Anabaptistici, a Job. Henrico Ottio, 4to, Basileæ, 1672.—Cor. Heersbachius, Hist. Anab., edit. 1637, p. 140.

founders.^a A small number of this sect which is settled in England retain its peculiar tenets concerning baptism, but without any dangerous mixture of enthusiasm.

The mutiny of the Anabaptists, though it drew general attention, did not so entirely engross the princes of Germany as not to allow leisure for other transactions. The alliance between the French king and the confederates at Smalkalde began about this time to produce great effects. Ulric, duke of Wurtemberg, having been expelled his dominions in the year 1519 on account of his violent and oppressive administration, the house of Austria had got possession of his duchy. That prince, having now by a long exile atoned for the errors in his conduct, which were the effect rather of inexperience than of a tyrannical disposition, was become the object of general compassion. The landgrave of Hesse, in particular, his near relation, warmly espoused his interest, and used many efforts to recover for him his ancient inheritance. But the king of the Romans obstinately refused to relinquish a valuable acquisition which his family had made with so much ease. The landgrave, unable to compel him, applied to the king of France, his new ally. Francis, eager to embrace any opportunity of distressing the house of Austria, and desirous of wresting from it a territory which gave it footing and influence in a part of Germany at a distance from its other dominions, encouraged the landgrave to take arms, and secretly supplied him with a large sum of money. This he employed to raise troops, and, marching with great expedition towards Wurtemberg, attacked, defeated, and dispersed a considerable body of Austrians, intrusted with the defence of the country. All the duke's subjects hastened, with emulation, to receive their native

^a Bayle, Diction, art. *Anabaptistes*.

prince, and reinvested him with that authority which is still enjoyed by his descendants. At the same time, the exercise of the Protestant religion was established in his dominions.⁶²

Ferdinand, how sensible soever of this unexpected blow, not daring to attack a prince whom all the Protestant powers in Germany were ready to support, judged it expedient to conclude a treaty with him, by which, in the most ample form, he recognized his title to the duchy. The success of the landgrave's operations in behalf of the duke of Wurtemberg having convinced Ferdinand that a rupture with a league so formidable as that of Smalkalde was to be avoided with the utmost care, he entered likewise into a negotiation with the elector of Saxony, the head of that union; and by some concessions in favour of the Protestant religion, and others of advantage to the elector himself, he prevailed on him, together with his confederates, to acknowledge his title as king of the Romans. At the same time, in order to prevent any such precipitate or irregular election in times to come, it was agreed that no person should hereafter be promoted to that dignity without the unanimous consent of the electors; and the emperor soon after confirmed this stipulation.⁶³

These acts of indulgence towards the Protestants, and the close union into which the king of the Romans seemed to be entering with the princes of that party, gave great offence at Rome. Paul III., though he had departed from a resolution of his predecessor never to consent to the calling of a general council, and had promised, in the first consistory held after his election, that he would convoke that assembly so much desired by all Christendom, was no less enraged than Clement

⁶² Sleid. 172.—Mém. de Bellay,
159, etc.

⁶³ Sleid. 173.—Corps Diplom.,
tom. iv. pp. 2, 119.

at the innovations in Germany, and no less averse to any scheme for reforming either the doctrines of the Church or the abuses in the court of Rome. But, having been a witness of the universal censures which Clement had incurred by his obstinacy with regard to these points, he hoped to avoid the same reproach by the seeming alacrity with which he proposed a council; flattering himself, however, that such difficulties would arise concerning the time and place of meeting, the persons who had a right to be present, and the order of their proceedings, as would effectually defeat the intention of those who demanded that assembly, without exposing himself to any imputation for refusing to call it. With this view, he despatched nuncios to the several courts, in order to make known his intention that he had fixed on Mantua as the proper place in which to hold the council. Such difficulties as the pope had foreseen immediately presented themselves in great number. The French king did not approve of the place which Paul had chosen, as the papal and imperial influence would necessarily be too great in a town situated in that part of Italy. The king of England not only concurred with Francis in urging that objection, but refused, besides, to acknowledge any council called in the name and by the authority of the pope. The German Protestants, having met together at Smalkalde, insisted on their original demand of a council to be held in Germany, and, pleading the emperor's promise as well as the agreement at Ratisbon to that effect, declared that they would not consider an assembly held at Mantua as a legal or free representative of the Church. By this diversity of sentiments and views, such a field for intrigue and negotiation opened as made it easy for the pope to assume the merit of being eager to assemble a council, while at the same time he could put off its meeting at pleasure. The Protestants, on the other hand, suspect-

ing his designs, and sensible of the importance which they derived from their union, renewed for ten years the league of Smalkalde, which now became stronger and more formidable by the accession of several new members.⁶⁴

During these transactions in Germany, the emperor undertook his famous enterprise against the piratical states in Africa. That part of the African continent lying along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, which anciently formed the kingdoms of Mauritania and Massylia, together with the republic of Carthage, and which is now known by the general name of Barbary, had undergone many revolutions. Subdued by the Romans, it became a province of their empire. When it was conquered afterwards by the Vandals, they erected a kingdom there. That being overturned by Belisarius, the country became subject to the Greek emperors, and continued to be so until it was overrun, towards the end of the seventh century, by the rapid and irresistible arms of the Arabians. It remained for some time a part of that vast empire which the Caliphs governed with absolute authority. Its immense distance, however, from the seat of government encouraged the descendants of those leaders who had subdued the country, or the chiefs of the Moors, its ancient inhabitants, to throw off the yoke and to assert their independence. The Caliphs, who derived their authority from a spirit of enthusiasm

⁶⁴ This league was concluded December, 1535, but not extended or signed in form till September in the following year. The princes who acceded to it were, John, elector of Saxony; Ernest, duke of Brunswick; Philip, landgrave of Hesse; Ulric, duke of Wurtemberg; Barnim and Philip, dukes of Pomerania; John, George, and Joachim, princes of Anhalt; Gebhard and

Albert, counts of Mansfield; William, count of Nassau. The cities, Strasburg, Nuremberg, Constance, Ulm, Magdeburg, Bremen, Reutlingen, Heilbronn, Memmingen, Lindau, Campen, Isna, Bibra, Windsheim, Augsburg, Frankfort, Esling, Brunswick, Goslar, Hanover, Göttingen, Eimbeck, Hamburg, Minden.

more fitted for making conquests than for preserving them, were obliged to connive at acts of rebellion which they could not prevent; and Barbary was divided into several kingdoms, of which Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis were the most considerable. The inhabitants of these kingdoms were a mixed race—Arabs, Negroes from the southern provinces, and Moors, either natives of Africa, or who had been expelled out of Spain; all zealous professors of the Mahometan religion, and inflamed against Christianity with a bigoted hatred proportional to their ignorance and barbarous manners.

Among these people, no less daring, inconstant, and treacherous than the ancient inhabitants of the same country described by the Roman historians, frequent seditions broke out, and many changes in government took place. These, as they affected only the internal state of a country extremely barbarous, are but little known, and deserve to be so. But about the beginning of the sixteenth century a sudden revolution happened, which, by rendering the states of Barbary formidable to the Europeans, hath made their history worthy of more attention. This revolution was brought about by persons born in a rank of life which entitled them to act no such illustrious part. Horuc and Hayradin, the sons of a potter in the isle of Lesbos, prompted by a restless and enterprising spirit, forsook their father's trade, ran to sea, and joined a crew of pirates. They soon distinguished themselves by their valour and activity, and, becoming masters of a small brigantine, carried on their infamous trade with such conduct and success that they assembled a fleet of twelve galleys, besides many vessels of smaller force. Of this fleet Horuc, the elder brother, called Barbarossa from the red colour of his beard, was admiral, and Hayradin second in command, but with almost equal authority. They called themselves the friends of the sea, and the enemies of all who sail upon

it; and their names soon became terrible from the Straits of the Dardanelles to those of Gibraltar. Together with their fame and power, their ambitious views extended, and, while acting as corsairs, they adopted the ideas and acquired the talents of conquerors. They often carried the prizes which they took on the coast of Spain and Italy into the ports of Barbary, and, enriching the inhabitants by the sale of their booty and the thoughtless prodigality of their crews, were welcome guests in every place at which they touched. The convenient situation of these harbours, lying so near the greatest commercial states at that time in Christendom, made the brothers wish for an establishment in that country. An opportunity of accomplishing this quickly presented itself, which they did not suffer to pass unimproved. Eutemi, king of Algiers, having attempted several times, without success, to take a fort which the Spanish governors of Oran had built not far from his capital, was so ill advised as to apply for aid to Barbarossa, whose valour the Africans considered as irresistible. The active corsair gladly accepted of the invitation, and, leaving his brother Hayradin with the fleet, marched at the head of five thousand men to Algiers, where he was received as their deliverer. Such a force gave him the command of the town; and as he perceived that the Moors neither suspected him of any bad intention nor were capable with their light-armed troops of opposing his disciplined veterans, he secretly murdered the monarch whom he had come to assist, and proclaimed himself king of Algiers in his stead. The authority which he had thus boldly usurped he endeavoured to establish by arts suited to the genius of the people whom he had to govern; by liberality without bounds to those who favoured his promotion, and by cruelty no less unbounded towards all whom he had any reason to distrust. Not satisfied with the throne which he had

acquired, he attacked the neighbouring king of Tremecen, and, having vanquished him in battle, added his dominions to those of Algiers. At the same time, he continued to infest the coasts of Spain and Italy with fleets which resembled the armaments of a great monarch rather than the light squadrons of a corsair. Their frequent and cruel devastations obliged Charles, about the beginning of his reign, to furnish the marquis de Comares, governor of Oran, with troops sufficient to attack him. That officer, assisted by the dethroned king of Tremecen, executed the commission with such spirit that, Barbarossa's troops being beaten in several encounters, he himself was shut up in Tremecen. After defending it to the last extremity, he was overtaken in attempting to make his escape, and slain while he fought with an obstinate valour worthy of his former fame and exploits.

His brother Hayradin, known likewise by the name of Barbarossa, assumed the sceptre of Algiers with the same ambition and abilities, but with better fortune. His reign being undisturbed by the arms of the Spaniards, which had full occupation in the wars among the European powers, he regulated with admirable prudence the interior police of his kingdom, carried on his naval operations with great vigour, and extended his conquests on the continent of Africa. But, perceiving that the Moors and Arabs submitted to his government with reluctance, and being afraid that his continual depredations would one day draw upon him the arms of the Christians, he put his dominions under the protection of the Grand Seignior, and received from him a body of Turkish soldiers sufficient for his domestic as well as foreign enemies. At last, the fame of his exploits daily increasing, Solyman offered him the command of the Turkish fleet, as the only person whose valour and skill in naval affairs entitled him to command against Andrew

Doria, the greatest sea-officer of that age. Proud of this distinction, Barbarossa repaired to Constantinople, and, with a wonderful versatility of mind, mingling the arts of a courtier with the boldness of a corsair, gained the entire confidence both of the sultan and his vizier. To them he communicated a scheme which he had formed of making himself master of Tunis, the most flourishing kingdom at that time on the coast of Africa; and, this being approved of by them, he obtained whatever he demanded for carrying it into execution.

His hopes of success in this undertaking were founded on the intestine divisions in the kingdom of Tunis. Mahmed, the last king of that country, having thirty-four sons by different wives, appointed Muley-Hascen, one of the youngest among them, to be his successor. That weak prince, who owed this preference not to his own merit, but to the ascendant which his mother had acquired over a monarch doting with age, first poisoned Mahmed, his father, in order to prevent him from altering his destination with respect to the succession, and then, with the barbarous policy which prevails wherever polygamy is permitted, and the right of succession is not precisely fixed, he put to death all his brothers whom he could get into his power. Alraschid, one of the eldest, was so fortunate as to escape his rage, and, finding a retreat among the wandering Arabs, made several attempts, by the assistance of some of their chiefs, to recover the throne which of right belonged to him. But these proving unsuccessful, and the Arabs, from their natural levity, being ready to deliver him up to his merciless brother, he fled to Algiers, the only place of refuge remaining, and implored the protection of Barbarossa, who, discerning at once all the advantages which might be gained by supporting his title, received him with

every possible demonstration of friendship and respect. Being ready at that time to set sail for Constantinople, he easily persuaded Alraschid, whose eagerness to obtain a crown disposed him to believe or undertake anything, to accompany him thither, promising him effectual assistance from Solyman, whom he represented to be the most generous as well as most powerful monarch in the world. But no sooner were they arrived at Constantinople than the treacherous corsair, regardless of all his promises to him, opened to the sultan a plan for conquering Tunis and annexing it to the Turkish empire, by making use of the name of this exiled prince, and co-operating with the party in the kingdom which was ready to declare in his favour. Solyman approved, with too much facility, of this perfidious proposal, extremely suitable to the character of its author, but altogether unworthy of a great prince. A powerful fleet and numerous army were soon assembled, at the sight of which the credulous Alraschid flattered himself that he should soon enter his capital in triumph.

But just as this unhappy prince was going to embark, he was arrested by order of the sultan, shut up in the seraglio, and was never heard of more. Barbarossa sailed with a fleet of two hundred and fifty vessels towards Africa. After ravaging the coasts of Italy and spreading terror through every part of that country, he appeared before Tunis, and, landing his men, gave out that he came to assert the right of Alraschid, whom he pretended to have left sick aboard the admiral's galley. The fort of Goletta, which commands the bay, soon fell into his hands, partly by his own address, partly by the treachery of its commander; and the inhabitants of Tunis, weary of Muley-Hascen's government, took arms, and declared for Alraschid with such zeal and unanimity as obliged the former to fly so precipitately

that he left all his treasures behind him. The gates were immediately set open to Barbarossa, as the restorer of their lawful sovereign. But when Alraschid himself did not appear, and when, instead of his name, that of Solyman alone was heard among the acclamations of the Turkish soldiers marching into the town, the people of Tunis began to suspect the corsair's treachery. Their suspicions being soon converted into certainty, they ran to arms with the utmost fury, and surrounded the citadel into which Barbarossa had led his troops. But, having foreseen such a revolution, he was not unprepared for it: he immediately turned against them the artillery on the ramparts, and by one brisk discharge dispersed the numerous but undirected assailants, and forced them to acknowledge Solyman as their sovereign, and to submit to himself as his viceroy.

His first care was to put the kingdom, of which he had thus got possession, in a proper posture of defence. He strengthened the citadel which commands the town, and, fortifying the Goletta in a regular manner, at vast expense, made it the principal station for his fleet, and his great arsenal for military as well as naval stores. Being now possessed of such extensive territories, he carried on his depredations against the Christian states to a greater extent and with more destructive violence than ever. Daily complaints of the outrages committed by his cruisers were brought to the emperor by his subjects, both in Spain and Italy. All Christendom seemed to expect from him, as its greatest and most fortunate prince, that he would put an end to this new and odious species of oppression. At the same time, Muley-Hascen, the exiled king of Tunis, finding none of the Mahometan princes in Africa willing or able to assist him in recovering his throne, applied to Charles as the only person who could assert his rights in oppo-

sition to such a formidable usurper. The emperor, equally desirous of delivering his dominions from the dangerous neighbourhood of Barbarossa, of appearing as the protector of an unfortunate prince, and of acquiring the glory annexed in that age to every expedition against the Mahometans, readily concluded a treaty with Muley-Hascen, and began to prepare for invading Tunis. Having made trial of his own abilities for war in the late campaign in Hungary, he was now become so fond of the military character that he determined to command on this occasion in person. The united strength of his dominions was called out upon an enterprise in which the emperor was about to hazard his glory, and which drew the attention of all Europe. A Flemish fleet carried from the ports of the Low Countries a body of German infantry ;⁶⁵ the galleys of Naples and Sicily took on board the veteran bands of Italians and Spaniards which had distinguished themselves by so many victories over the French ; the emperor himself embarked at Barcelona with the flower of the Spanish nobility, and was joined by a considerable squadron from Portugal, under the command of the Infant Don Lewis, the empress's brother ; Andrew Doria conducted his own galleys, the best appointed at that time in Europe, and commanded by the most skilful officers ; the pope furnished all the assistance in his power towards such a pious enterprise ; and the order of Malta, the perpetual enemies of the infidels, equipped a squadron, which, though small, was formidable by the valour of the knights who served on board it. The port of Cagliari in Sardinia was the general place of rendezvous. Doria was appointed high-admiral of the fleet ; the command of the land-forces under the emperor was given to the marquis del Guasto.

On the 16th of July, the fleet, consisting of near five hundred vessels, having on board above thirty thousand regular troops, set sail from Cagliari, and, after a prosperous navigation, landed within sight of Tunis. Barbarossa, having received early intelligence of the emperor's immense armament, and suspecting its destination, prepared with equal prudence and vigour for the defence of his new conquest. He called in all his corsairs from their different stations; he drew from Algiers what forces could be spared; he despatched messengers to all the African princes, Moors as well as Arabs, and, by representing Muley-Hascen as an infamous apostate, prompted by ambition and revenge not only to become the vassal of a Christian prince, but to conspire with him to extirpate the Mahometan faith, he inflamed those ignorant and bigoted chiefs to such a degree that they took arms as in a common cause. Twenty thousand horse, together with a great body of foot, soon assembled at Tunis; and by a proper distribution of presents among them from time to time, Barbarossa kept the ardour which had brought them together from subsiding. But, as he was too well acquainted with the enemy whom he had to oppose to think that these light troops could resist the heavy-armed cavalry and veteran infantry which composed the imperial army, his chief confidence was in the strength of the Goletta, and in his body of Turkish soldiers, who were armed and disciplined after the European fashion. Six thousand of these, under the command of Sinan, a renegado Jew, the bravest and most experienced of all his corsairs, he threw into that fort, which the emperor immediately invested. As Charles had the command of the sea, his camp was so plentifully supplied not only with the necessaries but with all the luxuries of life that Muley-Hascen, who had not been accustomed to see war carried on with such order and magnificence, was filled with

admiration of the emperor's power. His troops, animated by his presence and considering it as meritorious to shed their blood in such a pious cause, contended with each other for the posts of honour and danger. Three separate attacks were concerted, and the Germans, Spaniards, and Italians, having one of these committed to each of them, pushed them forward with the eager courage which national emulation inspires. Sinan displayed resolution and skill becoming the confidence which his master had put in him; the garrison performed the hard service on which they were ordered with great fortitude. But, though he interrupted the besiegers by frequent sallies,—though the Moors and Arabs alarmed the camp with their continual incursions, the breaches soon became so considerable towards the land, while the fleet battered those parts of the fortifications which it could approach with no less fury and success, that, an assault being given on all sides at once, the place was taken by storm. Sinan, with the remains of his garrison, retired, after an obstinate resistance, over a shallow part of the bay towards the city. By the reduction of the Goletta, the emperor became master of Barbarossa's fleet, consisting of eighty-seven galleys and galliots, together with his arsenal and three hundred cannon, mostly brass, which were planted on the ramparts; a prodigious number in that age, and a remarkable proof of the strength of the fort, as well as of the greatness of the corsair's power. The emperor marched into the Goletta through the breach, and, turning to Muley-Hascen, who attended him, "Here," says he, "is a gate open to you, by which you shall return to take possession of your dominions."

Barbarossa, though he felt the full weight of the blow which he had received, did not, however, lose courage or abandon the defence of Tunis. But, as the walls were of great extent and extremely weak, as he could

not depend on the fidelity of the inhabitants, nor hope that the Moors and Arabs would sustain the hardships of a siege, he boldly determined to advance with his army, which amounted to fifty thousand men,⁶⁶ towards the imperial camp, and to decide the fate of his kingdom by the issue of a battle. This resolution he communicated to his principal officers, and, representing to them the fatal consequences which might follow if ten thousand Christian slaves whom he had shut up in the citadel should attempt to mutiny during the absence of the army, he proposed, as a necessary precaution for the public security, to massacre them without mercy before he began his march. They all approved warmly of his intention to fight; but, inured as they were in their piratical depredations to scenes of bloodshed and cruelty, the barbarity of his proposal concerning the slaves filled them with horror; and Barbarossa, rather from the dread of irritating them than swayed by motives of humanity, consented to spare the lives of the slaves.

By this time the emperor had begun to advance towards Tunis; and, though his troops suffered inconceivable hardships in their march, over burning sands, destitute of water, and exposed to the intolerable heat of the sun, they soon came up with the enemy. The Moors and Arabs, emboldened by their vast superiority in number, immediately rushed on to the attack with loud shouts; but their undisciplined courage could not long stand the shock of regular battalions; and though Barbarossa, with admirable presence of mind, and by exposing his own person to the greatest dangers, endeavoured to rally them, the rout became so general that he himself was hurried along with them in their flight back to the city. There he found everything in the

⁶⁶ Epistres des Princes, par Ruscelli, p. 119, etc.

utmost confusion ; some of the inhabitants flying with their families and effects, others ready to set open their gates to the conqueror, the Turkish soldiers preparing to retreat, and the citadel, which in such circumstances might have afforded him some refuge, already in the possession of the Christian captives. These unhappy men, rendered desperate by their situation, had laid hold on the opportunity which Barbarossa dreaded. As soon as his army was at some distance from the town, they gained two of their keepers, by whose assistance, knocking off their fetters and bursting open their prisons, they overpowered the Turkish garrison and turned the artillery of the fort against their former masters. Barbarossa, disappointed and enraged, exclaiming sometimes against the false compassion of his officers, and sometimes condemning his own imprudent compliance with their opinions, fled precipitately to Bona.

Meanwhile, Charles, satisfied with the easy and almost bloodless victory which he had gained, and advancing slowly with the precaution necessary in an enemy's country, did not yet know the whole extent of his own good fortune. But at last a messenger despatched by the slaves acquainted him with the success of their noble effort for the recovery of their liberty ; and at the same time deputies arrived from the town, in order to present him the keys of their gates, and to implore his protection from military violence. While he was deliberating concerning the proper measures for this purpose, the soldiers, fearing that they should be deprived of the booty which they had expected, rushed suddenly and without orders into the town, and began to kill and plunder without distinction. It was then too late to restrain their cruelty, their avarice, or licentiousness. All the outrages of which soldiers are capable in the fury of a storm, all the excesses of which men

can be guilty when their passions are heightened by the contempt and hatred which difference in manners and religion inspires, were committed. Above thirty thousand of the innocent inhabitants perished on that unhappy day, and ten thousand were carried away as slaves. Muley-Hascen took possession of a throne surrounded with carnage, abhorred by his subjects, on whom he had brought such calamities, and pitied even by those whose rashness had been the occasion of them. The emperor lamented the fatal accident which had stained the lustre of his victory ; and amidst such a scene of horror there was but one spectacle that afforded him any satisfaction. Ten thousand Christian slaves, among whom were several persons of distinction, met him as he entered the town, and, falling on their knees, thanked and blessed him as their deliverer.

At the same time that Charles accomplished his promise to the Moorish king of re-establishing him in his dominions, he did not neglect what was necessary for bridling the power of the African corsairs, for the security of his own subjects, and for the interest of the Spanish crown. In order to gain these ends, he concluded a treaty with Muley-Hascen on the following conditions : That he should hold the kingdom of Tunis in fee of the crown of Spain, and do homage to the emperor as his liege-lord ; that all the Christian slaves now within his dominions, of whatever nation, should be set at liberty without ransom ; that no subject of the emperor's should for the future be detained in servitude ; that no Turkish corsair should be admitted into the ports of his dominions ; that free trade, together with the public exercise of the Christian religion, should be allowed to all the emperor's subjects ; that the emperor should not only retain the Goletta, but that all the other sea-ports in the kingdom which were fortified should be put into his hands ; that Muley-

Hascen should pay annually twelve thousand crowns for the subsistence of the Spanish garrison in the Goletta; that he should enter into no alliance with any of the emperor's enemies, and should present to him every year, as an acknowledgment of his vassalage, six Moorish horses, and as many hawks.⁶⁷ Having thus settled the affairs of Africa, chastised the insolence of the corsairs, secured a safe retreat for the ships of his subjects, and a proper station to his own fleets, on that coast from which he was most infested by piratical depredations, Charles embarked again for Europe, the tempestuous weather and sickness among his troops not permitting him to pursue Barbarossa.⁶⁸

By this expedition, the merit of which seems to have been estimated in that age rather by the apparent generosity of the undertaking, the magnificence where-with it was conducted, and the success which crowned it, than by the importance of the consequences that attended it, the emperor attained a greater height of glory than at any other period of his reign. Twenty thousand slaves whom he freed from bondage either by his arms or by his treaty with Muley-Hascen,⁶⁹ each of whom he clothed and furnished with the means of returning to their respective countries, spread all over Europe the fame of their benefactor's munificence, extolling his power and abilities with the exaggeration flowing from gratitude and admiration. In comparison with him, the other monarchs of Europe made an inconsiderable figure. They seemed to be solicitous about

⁶⁷ Du Mont, *Corps Diplomat.*, ii. 128.—Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, iv. 89.


⁶⁸ Joh. Etropii *Diarium Expedition. Tunetanae*, ap. Scard., vol. ii. p. 320, etc.—Jovii *Histor.*, lib. xxxiv. 153, etc.—Sandoval, ii. 154, etc.—Vertot, *Hist. des Chevaliers*


VOL. I.

de Malthe.—*Epistres des Princes*, par Ruscelli, traduites par Bellforest, pp. 119, 120, etc.—Anton. Pontii Consentini *Hist. Belli adv. Barbar.*, ap. Matthæi *Analecta*.

⁶⁹ Summonte, *Hist. di Napoli*, vol. iv. p. 103.


nothing but their private and particular interest; while Charles, with an elevation of sentiment which became the chief prince in Christendom, appeared to be concerned for the honour of the Christian name and attentive to the public security and welfare.













Stanford University Libraries



3 6105 020 076 712

Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
STANFORD AUXILIARY LIBRARY
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305-6004
(415) 723-9201
All books may be recalled after 7 days

DATE DUE

APR 1 1998
APR 20 1998

